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Abstract 
The proliferation of nuclear technology in the Middle 
East, primarily in Israel, has created a series of problems 
and issues for research which are dealt with in this study. 
A general theoretical framework within which these problems 
could be discussed, is suggested. First, the concept of 
regional sub systems of the global international system, is 
applied to problems of nuclear proliferation in general. 
Then, the effects of the proliferation of nuclear technology 
on the one hand, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons on 
the other, on the various levels of the international system, 
are analysed. Second, the problem of the uses of nuclear 
options for diplomatic and strategic bargaining, is considered 
hero., as distinct from that of weapons themselves. A model 
of these uses is formulated, and two case studies, one on 
Israel and one, in comparative terms, on India, are investigated. 
The development of the nuclear option in Israel is 
studied within the general framework of the Israeli strategic 
doctrines. This development triggered a public debate in 
Israel on nuclear policy. This debate and the international 
reactions, forced the Israeli government to formulate a policy 
regarding problems of arms control. Both the public debate 
and the Israeli position on arms control are studied. 
The development of the Israeli nuclear option put the 
Arab statss and especially the Egyptian government into grave 
dilemmas. The reactions of the various Arab regimes to the 
Israeli option varied. The Egyptians had to develop a series 
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of responses, which on their part were directed mainly at 
creating a deterrent against Israel 'going nuclear'. The 
major problem of whether the development of the Israeli 
option has affected the structure of the conflict between the 
two sides is analysed. 
tIhile the development of nuclear options doos not 
appear yet to have had any profoundly de-stabilising effect 
on the Middle East sub-system (and the same could be said 
about the Indian-Pakistani relationship), it is argued that 
a possible future proliferation of nuclear weapons into the 
Arab-Israeli region, will have destabilising effects on this 
region and on the Middle East sub-system in general. And 
it is further argued that if this proliferation is asymmetrical 
it might have some destabilising effects on the bipolar system 
as well. 
Thus the whole issue of nuclear proliferation in the 
Middle East, is put within the general framework of different 
levels of the international system, and the interaction 
between developments in a sub-system on the one hand, and 
the bipolar system on the other, is discussed. 
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Note on Abbreviations and Glossa 
The parliamentary records of Israel (Devray Haknesset) appear in the 
footnotes as Knesset. 
Records of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament appear as 
ETD%T. 
SALT = Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
UAR (United Arab Republic) was used in different places to indicate 
both the political unit coverinc both Egypt and Syria, and Egypt 
alone. 
ZMLkL Zeva Hagana. L'Israel (üebrevz), Israel's defence forces. 
PALM ACH = Plugot P: achaz (Hebrew), the shock troops of Haganah (194.1-lf. 3) 
Hanodedet (Hebrew), = Patrol; a special unit of Haganah, created in 
1937. 
Summary of ;; or1d Reports appear in footnotes as B. B. C. L: onitorin\ 
Service. 
Introduction 
During the last decade or so, nuclear proliferation 
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has become an issue of major concern in international 
politics, and in consequence the subject of much writing 
and political analysis. The writing on the subject falls 
into different categories: There is the question of the 
effects of proliferation on the structure of the international 
system. There, the debate has evolved mainly around the 
question of whether proliferation would stabilise, or 
destabilise, the international systom; and, relcted to it, 
the question of what would be the structure of a future 
international system in which proliferation took place. Then 
there is the question of the motives behind a decision to 
'go nuclear'. More fundamentally, it is asked whether pro- 
liferation will take place at all, and if so, at what pace. 
And in response, there has been a discussion on measures to 
halt proliferation. This body of literature gradually came 
to centre on the negotiations of the Eighteen Nation Disarma- 
ment Committee in Geneva, and after the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty was accepted by the United Nations, and later came 
into force, on the prospects for its success. Finally, there 
have been studies of different potential nuclear powers and 
their policies on the one hand, and the policies of the nuc- 
lear powers on proliferation on the other. The literature 
on the effects of proliferation on the structure of the inter- 
national system, is mainly concerned with the effects on the 
bipolar system and - to a much lesser extent - on local balances 
of power. These latter are taken usually to be the relations 
between pairs of enemies which have (both or one of them) 
nuclear options. 
0 
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Some of the problems involved in nuclear proliferation 
in the Middle East, havo been described and referred to in 
numerous journalistic articles, and also discussed with a 
more analytical approach in some general books on nuclear 
proliferation or on the strategic problems of Israel. How- 
ever there is no systematic discussion of some basic problems 
like, the relationship between nuclear development in Israel 
and more general Israeli strategic doctrines, the Israeli 
poBition on problems of arms control in general and on nuclear 
proliferation in particular, the public debate in Israel on 
the same problems, and the interaction between nuclear develop- 
ments in Israel and the nuclear issue in the Arab world. These 
topics constitute the central part of this study. 
The possibility of nuclear proliferation in the Middle 
East, raises a series of major problems, not least of them the 
question of the structure of the political relations in the 
Middle East sub-system in such an eventuality, and the degree 
of stability (or otherwise) which would result. This problem 
is discussed in detail in Chapter VI. 
The analytical instruments available for such dis- 
cussions as those I have mentioned are mainly taken from the 
strategic literature. However, it appears that this litera- 
ture and particularly that part of which that deals with 
nuclear proliferation, treated these problems either within 
the context of the bipolar system, which it usually tended to 
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identify with the global international system, or within the 
context of local conflicts between pairs of enemies. In 
this study, a concept taken from a different branch of inter- 
national relations, namely the concept of the regional sub- 
system, or regional subordinate state system, has been applied 
to the problems of nuclear proliferation. It appears that 
the introduction of this analytical concept would supply the 
study on the effects of nuclear proliferation with a different 
kind of framework within which problems like the structure 
and stability of a 'world of nuclear powers' could be studied. 
Furthermore, the study of nuclear proliferation, and those 
measures of arms control which are related to it, could be 
introduced into the general theoretical study on regional 
sub systems and enrich it. 
The introduction of the concept of the sub-system also 
helps in an elaboration on the effects of the proliferation 
of nuclear technology, and hence nuclear options in the 
international system. 
The study of the effects of the proliferation of nuc- 
lear options both on the global international system and on 
different sub systems raises immediately another major problem 
which, again, has been mentioned only very briefly, and hardly 
defined as such, in the literature on nuclear proliferation. 
This problem concerns the strategic and diplomatic uses of 
the nuclear options themselves. In other words, how can the 
potential nuclear powers use their options so as to secure 
diplomatic and strategic advantages from different categories 
of powers. 
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This particular problem is discussed in this study on 
several levels. First, a general model of these uses is 
drawn (in Chapter TI), to which two case studies are attached. 
Second, the study of the Arab position (Chapter V) discusses 
the way in which the, Arabs reacted to some of the uses of the 
Israeli option, and also one of the uses to which Egypt has 
put her very meagre nuclear capability (which hardly consti- 
tutes an option). In this way, the strategic bargaining 
between a pair of local enemies with nuclear options (at least 
on the part of one of them), is analysed. This analysis is 
augmented by a more comprehensive discussion of the Israeli 
strategic doctrines and the uses of the option as part of 
them (included in Appendix I). 
There are several types of potential nuclear powers. 
First, local powers like Israel and Egypt which are involved 
in local conflicts in one sub-system. Another type, includes 
powers which are involved (or might become involved) in a 
conflict with China, which on its part has aspirations to 
become a super power. Then there are those powers which by 
'going nuclear' might affect directly one of the super powers 
and the bipolar system. These are powers in one of the big 
military alliances and perhaps every potential nuclear power 
In Europep It appeared to be worthwhile to include one 
example from the second category as a comparison to the bar- 
gaining process between Israel and Egypt, insofar as the uses 
of the nuclear options were concerned. Thus India was in- 
cluded as the second case study in the Chapter discussing the 
uses of the options. Needless to say this case study is not 
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intended to be a comprehensive study of the nuclear issues 
in India but only as a short comparison and 'control' to the 
Israeli case. 
The 1967 war constituted a watershed in the political 
developments in the Middle East. It was felt therefore %'-Phat, 
as far as the historical discussion is concerned, this date 
should be an appropriate one to end the study. Thus Chapters 
III, N and V (unless specifically stated otherwise) carry the 
discussion only up to that date. 
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Chapter I 
TNUCLD! LR PROLIFT RATIO? l A: TD THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
I;: TDI?. ATI0 : 1L SYSTEM 
Since 1949 the principal, though by no means an 
exclusively characteristic, feature of the international 
system has been the existence of two super powers armed 
with, first, nuclear weapons, and later on thermonuclear 
weapons, facing each other within a framework of severe 
competition and conflict. Each of these powers leads a 
system of military alliances aimed at preparing for, but 
mainly deterring, war. Since the beginning of the 
sixties each of these super powers has acquired the 
capability to destroy the other almost completely, and 
has gradually become capable of doing this after absorbing 
a first nuclear strike from the other side. Furthermore 
can 
each one of them/destroy any other power in the world, and 
in fact any possible coalition of states, without danger 
of overwhelming damage to itself. 
(' 
This concentration of military power in the hands 
of two states could have justified the use of the notion 
of 'bipolarity', which increasingly became the descriptive 
term for the system, were it not for the fact that in 
political terms the picture is far from being as clear cut. 
(1) Though this does not take into account the effects 
of radio active pollution of the atmosphere as a 
result of large scale nuclear war. 
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Indeed the growth in the comparative military power of 
the super powers, described above, which occurred mainly 
during the sixties, took place already within an inter- 
national system which, in political terms, approximated 
less and less to the model of tight bipolarity. 
(1) 
The 
model of bipolarity itself never fully corresponded to 
the actual international system, but it was somewhat 
closer to it during the fifties, before the developments 
in nuclear military capability of the sixties. Bipolarity 
is at present only one facet of the totality of inter- 
national interactions, and in this work would mean the 
complex of relations between the super-powers and the 
big military alliances. 
The super powers are far from enjoying the 
political advantages which could be assumed to accrue from 
such a military power capability. This is quite obvious 
simply from an impressionistic observation of the system. 
The two super powers are limited in their political 
activity by many factors. These factors, as Stanley 
Hoffmarfl has suggested, spring fron two main sources; first, 
the rising price of the use of force; and second, the 
enhancement of the power of nationalisra(2). In other 
(1) In this context "tight" bipolarity means a system in 
which all political and military power is concentrated 
around two poles and in which political decisions in 
all countries are being dictated by the logic of 
bipolarity. 
(2) See S. Y. offman) 'Nuclear Proliferation and "World 
Politics' in A. Euchan (od. ), ' Jorld of Nuclear 
Powers', Prentice Hall, 1966. 
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words, both super powers are restrained from translating 
their nuclear might directly into political power because 
of systems of alliances and commitments which force them 
always to bear in mind the possibility of direct confront- 
ation between them, a confrontation which neither of them 
could well afford. The 'rules of the game' of the 
central balance of deterrence do not allow them to invoke 
the nuclear power in their hands, and in the last analysis 
restrain them even from using it against mQdium and small 
powers which are not in any way part of any military 
alliance. As the two super powers become more and more 
status quo powers, as the central balance of deterrence 
becomes more stable, and, most importantly, as the super 
powers perceive the advantages which accrue to them from. 
the stabilisation of this balance, or rather the dangers 
of its being destabilised, their readiness to transform 
nuclear force into political influence and control is 
further eroded. Precisely because of the inhibitions on 
the uses of nuclear weapons, the ability to use conventional 
forces with a limited risk by the super powers is also 
becoming questionable. Even when these are being used 
as in the case of Vietnam, the limitations imposed on them 
are considerable. Here the rising force of nationalism 
and fears of international escalation make even the direct 
correlation between military force (this time conventional) 
and political influence again equivocal, 
(') 
Robert Osgood 
(1 cf. Pierre Hassner, 'The Nation State in the Nuclear 
Age', Survey, April 1968. 
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also recognizes the Crowing limitations on the usefulness 
of limited wars when launched by a super power. However 
he still envisages some possibilities for their use. 
(1) 
The "reappraisal" of limited war should be quali- 
fled. It is right that the experience in Vietnam should 
lead to such reconsideration, but it is-still too limited 
an experience from which to draw general conclusions as to 
the usefulness of limited conventional war for the super 
powers. It is partly because of the nature of the enemy 
which the Americans have encountered in Vietnam that the 
whole concept of limited war has suffered such a blow. 
It is partly again, because in order to secure one of their 
objectives in Vietnam, namely to prove their readiness to 
insure against "Domino Theory" effects in South-East Asia, 
that the Americans in fact had to secure a total victory in 
Vietnam. Total victory which could be achieved only by 
invasion of North Vietnam. But such an invasion was 
impossible because of fears of international escalation. 
Thus the concept of limited war in the particular case of 
Vietnam (when it is seen within the context of an American 
attempt to contain China) was doubtful from the start. 
(2) 
In any case, one should draw a distinction between the actual 
application of limited wars to the "grey areas" of the world, 
and the development of strategic doctrines for limited war 
(1} See ThA Reappraisal of Limited War, Adeiphi Paper 
No. 54, The Ins=titute for Strategic Studies, London, 
February 1969. 
(2) This important point was suL-es ted by Robert Hunter 
and Philip ', Tindsor in 'Vietna: ', and United States 
Policy in Asia', International %f'farirs, April 1968. 
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as part of the super powers direct relationship. This 
second category serves an important objective as far 
as attempts to halt escalation into nuclear wars are 
concerned. In other words, the very fact that strategic 
doctrines of limited war are still part-of the "arsenal" 
of both sides, enhances the credibility of the nuclear 
deterrent. It becomes less effective when the relations 
of one super power and a medium resolute power are 
concerned. There the correlation even between conventional 
t; eapons and political influence of the super powers has 
suffered. 
A discussion of the effects of nuclear prolifer- 
ation on the structure of the international system must 
start therefore with the prior question of the effects 
of the existing nuclear weapons on the system. The 
structure of the system could be defined in terms of the 
way in which political power or political influence is 
distributed within it. It is clear from this definition 
that it is not simply the distribution of nuclear weapons 
in the system which decides its structure. The question 
is really the correlation: between the two types of power 
(nuclear and political), It has already been suggested 
that what seems to emerge is that there is a gradual 
widening of the gap between them. 
1'1 
Scholars from diverse schools of thought about 
other problems in international politics have a common 
approach as far as the question of the relationship 
between nuclear weapons and the distribution of political 
power is concerned. Thus Hertz 
(1) 
and Kenneth Boulding(2) 
argue that nuclear weapons changed the nature of inter- 
national relations to such an extent as to render the 
nation state obsolete. Pierre Gallois(3) and J. Burton 
argue that the effect is so enormous as to act as the 
great equaliser among states. Proliferation, according 
to them, will in fact strengthen the nation state and 
stability. 
These arguments have been advanced within the 
framework of a discussion on the future of the nation 
state in the nuclear age, but they reveal the underlying 
assumption that in fact nuclear weapons have become the 
only measure for the distribution of power in the system. 
The same approach, but from a completely different start- 
ing point, is noticeable anong scholars (like Lohlsteter) 
who argue that there is an identification between nuclear 
weapons and the distribution of power in the system, and 
(1 International Relations in the Atonic Age , New York, 1959. 
(2) Conflict and Defense , New York, 1962. 
(3) The Balance of Terror ,1 ew Yorlk, 1961. 
(1k) International Relations , Cambridge University Press, 1965. 
is 
that to the extent that there is a need of limited war, 
at least one super power 
(the U. S. in this case) can be 
(strategically presents everywhere in the Globe, and more 
ý1 
so than local neighbouring countries, including China( 
Kennet Waltz argues 
(2) 
that in fact the gap between the 
distribution of nuclear weapons power and political power 
is not as large as all that. It seeps, hoi". ever, that 
many current events and patterns of behaviour suggest that 
there is such a cap and that there is no obvious direct 
automatic correlation between the two types of power. 
Moreover, on a certain level there is a converse relation- 
ship between them. Some examples are: 
(a) within the 
military alliances the 'rebellior. ' of France and Rumania, 
(b) as between super powers and small powers: the 'Pueblo 
affair'; or the American spy plane shot 
down by North 
Korea; and the Crave limitations on the ability of the 
super powers to control and influence their allies, client 
states or quasi-clients all over the Globe; (c) the under- 
standing of the need for developing; strategies of limited 
non-nuclear wars. This has enhanced on the one hand the 
credibility of the nuclear deterrent as between the two 
super powers, but on the other also points to the lack of 
correlation between nuclear weapons and political power and 
(1 See Albert tirolsteter, 'Illusions of Distance' , 
ForeiG, r. Ufai-rs, January 1968. 
' Internationa'_ Structure, I at: iona1 Force, and the 
Dzlance of :! orld Power', Journal of Internatio-ia] 
:. f fa? rs, vol, 21, !, To. 2, 'iileory a]14 1. eZlit; r 
iii intern_ ; tonal ,? e1a ýj 0I: ä " 
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influence; (d) the converse relationship between nuclear 
weapons capability and political power in the cases of 
Britain and France. In neither case has the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons changed the political importance of 
these states either way. Britain, which acquired nuclear 
weapons at the same time as it appeared to lose its 
conventional capability for military intervention, has 
lost her Empire, her special relationship with the U. S. 
has not been dependent on her nuclear capability, and the 
erosion of her position in Europe has had no relevance to 
nuclear capability. What this capability has enabled her 
to do has been to keep certain options open. One option 
is to'join eventually as a senior member, a possible 
European nuclear deterrent (if and when it is created) 
Second, on the tride spectrum of deterrence vis-a-vis the 
Soviet Union, a British (or for that matter a French) 
independent nuclear deterrent, has some - albeit very 
limited - credibility. This observation is not a judgement 
on the desirability (or lack of it) of such independent 
deterrents within the framework of the Western Alliance, 
or about the validity of the "minimal" or "proportional'' 
deterrence doctrines. In the case of France, the economic 
price of the development of missiles capability has perhaps 
been even higher than the possible political Cain she could 
have hoped to achieve through the options she acquired by 
her nuclear capabilit). 
0) 
This price is composed of 
(1 On the financial price of the French missile pro,;, rar nne 
alone as distinct from the nuclear programme see 
Elizabeth You;:, -, Fr0Ic:, Strategic : 'issiles rro- 
, ra'. ime, Adelp: ii Paper !, Ile institute for 
Strategic Studies, London, July 1967" 
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several elements: the weakening of its relative economic, 
and therefore political, power inside Europe; the weakening 
of the Western alliance in general, and by this the 
weakening of France itself; and the deterioration of re- 
lations with the United States. 
The most penetrating and sophisticated discussion 
on the possible effects of proliferation on the international 
system is the one by HoffmaM. 
(') 
HoffmannarMes that the 
current international system is composed of three coe: cistent 
layers: (1) Bipolarity, which means that only two states 
have the capacity to destroy one another completely even 
if one of then; strikes first. Only those two states have 
the resources both military and economic which allow them 
to be present in more or less overt form in most of the 
world; (2) Polycentrism, in which every state "hides" 
itself behind high fences, and in which the gap between 
the military component and the overall achievement of 
objectives has deepened. The nation states are centres 
rather than powers precisely because of the growing im- 
potence of the military component; (3) multipolarity, in 
which the gap between nuclear weapons capability and 
political influence will narrow again and possibly a new 
hierarchy based on nuclear power will emerge. This last 
layer is an emerging one, and it will be further developed 
(1) See Hoffnai4 op. cit. 
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by proliferation. 
(i) 
This analysis conveys part of tho complexity of the 
totality of international relations in the nuclear ag, e. 
Hoffmann points, quite rightly, to the deepening gap 
between riilitary capability (mainly nuclear) and political 
a chievenent . 
However, it is precisely this ý; aiý which allows 
change in the distribution of political power with only 
limited relevance to nuclear weapons. This is especially 
the case with small and medium powers. states continue 
to be active in the political sphere and keep trying to 
change their political environment. Jhat is important, 
however, is that these attempts and changes occur more 
within their immediate environment, and are organised 
within limited parts of the international system. Thus 
the concept of pplycentrisrz is less relevant when one 
considers various more limited parts of the international 
system, parts which could be defined as regional sub-systems 
of the global international system. One level of the 
behaviour of states, namely the one aimed at the inter- 
national system as a whole, could perhaps be defined within 
either the context of bipolarity or as polycentric, but a 
more important part of their international interactions is 
(1ý For some other important discussions on the problems 
of the structure of the international system, vainly 
arran. ed around the concepts of bipolarity and nulti- 
polarity, see: Kenneth 1ialtz, 'Tile Stability of a Dipolar 
System', Daedalus, Summer 1964; Karl J. Deutsch and J9 
David Sin: er, ": ultipolar Power Systems and Intern L ti. onal 
Stability', 'lorld Polit-Lcs, t_ýril 1964; Cirro Elliott 
Zoppo, ':; uclear Tec: nnoloL, y, r.: ult'polarity, and In, 
national Stability', : orld Politics, July 1966; :.: ichard 
Rosecrance, 'Pipolarity 
, iiu1ti! ýolarity and the Future Journal of Conflict Resolution, September 1966; t, ortoný A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, 
NO'-' Yorks 1957 
conducted izithin their respective sub-systems. This 
particular behaviour, in many cases, is not characterized 
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by "hiding behind the fence", but rather by intensive 
political activity - activity which cannot perhaps amount 
to real multipolarity in the global international system, 
but which may have a profound impact within the sub-systems 
in which it is being conducted. 
The international systen therefore has more dimensions 
and levels than those suggested by Hoffmann. If it is 
observed as a unity, the three levels suggested by Hoffmann 
represent reality, but if it is observed more closely and 
in more detail, a very large part of the international inter- 
actions is conducted within the sub-systems, and may have 
different characteristics from those of the levels suggested 
by IIoffmann. It is interesting, however, that within some 
of the sub-systems one can find - inter alia - one or more 
of "Hoffmann's levels"; but they may assume different 
characteristics. 
The 'regional sub-systems'. 
(1) 
approach suggested 
below should be construed as a model which by its very 
nature as a nodal, only approximates to, and condenses one 
On this approach see prinarily Michael Brecher, The New 
States of Asia, London, Oxford University Press, 1963, 
Chapter 3 Z"; 6. See also Michael Brecher, 'International 
Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System 
of Asia I, 1 orld Politics , January 1963; Aron Raymond, Peace and .i Theory of International ? elatioz.., Mow 
Yorl:, 1966, pp. 389-3j5; Geor e : odelski, 'International 
Relations and Area Studies', International ^elations, 
London, April 1961 ; J. i . Rosenar. ed. , Internatio., zl Politics and orei^n Policy, New Yorl., 19 1, pp. 8-77; see 
also be' ozo refererices in footnotes 1w3, For some 
related articles see also flo,; er Masters, 'A I. Iulti-Bloc 
Model of tic Internatior.. -ti S«sten: t, 
Scic:, cc ILev , L)ecemocr 1961; T; olf'ran iranrieder, ' _'_: o International ; rster.:: Bipolar or I_ultibloc', Journal of 
Conflict ""0Sa1utjo 1 S* rV lo e4? teýabc 196;. T. ie sub-. ý, a ýel_ý 
approach -s also discussed in t, -10 literature on 
inter- 
national integration. On the application of this a'iproacl2 
to foreiGn policy analysis see Michael Brecher, ßlerýa Steinbern and Janica Stein, flu Framework for Research on 
Foreign Policy Behaviours, Journal of Conflict resolution, March 1969. 
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analytical aspect of international politics. As such, 
and also inherent in this particular model, there is a 
whole ranee of ambiguities which are the result on the 
one hand of the Cap between any model and the reality 
it tries to present, and also because of the interpene- 
trations of the various sub-systems and the ambivalence 
of congruenco and discontinuity between them. 
(1) 
These 
types of relationship might occur both as between whole 
sub-systems and also among some actors in the various 
cub-systems. However, notwithstanding these important 
ambiguities, the model still suggests that these hinds 
of relationship (with the qualification of the unique 
role of the super-powers) are less meaningful than the 
2ý (types 
of relationship inside the sub-systems. 
The global international 
(3) 
system comprises 
(i) On such ambiguities and also on the concepts of dis- 
continuity and congruence in this context, see Oran 
Young's penetrating essay 'Political Discontinuities 
in the International System 't 7orld Politics, llpril 
1968. 
(2) And see below. 
(3) The "global international system" comprises the 
totality of political international interactions. 
The use of the term "system" connotes a certain 
interaction between the different components of 
the system, which is certainly the case in the current 
international system. This interaction justifies 
the use of the concept. It is however clear that 
interaction does not mean necessarily inter-dependence. 
Althoufjh, and mainly because of the existence of the 
bipolar system, many moves in the international system 
are interdependent, still, this inter-dependence is on 
many occasions limited, and sometimes completaly 
lacking. 
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different levels and components, one of them is the 
division into several regional sub-systems. These 
sub-systems are political international ones and are 
delimited by Geographical proximity. The fact that 
in some cases they have common historical and cultural 
elements is not important as far as their nature as 
international political frames of reference is concerned. 
Clearly there are many criteria for defining 
international sub-systems. The following classification 
is therefore somewhat arbitrary. What is even more 
important is that the element of "regionality" may change, 
in thQ sense that relations between states belonging to 
completely different regions may be more meaningful than 
between states within the same region. As it happens, 
however, apart from the relations between the super powers, 
Chinats growing involvement, and some areas of inter- 
national interactions of Britain and France, most states 
organise their more meaningful international interactions 
within the framework of their regional sub-systems. 
A sub-system is defined by a certain concentration 
of international political activity. Three main criteria 
are applicable here: (a) the high level of international 
political interactions between states belonging to this 
area. This level of activity can be measured by three 
main methods: the occurrence of conflicts and wars on the 
one hand, and acts of co-operation, military alliances, 
etc* on the other hand; the intensity of normal diplomatic 
exchanges between the various participants; the images and 
solf-perceptions of the various members of the sub-system 
about their own international roles and capabilities, and 
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also their images of the capabilities and roles of the 
other members of the sub-system. (b) The various foreign 
policy objectives of the members of the sub-system, and 
also their strategies for achieving them, are primarily 
concerned with other members of the sub-system, or are 
concerned with the general system of international 
relations within the sub-systeri. K. J. IHolsti(1) dis- 
tinguishos between three types of foreign policy objectives: 
"core" values or objectives to which states and governments 
are absolutely committed at all times; middle range goals; 
and "universal long range goals", which seldom have direct 
impact on the actual day to day handling of the foreign 
policy of'a state. It seems that as far as the relations 
in a sub-system are concerned, the two main typos relevant 
are the "core" values and the middle range ones. 
(c) The super powers are usually present in the various 
sub-systens. Inside each sub-system they become members 
of it, sometimes with more power or influence than. other 
members, sometimes with less power, 
Although in the last analysis the behaviour of the 
super powers in the sub-systems is governed by the bipolar 
or super power relationship, it is formulated within the 
special configuration of the situation in the sub-system. 
Furthermore, distinctions are increasingly being drawn 
International Politics, 1l1ramework for Analysis 
Prentice Nall, 1967. 
between the super Power level of relations on the one hand 
and needs, strategies and the policies of the particular 
super power in the area on the other. In other words, 
the super powers themselves may recognize the need to see 
their relations as having several levels both in General 
and also, at least analytically, inside each sub-system. 
In the first case relations between the super powers within 
each sub-system will constitute a different level from 
the General strategic and political relations on the 
global level existing between the U. S. A. and the Soviet 
Union. In the latter case, they may recognise that 
certain steps taken within the context of the sub-system 
have or have not relevance either to the general bipolar 
relationship or to the situation inside the sub-system 
itself. 
States may exist in the same area but belong to 
another political (in the sense of international politics) 
sub-system. But in general Geographical proximity has a 
decisive influence on relations and foreign policy objectives 
of a state. This is why the concept of a sub-system 
advanced here is conceived as a regional sub-system. 
States may belong to different sub-systems and may 
change their sub-systems. This change nay occur either 
following a change in self-perceptions which, on its part 
will lead to a change in foreign policy objectives and the 
strategies to cpply them, or as a reaction to initiatives 
by other states. These initiatives may include even 
drastic changes in weapons' systems, as part of the 
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capabilities of other neighbouring states. The emphasis 
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on the intensity of diplomatic or military interactions 
allows for flexibility in delineating the borders of a 
sub-system. Furthermore, because of changes in the 
intensity of diplomatic and military interactions, sub- 
systems might expand or contract. 
The "regionality" of the sub-sy:, tems derives partly 
from the limitation on the military capability of "reach" 
in parts outside its geographical sub-system of - by now - 
almost every country in the world except for the United 
States and (only gradually) the Soviet Union. 
(') 
Iiassner 
has pointed out that even this strategic capability is not 
political capability, and factors like history, politics 
and culture are perhaps more important in deciding the 
"belonging" of a state to a certain area. 
(2) 
" it is true, 
however, that as far as sheer military'capability is con- 
cerned, there is one qualification to this statement, 
namely, the ability of the medium powers like Britain and 
France to intervene in some countries in Africa, provided 
that this intervention will not create large-scale military 
involvement. To this category belong the various French 
interventions in former French colonies in Africa and the 
British interventions in East Africa. 
The global international system is composed first 
of the two super powers and their relationship (constituting 
(1) Cn American strateGic mobility see 1bhlsteter, 
op. cit. 
(2) See Hassner, op. cit. 
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a bipolar relationship); second, of the military alliances 
like NATO which at a certain level are, together with the 
super powers, part of the bipolar system; third of the 
activities of some of the medium powers like China, Britain 
and France which are pursued beyond the sub-systems to which 
they belong. These activities are conducted within the 
various sub-systems, outside Europe. Thus, although in 
one sense the Atlantic Alliance is part of the bipolar 
system, there is another aspect of relations within the 
Alliance which is concerned mainly with what is happening 
inside Western Europe on the one hand and between the West 
European sub-system and North America on the other hand. 
Apart-from that, the global international system includes 
the international interactions within the various'regional 
sub-systems. 
ßrecher(1) suggests six conditions for the existence 
sub- 
of such a/system: 
(1 Its scope is delimited with primary stress on a 
geographic region; 
(2) There are at least three actors; 
(3) Taken together they are objectively recognized by 
other actors as constituting a distinctive community, 
region, or segment of the global system; 
(4) the members identify themselves as such; 
(1) In 'A New Subordinate State System', loc . ci. t. 
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(5 the units of power are relatively inferior to units 
in the dominant (by which Brecher means the bipolar 
bloc system) and perhaps the four medium powers 
Britain, France, Germany and China. 
(6) Changes in the dominant system have treater effect 
on the subordinate system than vice versa. 
These conditions, however, could perhaps be applied 
after the basic three criteria suggested in pp. 24-25- 
It is also doubtful whether conditions 3 and 4 are necessary. 
The perceptions of outside powers as to the sub-system in 
general are less relevant than the actual policies and 
strategies (including conflicts and alliances), pursued by 
the local powers. The same applies to point 4. The 
images and-perceptions of the local powers inside the sub- 
system are important not as regards the scope of the region 
but as regards their images of intentions and capabilities 
of the other side. To cite two examples: Israel is not 
considered by the Arabs and also by some Israelis and 
outside observers to be part of the Middle East sub-system. 
However, if one applies the criteria, of intensity of con- 
flicts and also the images that the Arabs have of the 
Israeli intentions, ` then Israel is very much'in the Middle 
East sub-system. Pakistan is considered at least marginally 
as part of the Middle East sub-system, whereas India is not, 
But if one considers both these countries' relations with 
the Middle East one cannot see much difference. In fact 
both of them should be considered as not being members of 
this sub-system. Their involvement in Middle Eastern 
affairs arises not froh objectives within this region, or 
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suspicions about the policies of countries in the Middle 
Bast as they night directly affect their own countries, but 
rather from an effort to recruit diplomatic aid from other 
outside powers. Their main concern is their own mutual 
conflict and competition. 
Condition 6 is also not entirely valid. If the 
dominant system means bipolarity in the narrow sense of the 
strategic relation between the two super powers and only 
between them, their one can argue that changes in sub systems 
are not able to affect these relations to any great degree. 
If the two super powers are becoming less involved in various 
sub-systems, if their mutual relations are based more and 
more on the growing stabilisation of the central balance of 
deterrence, or at least attempts to keep it stable, then 
changes in sub-systems will not affect this system of re- 
lations very much and vice versa. If the dominant system 
means "bipolarity" in the broader sense, i. e. the whole 
bloc system and the role of the super powers as world powers, 
then the case may be different. Changes in the "dominant" 
system will have great effect on some sub systems; it may 
also be true that changes in a certain sub-system brought 
about by a local member of this sub-system may affect the 
bipolar system to a considerable degree. 
No empirical research has been done on the intensity 
of international interactions in various parts of the world 
which would allow us to delineate exactly the various sub- 
systems. Every delineation therefore must be partly or 
fully impressionistic. Drecher(l) suggests five: 
(1) Ibid. 
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Middle East, Azierica, Southern Asia, Western Europe, 'Test 
Africa. It seems, however, that there is room for more. 
The followinG. is an attempt to resister a tentative list, 
of itself of purely heuristic value: 
(1) Trestern Europe; (2) Eastern Europe; 
(3) 2"Iiddle East; 
(1) (4) South Last Asia (possibly with 
Indonesia and Australia); (5) Indian sub-continent and 
China; (6) East Black Africa; (7) West Black Africa. 
(2) 
Because the international system is, on one level, 
divided into sub-systeras, the problem of nuclear prolifer- 
ation should be discussed within this framework as well. 
(1 On the Middle Bast as a re; ional sub-system see 
apart from Brecher o2. cit. also Leonard Linder, 
'The Middle Past Subordinate International System', 
World Politics, April 1958. The concept is also 
used by I. :. illiam Zartrman, 'Military Elements in 
Regional Unrest', in J. C. I3urewitz (ed. ), Soviet- 
Anerican rivalry in the Middle East, Praeger, 1: etr 
York, 1969; U. Brecher, 'The L: iddlo Nast Subordinate 
System and its Impact on Israel's Foreign Policy', 
International Studies ruarterly, June 1969. The 
Soviet naval build up i:: the ": editerranean and 
; iestern anxieties about it (which arc shared by many 
of the littoral states), coupled with the continued 
crisis in the Middle East, create a set of interactions 
which affect tue thole of the '. 'editerronean basin. 
This night possibly lead eventually to the emergence 
of a new sub-systei:, of the Mediterranean basin. 
(2) Cn the sub-systems in ýifrica see I. ? filliam7 Zartiaan, 
'Africa as a Subordinate State System', International 
Organization, Summer 1967. Znrtmnn considers the 
whole of Africa as one sub-system, inclusive of three 
sub-refions: East Africa; 'lest Africa and North Africa. 
It could however be armued that the first two are 
developing Gradually their distinct characteristics as 
separate sub-systems. On a possible South African 
sub-system sea 7;. L. Bowman, 'The Subordinate State 
System of South Africa', International Studien 
Quor terlyy, Scptomber 1963. 
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Nuclear Proliferation and its effects on the bipolar 
system and the sub-systems. 
The two main approaches to the effects of nuclear 
proliferation on the international system are concerned 
with the prospects of peace and stability in a future 
system in which nuclear weapons have spread to several 
new countries, or in 'Which there are no obstacles to pro- 
liferation as a result of international agreement or the 
realisation of the special nature of these weapons. 
The majority of scholars concerned with the 
problem present in different ways and arguments the 
position that proliferation will considerably increase 
the dangers which already exist in the system. There 
will be less control over processes of escalation, the 
probability of nuclear wars will increase many fold and 
basic detrimental changes will occur in the system. 
These arg ments . are -- enumerated roughly below 
(and 
this is not an exhaustive list). They are partly 
political-strategic; partly military-strategic: - 
(1) The mathematical ar&-unient namely, that the 
more nuclear Weapons are in the hands of more powers the 
probability of nuclear wars increases in direct proportion 
to the number of these powers or at least in some pro- 
portion to this number. There is also the argument that 
the probability of war will increase in a geometrical pro- 
gression. 
(1) 
(1 F. liken, ' C, -, n '7e Limit the Nuclear Club? ' Bulletin 
of the Atomic Scie . ticts, September 1961. 
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This argument could be divided into the fol. los: in, -,,: - 
(a) as the number of nuclear weapons increas ;, the 
probability of their transfer into the hands of the 
military leadership increases as tVell. 
1 
(b) the dcanger of a general war occurring because 
of miscalculation or misjudgement by one man will increase 
considerably. 
(2) 
(c) there is a danger that the bombs will fall 
into the hands of revolutionary leaders who have nothing 
to lone and a lot to gain by using the bomb. 
(3) 
(2) The present nuclear powers are responsible 
ones whereas the new nuclear powers, among which will be 
some of the developing countries - may not as yet be res- 
ponsible. A further more sophisticated argument along 
the sane lines maintains that indeed even the nuclear 
powers have acted in a way bordering on irresponsibility, 
but have somehow avoided becoming engulfed in a nuclear 
war. In the process of their confrontations they have 
undergone a process of education. They have educated 
themselves as to both the dangers of an escalation and to 
the ways to avoid it. They have learned how to use their 
nuclear arsenals for tigre its and blac'. mail but they have 
also learned the necessary limitations on the uses of these 
weapons* 
(4) 
(1) Aiken, oP. cit. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) ibid. 
(4) ibid. 
(. 
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(3) Nuclear proliferation may create dangers of 
catalytic wars, i. e. a possibility that a minor nuclear 
power may deliberately cause a nuclear war between the two 
super powers by delivering a bomb against one of then and 
succeeding in creating the impression that in fact the 
other super power was the one which actually delivered it. 
An irredentist new nuclear power like West Germany is some- 
times mentioned as an example. 
(Li) Nuclear proliferation may threaten the 
stability of the international system partly for the 
reasons given above, and also because a process of frag- 
mentation in the system will 'cake place. 
(1 
(5) Acquisition of atomic weapons by one local 
pourer will motivate his local enemy to frantic efforts to 
tgo nuclear' as jell. 
(2 
(6) The lack of sophisticated and developed 
technological capabilities -will not allow for the develop- 
ment of stable balances of deterrence in a multi-polar 
power system. The main emphasis in this argument is put 
on the lack of stability in the international system in 
general which would be caused by nuclear proliferation. 
This arcument is divided into the following: 
(1) Hoffriarn, op. cit. 
(2) Ibid. 
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(a) the difficulty of developing a second strike 
capability. This would increase motivations for a first 
strike surprise attack. 
(1) 
(b) lack of a capability for buildin; forces for 
a flexible response stratcM. This strategy is important 
in order to keep options open and maintain deterrence 
while avoiding escalation. It requires, however, enormous 
2 
economic potential. 
(c) lack of a potential to develop an adequate 
control and command system. 
(3) 
(d) lack of ability to develop various 'fail safe' 
measures* 
(4) 
(7) The super powers succeeded in developing tacit 
understandings as to the control of escalation. The same 
applies to various arms control measures. Thus there are 
various accepted 'siGnals' as between the two super powers 
regarding the uses of nuclear weapons and the distinction 
between them and conventional weapons. Nuclear prolifer- 
ation will upset these sophisticated tacit understandings 
and thus upset the stability'of the central balance of 
deterrence* 
(5) 
(1 IIoffmann, Zoppo, op. cit,, et al. 
(2) Zoppo, op. cit., et al. 
(3) Zoppo, op. cit. 
(4) Zoppo, op. cit. 
(5ý Zoppo, op. cit., Iioffmann op. cit., Thomas Schelling 
in 'Signals and Feedback in the erns Dialoöuet, 
bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1965. 
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ý8 The emergence of new nuclear powers will 
impose on the super powers the need to resume the arms 
race in order to defend themselves against these new 
powers. Thus the main art-is race will start again. 
(9) Even the threat to go nuclear has destabilising 
effects on the international systen. 
(2) 
(10) The probability of a nuclear exchange between 
two new nuclear powers will be quite high. Once this 
happens the established taboo on the use of nuclear weapons 
will have been eroded. This psychological inhibition has 
partly been responsible for the fact that no nuclear wars 
have yet occurred between the two super powers. Once the 
taboo has been lifted, the danger of war between the super 
powers or between pairs of nuclear foes will increase con- 
siderably. In other words, nuclear weapons will again 
become an instrument of war. 
(3) 
(11) Reciprocal communication of intentions during 
crisis situations is crucial in order not to let deterrence 
fail. This is extremely demanding in situations of crisis 
when short term tactical considerations tend to become more 
important than, or at least to obscure, the real important 
political issues and long range foreign policy objectives. 
(1) Hoffmann, op. cit. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) Hoffmann after R. Aron, see Hoffmann, op. cit. 
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'The difficulties of maintaining the dynariic requirements 
for a stable deterrent system and the risks of miscalcu- 
lation in crisis and limited conflict would be severely 
multiplied by an increase in independent nuclear decision 
centers.... '(1) 
(12) 'Initial experience with nuclear development 
suggests that ..... adversary powers may not reach 
deterrent 
sufficiency at an even pace or with strategic symmetry. 
The complexity of deterrent calculations would be severely 
magnified for all powers in the system. ' 
(2 
(13) 'Shifting deterrent relationships could con- 
fuse the siMallinC of intentions between the super powers 
at tactical and strategic levels. 
(3) 
In fact, what all these arguments tend to show is 
the dangers to the stability between the two super powers. 
In other words, bipolar stability is considered to be 
identical or almost identical with the stability of the 
global international system. 
(14) Dangers of misescalation or miscalculation, 
i. e. a local power 'which has a nuclear enemy Will try to 
involve his super power ally in a star against the new 
round. 
(4) 
Hoffmann argues that in case of proliferation, there 
are several possibilities: There might be a resurgence of 
(I) Zoppo, qp. cit. 
(2) I bid. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4 } I: offr.: a: n, op. cit. 
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bipolarity, either condoninion or redivision of the world. 
Or else there would be a continuation of the existing system 
(three coexistent levels). Finally, there could be a now 
hierarchy of powers and also a possibility of fragmentation. 
General Gallois argues that nuclear proliferation 
will in fact increase stability in the international system. 
The main argument here is that balances of deterrence could 
be created between different enemies in the world and that 
Gradually proliferation will eliminate war altogether. 
Furthermore, small powers could deter bigger ones because 
minimal deterrence is sufficient, and thus the growing 
equilibrium in the system will be followed by growing 
stability. 
A discussion of the effects of nuclear proliferation 
on a system composed of sub-systems could certainly make 
use of the various arguments about the dangers of prolifer- 
ation. But what is important is that as nuclear prolifer- 
ation is a strategico-political phenomenon and as inter- 
national political behaviour can be differentiated according 
to sub-systems, there is a prima facie case for arguing that 
nuclear proliferation will have different effects on regional 
sub-systems on the one hand and on the bipolar system on the 
other hand 
(and possibly, on the Global international system 
as well) . 
Thus the two levels of discussion should be, first, 
the effects of proliferation on the bipolar system, and 
second the effects on the various sub-systems. The two 
variables that are relevant to the structure of the different 
systems are: stability and equilirbiun. 
(1) 
A third 
(1) For a definition of these concepts, see below P. 
At. 
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possible variable is flexibility, but for the purpose of 
this discussion only the concept of stability would be 
discussed, and with some reference to the concept of 
equilibrium. This is partly for the obvious reason that 
the problem of stability, or in the present context the 
avoidance of major violence, is crucial to a yorld where 
proliferation takes place, and indeed the literature dis- 
cussed above was primarily concerned with it, though mainly 
with the effects of proliferation on the bipolar system. 
As there is a notion that an international system with a 
large measure of equilibrium is also more stable, a short 
discussion of the effects of nuclear weapons on the cor- 
relation between equilibrium and stability will be included. 
There are several ways in which to assess the 
effects of proliferation on sub-systems, on bipolarity, and 
on the global international system. First, to analyse the 
effects caused by the proliferation of nuclear weapons to 
Britain, France and China. Second, to assess the effects 
of the proliferation of nuclear technology, namely the 
proliferation of nuclear options. Third, to study the 
expectations of statesmen and scholars who wish their res- 
pective countries to tao nuclear', as to the roles their 
countries will play in the international system and in their 
respective sub-systems; and last to discuss the various 
conditions conducive to stability and equilibrium in the 
present balance of deterrence and to try to apply them to 
a world of nuclear powers. This last method is, in fact, 
the one which has been partly used by the various writers 
on the probler: s of nuclear proliferation, although they have 
I 
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concentrated mainly on the effects on the bipolar system 
which they, incidentally, tend to identify with the 
global international system. 
The discussion in this Chapter will concentrate 
on the following: first, a discussion of the effects of 
proliferation to Dritain, France and China; second, some 
of the effects of the proliferation of nuclear technoloW 
(or nuclear options) on the bipolar system on the one 
hand and to two sub-systems on the other; third, a very 
brief comment on the future possible effects of the pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons on the bipolar system on the 
one hand, and in general on regional sub-systems on t: ie 
other. The burden of this discussion is to show that 
the proliferation of nuclear options had already multi 
dimensional effects on both the bipolar system and on two 
regional sub-systems, and again that in the future one 
could expect different and complex effects on the relations 
between the super powers on the one hand and various cub- 
systems on the other. 
Part of the discussion in the rest-of the Chapters 
ties in t: ith these basic notions in the following way: 
in Chapter 2 there is partly a discussion of the trays in 
Which the proliferation of nuclear tec', nzoloGy is being, 
perceived as instruments for pressure. Success. or failure 
in pursuance of this pressure miGht or rliGht not contribute 
to the stability in reCional sub-systems. In Chapter 4 
there is a discussion about the way in which the decision 
makers of one near-nuclear-weapon power teere perceiving 
the role of a nuclear option Within the context of the 
objectives of their state, the main objective being the 
increasing of stability and the strengthening of the 
territorial status quo. In Chapter 5 there is a discussion 
of precisely how this option affected the images of the 
decision makers in the powers opposed to the near-nuclear- 
weapon state. These images have on their part affected 
stability. But the main discussion of a regional sub- 
system is included in Chapter 6. 
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Stability and equilibrium in international systems 
could be defined in the following way: 
Stability A useful definition is the one suggested by 
Kenneth Wal tz: 'The stability of a system has to be defined 
in terms of its durability as well as of the peacefulness of 
adjusting within it. 'O) 
Equilibrium A state of an international system which is 
characterised by a distribution of political and military 
power in which the margins of superiority or inferiority in 
political power among the various participants is limited, 
and in which the ratios between the influence exercised by 
individual members and their actual power is not too 
unequal. 
(2) 
It seems that the bipolar system and the balance 
of deterrence characterising it is now more or less stable, 
but was certainly suffering from disequilibrium until 
recently and to a certain extent still is. A multipolar 
power system is usually characterised by equilibrium and 
either stability or instability. 
(3) 
The classical balance 
(1) See Waltz, 'The Stability of a Bipolar System', 
op. cit., p. 887. 
(2) This definition is somewhat eclectic. 
(3) For somewhat opposing views about the effects of 
equilibrium on international stability, see Waltz ibid, and Deutsch and Singer cit. 
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of pourer in Europe was characterised by equilibrium among 
its 'essential members' and was reputed to have a high 
degree of stability. 
(') 
That the bipolar system is stable does not mean 
however that all the sub-systems are or were stable or in 
equilibrium. It is more accurate to suggest that some 
of them are stable while others are unstable. According 
to David IIood(~) there occurred 81 ' arned conflicts' after 
the beginning of the atomic age i. e. after 1911.5 (one of 
these conflicts the USSR=Iran hostilities started in 1911.1 
but continued until 19+7), most of them in sub-systems'out- 
side Europe and without the participation of a super power. 
(3) 
This high incidence of violence suggests a high degree of 
instability in some sub-systems, particularly when compared 
with the situation before the Second World War and again 
before the First World ? Tar. 
(4 
(1ý On the model of the European balance of power see 
Torton I: aplan on. cit. from which also the term 
'essential members, is taken; on the stability of the 
European balance of power see also Hans P-Iorgenthaugh 
Politics amcin, TTatiors, 3rd edition, New Yoric 1961; 
on the balance of pot-: er in Europe see also Gullick, 
The Classical Balance of Power in Eurotee. 
(2) Conflict in the Ti: cntieth Century, Adelphi Paper 48, 
The Institute for Strategic Studies, London, June 1968. 
(3) Wood points out that only 28 out of these 81 clashes 
tool. the form of fiGÜtin,; between states, whereas 24 
of the conflicts before 1939 are categorized as such 
conflicts. The rest, during both these periods, are 
categorised as 'armed insurgency against the central 
government', 'civil war between factionst or 'military 
coups d'etatt. However, on further investigation it 
seems that if one includes anti-colonial wars in which 
a distinct national cor; i;, unit. r fought against another 
national power (the coloi-I-i_al po--: er), the number of 
what one could safely tern as international conflicts 
in : rood's list, till i. iicrease to 52. Cne can only add 
that :, Ire ! rood's categorisation is not necessarily the best one. 
(4) According to ? rood, in the period 1898-1930, inclusive 
of the First ! Iorld Isar, there were 43 of these ' arried 
conflicts'. 
Q6ý 
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But in the case of the bipolar system, the 
political disequilibrium it has witnessed is as follows: - 
First, the U. S. enjoys much märe political influence and 
control and is also much more involved in various sub- 
systems than the USSR; second, the two super powers 
together enjoy less political control and influence than 
could have been expected in view of their enormous 
military capability. 
(1) 
This second disequilibrium 
affects mainly the global international system as distinct, 
analytically, from the bipolar system, and derives from 
the inhibiting forces working within the framework of 
the central balance of nuclear deterrence. Thus the two 
super powers sometimes avoid an increase in their 
political influence in various sub-systems because it may 
invoice a response from the other super powers which may 
start a process of escalation. The concept relevant 
here is that of self-deterrence, i. e. each side deters 
itself from a certain action that may put its opponent in 
a situation in which he is almost sure to react because 
of tremendous pressures to do so. This reaction may start 
an almost irresistable process of escalation. 
The two disequilibria in the bipolar system and in 
their impact on the Global international system do not 
(1) See above pp. 1-Aw14. 
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however destabilise the central balance of deterrence. 
The lack of direct correlation between equilibrium and 
stability is thus becoming more evident. 
The same situation may be witnessed in different 
sub-systems, i. e. that stability is not necessarily the 
outcome of equilibrium. What is important in this res- 
pect is the question whether a certain system is 
"homogeneous" or uheterogeneousn(1), or in Hoffmann's 
language whether it is a ! 'revolutionary" or a "moderate" 
( 
systen2) . According to Raymond Aron homogeneous systems 
are 'those in which the states belong to the same type, 
and obey the same conception of policy', whereas hetero- 
geneous systems are 'those in which the states are organized 
according to different principles and appeal to contradictory 
values. ' One may assunie that this definition can in fact 
cover not only differences between competing ideologies 
but also between competing conceptions of national role and 
self- )erceptions. In other words, it is not necessarily 
the case. that only differences in conceptions about the 
domestic social structure of the states participating in 
the system lead to the heterogeneity of the system, but 
also, and perhaps more importantly, differences as to the 
role of the state in the system, the rules of the Came 
itself, and the nature of the system. This last modifi- 
(1) See flay tionti Aron +Peace and Uar, ', (trans. )., London, 1c''S, 
147-1 t: 9. 
(2) See 'su3_iiverls Trot"bies. or The Set-tin. - of i-nori. c^. ý 
Forei aI oiicv : ýý- ý ': cxra: ": = : ill, .. ct; Yorlý, - 1ýG&* pig. ts. 18 
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cation is quite obvious when the situation in the communist 
world is beine considered. There the internal differences 
are due more to the second set of factors, i. e. differences 
in perceptions about the nature of the system. The 
process of growing heterogeneity in the Communist bloc 
which in East Europe was due to realities of power; and to 
the differences in conceptions about states' roles and 
structures of the various systems, has stopped as far as 
East Europe is concerned. This was one of the consequences 
of the invasion into Czechoslovakia in 1968. Indeed the 
invasion came partly precisely because this process appeared 
to the Soviet leaders as endangering the' international 
system in East Europe. This process might however be 
renewed and in* any case as long as it went on it is perhaps 
even safe to claim that the differences in conception. as to 
the structure of the system were more important than the 
differences in the domestic social structure. 
The effects of the proliferation of nuclear tech. noloßy 
on the bipolar system. - 
It is quite understandable that the United States 
has always found it in its interest to oppose nuclear pro- 
liferation. Between 1945 and 1949 American objective and 
(1ý Russia vis a-; ris China as regard the nature df the 
Global international system and of the bipolar 
system; the east Curopean states against Russia 
as regards the structure of relations inside the 
communist -world and perhaps also about the structure 
of the bipolar relationship. 
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hope '.: ore that the Soviet Union would not acquire these 
weapons. When this proved illusory, the decision was 
taken not to help other states. to produce these instruments 
of destruction. Under the 1"IacIlahon Act of April 1946, 
nuclear cooperation with any other state became illegal. 
However, America was primarily concerned. with the simmering 
cold war, competition and conflict with the Soviet Union 
and the building up of the alliance systems. The possi- 
bility of proliferation seemed remote, and the possible 
dangers of proliferation to the stability of the balance 
of deterrence had not yet been considered in depth. To 
the extent that proliferation might have taken place, the 
possibility was that it would occur among the Western 
Alliance. Here the difficulty was that any anti-prolifer- 
ation policy might have affected the internal stability of 
the alliance (thus hampering its development which was 
considered in the fifties as the over-riding consideration). 
However, the attention paid to the problems of 
proliferation gradually grew. A report issued in Hay 
1958 in America by the : National Planning association 
included a chart suggesting that 1970 might see between 
eight and twelve independent nuclear weapon states. Its 
conclusion was that 'most nations with appreciable 
military strength will have in their arsenals nuclear 
weapons, strategic, tactical, or both'. 
(') 
Clearly this 
(1 } 1970 'Jithout .. rms Control' , The National PlanninC Association, 'JashinGton LC, p. 41 
47 
kht- 
report proved t1ronc. The basic approach of the report 
was mistaken, primarily because it had not dealt with 
the political and strategic problems involved in nuclear 
proliferation and instead concentrated on the technological 
and economic aspects of it. But the first indication of 
the realisation of the dangers to the central balance of 
deterrence came with the two famous articles by Albert 
S1ohlstetter 'The Delicate Balance of Terrort, 
(1) 
and 
'Nuclear Sharing: Nato and the 11+1 Problern*. 
(2) 
The 
American concern with the problem of proliferation grew 
considerably during the Kennedy administration. This was 
gradually paralleled by Russian apprehensions about the 
same problem. However in the Russian case the main concern 
for some time had been the possibility of Germany "going 
nuclear". This coloured most of their position during 
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee meetings. In 
any case, the controversy about the various programmes for 
nuclear sharing inside Nato bedevilled the Eighteen Nation 
(4) 
Disarmament Committee negotiations up to 1967, and pointed 
to the fact that although the two super powers were be- 
coming more conscious of the dangers to the central balance 
of deterrence if proliferation took place, to y still could 
not put a strategy of non-proliferation at the top of their 
list of priorities. 
(1) Foreign , 'affairs, January 195q. 
(2) Foreign Affairs, April 1961. 
(3) The creation of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament 
Committee was endorsed by the United !, Tations General 
Assembly on 20.12,1961 in resolutio_z 1722 (xvi). The 
Committee has the foilotrin1ý, . aember hip: Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Prance, India, 
Italy, : ie:: ico, ý; igoria, Poland, ; 'omania, Sweden, Union 
of Soviet Socialist flopublics, United Arab i: epublic, 
United : Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
United States of America. 
France decided not to Participate. (4) An agreement on this was reacjed outside the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee in Fall 1966. 
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As-has been suggested above, the main concerns 
about the General dangerous implications of proliferation 
to the stability of both the central balance of deterrence 
and of the global international system were 
voiced by the U. S. 
(') 
The Soviet Union began to share 
the same general apprehensions only gradually and hesi- 
tantly. However, once these fears became common to the 
two sides, the negotiations in the Eighteen Nation Dis- 
armament Committee were speeded up and the joint draft 
resolution for the Non Proliferation Treaty was presented 
to the other members of the committee. Whereas during 
the first patt, of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament 
Committee negotiations on the Non Proliferation Treaty 
the main bone of contention has been the plans for a 
Multilateral Force or other plans approximating to it, 
with the two super powers playing the roles of antagonists 
While the non aligned tried to compromise between them, 
the second pert Was marked by the growing understanding 
between the super powers (and Britain); and the main point 
of disagreement was now the various discriminatory clauses 
in the various drafts. The non-nuclear-weapon states 
began to stress the differences between themselves as a 
group on the one hand and the nuclear powers or block 
members on the other. 
(1 One indication of the highest priority given in Mcrica 
to the conclusion of the Non Proliferation Treaty is the 
unanimous support Given to Senate ^esolution 179 of 1966 
(the Pastore Resolution), which commended the President 
for his efforts to negotiate an agreement limiting the 
spread of nuclear weapons. On this particular resolution 
as such an indication, and also about the priority this 
problem had in the United States, sec inter-al: i_n Curtin 
Winsor, Jr. p 'The Non Proliferation Treaty: 1i step Toward 
Peace', Crbis, Vol. XII, 'Tinter 1967, Iýo, 4, pp. 1005-1006. 
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The significance of this development in the context 
of the arGu^ent here is that the two super powers (and 
again, but perhaps to a lesser degree, Britain), increasingly 
accepted the notion which has in fact governed the American 
main school of strategic thinking from the beginning of the 
Kennedy Administration, i. e. that the bipolar system can be 
maintained for a very long time to' come and that this system 
can be stabilised and can also heap the world from major 
eruptions of violence. But this depended partly on the 
halting of nuclear proliferation. This realigation, or 
rather this image, of'the international system, eventually 
brought about the endorsement of a common draft of the Non 
Proliferation Treaty, its acceptance by the U. N., and the 
great pressures exerted by the nuclear powers on their 
allies, clients, semi-allies and non-aligned states, first 
to sign and then ratify the Treaty. 
This evolution emphasised that there was a growing 
realization on the part of the super powers as to their 
common interests in view of the possibility of proliferation. 
(There was, of course, another element strengthening their 
opposition to proliferation, namely the potential possi- 
bility of it weakening their power position vis-a-vis the 
rest of the world - the feeling of membership of the 
exclusive club etc. 
(1)) 
This realization contributed to 
the creation of, and was at the same time influenced by, 
the image of the international system mentioned above. This 
(1) See below pp. 35-g(.. 
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new in age and realization certainly helped to increase the 
efforts to , tabiliso the central balance of deterrence. 
Taus in a sor; ýe.: Lý t paradoxical rianner, the proliferation 
of nuclear technology added its contribution to the process 
of stabilization of the bipolar relationship. It may be 
argued of course, as indeed it is by Elizabeth Young(1)1 
that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is eight years or so too 
late and that it is a product of 'optimistic bipolarity' 
as it were. But this does not change the fact that the 
new common awareness is here now, and this may contribute 
to stability as between the two bi;; powers. What they 
have perhaps lost in the meantime is their ability to impose 
bipolarity as a comprehensive system, both dominating the 
global international system and almost identical with it. 
In other words, they cannot hope any more - as they could 
have perhaps hoped at the beginning of the sixties - to 
impose anew a 'pure' bloc system that will cover the great 
iiajority of the states in the world and also to control it 
effectively. What they have gained is the continuation 
of the process of developing a now system of stable and 
perhaps closer relations between themselves as super powers, 
but again not as world powers. This new kind of relation- 
ship is different from the continuation of the bloc system. 
It is rather a new system in Nahich the super powers are 
approaching closer to each other and working out agreements 
for the stabilization of their relationship, and at the 
(1) The Control of Proliferation: the 1963 Troaty in 
! iind!:, L; ht and Forecast, idelpiii Finer No. 56, 
April iq69, ': 'pie institute for ätrato is Studies, 
London. 
bbb.. - 
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same time losing a measure of their influence over allies 
and non-aligned together. Thus, even if the ilon Prolifer- 
ation Treaty is not ratified by some countries, the neu 
images of the system and the realization of the dangers 
have already had their impact. 
A second result of the evolution *s;: etched above is 
that the process of negotiations itself triggered by the 
proliferation of nuclear options is also contributing to 
the creation of A new and calmer climate of relations 
between the super powers. 
Thirdly, the demands by the non-nuclear powers 
that the super powers will start negotiations to halt 
vertical proliferation have partly succeeded. They found 
their formulation in the Non-Proliferation Tsseaty, article 6, 
which stipulates that 'Each of the parties to the treaty 
undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an-early date and to nuclear disarmament and 
on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict 
and effective international controls. It seems quite 
obvious that, first, this is still far from the demands 
made by the non-nuclear powers during the negotiations at 
the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee, and, second, 
that there are good reasons for the super powers to reach 
such an agreement in any case, even without the prompting 
of the non-nuclear powers e Such an agreement will have, 
apart from other consequences, stabilising effects on the 
central balance of deterrence. The negotiations on these 
c) 
arms limitations will, in the last analysis, succeed or 
fail because of the interests or supposed interests of 
the super powers themselves. But, notwithstanding all 
these qualifications, it seems clear that the ability of 
near-nuclear-weapon states to "go nuclear" and the 
possible readiness of some of them to do just this because 
of, among other things, the reluctance of the super powers 
to halt vertical proliferation, has contributed to the 
decision to start negotiations on this very problem of 
vertical proliferation. This decision by itself, quite 
apart from possible agreement, is a contribution to the 
stability of the central balance of deterrence and also 
to the General climate of relations between the U. S. A. and 
the U. S. S. R. as super powers. 
This discussion reveals the multi-dimensional 
effects of the proliferation of nuclear technology. This 
particular kind of proliferation has on the one hand 
created a potential for great destabilising effects in the 
future as far as the global international system, and 
1 At pbssibly its various sub-systeris, are concerned. 
the sarge time it has contributed in a rather paradoxical 
way to 'Bone processes that may have, and perhaps already 
have iiad, sore stabilising effects on the bipolar system. 
As far as the sub-systems are concerned, the main 
destabilising effects of the proliferation of nuclear tech- 
nology (as distinct from the creation of a potential for 
(1) On this see below pp. L3-'1o. 
ýý 
future destabilising elements), could presumably We in 
(a) starting an arms race;, (b) motivating preventive wars. 
The destabilising effects caused by an arms race fall 
within the realm of creating a potential for future 
eruptions of major violence or creating such conditions in 
which crisis management will be much more difficult. 
The second thesis, concerning preventive wars, is 
even more interesting because it assumes that the prolifer- 
ation of nuclear technology can directly lead to war. The 
validity of parts of this thesis can be checked by two 
historical instances which are detailed below. Theoretically 
there could be three types of such wars. First, in the situ- 
ation of a local conflict where one side is a near-nuclear- 
weapon state and the other is not, or is unable to catch 
the nuclear capability of its enemy, this latter power 
launches a preventive war in order to destroy the nuclear 
capability of the enemy. Second, under the same con dition_s , 
the power which is less developed in its nuclear capability 
decides to launch a preventive war not in order to destroy 
the nuclear capability of the other side but in order to 
achieve his r:: ain objectives in the conflict. The war is 
launched because of the understanding or assumption that 
otherwise the balance of power may be changed in a way 
detrimental to the initiator of hostilities, and he will 
never be able again to achieve his objectives by force of 
power. 'third, both in a situation of a local conflict and 
in the case of a conflict in which one of the super powers 
(or China) are concerned, when a nuclear power decides to 
launch a preventive war in order to stop a near-nuclear-state 
ý -- - ---- 
ýý I ü `ý 
from 'GoinG nuclear', or once this latter has 'Gone nuclear' 
but is only in the first stases of development and has not 
yet the capability to retaliate acainst a nuclear strike. 
In this case, the main purpose of the preventive strike will 
presumably be to knock out the nuclear capability of the 
near or new nuclear power, but it may also be to achieve 
some other objectives, au in the sbcond type of preventive 
war suggested above. Iiowever, this second objective seers 
unlikely in the case of a war launched by a super-power as 
in any case the super power is so much stronger than any 
of the near nuclear states. It may be perhaps more rele- 
vant in the case of China vs. India (if the latter decides 
to -manufacture nuclear weapons). 
l onL pairs of enemies wi lt-h - hou h they are by no 
means equal - nuclear options, India and Pakistan; Israel 
and E ypt stand out as very remarkable examples. This is for 
several reasons. wirst, in both cases there is a long and 
ferocious conflict. Second, in both cases one side is much 
superior to the other in its potential nuclear capability. 
Third, in both cases there have been several violent clashes 
in the past twenty years, and what is more important, there 
has been a major var in the recent past. This war occurred 
after the development of a nuclear option by one side. Is 
it possible that these wars (or at least one of their) were 
launched as preventive measures in order to forestall the 
invocation of a nuclear option? 
it seems that in the two crises that preceded those 
wars (the Arab-Israeli war of 1967 and the Indian-Pakistani 
war of 1965) the issue of nuclear options played a minor 
part, if any. In the Arab-Israeli case, the nuain causes 
r r" 
ýJ 
for the immediate crisis lay within the context of recip- 
rocal miscalculations about the short-ranee intentions of 
the various parties to the crisis, E, aypt, Israel and Syria. 
All of them were drawn into a process of escalation by the, 
then, old and accepted pattern of events of sabotage and 
retaliation, and the colossal miscalculation of the 
Russians about the intentions and capabilities of all sides. 
On one level were the basic issues of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, and the apprehensions of the Arabs about 
the possible effects of the Jordan Water Project on the 
future capabilities of Israel. Apart from this, there 
were the competition in the Arab World and the activity of 
Fatah(l). The issue of the nuclear options did not appear 
as one of the causes for starting the crisis nor for the 
war that ensued. Significantly, too, the declarations 
of the Egyptian spokesmen also have not referred to it as 
a direct contributory element to the decision to start 
their initial moves in the crisis. 
(2) 
The 
(1 See chapter 5; sec also I; ichael IIox-: ard and Robert 
Hunter, Israel and the drab 'Iorld, Adelphi Paper 
Iýýo. 41 , ; 'l. e Institute for Str. ate'ic Studies, London, 
September 1967; `Taltor Laqucur, The oad to ': nr 
1967, llcidenfeld c iTicholson, London 1963; C: zarles 
Yost, 'How It Degen', rlOreiMl Affairs, January 1968; 
Kennett Love, Suez, The --,. `i-: ice I'ot :, c . arg HcGraW- 
Iiill, _! e« Yoric, 1.969. 
(2) See chapter 5; see also for example, President 
Nasser's speech announcing his resignation, 8.6.1967; 
and A: uhar.: mad _Irssenin I: eika 1's article in al-ahara=n 
on 27.5.1967, anon1; many others. 
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amount of Arab writing on Israel's atomic plans is vast(l) 
but it has not been related directly to the causes of the 
war. One observer suggests that because Egypt was in a 
way 'losing' in the arms race, she could have considered 
it in her interest to start a war. However he discounts 
this as a factor in the crisis of 1967.2) Thus although 
some Arab writers have discussed the possibility or even 
the necessity of starting a preventive war against Israel 
because of fears about the latter's possible nuclear cap- 
abilities, this does not seem to have been the immediate 
cause of the crisis. 
'ossib Ly The nuclear development in Israel was/involved in 
ofly reiao tely an:? the causes of the war. /In an indirect way, to the extent that 
it was at the same time a contributory element to, and was 
affected by, the conventional arms race, and to the oxtent 
that this arms race might have contributed to a general 
feeling of insecurity in the area. Nuclear development 
in the Arab-Israeli area has been partly connected, at 
least psychologically, with the developments in the field 
of missiles mainly in Egypt and the various meanings 
attached to this development in Israel. 
(-3) 
Thus it 
is only by putting nuclear developments within the rather 
(1) For a discussion see below Chapter V. 
(2) Nadav Safran, 'From War to War, New York, 1969, p. 267. 
In any case Safran refers mostly to the conventional 
arms race. 
(3) See below pp. l22. -22-'; 232-lc. 
wider field of the arms race that any kind of correlation 
between this particular development and the war can be 
established. What one can perhaps add is that nuclear 
developments in Israel and the conventional arms race in 
general all contributed to the general feeling. of insecurity 
in the area. Despite this, the whole nuclear issue seems 
still to be rather marginal in the whole range of the causes 
of the war. Perhaps the most important argument against 
the notion of preventive war in this context is that the 
'shooting' tear was started by Israel. Thus the power that 
had more cause to start a preventive war within the context 
of nuclear fears - at least on the basis of evidence avail- 
able "- namely Egypt, was apparently aiming at a diplo- 
matic victory 'rather than a direct military clash. It was 
indeed ready to accept war, but may have preferred to secure 
a simple diplomatic success, a success which would have had 
no relation to the nuclear capability of Israel, and perhaps 
would have only encouraged its development. 
The Indian-Pakistani conflict and the issue of 
nuclear proliferation directly connected with it bave, as 
has been suaGested above, some similarities with the Israel- 
rGyptian conflict. The differences are also quite obvious. 
First, the sizes of all states involved are completely 
different. Second, in the Indian case there is a third 
power directly involved, i. e. China, against which most of 
India's potential nuclear effort would be directed. Third, 
China is also aspiring not only to become a decisive power 
in her sub-systems but also to become both a world power 
and a super power. Thus every conflict in the Indian sub- 
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continent directly affects a power which is trying to 
become part of the bipolar system, -which China on her part 
is trying to change into a tripolar system. 
However, for the purpose of this discussion about 
the feasibility of a preventive war against a potential 
nuclear power, the Indian-Pakistani war of 1965 is of im- 
portance. The Indian nuclear programme started a long 
time before 1965 and indeed there were many'rumours and 
even official confirmations that India would be able to 
invoke her option in a comparatively short period. 
(') 
In 
the context of the Groat tension existing between the two 
sides such a situation could have had serious inplications. 
The General fear prevailing in Pakistan about the Indian 
nuclear development found its expression in many newspaper 
articles. It is significant for example that the former 
foreign minister Zulfil; ar Ali Bhutto in his book, 'The I yth 
of Independencet referred several times to its and while 
pointing out the very low degree of industrial development 
UO 
in Pakistan, nevertheless calls for a nuclear development 
by Pakistan. He writes: '1e arc, however, not immediately 
concerned with the question of a nuclear stalemate. our 
problera, in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon in 
time before the crisis begins. India, whose progress in 
nuclear teclunoloGy is sufficient to ma.. e her a nuclear 
power in the near future, can provoke this at a time of her 
own choosing. She has already received foreiGn assistance 
(1) See belog Chapter II. 
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for her nuclear pro; ararnnie and will continue 
Pakistan must therefore embark on a similar 
although a nuclear weapon will be neither a 
nor can it be produced in a few years. We 
write it off as a practical deterrent in an- 
India in the near future. 
'(') 
to receive it. 
programme, 
real deterrent 
must therefore 
y conflict with 
This, of course, was : "ritten after the war of 1965. 
It is obvious that Bhutto at least re,; ards India as an 
aggressive. power'intendinG and planning to integrate 
Pakistan into India. In another passaao discussinG 
India's basic intentions towards Pakistan, the problem of 
Kashmir, and the question of nuclear weapons, he writes: 
'If the worst ziere to come to the worst, what would be the 
consequences of Pakistan abandoning Jammu and Kashmir? It 
is clear that a compromise of this nature would whet but 
not satisfy India's appetite and, with hor growing military 
power and possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, she 
would use these territories as a rallying point for inte- 
I: 
gating the renaining parts of Pakistan. 
The question however, is whether these Pakistani 
fears were among the causes of the war. These causes 
should be considered within several conte:: ts: on the 
Indian part there was the Crowing fear of a combined 
Chinese-Pakistani front, a fear that had boon exacerbated 
by both the Chines nuclear e:: periment and the rapprochement 
between Pakistan aid China of . larch 1965. This Growing 
understanding between these two erstwhile enemies, and the 
(1) See p., 153 
(2) See P" 177 
Go possibility of a new push by China towards South East Asia 
(at least in the image that some Indian decision-makers 
had of the Chinese intentions), and one which would be 
conducted by the strategy of 'national liberation wars' and 
preceded by a Chinese effort to neutralise India - all would 
endanger India considerably. 
" 
Thus within the context 
of Indian-Chinese relations the Pakistani moves were magni- 
fied and contributed to a rapid deterioration. By invoking 
the Chinese threat or potential threat, the Pakistanis only 
succeeded in exacerbating a process of escalation. 
The growing; Pakistani fears were concentrated first 
on the direct relations between India and Pakistan, i. e. 
as to the future of Kashmir, the feeling being that unless 
something was done imm ediately,. the ILas: unir problem would 
be settled for all intents and purposes by the Indian gait 
accompli. The world would forgot about it and the super 
powers would come to accept the status quo. Second were 
the extensive armament plans India endorsed, plans which 
Pakistan considered with great alarm. This armament 
programme and the Pakistani fears should also be considered 
within the conte;: t of the changing relations between India 
and the two super powers. Since the 1962 Indian-Chinese 
z: ar relations between India and the U. S. A. had improved 
ý1) See for e: oraple Major General P. S. Lha&at 
ýForý the S ±. e? dt 1965 quoted by Russel 
Erines The ncioýF£;.: ý st r f1 Ct 1968, 
Pall Flail Pros, 1968. 
-t 
considerably and generous military aid had been promised 
by America and the U. Ii. Relations between India and the 
Soviet Union had for a long time been cordial. Both super 
powers had started to supply India with sophisticated 
weapons. America and Britain concentrated on equipment 
for defence against China, while Russia supplied India, 
among other things, with a factory for producing riig 21's. 
Even before this factory went into production, Russia 
started to supply India with Soviet made I'1ig 21+s. Already 
by the. Autumn of 1965 India had 12 of these planes(1). 
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At the same time the Indians were also very concerned 
about the American weapons that Pakistan had, mainly the 
Patton tanks. 
, 
Thus fears about present and future armament 
programmes were prominent on both sides. Pakistani fears 
were concentrated on the future situation while the Indians 
were concerned with the state of affairs in the present. 
These Indian fears concentrated upon the quality of the 
Pakistani weapons, quality rather than quantity. Quanti- 
tatively, India was superior, although this superiority was 
partly cancelled by . her: need to divide ', her., forces 
between two fronts (the Chinese and the Pakistani). 
ostensibly this difference should have led to a Pakistani 
preventive war, which indeed in a way was the case. How- 
ever, this was ._ not directed against the possible future 
change in the balance of power and also not against the nuclear 
(1 See on this and the other, raterial about the causes 
of the roar, Russel Brines 'The Indo Pakistani 
Conf? ictý, on. cit. 
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capability of India, but rather in the hope of accomplishing 
a very limited objective, i. e. solving the Kashmir problem 
in a way advantageous to Pakistan. It Evas India which 
decided to escalate the conflict beyond these limitations 
and to achieve by this very escalation a more comprehensive 
military victory, which would perhaps prove to Pakistan 
that the Balance of power even at the time of the war was 
favourable to India. 
The problem, of 
there in the minds of 
role within the conto: 
it was part ware 
the future and not an 
nuclear options was certainly always 
the Pakistanis, but played a smaller 
Kt of the immediate motives for the 
of the general complex of fears about 
independent direct cause for attack. 
The two wars also show that the real +shooting' in 
one case, and the escalation into General war in the second 
case (India-Pakistan), were started in both cases by the 
powers which were both stronger in conventional armies and 
which also enjoyed a much higher level of nuclear develop- 
ment. This does not say much about the motivations in 
starting the wars. In the case of Israel, it was not pre- 
meditated war but a reaction once the crisis escalated, and 
the same pattern applies to India. Furthermore there is 
always a Zap between the images that a power has of itself 
and objective reality, and this certainly existed in both 
cases, i. es both Israel and India exaggerated the capabilities 
(1} It is interesting that in his political autobiography, 
Ayub P. iian while discussing India's rearmament prograi. u e, 
never mentions India's nuclear developroe; it. His book 
ends in mid-1965, and ^o he has no comments on the 
causes of the war. See ' `riends not asters %, especially 
chapters 9 &.: 10, 
G3 
of their enemies. : 'hat is importan 
India and Israel were both stronger, 
it necessary to escalate the crisis. 
a preventive war against the nuclear 
them seems therefore an even remoter 
two wars 0 
t;, however, is that 
and yet still found 
The possibility of 
potential of both of 
explanation for the 
Where tl: e dancer of preventive war within the con- 
text of nuclear proliferation does emerge is perhaps as 
between a near nuclear weapon state and its nuclear enemy. 
The obvious cases are Russia against Germany; Russia or 
China against Japan in the case of a decision by the latter 
to 'go nuclear' and also to abandon at the same time her 
military pact with the U. S.: and China against India. 
This is at least the situation at the time being. 
One has to draw a distinction of course between near- 
nuclear-weapon powers which have military alliances and 
Guarantees from big powers and those which do not enjoy 
this luxury. 
(1) 
A different question of course is whether 
a super power will be ready to retain its guarantee if its 
ally does become a nuclear power. This would depend on 
the general climate regarding nuclear proliferation at the 
time. Although the Non--Proliferation Treaty has not yet 
come into force the climate of attitudes among the big 
powers is still such that it seems inconceivable that a super 
The clear line of such a distinction is serietýhat 
eroded by the American, Soviet and British Guarantee, 
through the Security Council, for support to states 
party to the :; on-Fro1jfera tion Treaty, trjých are 
threatened or attacked b; r nuclear t47eapons. 
1963) ). (Resolution 255 of the Security Council ( % 
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power would be ready to accept such a development with 
equanimity. ' Thus within the present context of political 
relationships both within and outside the alliances, it 
seems hard to believe that nuclear proliferation could take 
place within the alliances without affecting considerably 
the nature of super power guarantees. Outside the 
alliances system the danger of preventive war launched by 
a nuclear power against a new nuclear power in its first 
stages of nuclear weapons development seeds more possibleo(l 
The hind of political contort in which the relations between 
Germany and Russia are conducted and the emphasis put by 
Russia on the issue of possible proliferation to Germany, 
suggests that a preventive strike by Russia against a newly 
nuclear Germany is more than a remote possibility. The 
kind of relations between both Russia and China on the one 
hand and Japan, on the other hand, and between China and 
India, tend to suggest that in both cases the danger of a 
preventive war (in case of either Japan or India Going 
nuclear) launched by China in the case of India, or Russia 
and/or China in the case of Japan is again comparatively 
limited. The dangers will lie mainly in the inability of 
these newly nuclear powers to constitute in the long range 
a stable balance of deterrence between themselves and China 
or one of the super-powers. The case of West Germany is 
different because of the special fears and apprehensions of 
Russia and also because the central balance of deterrence 
will be affected by her (West Germany) becoming a nuclear 
power, Much more so than in the case of any other power. Here 
(1) Cf. Hoffmann on. cit. 
o 
the distinction between nuclear proliferation in Europe, 
which is still the main area of bipolar relationship., and 
proliferation in other parts of the world is significant. 
Apart from the growing reluctance of the super 
powers to take upon themselves new commitments in other 
parts of the world, (unless they come under great pressure 
by their clients or allies - as is now the case in the 
Middle East - and even then only with great reluctance and 
continuous attempts at achieving mechanisms for crisis 
management), they are also at present creating for them- 
selves the option not to become entangled in dangerous 
situations which might arise outside Europe. This caution, 
which admittedly might not necessarily be shared in equal 
proportion by the U. S. and Soviet Union, could enable them 
to withstand many of the probable effects of nuclear pro- 
liferation in 4ome regional sub-systems outside Europe. 
A priori it could be argued that a symmetrical decision 
by the super powers to withdraw from a certain sub system 
in which proliferation took place, would ascertain the 
continuation of the overall stability of their nuclear 
strategic relationship. 
The problem of syruaetry is therefore crucial here. 
It could be argued again that within this context, a 
symmetry in the actions of the super powers would depend 
to a large extent on the symmetry (or lack of it) of the 
development of the nuclear options in the hands of the 
local powers in the sub-system itself. If for example a 
pair of local enemies 'went nuclear' at the same time, the 
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super powers would have the option to decide to withdraw 
simultaneously from the same region, once they felt that 
there was a high likelihood of escalation resulting from 
the destabilising effects of the e:: istence of nuclear 
weapons in the area. The current move towards less 
control by the super powers in the world and the partial 
fragmentation of the international system, only shows that 
the option for simultaneous withdrawal from areas affected 
by nuclear proliferation is not out of step with the 
current trend. 
(') 
A different development could be assumed in case 
of asymmetrical proliferation in a regional sub-system. 
If only one state out of a pair of local enemies 'went 
nuclear', the pressure on the super power patron of the 
opposing local power to become further involved in the 
local conflict, would become very strong. Such an in- 
volvement - which would probably take the form of 
guarantees - would probably create great pressures on the 
other super power to become involved in a symmetrical Jay. 
Thus an asymmetrical proliferation might result in greater 
commitment of the super powers in the sub-system, Such an 
involvement might result either in some kind of a crisis 
management mechanism as between the super powers plus some 
kind of strict control over the local nuclear powers, or 
For a more detailed description of the possible 
future super Powers'' configurations in case of 
nuclear proliferation in one sub-system, see 
below Chapter 6. 
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conversely it might result in an international crisis 
and thus endanger the stability of the super-powers' 
relationship. Still another possibility is that the 
super power whose ally is inferior in nuclear development, 
would refuse to become drawn into an overcommitment, even 
in face of asymmetrical proliferation. 
The effects of limited proliferation in a regional 
sub-system, on the super powers' relationship could be 
quantified in the following way(1) : symmetrical prolifer- 
ation, high probability of no effect on stability of the 
central balance of deterrence; asymrietrical prol3. feration, 
three equal possibilities; super power affected 
(ally of 
inferior local power), choosing not to intervene; two 
super powers intervening (first the ally of inferior 
local power and then consequently the other one), but 
creating a stabilising mechanism (either by control over 
local powers or through an agreement to withdraw jointly 
from the area once escalation started or still not to 
intervene once escalation started); super powersi involve- 
ment by extending guarantees, without working out mechanisms 
of control or crisis management. In the first two of these 
three possibilities, the central balance of deterrence 
would not be destabilised. 
A different set of dancers to the stability of the 
super powers relationship might come if the new nuclear 
p 
powers outside Europe (as for Europe see above) were trying 
to play an independent role in the global international 
(1) This quantification has only heuristic value. 
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system. This was the case with China and might be in 
the future the case with Japan. Here the main danger 
is related to the growing difficulties in the process of 
decision raking in both super pourers in case of a crisis 
between then, a crisis in which Japan or a similar power 
might become involved or at least in which the possibility 
of such-involvement must be taken into account. Here 
Zoppo s(1) argument is certainly valid, but with three 
major qualifications: (a) the experience of SALT proves 
that the super powers can maintain a system of conmunications 
and consultations about their strategic capabilities and 
doctrines and thus on the one hand achieve such information 
as would enable them to assess more rationally and 
accurately their mutual moves in times of crisis, while on 
the other hand create a basis for some form of permanent 
mechanism for planning strategic moves in times of crisis; 
(b) the development of various ABM systems would again 
lessen the uncertainties of the super powers about the 
threat of such a new nuclear power, in case of a crisis 
between the super powers; (c) the great development in 
the field of detection and satelite intelligence would 
supply the super powers with a host of information about 
the delivery systems of this new nuclear power and thus 
again lessen the uncertainties of the decision makers, 
Whereas the effects of proliferation in the sub- 
systems, on the central balance of deterrence could be 
(1) See Zoppo op. cit. 
destc, bilisinG only in somo 1imitcd- cases , and which the 
0 
super powers already control, and can further devise, 
' nechanisms to overcome some of these continGoncios, the 
outcome might be different for the local powers themselves. 
Both s"etrical and asymmetrical proliferation in some 
sub-systems might result in critical destabilisation of 
the local balances oil Posper. 
(1) 
Decision r.. aý: ing processes 
t', ould become much more complex, there wcfuld be groat 
systemic pressures on the local powers, and the structure 
of relations inside each sub-syste: -, might change. 
One of the indicators of growing fr grientation in 
the international system of today is the emerging poly- 
centrism in the alobal international system coupled with 
increasing multipolarity inside each sub-system. 
(2) 
Asymmetrical proliferation to small and medium powers in 
sub-systems, powers which are not aspiring to competition 
with the super powers, a proliferation which leads to super 
power involvement, night partly change this development in 
the sense that the local powers change their respective 
sub-systems into Polycentric ones. At the same time 
such a trend would lead to some revival of bipolarity in the 
(1) For a co.. ipreFýensive discussion of auch effects in 
case of riainly syrlmCtrical prolif cration in the 2"iiddle tact see Chapter 6. 
(2) The ter.:: 3 Polycentrism and r,. ultipolarit; " are used 
leere in the sense that ! Toff: aenn gives then, see 
Hoffmann on. cit. 
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global international system, a revival howover, which 
would not affect all the regional sub-systems. 
(') 
Symmetrical proliferation in regional sub-systems might 
increase polycentrism in the global international system 
and lessen super powers influence over parts of the world. 
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At the same time it could possibly create local bipolarities 
inside sub-systems affected by proliferation. Further 
proliferation inside sub-systens beyond pairs of local 
enemies, might create hierarchical systems inside these 
sub-systems, and probably have further destabilising 
effects on the local balances of power. The process of 
fragmentation in the global international systems would 
probably go on in such a case. 
(1) For another model see Chapter 6. 
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TIM USES OF NUCIMAR OPTIONS 
I 
In most of the literature on the problems of nuclear 
proliferation, the phase of being a 'near-nuclear-weapon 
state' or potential nuclear power, is considered transitory. 
(The status of a 'civil nuclear power' is considered more 
permanent. ) The writers are interested either in a parti- 
cular state's motivations for 'going nuclear' or in the 
likelihood of its 'going nuclear', or in ways of stopping 
this process. There is however only a limited study of 
one central problem: what are the strategic and diplomatic 
uses of the nuclear options themselves? namely, how could 
a state use its options, either tacitly or overtly, for 
the purpose of diplomatic or strategic bargaining. 
(') 
That nuclear options have already been used as 
bargaining counters in diplomacy, is well enough known, 
although because of the nature of diplomatic practice, the 
knowledge is not detailed. Some of the examples for this 
practice in the past will be cited in this chapter. On 
the basis of this past practice, and because of two 
principal reasons, listed below, it could be argued that 
nuclear options will be used in the future as instruments of 
(1ý This problem is mentioned, for example, although 
quite briefly, by Kurt Gesteiger, 'Nuclear Prospects 
and Foreign Policy', Survey, January 1966. On the 
case of Israel in this context, see a brief reference 
in Leonard Beaton, ' by Israel Does Not Need the Bombt, 
The New Middle East, April 1969; see also, Aubrey 
Bodes, Dialogue With Ishmael, Funk & Wagnalls, New 
York 1968, Chapter 13. 
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bargaining in strategy and diplomacy. The reasons are: 
(a) The Non-Proliferation Treaty acts as a holding operation 
against further proliferation, but at the same time it is 
not capable of keeping the signatories very far from the 
stage of becoming fully nuclear - if they so wish it. They 
will decide what stage of their nuclear development they 
will reach according to their national interests (or rather 
the way in which they perceive their national interests), 
the success and comprehensiveness of the inspection system, 
and super-power pressures and accommodation. The way is 
open for them to go on building a certain capability which 
is not directed exclusively at weapons' production, but 
could still serve this purpose after a political decision 
was taken. They-can also decide to opt out of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty altogether according to article 10(1). 
(1 
Thus the Non-Proliferation Treaty does not cancel 
the nuclear options of near-nuclear-weapon states. In order 
to prevent these options from being invoked in some circum- 
stances, there is a need for constant attention to be paid 
by the powers which find it in their interest not to allow 
(1) The text of this article runs as follows: 'Each Party 
shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the 
right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that 
extraordinary events, related to the subject matter 
of this Treaty, have jeopardi©ed the supreme interests 
of its country. It shall give notice of its with- 
drawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the 
United Nations Security council three months in 
advance. Such notice shall include a statement of 
the extraordinary events it regards as having 
jeopardised its supreme interests. ' 
I 
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further proliferation in general, and/or in particular 
cases. Indeed, the Non-Proliferation Treaty 'codifies', 
in a manner of speaking, the status of the nuclear option 
and thus keeps open the possibility of using the option 
as an instrument of pressure. Moreover, once the Treaty 
became operative, the action of any party in opting out 
might jeopardise the whole anti proliferation strategy, 
much more than if the same party had never adhered to it 
in the first place. Such opting out might create a chain 
reaction; might create doubts as to the whole validity of 
the Treaty and might encourage near-nuclear-weapon states 
which refused to become parties to the Treaty in the first 
place, to invoke their option without undue fear of sanctions. 
Thus the effort to keep the Treaty a going concern, must 
be carried on, and although the non-proliferation strategy 
scored an important success with the accomplishment of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, the task has not ended and in 
some ways became more complicated. 
(b) It appears at present that those powers that 
refused to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, are 
still reluctant to 'go nuclear'. * This is mainly because 
of strategic, political and economic(') reasons rather 
(1) On the economic problems involved in the development 
of an Indian nuclear deterrent, see for example 
Major General D. Sorn Dutt, India and the Bomb, 
Adelphi Paper No. 30, Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London, 1966. 
The problem of how to finance a nuclear deterrent becomes more and more the problem of how to finance 
the production of the delivery systems and of the 
command and control system, rather than that of the 
production of the nuclear warheads. Here a dis- 
tinction could be made between those potential nuclear 
powers whose opponents are the super powers or China 
continued... 
"r d 
than super-power pressure. There is therefore a high 
probability that many. states will have nuclear options 
open, and even if they are reluctant to 'go nuclear' will 
at the same time be unwilling to forgo their options, and 
realise increasingly the potential benefits to be derived 
from these options. 
In the past nuclear options have been developed, 
at least in the first stages, without the intention that 
they could eventually serve as instruments for bargaining 
or threats. 
(') 
The realisation that these options could 
be useful as bargaining counters grew gradually. It 
could therefore be argued that in the future, powers might 
decide to develop a nuclear option, partly in order to 
use it as such a bargaining instrument. 
That is a Near-Nuclear-Weapon State? 
It seems easier to define what is a nuclear power 
than to define a near-nuclear-weapon state, though even in 
Footnote continued from previous page 
on the one hand, and those which face only local 
enemies. For the first category, the financial 
price is much more severe, than for the second ones 
On price estimates of different nuclear capabili- 
ties, inclusive of the delivery systems, see Report 
Of 'The Secretary-General On The ]affects Of The 
Possible Use Of Nuclear Weapons And On The Security 
And Economic Implications For States Of The 
Acquisition And Further Development of These Wen pons, 
UN Secretary-General Report 6858,196L. ' 
(1) One of the first and still best analyses of the 
rationale for the nuclear development in six of the 
potential nuclear powers and three actual nuclear 
powers, is included in Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, London, 1962. 
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the former case there are ambiguities. The problem is 
compounded by the introduction of the concept of a 'civil 
nuclear powert, which is defined more by the political 
intentions than by capabilities. 
Heurlin(1) suggests one definition of what is a 
nuclear power: 'a country which is recognized - on account 
of its nuclear weapons' tests - to possess one or more 
nuclear weapons which must be presumed available for inde- 
pendent use in an armed conflict. ' The Non-Proliferation 
Treaty defines a 'nuclear-weapon-state' as '... one which 
has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967,. 
(2) 
The Treaty is careful to note that this definition was 
formulated 'For the purpose of this Treaty... ' The 
differences between the two definitions are: (a) the 
operative date (in the Treaty this was fixed at 1 January 
1967); (b) the Non-Proliferation Treaty includes the test 
of a nuclear device as one of the criteria for securing 
the status of a nuclear power. Both definitions have their 
(1ý See Bertal Heurlin, 'Nuclear Proliferation', 
Co-operation and Conflict, III-IV, 1967. 
(2) Article 9(3) of the Treaty. 
rri 
r, 
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(3) i_. 
advantages and disadvantages. Ostensibly the definition 
in the Non-Proliferation Treaty is more useful for the 
following reasons: First, as the technology of the bomb 
is less complicated than the development of the missile 
material, it could be taken for granted that once a test 
on a device was carried through, the state concerned had 
already mastered the technology of the bomb or was very 
close to it. Second, for states which have a high level 
of nuclear potential, the main obstacle to tgoing nuclear' 
is political. Once a test was carried through, the 
political intentions would become clear. Indeed the test 
would be in any case in defiance of the Test Ban Treaty 
d" 
(provided it was not conducted underground), and of the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty as well, and this clearly suggests the 
political decision to go ahead with a nuclear weapons pro- 
gramme. There would not be any reason why this particular 
state should refrain from this once the test was conducted 
and thus incur reactions fror. the international community in 
any case. Third, precisely because nuclear weapons are. 
in the first place deterrence instruments, and because the 
technology of the bomb is not an unsurmountable obstacle, 
once a test was conducted, nuclear threats by the tester 
will already have some credibility. 
At the same time, it could be argued that only the 
actual possession of the bomb could make a state a nuclear 
weapon power, in the sense that only then could this state, 
according to circumstances, deter another nuclear power. 
The definition of the Treaty will cover this contingency 
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only if the test of a device was sufficient to create enough 
uncertainty in the mind of the nuclear opponent as to 
whether the tester already had the actual weapons. This 
only shows that in different circumstances, the notion of 
a nuclear power could be defined in different ways. Indeed, 
there are more examples which show the possibility of 
different border cases between nuclear-weapon states and 
near-nuclear-weapon states. One case may be that in which 
a state explodes a nuclear device in order to indicate to 
other states that it may still consider the possibility of 
not proceeding with its nuclear programme if certain demands 
were met. The exploding of the device is used as a signal 
in a bargaining process. However, in view of the enormous 
effort needed to make a decision in defiance of both the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and of the Test Ban Treaty, it 
seems safe to assume that the state carrying out the test, 
is willing in any case to go ahead and produce nuclear 
weapons notwithstanding any concessions which might be 
offered to it. The position might be somewhat different 
if the Non-Proliferation Treaty were to disintegrate because 
many states decided to opt out of it, and hence the 
situation had become more fluid. 
An intriguing question is whether a state could be 
considered nuclear if it declared that it possessed a 
nuclear weapon but did not want to test it because it was a 
party to the Test Ban Treaty or the Non Proliferation Treaty 
(in the second case assuming that it had developed this 
device before becoming party to the Treaty), or, again, 
JJ 
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because of technical reasons (lack of testing sites) or 
because a test was not in its interest at the time. It 
might add that it was ready to submit the weapons for 
inspection, for the sole purpose of proving this capability. 
A similar problem would be posed by states which adhered to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty, declaring at the same time 
that they had already produced one or few nuclear weapons, 
but were now ready to adhere to the Treaty. Thus a power 
which had, in fact, nuclear bombs could be considered as a 
non-nuclear power according to the Treaty and might even 
adhere to it. 
In order to account for such situations the definition 
of a 'nuclear-weapon-state' could be widened as follows: 
"A"nuclear-weapon stat&4 is one which has manufactured a 
" nuclear weapon, tested it, or tested a nuclear device, or 
proved that it has a nuclear weapon, which must be presumed 
available for independent use in an armed conflict. "(') 
This discussion and the examples given, only serve to show 
that the definition of a 'nuclear power' might change 
according to circumstances and also according to the uses 
required bf the nuclear capability. In some cases deterrence 
Another and more restrictive definition is suggested 
by Wibrich who argues that three elements are needed: 
possession of nuclear weapons, capability for 
independent decision on the uses of it and effective 
delivery systems. See Mason Wiltrich, 'Guarantees for 
Non Nuclear Nations', Foreign Affairs, July 1966. 
79 
may be secured at even a low level (explosion of a device 
or acquiring nuclear weapons without testing them). In 
some (and perhaps most} cases, this would not be sufficient 
be 
and could possibly/even counter-productive. 
What then is a 'potential nuclear state' or a 'near- 
nuclear-weapon state'? Here a distinction should be 
drawn between capabilities and intentions, or in other words, 
between 'civil nuclear states' and 'near-nuclear-weapon 
states'. A definition based on capability would be: "A 
potential nuclear state (comprising both sub-divisions) is 
the one that has an independent plutonium production 
capability sufficient to produce one or more bombs per year, 
or is working on it and is close to achieving it, and which 
has the minimum independent scientific, technological and 
financial capability to master problems of bomb technology 
and delivery systems (either by self production or by 
acquisition). " In this context "Independent" means 
"without outside control". As plutonium production is 
more open to outside observance whereas bomb technology 
could be developed in complete secrecy, the definition 
includes a clause on the objective conditions of the 
productive potential rather than active work Sin the pro- 
duction. This definition covers of course both 'civil 
nuclear states', and 'near-nuclear-weapon states'. The 
division line between them would be through the introduction 
of a clause dealing with the political intention. Thus 
a 'near-nuclear-weapon state, would be the one with the 
capabilities defined above and "... which has the intention 
of possessing a nuclear weapons capability, or at least 
considers it as a possibility, or is assumed to have such 
an intention. " 
f 
Wilrich(l) bases his definition of a "potential 
nuclear state" only on capabilities, with the amendment 
that one should take into consideration outside help as 
well. 
Beaton discusses twelve states which have sometime$ 
been suggested as possible potential nuclear states 
(Canada, West-Germany, Japan, Sweden, Italy, Switzerland, 
Belgium, Netherlands, India:, Israel, U. A. R., and 
Czechoslovakia). There have been some indications that 
some East-European countries are now developing some 
'civil nuclear capability'. 
(2) 
For the purpose of this discussion 
nuclear-weapon state', which will cover 1, 
states' as well, will be used. However, 
nuclear states have less ability to exert 
virtue of their nuclear options than have 
nuclear-weapons states. 
the term tnear- 
civil nuclear 
pure 'civil' 
pressure by 
the near- 
(1) ibid. 
(2) See Jugen Notzold, 'Nuclear Energy in East Europe', 
Europa Archiv, No. 21,1967, republished in Survival, March 1968. - 
Martin and Young write "If nothing is done, this 
process may be expected to continue indefinitely, Proliferation has reached a stage where India could 
achieve a first fission test within eighteen months from the decision taken, Canada within two years, West Germany within three years, Israel, Sweden, 
Italy and Japan within five years, and Czechoslovakia, 
East Germany, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Poland, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Australia, South-Africa, Pakistan, 
and possibly Indonesia and the U. A. R. within ten. " 
See Andrew Martin and Wagland Young, "Proliferation", 
Disarmament and Arms Control, 3(2), 1965. 
It appears however that this prediction should be 
qualified in several ways, and in any case does not 
take into consideration other factors affecting the 
political decisions of various states. 
01 
As has been suggested before, some near-nuclear- 
weapon states have already used their nuclear options - 
and will presumably do more so in the future - as 
bargaining counters. They use these options as instruments 
either to compel other states to do something, or to deter 
other states from doing something. Thus two analytical 
concepts used in strategic theory could be applied here, 
namely deterrence and compellence. 
(1) 
But whereas in 
stratogy, deterrence and compellence are used in connection 
with the threat of a possible violent action involving 
military force, in the model suggested in this chapter, 
they are used in connection with the actual or implied 
threat to create a tremendous instrument of violence, 
namely a threat to produce nuclear weapons. As the 
nuclear options can serve as instruments of bargaining 
(both for deterrence and compellence purposes), in both 
strategy and diplomacy, the following discussion pre- 
supposes that deterrence and compellence, although being 
strategic concepts, could be used in the study and analysis 
of diplomatic practice as well. 
The model suggested below, like other strategic 
concepts and models, has among others, three significant 
characteristics - all of them doing some violence to reality: 
(i) For the definition of the second concept, see 
Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, Yale 
University Press, 1966. For an elaboration of 
this concept in connection with the use of 
nuclear options, see Appendix I. 
A 
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(a) it assumes rationality on the part of the actors, 
and rationality of a particular type; (b) it is 
.a 
behavioural model; (c) it is a 'situational model'. 
(') 
Categories of Near-Nuclear-Weapon States 
The first distinction should be made between those 
states which are known to have decided to 'go nuclear' 
notwithstanding any pressures or arguments against such 
a stop and those which have not yet made up their mind. 
To the extent that such a decision is made public and in 
unequivocal terms, the state taking it would lose its 
bargaining power vis-a-vis states which have either a 
general interest in halting proliferation or a particular 
interest in halting this particular state from 'going 
nuclear'. The entry into force of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty makes this distinction clearer. It could be 
assumed that those states which ratified the Treaty or 
joined it, certainly belonged to the second group of states. 
At the same time, the fact that a state has not become 
Party to the Treaty does not mean necessarily that it has 
decided to 'go nuclear', but rather that it keeps its 
options open on a higher level than is the case with states 
adhering to the Treaty. (As has been suggested already 
even states which adhere to the Treaty keep the option open 
but under greater technological and political restrictions. 
) 
(1) On 'situational models' see Karl Deutsch, 
The Nerves of Government, Glencoe I11., 
11963 st" IL-1l. 
I 
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Thus since the Treaty entered into force, there 
have been two categories of near-nuclear-weapon states 
with - theoretically - a third: (a) near-nuclear-weapon 
states which had become Parties to the Treaty; (b) near- 
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nuclear-weapon states which had stayed out of it but had 
not declared a decision to 'go nuclear'; (c) near-nuclear- 
weapon states which had decided to 'go nuclear' but had 
still not done sop (at present no state has declared that 
it has taken this decision). 
States opting out of the Treaty according to 
article 10(1. ), will join either category (b) or (c) 
according to the language they use and the actual steps 
they have taken. In a way it could be argued that a state 
acting according to article 10(1), might be considered as 
moving right ahead into category (c), even if it did not 
indicate an intention to tgo nucleart. To make such a 
far-reaching decision as opting out according to article 
10(1), a decision which would undoubtedly bring about 
great pressure by the super powers and the international 
community on the particular state, is perhaps justified 
only when the state in question really intends to produce 
nuclear weapons. At the same time it is possible to en- 
visage a situation in which a state decides to act 
according to article 10(1), without as yet making the final 
decision. By opting out of the Treaty, the state hopes 
to bring pressure to bear on either the super powers or 
other powers and also (on some occasions) to shorten the 
lead-time between a political decision and the actual 
production of the bomb. 
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The category of near-nuclear-weapon state is 
therefore a very wide one, permitting many intermediate 
situations and possible bargaining counters. Pressure 
could be exerted by the near-nuclear-weapon states on 
the super powers or other powers, and conversely by 
these latter powers on the near-nuclear-weapon states 
about the possibility of 'going nuclear'. The outcome 
of these pressures depends on the particular set of cir- 
cumstances of every state, on the patterns of pressure, 
and the nature of a possible quid pro quo. 
There are two differences between the threat to 
'go nuclear' and the threat to use force: (a) the results, 
and this is quite obvious; (b) the length of the process 
between the threat and its implementation. The process 
of bargaining about a decision to 'go nuclear' would be 
longer than in the case of the threat of force. There 
is always a certain time-lag until a test could be con- 
ducted, during which time bargaining can go on. Moreover, 
the possibility remains of continuing this bargaining 
after the test of a device and before production of the 
bombs. The use of force on the other hand is usually the 
end of a certain vital process of bargaining although on 
many occasions the process of bargaining goes on even 
there* 
(1) 
(1} The doctrine of "limited strategic war" envisages 
the delivery of one or few bombs as part of a 
bargaining process. 
ý. 
Categories of states against which the threat to 'go 
nuclear' can be applied 
The threat to tgo nuclear' for purposes of 
deterrence and compellence can be directed against three 
categories of states but can also affect another category. 
The first three categories are: (a) The two super powers, 
which in their role as world powers have a vested interest 
in halting proliferation. The United Kingdom was also 
very active in promoting the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
However, because of the limited resources at her disposal, 
it is probable that her ability to bring pressure to bear 
on the one hand and to give certain concessions to the 
near-nuclear-weapon states is very limited. 
The super powers are concerned about nuclear pro- 
liferation, primarily because of two reasons: (a) it 
poses a limited threat to their overwhelming control of 
nuclear power (although it is hard to envisage any new 
nuclear power which could match this preponderance); 
(b) it might affect the stability of the bipolar system. 
As has been pointed out in Chapter I, the destabilising 
effects on the bipolar system as a result of proliferation, 
are possibly less critical than has been usually suggested, 
as the super powers can develop strategies_ and policies 
which would allow them in many cases either to manage 
crises or to disengage from those parts of the world in 
which proliferation took place. However, this does not 
yet appear to be the way in which decision makers in the 
super-power governments look at proliferation, and in any 
case some of the effects could indeed be destabilising to 
86 
the bipolar system. Such, for instance might be the 
case of asymmetrical proliferation in a sub-system, in 
which the super powers are already deeply involved and 
commited. The problem however will remain as to what 
priority each super power attaches to anti proliferation 
strategy. Their position might vary from time to time 
and may not be symmetrical. 
One of the interesting problems is whether new 
members of the "nuclear club" will share the same interest 
as the first three nuclear powers in halting proliferation. 
At present, it seems that China and certainly France have 
drifted away from their enthusiasm for proliferation and 
are developing a tacit shared interest with the first 
three qt least in not encouraging. it. However, although 
they may perhaps be content that proliferation has not yet 
occurred, they are not likely, for a very long time to 
come, to do anything positive about it. The Chinese 
attitude could be summed up as being on the declaratory 
level, in favour of proliferation (to 'peace loving 
countries'), but not ready to supply actual weapons to 
other countries*() Although France has not become 
Party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, she has made it 
clear that she will act according to its spirit. 
(1) On the Chinese position, see Walter C. Clements 
Jr. The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations, 
Stanford, 1968, especially pp. 127-135" 
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It is difficult to speculate about what the 
attitude of new nuclear powers will be. Attitudes on 
proliferation may very well change if one's own country 
becomes nuclear. The reservations of several members 
of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee on the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty are not sufficient proof as to what 
may be their actual attitude if, indeed, they do 'go 
nucleart. In any case, as has been suggested in regard 
to Britain, it -is inconceivable that any of the newly 
formed nuclear powers will be in the position of the super- 
powers in having the interest and the resources to take 
action about a near nuclear power which threatens to 'go 
nuclear'. They may have these interests, if they are 
directly involved'with this "near nuclear" state. But 
in that case the relationship will be different in type 
and. intensity. They will not act as world powers, a role 
the super-powers are playing now, but in a different 
manner and will actually belong to one of the rest of these 
categories. 
(b) A nuclear enemy. At the present time this 
will mean enemies of one of the members of the nuclear club. 
In future it may mean more (if more states 'went nuclear'). 
At present there could be three possible sub-categories 
here: (1) The nuclear enemy being one of the super-powers. 
Two possible examples are Germany and Japan with the Soviet 
Union as their enemy. In that case the threat will affect 
the bipolar system. (2) Tho enemy being China - namely, 
a power which aspires to become the third super-power and a 
world power. Here, the threat may involve the two super- 
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powers, but again in a different capacity, as it will not 
necessarily be part of the central balance of deterrence. 
This might be the case if the possible near-nuclear-weapon 
state is India, and later on Australia as well. (3) The 
enemy being France or Britain. 
The 1967 French strategic doctrine as stated by 
General Ailleret(1)puts France as a possible enemy outside 
the framework of the central balance of deterrence. If 
developed to its logical conclusion it could bring about a 
situation where France, Ilke the two super-powers, would 
become involved in conflicts all over the globe, and thus 
may regard development of new independent nuclear forces 
as possible threat to her. The now strategy actually 
assumes future proliferation and the possibility of threats 
towards France from all "points of the compass". In this 
respect France puts herself voluntarily in the place of 
the super-powers, in their roles as world powers, but 
without the capabilities the latter possess. If France 
(and possibly other nuclear powers in her category) became 
involved in a conflict with a medium or a small nuclear 
power, she would be much more vulnerable to a nuclear threat. 
She would not have ABM systems and would not be able to 
count on tremendous nuclear offensive systems such as the 
super-powers possess. 
(1) See 'Directed Defences', Survival, February 1968. 
The original article, by General Ailleret was 
published in Revue de Defense Nationale, December 
1967. 
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One tends to assume that this French strategic 
doctrine was designed more as a political symbol, namely, 
to bring home the message to both America and Russia about 
the basic change in France's political posture, than as a 
real strategic change. Another possible explanation is 
that France, which is trying to develop a more active 
policy in Asia and Africa, wanted to back this new political 
activity with more military options. A third possible 
explanation was the will to back future political initiatives 
in Europe Itself. One or more of these explanations may 
be correct. In any case, since M. Pompidou became 
President, the emphasis on a world role for France has been 
somewhat muted. 
(4) if more near-nuclear-weapon states 'went 
nuclear1, new pairs of nuclear enemies would emerge. 
(e. g. 
India and Pakistan; Israel and the U. A. R.; Australia and 
Indonesia, etc. ). A preliminary phase may be that in 
which one state 'went nuclear' while the other remained 
in a near-nuclear stage. It is obvious that the nuclear 
power could use its newly acquired capability to obtain 
something from its unfortunate adversary, but the near- 
nuclear state could also use its option as an instrument 
of threat against its adversary. Eventually, if limited 
proliferation takes place, this type of conflict (that is 
to say, between a local nuclear power and a local near- 
nuclear-weapon power) will become more common. 
(c) Near-nuclear or non-nuclear enemies. In 
local conflicts this may be the most common situation, and 
certainly it is so at present. Pairs of enemies like 
-N-l 
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India and Pakistan, Israel and-the U. A. R. will, for a 
long times remain the main examples of the strategy of 
near-nuclear powers. If indeed Australia developed the 
nuclear capability, the same situation may perhaps arise 
eventually between her and Indonesia. 
A fourth category includes those states which 
might be affected by a decision to 'go nuclear' of another 
state, but against which no such threat was made. These 
are states which are in the same sub-system with the near- 
nuclear-weapon state, but which hitherto were in no direct 
conflict with it. Nevertheless they would have some 
cause for concern if that power 'went nuclear'. Thus for 
example, a power like Turkey might become somewhat concerned 
if Israel or Egypt 'went nuclear' and this might bring about 
a change in the perceptions Turkish decision makers have 
of the intentions and policies of the states which 'went 
nuclear'. One of the possible results of such developments 
is that neighbouring states might decide to reorientate 
their policies so as to be less involved in the sub-system, 
or to join military alliances outside the sub-system. Thus 
proliferation inside some sub-systems might bring about the 
adding of actors in the sub-system or conversely the con- 
traction of it. 
The Uses of the Indian Nuclear Option(') 
India has a substantial nuclear potential. It 
was suggested by Nehru in 1969 that India was '... more 
highly developed in nuclear energy than China' 
(2) 
, an 
assertion which with hindsight appears to be somewhat 
optimistic. 
O) 
However, India developed only a plutonium 
capability whereas China concentrated on Uranium production. 
This gave China a lead in the field of weapons programmes, 
while India decided time and again either not to produce 
nuclear weapons or to postpone such a decision. This 
position was probably modified recently. The new Indian 
nuclear programme is aimed at the creation of a very 
elaborate nuclear option which could - if exercised - create 
a credible deterrent to Chinese nuclear power. The new 
plan envisages an elaborate development in the field of 
weapons grade uranium and rocketry. However, the decision 
to invoke the option could be postponed for three or four 
more years. 
ý4ý 
One of the major reasons for India's refusal in the 
past to 'go nuclear' was the very strong position taken by 
Nehru against nuclear weapons in general, a position 
shared by the majority of the political elite 
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(1) only uses vis-ä-vis the super powers are discussed here. 
The uses of the option vis-h-vis China and Pakistan need 
a separate detailed study. 
(2) Speech in Lok Sabha, as quoted by The Hindu, 15.8.1962. 
(3ý For the Indian present capability see inter alia table 4 
in R. LJI. Patil, India - Nuclear weapons and international 
politics, Delhi 1969, p. 32. 
(4) See on this the various articles in The Institute for 
Defence Studies and Analyses Journal, New Delhi, July 
1970. 
(' C) 
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until the mid sixties*(') 
Precisely because of this strong position, it 
could have been expected that the effectiveness of the 
option as a bargaining counter might have been diminished. 
However, because at the same time India persisted in de- 
veloping a considerable nuclear potential, the possibility 
of a military programme could not have been ruled out, 
Thus for example, even Nehru himself in a speech in 1962 
in the Lok Sabha(2) said: "China may have an atom bomb, 
but broadly speaking, I think we are not thinking of the 
atom bomb. We are more highly developed in atomic energy 
than China is. That does not mean that China cannot 
produce an atom bomb before us, because we are not trying 
to do so... If they (Chinese) have an atom bomb, they 
will not lot it loose in India, but they will keep it for 
other purposes. If they do let it loose in India, it 
will be worse for them... ' Which incidentally might mean 
either that India will not 'go nuclear' under any conditions, 
or conversely that if China did attack India, the latter 
might as a result, go nuclear. If the second interpretation 
is valid then the threshold for an Indian decision to 'go 
nuclear' was put by Nehru at a very high level, namely, an 
(1) For an extreme position on this issue see Krishna 
Ienon's attitude in his extensive interviews with 
Michael Brecher. See Brecher, India and World 
Politics, Oxford University press, 1968, pp. 228-233" 
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actual Chinese nuclear attack on India. 
The bargaininG counter created by India's nuclear 
capability, resulted in at the beginning at least, from 
the suspicions of the rest of the world about India's in- 
tentions. The construction of a chemical separation 
plant only helped to increase these suspicions. India's 
contention that she was not planning to 'go nuclear' helped 
somewhat to calm outside suspicions, but still left India 
with a potentially important bargaining counter. 
The situation changed after the first Chinese ex- 
plosion in October 1964. On the one hand there was. a 
tremendous outcry in India, and a strong body of opinion 
began to demand that India should tgo nuclear'. Indeed, 
from that time onwards, this issue never left the arena of 
public debate and an important school of thought emerged 
which favoured an Indian independent nuclear deterrent. 
This school evolved a coherent and elaborate set of argu- 
ments to substantiate its position. On the other hand 
another school of thought insisted on the need for a search 
for some sort of outside nuclear guarantees. The Indian 
government declined to make a decision in favour of the 
'bombt, but gradually moved towards a much more flexible 
position than was the case before the first Chinese test. 
At the same time it started considering the possibility of 
some kind of international guarantees which would bo com- 
patible with India's general foreign policy stance. 
Within the context of this public debate and against 
the background of repeated Chinese tests, the Indian nuclear 
capability assumed greater importance as a bargaining counter. 
 
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The use of the option vis-a-vis the super powers 
There have been over the years three main areas of 
demand made by India vis-a-vis the super powers, which are 
related to nuclear issues. First, there was the demand 
for general disarmament and specially nuclear disarmament. 
(') 
Second, there were demands for steps to be taken against 
vertical proliferation. Third, ambiguous demands for 
guarantees against China. In all these demands, the 
nuclear option tras used either directly or indirectly, 
tacitly or formally. However, as far as the first demand 
was concerned, the option became useful mainly in the de- 
bates about a non-proliferation treaty, primarily in the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee. 
The position against nuclear weapons in general 
was voiced on many occasions. One example out of many 
was the Anti-Nuclear Arnis Convention which took place in 
June 1962 and in 'which many Indian leaders took part, and 
which called upon the super powers to take various steps 
in the field of nuclear disarmament. Mr. Nehru for instance 
suggested the creation of Atom-Free-Zones in different 
parts of the world, while maintaining that the ultimate 
objective must remain complete disarmament. 
(2) 
(1) This demand incidentally did not affect Indiats own 
development of conventional forces. For a study of 
India's defence policy which discusses the development 
of her conventional forces see Lorne J. Kavic, India's 
Quest for Security, University of California Press, 1967. 
(2) On the Convention see The Hindu, 11.6,1962; 15.6.1962; 
16.6.1962; 17,6.1962; 18.6.1962; 19.6.1962 (in which 
Nehru's speech was published); 20.6.1962; Guam, 
19.6.1962. 
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This Indian position on general and complete nuclear 
disarmament, was both part of the "nonaligned" approach to 
international affairs(1) and of the Ghandian heritage. 
One formulation of the basic declaratory Indian 
position on the relationship between international security 
and disarmament can be found in Trivedi's words in the 
Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee: "... India, in parti- 
cular, believes that international security lies not in 
armament but in restraints on armament and in disarmament. 
That belief is, in fact, the basic philosophy underlying all 
discussions on disarmament whether in our Committee or 
elsewhere. "(2) 
Precisely because such an approach insisted that 
nuclear weapons were evil by their very nature; that the 
major danger to world peace and security sprang from the 
existence of two nuclear-armed blocs confronting each other 
all round the globe; that the nonaligned world could create 
some "area of peace" in the world; and lastly that nuclear 
weapons everywhere and in any hands cannot enhance security 
but rather diminish its there was no logical possibility 
of positioning the Indian nuclear option as a bargaining 
counter within this ideological context. 
(1) On the nonaligned approach to these problems see 
inter alias C. V. Crabb, The Elephants and the Grass, 
Praeger, 1965, Chapter N. 
(2) ENDC/PV 335,28.9.967. 
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Even before the first Chinese test, the demand 
for nuclear disarmament, although pointed primarily at 
the super-powers had however a certain edge to it which 
involved China. If indeed nuclear disarmament took 
place all over the world and China adhered to it, then 
India's security could be strengthened as far as China's 
nuclear capabilities were concerned. Thus a demand 
directed primarily at the super-powers had at the same 
time a certain security advantage for India. 
Seeking a general and complete disarmament, because 
of "nonaligned" ideological reasons, remained one of the 
demands of India after the Chinese first test as well, but 
other issues concerning Indian-Chinese nuclear relations 
became equally important. 
Tho Indian nuclear option used as a bargaining 
counter in order to secure nuclear disarmament of the ex- 
isting nuclear powers, became useful once negotiations on 
a treaty against nuclear proliferation got under way in 
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. Isere India 
was able to use the option as a bargaining counter precisely 
because the negotiations were about this option itself 
(along with the options of other near-nuclear-weapon states 
and the possible future nuclear options of all the other 
non-nuclear-weapon states). The sharp edge of this demand 
could be seen in Trivedi's 
(1) 
words: "... Here we must make 
a clear and unambiguous distinction between the national 
(1) ENDC/PV 223,12.8.1965. 
ý, N 
97 
decisions of countries on the one hand and the obligations 
to be assumed by them'as signatories to an international 
instrument on the other. As the Committee is aware, India 
is the only country besides the four nuclear Powers which 
has a chemical separation plant in operation producing 
kilogramme quantities of plutonium. If any country wishes 
to embark on a nuclear weapons programme, it must have a 
chemical separation plant or a Gaseous diffusion plant. 
India is the only one of the countries not in possession 
of nuclear weapons which has this facility. And yet our 
Prime Minister has repeatedly declared that India does not 
intend to enter the nuclear weapon race. India believes 
that nuclear energy must be used only for peaceful purposes. 
This is our national decision, a decision which we have 
taken on a thorough examination of relevant political, 
economic and strategic factors, and we are determined to 
stand firm on it. 
"An international treaty is, however, a different 
proposition. What we are discussing in this Committee is 
not the ndtional decisions of countries. " 
India and the other nonaligned powers therefore 
pursued in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee two 
parallel objectives as far as the nuclear powers were con- 
cerned. First, repeated insistence that apart from the 
negotiations on measures against proliferation, the Eighteen- 
Nation Disarmament Committee should go on discussing problems 
pertaining to general and complete disarmament(1). and nuclear 
(1) There are numerous references to this objective. See 
for example Trivedi in ENDC/PV 240 pp. 6-7. 
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disarmament, or at least partial measures towards it. 
This demand was qualified however, in the sense 
that India was ready to pursue negotiations on "collateral" 
measures short of general and complete disarmament. Thus 
Trivedi: t'... to be sure the nonaligned nations are de- 
termined to continue to urge on all concerned the imperative 
need to achieve general and complete disarmament; but they 
do not say that general and complete disarmament must form 
part of a non-proliferation treaty, or that there can be 
no treaty on non-proliferation unless there is comprehensive 
or even nuclear disarmament. "(') 
Second, demands that the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
itself would contain some measures against vertical pro- 
liferation. Thus one of the basic demands of India in 
the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee was that "the 
treaty should embody an acceptable balance of mutual res- 
ponsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear 
powers, and that it should be a step towards the achievement 
of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, 
of nuclear disarmament, " 
(2 
This basic demand remained one of the bulwarks of 
the Indian position throughout the negotiations on nuclear 
proliferation in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. 
lYithin the framework of this position the Indian delegation 
raised several issues: 
p. 13. (1) See ENDC/PV 240 
(2) Trivedi, ENDC/PV 298 p. 90 
ý. 
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(1) a repeated call for a comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 
and also for the adherence of all states to the existing 
Test-Dan Treaty. 
(') 
This demand was clearly important 
for India also within the context of her conflict with a 
nuclear China. 
(2) The call for a balance of mutual responsibilities and 
obligations of both the nuclear powers and the non-nuclear 
powers inside the proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. 
2 Thus Chakravarty, to cite one example, said on 4,5.1965: 
"I have no doubt that the Disarmament Committee in Geneva 
will discuss this matter in detail, but I would like at this 
stage to outline for the consideration of the Commission 
what, in view of my delegation, could form the basis of an 
integrated solution of the problems of proliferation. The 
elements which should enter into an arrangement on non- 
proliferation could be the following: 
(i) an undertaking by the nuclear Powers not to 
transfer nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons tech- 
nology to others; 
(ii) an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons 
against countries which do not possess them; 
(iii) an undertaking through the U. N. to safeguard 
the security of countries which may be threatened 
by Powers having a nuclear weapon capability or 
about to have a nuclear weapon capability; 
(1) See Joint Memorandum ENDC/235 26.8.1968 by the eight 
nonaligned members of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament 
Committee. 
(2) 75th Meeting of the Disarmament Commission. See also 
Trivedi, ENDC/PV 335,28.9.1967; 
ýý 
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(iv) Tangible progress towards disarmament, 
including a comprehensive test ban treaty, a 
complete freeze on production of nuclear weapons 
and means of delivery as well as substantial 
reduction in the existing stocks and .... It 
(3) Demands within the framework of atomic energy for 
peaceful uses, within the framework of the proposed draft 
non-proliferation treaty. 
(') 
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() A demand that the control system according to the 
proposed Non-Proliferation Treaty should be "... universal, 
objective,. and non-discriminatory. " According to this 
principle, the control system should be applied to the 
, nuclear powers as much as to the non-nuclear powers* 
(2) 
The outcome of the long and protracted negotiations 
in Geneva about measures against vertical proliferation was 
rather limited. Clauses 9,10 & 11 of the preamble to the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty stiuplate: '(9) Declaring their 
intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the 
cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective 
measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, 
(1.0) Urging the co-operation of all States in the 
attainment of this objective, 
(11) Recalling the determination expressed by the 
Parties to the '1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test in 
(1) See Trivedi, ENDC/PV 335,28.9.1967; see also Husain, ErDc/PV 370,27.2.1968. 
(2) See Trivedi, ENDC/PV 335,28.9.1967. 
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the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in its pre- 
amble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test 
explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue 
negotiations to this end. ' 
And Article 6 states: 'Each of the Parties to the 
Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a 
Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and 
effective international control'. 
As has been noted in Chapter I, SALT was to a very 
limited extent the outcome of these stipulations. Obviously 
were it not for the realisation on the part of the super 
poz"rers that their national interests might be affected by 
the continuation of the arms race, they would not have had 
started SALT. 
It is difficult to speculate what might happen if 
SALT fails (but this is a very long term question,. It 
rather appears that SALT will become a permanent feature of 
the super powers' relationship). Will it bring about the 
disintegration of the Non-Proliferation Treaty? In any 
case, within the context of the discussion of the Indian 
position the question is irrelevant as India decided not to 
adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But it appears 
that as far as most of the near-nuclear-weapon states are 
concerned, the super powers' arms race does not. affect their 
direct security. Indeed, and this leads to the next subject, 
for powers like India and others on the periphery of China, 
the main concern is not how to halt the nuclear developments 
1 
ý"s of America and the Soviet Union, but rather how to keep the 
nuclear gap between each one of these powers on the one 
hand and China on the other, from narrowing. The answer to 
this dilemma lies in the Indian call for a complete dis- 
armament to which China should also adhere. This was not 
a realistic programme. But, although from the national 
security angle India could not attain any significant advant- 
age from a limited nuclear disarmament programme which would 
apply only to the super powers, she remained, as has been 
pointed out above, one of the main protagonists of measures 
against vertical proliferation. 
Guarantees against China 
The third area of bargaining with the super powers 
in connection with nuclear issues, was the problem of the 
Chinese bomb. The Chinese test of October 196+ created 
great anxieties in India. The government's policy of not 
'going nuclear' came under heavy attack and the need was 
felt to formulate some coherent new approach-to the subject. 
Within, this context, the Indian government embarked on 
some initiatives which could have been interpreted as an 
attempt to secure super-power nuclear guarantees to India 
against a Chinese nuclear threat or the actual use of the 
bomb. There were reports to the effect that in his meeting 
with Mr. Wilson, The British Prime Minister, in January 1965, 
Mr. Shastri raised the Possibility of some sort of joint 
nuclear guarantees by the super powers and Britain against 
a Chinese nuclear threat. Although these reports were 
denied by Shastri, he did point out in a press conference on 
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20.1.1965(1) that he had conferred with leaders of other 
states about the best way of how to act against a danger 
of a nuclear threat. 
India was obviously caught hero in a difficult 
dilemma. She was reluctant to forgo her nonaligned position 
which required that she would not accept military guarantees 
by the super powers, while at the same time she was still 
adhering to the 'no nucleart, policy formulated by Nehru. 
But such an approach would have meant that India would remain 
without any nuclear 'shield' against a possible Chinese 
nuclear threat. In very general terms, by declaring, as 
she did on several occasions during 1965 and later on that 
she would not 'go nuclear', India weakened her bargaining 
position vis-ä-vis*the nuclear powers, as far as nuclear 
guarantees were concerned. On the other hand, keen observers 
of the Indian scene could gradually come to the only con- 
clusion: that if some form of guarantee for India were not 
found, India would eventually have to 'go nuclear'. But the 
question really remained what type of guarantees India was 
seeking? 
India was probably interested in some form of joint 
guarantee by the two super powers, which would be chanelled 
through the United Nations. Both America and Russia had 
their own reservations about extending unilateral guarantees 
to India, partly because they Would lack the necessary amount 
(1) See The Hindu, 21.1,1965. 
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of control over decisions talon in New Delhi. Because of ambiguities 
in the Indian position, and the hesitations on the part of the super 
powers, the only outcome was the Security Council guarantee. This 
guarantee however, is extended only to states adhering to the Idon- 
Proliferation Treaty. Once India decided not to adhere to the Treaty, 
this guarantee does not cover her, Indeed, during the debate on this 
guarantee, India demanded that it should cover every state and not 
only Parties to the Treaty. 
At the same time, the super powers have a great staks in 
deterring China from using nuclear weapons or nuclear threats against 
India. This interest ste, _. s both from their reluctance to see China 
gaining further influence in Asia, and secondly from their interest in 
non proliferation. If China used her nuclear weapons against India, 
then India and probably other near-nuclear-weapon states would decide 
to 'so nuclear'. Thus the Indian option plays here a tacit role, in 
securing a tacit guarantee by the super powers. 
One paradoxical outcome of the Security council guarantee, is 
that the credibility of super-power guarantees to non-nuclear powers 
which have not signed the Treaty, was somewhat affected. To the 
extent that this guarantee is at all credible, the fact that a non- 
nuclear power is not covered by it might create doubts as to the 
readiness of either of the super powers or both of them, to come to 
its aid. At the same time, in the case of India, the interests of 
the super powers in deterring Chinese nuclear threats, is such as to 
lend credibility to their tacit commitment. There have been signs that 
the Indian Government attaches some credibility to this tacit guarantee. 
However, India decided recently to develop a comprehensive and 
sphisticated option which will enable her to decide a full scale 
weapon programme. 
r'r 
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The Uses of the Israeli Nuclear Option 
(1) 
The Israeli nuclear option was used, or could have 
been used(2) as an instrument either of compellence or of 
deterrence, in order to secure diplomatic or strategic 
objectives. This range of possibilities applied to its 
uses both vis-a-vis the super powers, and against the Arab 
states. In both cases the uses were partly based on in- 
tentional or unwitting ambiguity. 
Uses of the Option Within the Context of Relations with the 
Super Powers 
A distinction should be drawn hero between thoso 
uses which were directed primarily at both super powers to- 
gether, and those uses which were directed at each one of 
them separately. This distinction was not always very 
clear, and in any case should be considered as a distinction 
between models of behaviour which only approximate to reality. 
Moreover, these models include elements of ambiguity which 
allow for a flexibility in the sense that the same use of 
the option would sometimes be directed at only one super 
power and at other times at both of them, or again that 
the 
same use of the option would create ambiguities as to the 
real intentions of Israel and hence to the question of the 
direction or objective of the use. 
(1) For a comprehensive discussion of this subject see 
Appendix I 'Israel and the Atom: the Uses and Misuses 
of Ambiguity'. 
(2) The following discussion concerns mainly the uses of 
the option until 1967" However, the models suggested 
are - with some changes due to the continued crisis 
in the Middle East - applicable at present (end of 1970) 
as well. 
Arms control measures 
The recurrent refusal of Israel to adopt a policy 
of separate negotiations about non proliferation of nuclear 
arms in the Middle East(1) could be construed as creating an 
advantageous bargaining position within a context of negoti- 
ations on supplies of conventional arms to the Middle East, 
primarily to the Arab countries. For a long period Israel 
insisted on the need to impose restrictions on the sale of 
conventional arms to the Middle East. That was due to the 
fact that the Soviet Union was supplying the Arab countries, 
and primarily Egypt with massive amounts of weapons under 
very easy-credit terms and that this conventional arms race 
was assumed by some Israeli decision-makers to be detrimental 
to Israel. Presumably, if indeed general negotiations on 
arms control measures in the Middle East were to start, then 
the fact that Israel was much superior to Egypt in its 
nuclear development, would allow Israel to secure not only 
limitations on all conventional arms supplies, but also do 
so in a way that would favour Israel more than it would 
favour the Arab states. 
Although this use of the nuclear option was aimed 
primarily at both super powers, it had at the same time some 
separate implications for each one of theo. American demands for 
control of the nuclear activity in Israel or the demand that 
Israel should halt the development of its nuclear option could 
ý1) See Chapter 3. Cf. also a certain change in this 
posture under the Eshkol Government. 
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be countered by demands on America to seek a general and 
comprehensive arms control agreement which would cover con- 
ventional arms as well. At the same time, within the 
context of possible American negotiations with the Soviet 
Union precisely about such an agreement the Israeli nuclear 
option could be used by the American side as a bargaining 
counter. Thus the same option could be used by Israel 
against the United States in the first stage, and then 
again by the Americans as a lever against the Soviet Union 
in their own negotiations. This does not mean that the 
United States was interested in this option in the first 
place, and certainly it caused it much embarassment, but 
once it was created it could have been used as a bargaining 
counter in negotiations with the Soviet Union. 
A more tacit implication within this context concerns 
the use of the option against the Soviet Union. The impli- 
cation here was that if the Soviet Union proceeded in its 
supplies of conventional arms to some Arab countries, Israel 
would have either to 'go nuclear', or to shorten the lead time 
needed for the invocation of the option. Such a tacit threat 
was naturally a double edged weapon, as it could be encoun- 
tered by a Soviet counter threat to extend guarantees to 
these countries against an Israeli nuclear threat. 
A search for military guarantees or alliances 
The information on this point is vague and to an 
extent contradictory. Some search for military Guarantees 
from the Western Powers was conducted by Israel before 1967. 
It could be assumed that the nuclear option might have served 
I 
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not forthcoming. "" Also there was little readiness for 
a direct military guarantee by the United States to Israel. 
A political commitment existed all the time, but the question 
was whether it could be translated into a military one. The 
American reluctance to extend such a formal military guarantee 
was the result of several political factors which did not 
change basically after the 1967 war; but at the same time 
the growing Soviet military intervention in the crisis posed 
the question again at least of the readiness of the United 
States to extend alimited military guarantee to Israel 
against a possible Soviet attack. * Could the option be used 
as one of the instruments of pressure by Israel in order to 
secure such a guarantee. At a certain period before the 
1967 war, a joint American-Soviet guarantee for Israel would 
have been most welcome by Israel. Such a commitment was 
(I) 
by Israel in this context in order to bring pressure to bear 
on the Americans to extend such a guarantee? There are two 
contradictory answers here: on the one hand the threat to 
'go nuclear' in order to obtain American guarantees is not 
credible. This is so because Israel can not create a nuclear 
(i) The possibility of a joint American-Soviet military 
guarantee to secure a political settlement of the 
current crisis in the Middle East has been mentioned, 
but the danger of nuclear proliferation was not the 
major issue motivating this proposal. At the same time 
it appears that decision makers in both super powers 
do realise that there is a danger of proliferation in 
case of a continued crisis. This realisation is part 
of the general concern about the future of the Middle 
East but need not necessarily be part of an intentional 
use of the option by Israel as an instrument of pressure. 
Indeed it is not yet clear what are the opinions of 
Israeli decision makers about this idea of joint American- 
Soviet military presence in the Middle East. 
N 
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force which would be sufficient to deter possible conventional 
Russian intervention. Thus the threat to 'go nuclear' in 
order to deter the Russians would be irrational. On the 
other hand, Israel might maintain that without an American 
guarantee which would serve as a deterrent against Russian 
intervention, her very security was threatened. She would 
therefore threaten, as a desperate measure, to Igo nuclear', 
hoping that because of the American concern about prolifer- 
ation, the latter would concede and extend the guarantee. 
This type of threat is more credible. 
Securing the Supply of Conventional Weapons 
This was perhaps the most feasible arena for the 
use of the Israeli option. Both super powers find it more 
and more convenient to supply arms rather than to give 
guarantees or commitments which, once extended, might in.. 
volve them directly on behalf of their clients or close 
friends in the Middle East. This trend became much more 
obvious after the 1967 war. The readiness to supply such 
conventional arms after the war of 1967 was motivated pre- 
sumably by disparate consideration which barely included the 
nuclear issue. At the same time the nuclear issue could 
be used in this context in the future. The nuclear option 
was probably used in this way before the war. Indeed one 
writer has suggested that in 1964 and again in 1966 Dshkol 
brought the option into play suggesting to the Americans that 
the activities in Dimona would not be extended beyond the 
level attained at that time, as a quid pro quo for the 
supplies of American conventional weapons which would allow 
Israel to keep the balance with Egypt. 
') Clearly this 
particular use of the option was directed exclusively at 
the United States. 
A search for political advantages 
Under this general heading could-come the uses of 
the option to secure various political advantages from both 
super powers. One general tacit use is the continuous 
signal to both super powers, that Israel is an important and 
powerful regional power; that Israel has another instrument 
in her general inventory of instruments of pressure and 
persuasion; that the option might be used whenever Israel 
found it necessary, and hence that she has an important 
potential nuisance-value for the two super powers. Again, 
this particular use in more obvious in the context of 
Israeli-American relations, as the U. S. is the super power 
which has the tresponsibilityt to insure that Israel does 
1! 
not 'go nuclear'. The United States assumed that 'responsi- 
bility' as part of the general understanding between the 
super powers that each of them makes sure that its allies/ 
clients or friends will not tgo nuclear'. (The other super 
power might be involved in this process of persuasion as 
well, and it is certainly involved in it tacitly,. but its 
bargaining power is seriously curtailed because a direct 
intervention in the process of negotiations might be inter- 
preted as intervention in the sphere of influence of the 
other super power and thus invite reaction by the latter). 
The situation is of course full of ambiguities. There are 
(1) See Hodes, op. Cit., PP. 235-6. 
cases of completely nonaligned countries - and India is one 
example - in which both super powers are engaged in the 
persuasion process; there are-also different patterns of 
relationship between aligned countries and their super power 
patron. 
The Israeli concern with security problems on the 
one hand, and her consideration of the nuclear issue as 
primarily lying within the realm of the military on the 
other hand would suggest that the use of the option to 
secure political objectives was either not pursued or at 
least was likely to be pursued only marginally. This 
disinclination to use the option to secure political ad- 
vantages would probably be strengthened by the problem of 
"linkage" between different sets of issues within the con- 
text of bargaining between powers. Although the practice 
of using different types of issues as leverages in a bar- 
gaining process between states is accepted and applied, it 
always involves difficulties of how to assess the value of 
an 'article' in one of these types in terms of a different 
set of 'articles' belonging to a different type or category. 
Uses Directed at the Arab States 
Several uses could be considered within this context: 
First the threat that Israel might 'go nuclear' would be 
sufficient to deter the Arabs from attacking Israel; Second, 
the creation and existence of an Israeli nuclear option, 
would prove to the Arabs the scientific and technological 
superiority of Israel. Thus it would deter them from 
contemplating the possibility that they could ever compete 
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with Israel in science and technology, and this would lead 
them to the recognition that Israel is unbeatable. The 
option would also serve as a symbol of Israel's will to 
survive, and an element of frustration for the Arabs. This 
last element could be described as 'deterrence by frustration'. 
Third, the higher level of the option would deter the Arabs 
from trying to produce nuclear weapons. They would realise 
that if they tried to do so Israel would be the first in the 
race. Fourth, by creating intentional ambiguity and 
uncertainty about the actual level of nuclear development 
in Israel, the Arabs might suspect that the 'bombe itself 
was already in the hands of Israel. This would further 
deter the Arab states from attacking Israel. 
it appears that these uses have not changed the basic 
pattern of the Arab-Israeli conflict which existed before 
1967. 
(1 
Furthermore, it could be argued that the 
ambiGuity and uncertainty might have had also counterproductive 
effects from the point of view of the Israeli interest. Still 
the option can be a useful instrument in this context 
(specially in order to deter the other side from 'going 
nuclear'), provided a certain amount of clarity Were 
introduced as to the terms of its invocation, and the 
objectives which are hoped to be gained by it. Some such 
clarification was introduced during the Eshkol government 
before the 1967 war. 
(1) See on this point, Chapter V. 
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The Indian and Israeli Uses of the Option: A Comparison 
In the brief study of these uses outlined above, it 
appears that India and Israel represent two different types 
of uses of the option. The differences are duo to the 
nature of the international environment in each case, and 
of their respective perceptions of their respective roles in 
the international system at large. India pursuing a non- 
aligned role, used the option as an instrument of pressure 
directed at both super powers, whereas in the case of Israel 
the use was directed hors at the United States. India was 
concerned with both an important role in the international 
system, and in security against China. Hence she tried to 
use the option in order to secure measures of nuclear dis- 
armament of the two super powers, hoping at the same time 
that these measures would also impose restrictions on the 
nuclear programme of China. - At the same time she continued 
her search for some kind of guarantee against Chinese nuclear 
threats. Gradually the use of her option for the second 
objective became more important. India's search for some 
kind of guarantee was hampered from the beginning both by 
her hesitations about outside guarantees and by the growing 
realisation on the part of the super powers that nuclear 
commitments carry with them great difficulties and dilemmas. 
These are only aggravated by a multipolar structure of the 
world and the possibilities of escalation over which the 
super powers have only limited control. At the same time, 
because of the anti-proliferation policy of the super powers 
and their interest in not allowing China to extend her power 
in Asia, a tacit guarantee by the super powers against a 
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Chinese nuclear attack or threat against India, does exist, 
and is partly the result of the Indian option. 
The initial Indian decision not to produce nuclear 
weapons, has not reduced the suspicions of outside powers 
about India's intentions, and thus the option could still 
have been used in order to secure advantages. The 
ambiguity surrounding the Indian programme and intentions 
was created by a mixture of the intensive activities in 
the nuclear field there, coupled with the Indian insistence 
(with more and more qualifications) that she was not planning 
to 'go nuclear', and with the realisation that, facing a 
nuclear China, India might find the pressure to 'go nuclear' 
irresistable. Thus part of the ambiguity and also the 
usefulness of the option as an instrument of pressure, were 
created by the perceptions of the other powers rather than 
by the Indians themselves. 
Israel on the other hand is not facing a nuclear 
enemy and is part of a local conflict. Her interests are 
different and hence her uses of the option were different 
from those' of India. 
Chapter III 
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During the period 1952-51E' an increasing fooling of 
isolation, and hence anxiety, grew among Israeli decision 
makers. One factor in-ý this gras probably the assumption 
that the new revolutionary regime in Egypt t"-would succeed 
in eventually transforming all the Arab societies, bring 
about a fast process of modernization, and thus consider- 
ably strengthen their military capabilities, without first 
changing their basic hostility towards Israel. Another 
factor was the fear of a change in U. S. policy from sympa- 
thetic neutrality towards Israel to active alliance with 
the new Arab regimes. The various plans for a Middle 
Eastern Defence Organization, centered either around Iraq 
ý. r" 
or Egypt, served to exacerbate these fears and apprehensions. 
These developments were aggravated by infiltrations into 
Israel and the grave problem of day to &ýy security. 
(2) 
(1 Unless otherwise specified in the text, this chapter 
includes a discussion of developments and postures 
only up to 1967° 
(2) The literature on the Suez 'lar of 1956 abounds. 
However, on the Sinai War and the Israel's motivations 
for going to war, and also on the period of "retali- 
ation policy", see mainly Ernest Stock Israel on the 
Road to Sinai 1911.9-1956, Cornell University Press; 
see also: Hugh Thomas The Suez Affair; Burns, Lt. Gen. 
B. L. N. Between Arab and Israeli, London: Goo. G. 
Harrap & Co. 19 2; Childers Zrskir_e, The Road To Suez, 
'London, McGibbon & Kee 1962; v I"1ichael Bar-Zohar, Gesher 
Al Hayari-Hatichon (Hebrew), An-11asefer, 1965; Dayan, 
Moshe, Diary of the Sinai Campai. Tn, London, `. 1eidenfold 
£: Nicholson, 1966. Gabbay, Doily . 11 Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict, Geneva, Librairie E. Droz, 
1959; I: arshal, S. L. A. Sinai Victorý, : Tezr York, 1iiorrow, 
1953. Allon, Yigal, i. asac: _ Spei C: hol (yie'brew). 
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There have been various schools of thought in Israel 
which suggested different approaches both to these 
problems, and to the question of the best strategy for 
countering the political and security problems. The 
strategy adopted eventually culminated in the Sinai CampaiGn 
of October-November 1956. In this war Israel secured 
three objectives: (1) the end of organized infiltration 
sponsored by Egypt; (2) the opening of the Straits of 
Tiran; (3) the reinforcement of the credibility of the 
capabilities of the Israel Defence Army. The second 
objoctive was guaranteed by an international arrangement, 
with the U. S. as the main guarantor. 
After the end of the Sinai wer of 1956 there was 
also a feeling that the direct military threat to Israel 
by the Egyptian army had been eliminated for some time. 
it seems, however, that the basic assumption in Israel 
about the unabated hostility to Israel in the Arab world 
had not changed. Moreover, there was the fear that 
eventually Arab society night change and become modernised 
and also, perhaps, some kind of Arab unity might emerge. 
These changes, plus the tremendous effort devoted, mainly 
by Egypt, but also by other Arab countries, to military 
purposes, contributed in Israel to permanent concern about 
the stability of the balance of power. The basic assuxip- 
tion that if Nasser felt himself strong enough he would 
certainly attack Israel and that he was building up his 
army in order to achieve precisely such a suporiority, 
persisted. 
The problem therefore was how to retain the balance 
of power so that there would be no new war. 
In other 
words, the problem was how to deter the U. A. R. from trying 
to start another war. Thus, gradually a new doctrine of 
strategic deterrence started to emerge. It is conceivable 
that this doctrine was either the intellectual basis for a 
decision to start a scientific and technological effort 
which on its part would create an option for nuclear 
weapons, or that this new doctrine started to develop only 
after the initial scientific and technological decisions 
were taken and work had actually started. It is also 
possible that the strong lints between Israel and France 
during this period, and especially the very close relations 
between the defence establishments of the two countries, 
contributed to the decision. After all, this was the year 
in which France entered a crucial stage in her own nuclear 
1 
activity. 
It seems that the new doctrine of deterrence as it 
gradually developed contained two layers. The first 
related to the conventional army. Here, a posture of 
deterrence was derived partly from the victory in Sinai, 
partly from letting the other side realise that Israel was 
continuing to build-up a strong and efficient army. The 
notion that the image of Israeli capability in the eyes of 
the other side was of vital importance became increasingly 
central to Israel's decision makers. This insistence on 
. i. A1 1. L ( 
(1) See on this point p. I-ji. 
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posture is of course valid and important. The problem 
inherent in such a posture is that it may lead (1) to 
ever bigger arms races or (2) to a process of escalation, 
if the enhancement of the credibility demands demons- 
trations of force from time to time. The dilemma is a 
tortuous one. If credibility is not underlined by 
retaliatory attacks in face of provocations such as 
Fedaveen-type attacks, there may be a loss of credibility 
and a process of escalation may start. On the other 
hand, retaliatory attacks can themselves start a process 
of escalation. 
The second stage of the new doctrine was that 
aiming at the eventual creation of a nuclear option. 
Within the context of the decision making process 
in Israel itself, it appears that the group which x-=_ 
pressing for some time for nuclear devoiopment was the 
scientific establishment attached to the Defence Ministry. 
This group was headed by Professor Ernest Bergman, the 
chief scientific adviser to the Defence Ministry. Pro- 
fessor Bergman, a well known scientist and a man with 
considerable knowledge of defence probleras, had always 
been interested in these problems and contributed consider- 
ably to the defence-oriented scientific effort in Israell.. 
Furthermore, he enjoyed direct access to the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Ben Gurion. It appears that it was Professor Bergman 
who first raised the question of nuclear development in 
Israel and he persisted with this idea for some time. 
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His proposals date back to some time in the mid- 
fifties, but it was only later that the initial decisions 
were taken. From the beginning, however, while it was 
Professor Bergman who controlled the scientific side of 
the project, its complex political and administrative 
aspects became the concern of Mr. Shimon Peres, the 
director general of the Defence Ministry. It was Mr. 
Peres who succeeded in organising this comparatively huge 
effort (huge for a country the size of Israel), and eventu- 
ally his name was increasingly identified with the whole 
project. This, combined wit] Mr. Peres' political 
ambitions and his growing influence on the Prime Minister, 
Mr. Ben Gurion, gave rise to serious suspicions and appre- 
hensions among his political rivals. Eventually one of 
the contexts within which the nuclear project was discussed 
in the public and semi-public debate was concerned with the 
kind of special influence and control that I. r. Peres person- 
ally entertained with regard to it. What is significant 
in the context of this chapter is that there is no doubt 
that part of Mr. Peres' personal fZr. ance-oriented' policy 
was affected by his ever-growwring involvement with the 
nuclear project. What is also significant is that this 
was not just Mr. Peresº attitude. A large part of the 
Israeli establishment (especially the group around the 
Prime Minister I-Ire David Ben Gurion) was influenced in 
their European-orientated foreign and defence policy by the 
nuclear effort in Israel. This influence was a complicated 
process of interaction by which arms and technological 
needs, combined with the growing independence from a super 
power (in this case the U. S. A. ), contributed at the same time 
A in P, 
to the adoption (at least for a time) of a certain 
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strategy. This strategy on its part coupled with the 
needs mentioned above, had their iripact on the foreign 
policy of Isra©l. 
Thus, as will be shown later, if Israel wished 
to build a nuclear option as the mainstay of her deterr- 
ence posture, she needed certain technical aid from France, 
but at the same time she could not avoid certain political 
differences with the U. S. A. If the policy was pursued, 
then technological co-operation with France on the one hand 
and the international opposition to nuclear proliferation 
on the other would haves to bring about changes in forei, n 
policy. Israel would move closer to French attitudes 
about the relationship between the super-powers on the one 
hand and medium and smaller powers on the other hand, 
especially as far as the nuclear debate was concerned, and 
at the same tizic relations with America would be further 
aggravated. This development was only partly inevitable. 
It was accelerated by some misperceptions that some Israeli 
decision makers had about the connection between positions 
on the issue of nuclear proliferation and the General policy 
of America, France and Israel. 
Thus, once nuclear developient had started in 
Israel, it became increas; Lnaly one of the factors in the 
formulation of a certain foreign policy, namely the European 
(or French) orientation which was mixed with an anti-super- 
power approach. This development also became an important 
issue in domestic politics and debate. 
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At present there is no available evidence as to the 
initial intentions of the Israeli decision makers when the 
Dimona project was planned and launched. If, indeed, the 
objective of some Israeli decision makers was to create 
eventually the actual weapons, then the rationale for it 
could have been as follows: The possible chang-es'in the 
Arab world which have been mentioned before might create a 
situation in which an Arab victory with conventional weapons 
would not be an impossibility. Furthermore, the question 
is not just whether an Arab attack would prove to be a 
success, but of the nature of the Arabs' perceptions of the 
changes that might take place in their societies. Unity in 
the Arab world, or modernisation in the Arab world, might 
lead the Arabs to the assumption that they could succeed in 
their attack, and this eveli if the assumption proved to be 
false once put to the test. 
Thus tIe only alternative to annihilation or to 
war in general, would be the creation of a decisive deterr- 
ent force which would convince the other side that they 
could never accomplish their aims. 
One could speculate on further rationales. First, 
if nuclear deterrence failed then the now weapon could 
frustrate the conventional attack of the opponent. This 
could be achieved by threatening; to use the weapon, once 
the possibility of a conventional defeat for the Israeli 
side arose. 
Second, acquiring a superior weapon system, also 
meant the possibility of using it for cornpellent purposes, 
namely to force the other side to accept Israeli political 
12 
demands. This would presumably include a demand for the 
acceptance of the territorial status-quo and the signing 
of a peace treaty with Israel. 
(') 
All this would assume that the other side did not 
have similar Weapons. The Israeli side would thus be 
left with a superior weapon-system which could be used for 
either deterrence, defence or compellence. 
(1) For a possible reference to such an alternative see 
interview with Mr. Shimon Peres in Davar, 28.9.1962. 
Following are the relevant question and answer: 
'question: '., Then you have recently mentioned the need 
for a new approach, you have stressed the moves from 
the stage of defence to the stage of deterrence and 
from this to compellence. '. ghat is the now stage? 
answer: I would have explained it in the following 
way: when the types of arms in the hands of the two 
sides were limited, obviously the doctrine of defence 
had its place. The two sides had a long time to defend 
themselves, stop and in the last analysis conduct a 
defensive war. When the new jet planes and tanks 
arrived the main danger they represented was of surprise 
attack and naturally the basic defence was to deter 
the enemy from attaching. But when the non conventional 
weapons arrived, and in this stage they are mainly the 
missiles, by the very existence of the weapon - even 
before it is used - there might be created a compellence 
to the existing situation. Obviously when we say 
'compellence' we have to remember the difference bet- 
ween the Arabs and ourselves as far as the objective 
of compellence is concerned. The Arabs want to compel 
us to surrender and we want to compel them to make 
peace. The difference between types of arms changes 
to a certain extent the various conceptual approaches'. (Mr. Peres refers here to the effects of missiles but 
says that his analysis of the phase of 'compellencel 
covers non conventional weapons in general. Whether 
he refers here to nuclear weapons or not is everybody's 
guess. What is important in this context is simply 
to speculate on how possibly the alternative of com- 
pellence as a use of nuclear weapons in the Arab- 
Israeli context could be envisaged). See also 
Avraham Schweitzer, 'Hal tz', 14.8.1962. 
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Subsequently, a new rationale was suggested by 
some political commentators on the development of an 
independent nuclear deterrent in Israel. The argument 
this time was that if both sides acquired nuclear weapons, 
then a situation resembling the 'balance of terror' bet- 
ween the two super powers, would emerge. It was argued 
that it was possible to transform the present (pro 1967) 
Unstable situation between Israel and the Arab countries 
into a new situation, whereby the Arab world would be 
convinced that there was no hope of defeating Israel, and 
would accept the 'rules of the game' which governed the 
behaviour of the two super pouers. 
(1) 
The decision to start the Dimona project could 
have most probably be aimed at creating an option. Eventu- 
ally the option which in fact was created served or could 
have served several purposes. 
(2) 
It is not clear however 
-whether it was intended from the beginning to use the 
option as a bargaining counter for strategic and diplomatic 
bargaining. 
The notion of a nuclear option is by itself very 
intriguing. The term itself' Was coined and used for the 
first time by Beaton and Maddox in their famous boot: ''she 
Spread of Nuclear WeaponsI. Was it after they published 
(1ý On this rationale see below in the chapter on-the 
public debate in Israel, 
(2) See Appendix I. 
this book that decision makers in states developing nuclear 
capabilities realised that in fact what 
they were doing was 
building an option, or was it rather that after the publi- 
cation of the book some decision makers decided that 
the 
idea of an option was worthwhile and therefore concentrated 
on building the option while postponing the final decision? 
Or was it still that the publication of the book coincided 
with growing pressures against 'going nuclear' from the 
super powers on the potential nuclear powers? Cculd it be 
that this pressure was combined with the realisation by 
decision makers of the various potential nuclear powers of 
the dangers and complexities of the problem, a realisation 
which forced them eventually to build options rather than 
face the agonizing consequences following the momentous 
decision to tgo nucleart? 
(1) 
(1) In the British case at least the initial decision was 
to tgo nuclear'. From the very first nuclear research 
was aimed at producing nuclear weapons. In Britain, 
this was simply the continuation of research and de- 
velopr., ent conducted in cooperation with the U. S. A. Even 
during, the ': iar itself, there was an indication that 
Britain was interested in building its own independent 
nuclear weapons regardless of the exigencies of the 
Second Uorld : Jar. Thus at a meeting in which Lord 
Cherwell, Harry Hopkins and Bush tools part on May 25, 
19113, Lord Cherwell admitted that the U. I. objected to 
the American principle of restricting the information 
flow according to the 'use in war' principle, and that 
this government wanted the information at once so it 
could manufacture the weapon promptly after the war'. 
(See R. N. Rosecrance 'British Incentives to Become a 
Nuclear Power' in R. N. I osecrance (ed. ) The Dispersion 
of I? uciear, "eanons' , Columbia University Pre: s, 1964), 
Rosecrance quotes from R . G. : Iewlett and O. D. Anderson 
Jr. 'Elie Nei-., '-: orld, 12229-1946; (Vol. 1 of A History of 
the United States Atomic zergy Commission, University 
Park, Pa., 1962, p. 266). The decision to build inide- 
pendent nuclear weapons was taken in 1945 when the Prime 
Minister announced to Parliament that 'the government 
have decided to set up a research and exparimental 
contd... 
j P. 0 
The French example is interesting in discussing the 
Israeli project because of the initial French involvement' 
in the Dimona Project which created the Israeli nuclear 
option and because of the close links existing at the time 
between the two defence establishments. It is also 
siGnificant that the two states collaborated in the Sinai 
campaign and possibly drew some common conclusions from it. 
That they drei-, r identical conclusions from it is the result 
of their mistaken assumption about their respective position 
within the international system. After the 1956 war, France 
Footnote continued from preceding page. 
establishment covering all aspects of the use of 
atomic energy'. (Quoted in Rosecrance op. cit. ) 
Thus, for various reasons, Britain from the beginning 
applied a nuclear weaponsI programme without even 
considering the possibility of building only an option. 
As far as France is concerned, the situation was loss 
clear-cut. It seems that France decided to prepare forgoing 
nuclear' some time at the beginning of the fifties, 
with the decision both to rake nuclear weapons and 
nuclear submarines taken' by tiendes-France in 1954. 
This decision was ratified by the Mollet government 
in 1956 (see Ciro Zoppo, 'France as a Nuclear Power' 
in R. U. losecrance (ed. ) ' y: ze Dispersion of ITuclear 
:: capons, op. cit. ) i. e. long before De Gaulle came 
to power. However, trork on nuclear projects which 
could lead eventually to a weapons programme had 
started in 1945 when the Commissariat a l'Fnergie 
Atomique was established. But only in 1951 did 
those who were concerned with military strategy start 
considering the question of a weapons programme and 
conclude that nuclear armaments were perfectly con- 
ceivable for a country like France. (See Zoppo, op. cit. ). This shows that a possible option was envisaged in 1945 but that no decision was taken at the time to develop a nuclear weapons' programme. The first dis- 
cussion of such a programme started after about five 
or six years. 
There is still another possible explanation i. e., that from the very beginning, there are usually different 
approaches among the decision makers concerned with these projects. Some of them are interested in a full and comprehensive nuclear progra e, while others 
are reluctant to 00 in this direction. A nuclear option is sometimes the result of disagreement among decision makers rather than an elaborate decision, taken by all concerned. 
A 
realised the limitations of an independent policy in 
what she assumed was a bipolar world. She faced the 
dilemma of a member of a military alliance organised to 
deter the Soviet threat., where the leader of the alliance, 
the U. S. A., demanded political discipline. She felt 
that an independent nuclear deterrent was needed, both 
to pursue an independent policy, and to deter the Soviet 
threat if the U. S. A. found it impossible to intervene 
on behalf of Europo once deterrence failed. 
(At least 
these were some of the explanations, or rather justifi- 
cations, advanced by France. It seems that they probably 
played a part in French nuclear policy. )(') 
Israel on the other hand was outside any military 
alliance and was thus ostensibly more vulnerable to 
aggression. However it was not confronting a major power 
and also enjoyed the ability to develop an independent 
policy without threatening the framework of an alliance. 
Israel was confronted with a conventional threat outside 
the whole alliance system. While these strategic, 
political, and psychological situations required therefore 
that France and Israel would pursue separate approaches, 
nonetheless it seems that the French example had some sort 
of influence or impact upon Israeli decision makers. 
(1) See Zoppo op. cit.; Lawrence Schein! an, ýAtoiric 
Ener!, -v i olic'- in France Mid-or the r ourta ! ePuiOlic' , 
Princeton University Press, 1965. '.: olf :: enNl, 
Deterrence an. Persuasion. London 1970, 
). 
p 15. 
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The Building of the Israeli Nuclear Option 
The new doctrine of deterrence built on a nuclear 
option and believed to be a satisfactory answer to any 
change in the balance of power emerged gradually. This 
new development was kept secret and thus its revelation 
to the world was all the more dramatic. 
On the 16th of December 1960 the London 'Daily 
Express' claimed that American and British intelligence 
experts believed that Israel gras developing an atomic 
bomb. According to the paper, a sudden meeting of American 
statesmen and intelligence leaders had taken place to dis- 
cuss this surprising information. The meeting had been 
summoned by Allen Dulles, and the President-Elect J. F. 
I; ennedy was among the participants. 
Three days later, r.: serican and British newspapers 
proceeded to discuss the matter at length. The picture 
which emerged from these reports was as follows: 
Israel, frith French aid, was secretly building a 
large atomic reactor near Beer-Sheva in the Negev. 
American intelligence experts had become so worried that 
they reported the whole matter to the Joint Atomic nergy 
Commission of the Senate and the Congress. This briefing 
toot: place on the 9th of December with C. I. A. and State 
Department officials giving the details. Intelligence 
experts believed that the reactor was of the same type as 
the first French plutonium reoctor. 
(1) 
In response to 
(1. ) See TTetr-i'or; c Tines 19.12.960. 
.__.. . __r. ý, -, 
questions put by the American Administration, Israeli 
officials were reported to have said that what was being 
built was a textile plant. 
" 
Over the years more information about the atomic 
capabilities of Israel has been published in open sources 
fron which it appears that the first plans for nuclear 
2 
development in Dir. ºona were drawn up some time in 1955. 
However these seemed to be on a very modest scale. In 
1957 a secret agreement relating; to Dimona was signed with 
France, the details of which are not yet kn. own. 
0} 
The 
reactor eventually built was of the natural uranium type, 
'with a capacity of 24 2lgw and capable of producing around 
6 ices of plutonium a year. 
(4) 
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The usual stages for acquiring a nuclear capability 
in the plutonium range are: a reactor; - a chemical separ- 
ation plant; mastery of the technology of a bomb; a test; 
an appropriate delivery system. The opsn information 
available points to the e:: istence of a reactor and a possible 
conventional delivery system in aircraft. There is no 
evidence of a chemical separation plant. Such a plant is 
a major technological undertal; ing and it seems inconceivable 
" that it could be built in secret, although it is possible 
to reprocess the plutonium in laboratory conditions. However, 
(1) See Daily Telcgrenh 20.12,196o. 
(2) See Jewish I DV stbvwr 
(3) See L. Denton and J. Maddox, The Spro d of Nuclear, 
! 1ea2ons ', London 1962. 
(4) Beaton and 2: addox op. cit. , p. 173; -'illiaii R. Van Cleave, 'The Ir.: pact of : 11-zc], ear TechnoloGy on 
t. ýe l.: iddle 
Basti, In-' ernn, tionol `; esearesi -nd Toc. unolöjry : '1uclear 
Journal, rebruary 1969, p. 31. 
this is a very slow and expensive method. 
Apart from a possible conventional delivery system, 
there have been persistent news reports of the development 
of a missile system in France for Israeli use. If these 
news reports are correct, then Israel could acquire in a 
short while a sophisticated delivery system capable of 
carrying nuclearwarheads. The system is reported to be 
made of a version of the French 'Diamant' missile. Other 
sources, however, consider that the 'Topaz' missile is being 
used as the basis for the Israeli-French development effort. 
There have boon reports of several test shots and the supply 
date was fi.; ed at 1970, 
(2) 
The imposition of the total 
embargo by France may presumably have affected this date. 
The French Interest 
What were the French motives in signing the secret 
agreement with Israel of 1957? Soon after the first reports 
of collaboration between France and Israel appeared in the 
press some explanations as to the French position were ad- 
vanced: 
(1) that French nuclear assistance would anger, embarrass, 
and confuse Nasser. This would help France in its efforts 
to crush the Algerian rebellion, which in the French view 
was backed to a very large extent by President Nasser. 
" 
(1) Iý.. 
t 
(2) See Neu York 'Mmes 7.1.1966; Daily Te1e? ro»h 8.1.1966; 
Janos '. 121 the : orld Airplanes 199-197P ', p. ; Van Cleave, 
org. ci t., p. 26. 
(3) Daily `:: mess, 19.12.1960. 
'3 fl (2) General, do Gaulle proved by this step the 'nuisance 
value' of France. This would enhance his position vis-ä- 
vis the U. S. In other words, if America did not respond 
to French demands the latter might behave Irresponsibly. 
) 
This last explanation seems however somewhat far- 
fetched, as at the time of the signing of the secret 
agreement between France and Israel de Gaulle was not yet 
in power, and the previous regime was not nearly so intent 
on acquiring nuisance-value capability via-ä-vis the U. S. A. 
' 
(3) The selling of nuclear 1. nowhow would balance some of the 
French expenses in its nuclear development. 
(2) 
(4) France was interested in acquiring more plutonium. 
Thus by aiding the Israelis in their nuclear effort she 
(3 
would eventually act the plutonium produced in Diraona. 
(5) French prestige. France would become an exporter of 
nuclear knowhow. 
(4 
Because the processes which brought about the 
French decisign are still shrouded in secrecy, it is difficult 
to establish which of those explanations is the most valid 
or sufficient. 
(1) Daily E press, 19.12.1960. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) The Nov, Yorl; Times, 19.12.1960. 
ý1ý ibid. 
It is interesting to note the general background 
in nuclear matters at the time. 1957 was a year of great 
activity in the nuclear field the world over. It was the 
year in which the Sine-Soviet agreement to 'share new 
technology' was signed, in which the Soviet Union undertook 
to recognize whatever came under the heading of 'new tech- 
nology'; the year in which Bourges-Maunoury elaborated the 
policy of guaranteeing, that France would remain one of the 
great powers by manufacturing nuclear weapons and. the 
year in which great developnents in 'atoms for peace' pro- 
grammes took place in many parts of the world. 
The French position on proliferation was described as 
anti-disseminational i. e. opposition to the nuclear powers 
giving nuclear weapons to other countries. At the sarge time, 
it argued that it could not oppose independently produced 
nuclear weapons by new pocaers. 
(2) 
It seems that by its 
contacts with Israel in the atomic field France struck a 
middle way i. e. disseminating nuclear technology, without 
actually exporting nuclear weapons. 
(3) 
The Official Israeli Policy on the ouostion of Nuclear 
; 7eapons in the '. -riddle East (up to 1217) 
I Israel assumptions about arms-control and disarmament 
The creation of the State of Israel, the 1948 war 
and the armistice-regime which governed the relations between 
(1 ) W. I, iendl, o^. cit. pp. 104-105 
(2) W. Mendl - 'French attitudes on disarmament' 
Disarmament, June 1967, republished in Survival 
December 1967. 
(3) Israeli-French nuclear co-operation probably weakened 
Gradually even before the 1967 war. This was due 
probably to the gradual change in French policy on the 
Middle 2 ast and on nuclear proliferation. 
Israel and the Arab states for eighteen years, have not 
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abated Israeli consciousness of the military dangers posed 
by various Arab states. Some sort of an arms race, or at 
least the motives for starting such an arms race, have 
existed throughout this period in the Arab-Israeli area. 
This kind of tension and awareness formulated the basic 
attitudes of the political and military elite to the prob- 
lens of arms control and disarmament. In fact some sort 
of an arms competition and later an arms race, persisted 
all through this period. Thus Dritain resumed her arms 
exports to the Arab countries immediately after the e; id 
of the 1948 war, and Israel turned in 1950 to the U. S. A. 
and asked for deliveries of armaments of various kinds, 
including jet aircraft. Later on, the Tripartite Declar- 
ation of 1950 purported to control the arms trade in the 
riddle East, but its effectiveness was limited. The 
various plans for the establisbnent of a Middle East Defence 
Organization, centered on Egypt or Iraq, did not help a 
policy of arms control in the area. Furthermore, the 
Soviet Arms Deals with Egypt (ostensibly described as the 
Czechoslovak Arms Deal) on the one hand, and the French- 
Israeli Arms Deals of 1955 and 1956 on the other, further 
damaged any policy of arms control. The period 1957 to 
1967 was characterised by an ever growing arms race in the 
Arab-Israeli area, an arms race which certainly at one and 
the same time further affected Israeli thinking on arms 
control and Zias, at least as mar as Israel was concerned, 
itself partly the product of the same Israeli thinking. 
It appears that Israeli thinking on these problems 
was based on the following considerations: 
(a) The existence of a 'ferocious' conflict with the 
Arab states, a conflict which had already escalated twice into 
f C) 
e) war, and had the potential of escalating again into war. 
I 
(b) The belief that the ultimate arbiter in this 
conflict was the force of the sword. 
(c) The belief that the only Guarantor of the security 
of the country was the Israeli army. 
(d) The low credibility that was attached to possible 
military Guarantees from the Big Poz: ers . There were two 
qualifications to this assumption: first, from time to time 
Israel sought to become a member of a military alliance with 
ZYestern countries. This suggests that if this had been 
achieved, Israeli attitudes towards such military Guarantees 
would have been different. Second, the cordial relations 
between America and Israel during the Eshlcol government may 
have created the impression that there was some tacit American 
Guarantee to Israel. Thus Pr. Eshkol, speaking to an 11-erican 
correspondent, said that he was told by American officials 
while asking for American weapons ' ... do not spend your money. 
After all we are here and the Sixth Fleet is in the IIediter- 
raneanl. 
(1) 
It is not clear whether Ir. Eshkol himself used 
this opportunity in order to show his trust in some sort of 
a tacit merican Guarantee, or whether it Was the other way 
round. In any case, this declaration-brought about an inten- 
sive debate in Israel itself, and the General, almost unanimous, 
feeling was that Israel could count only on its own power and 
not on outside aid. 
(0) The belief that as Israel was superior to its 
enemies in scientific capabilities and technoloGy, these 
(1) Quoted in Shy el SeC; ev, i: ilcI amn vo "Shhalorn L: irnizrach 
I: a tichon (ý'ebreit) , Tel-. Aviv, 1963t p. 
68. 
"ý `ý Cä ýýý 
potential advantages should be utilised in the field of 
armaments. 
The notion of superior scientific capability as part 
of the General security effort had two aspects. The first 
entailed that only if Israel became a developed industrial 
and technological society could she sustain the conflict; 
by being a developed country the quality of her people as 
citizens and as soldiers would be raised; and so on. The 
second aspect was more limited, holding that by developing 
scientifically, Israel would be able tb use her capabilities 
for arms production and for an efficient use of the army. 
Both aspects wore dealt with extensively by Israeli leaders. 
To cite an example for the first aspect: on 2.11,1955 Mr. 
Ben-Gurion who had become Prime Ilinister again, presented 
his new Government to the Knesset and concentrated on the 
security problem. He said inter alia: 'Security means 
encouraging scientific research and scientific ability in 
all the physical, chemical, biological and technological 
professions and this on a high level with top expertise. 
We shall never have quantitative superiority in human re-' 
sources, equipment and material resources. But we can 
have spiritual superiority, and we have to develop it to 
the utmost of our moral and intellectual capability. 
(') 
Obviously for Mr. Ben-Gurion this emphasis on scientific 
capability had in this particular example even wider impli- 
cations than the first' aspect suggested above. 
(1) See David Ben Gurion ': Iedinat Israel : Iamitchadeshet' 
(Hebrew), Vol. 1t PP-09070- 
0 
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As far as the second aspect is concerned, i. e. the 
contribution of modern technology to the development of arms, 
a good example was the following: '... The development of new 
arms, the production, maintenance and repair of existing, 
ones, all these demand a highly developed modern and bold 
scientific, industrial and technological level'. 
'... There must be national readiness to invest in 
scientific and technological development. This investment 
may not bring immediate results but it is vital for the 
future... t(1) '... For this we need three simultaneous 
efforts. One effort for the short run, that is the indus- 
trial one: to change the nature of industry in Israel, to 
make it more modern, automatic, rational. ... second, for 
the medium range, a scientific effort.... Third the edu- 
cational effort. This is the long term. ' 
(2) 
And'Yigal 
Allen, while discussing the general problems of the security 
of Israel, Wrote: 'The military needs encouraged and 
quickened the development of technological sciences and its 
accomplishments. The wish to have the upper hand in the 
battlefield while competing with the enemy, diverts large 
resources to scientific research aimed at scientific in- 
ventions. But pure scientific research, even that pursued 
without being contracted for by the defence establishment, 
contribute to the development of armaments. It is a 
national must' for Israel to strive to achieve a high 
scientific level in its technology.... There are highly 
(1) Shimon Peres, ; Hashln v 1-izbe t (Hebrew), M IIasefer, 
Tel Aviv, p. 238,1965. 
(2) Peres opt cit., pp. 266-267. 
136 
developed teaching and research institutions in Israel... 
On top of tier there are scientific branches in various 
economic institutions and the Defence ministry invests a 
lot in encouraging military research'. 
(') 
(f) The belief that in an arms race the gabs would 
always be quantitatively superior. Thus Israel should try 
and balance this kind of superiority by other cleans. 
(g) The belief that the search for a limited mili- 
tary superiority arrived at by a better quality of the 
soldiers or by the quality or kind of weapon systems acts 
as a deterrent. 'This was based on the assumption that 
there was no hope in the short, nor perhaps in the middle 
term for a political settlement to the conflict, and only a 
balance of power tipped in favour of Israel would secure 
the continuation of the status quo. In this last assump- 
tion and in some of the others, Israel's attitudes were and 
still are common to states involved in situations of severe 
international conflict. The notion, for exanple, of the 
'balance of power' as a balance in which 'we' are stronger 
than the other side is very common. 
(2) 
It would be a simplification to assume that these 
considerations and attitudes were always present with the 
same intensity or importance. There have been chances in 
(1) 
4tllon 'i'. csach Shel Chol' , pp. 183-184. 
(2) See Ernest Haas 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, 
Concept, or Propaganda', in James N. Rosenau (Ed. ), 
International Politics and Foreir-n Polic *, The Free 
Press, New York, third printing, July 19 5. 
some of these attitudes, the most marked occurring probably 
first in the mid-fifties and then again between the Ben- 
Gurion regime and the Esh1col regime (1963-67). Both during 
the latter years of the Ben-Gurion period and mainly during 
the Eshkol period the emphasis on deterrence grew. The 
concept itself was used or applied less before these 
1 
periods. 
Another latent assumption was the lack of trust in 
the feasibility of arms control measures. This sterns 
probably from one or some of the following causes: 
(a) The image Israel has of the attitudes and ob- 
jectives of the Arabs. This image, which seems at least 
partly to correspond to reality, entailed the belief that 
if the Arabs did gain military superiority they would try 
eventually to use it against Israel; it also entailed the 
belief that this was the overriding consideration of the 
Arab states, i. e. it stood at the top of their list of 
priorities. This last did not necessarily correspond to 
reality, but there was certainly enough evidence for it in 
various Arab declarations to enhance the image quite con- 
siderably. These two parts _.. of 
the iria;; e destroyed one 
of the bases for any disarmament or arms control negoti- 
ations, i. e. the tacit assunniption that the other side would 
be ready to accept some self-imposed limitations in the 
field of arms. 
(b) The lack of communication between the two sides 
to the conflict. This situation was already institutionalised 
(1} On some uses and misuses of the concept of deterrence in Israel see below in ' 
- kppendix. 
i. 
ýýý v 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In passing, one may argue 
that objectively such a barrier need not necessarily 
hamper arms control measures based on tacit understandings, 
although these will be much more vulnerable t'llan tacit 
understandings reached in conflicts where some kind of 
communication and dialogue goes on. However, the point 
here is not the feasibility of arms control measures but 
the Israeli perceptions and assumptions about these measures. 
(c) Lack of symmetry between Israel and the U. A. R., 
in either strategic doctrine or the main objectives of 
foreign policy; and also between Israel and some of the 
other Arab states - those which were directly involved in 
the conflict. ' This lack of symmetry even when not defined 
and perceived in such a way, hampered chances for arms con- 
trol measures. When this nsyitrietry was recognised as such 
by the parties to the conflict, it can be seen why there 
was less scope for arms control measures in the Arab Israeli 
1 
area. 
I1orrever, perhaps without formulating it in so many 
words, Israel and the Arab states had some experience of 
arms control measures. In some cases they even accepted 
then with more or less enthusiasm. These were of three 
kinds: (a) arms control measures related to the supply of 
arms, imposed by the big powers. Thus during the war of 
1948 and again between May 1950 and 1955 a certain system 
(1 On the need for such symmetry in arms control, see 
Thomas Schellina 'Si Mals and Feedback in the Arms Dialogue', Dullctin of the Atomic Scientists, 
January 1945. 
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of arms control operated under the Tripartite Declaration 
of ": ay 1950. It is doubtful., however, first, to what 
extent the parties to the conflict accepted these measures 
in practice; and second, if they did accept it, whether 
it was not the result of lack of demand on their part 
rather than adherence to a policy of arms control imposed 
from the outside. Thus in commenting on the whole situation 
in the field of armaments during the first half of the fif- 
ties, ! r. Peres, who was at the time Director General of 
the Defence Ministry, said: 'During the period after the 
War of Liberation we purchased most of our weapons from 
surplus stocks frone the Second World War. The big powers 
applied a total embargo, but the Arabs enjoyed the armam- 
ents left in the Middle East after the war. We had to be 
enterprising and develop various tricks in order to bring 
the weapons we needed for the rebuilding of Zahal'. 
'At the beginning of the fifties the enbargo was 
gradually weakened. The Tripartite Declaration of 1951 
(hero Mr. Peres certainly meant 1950), about ostensibly 
balancing the arms supplies to the Middle Bast, opened 
before us the first opportunity to buy more modern weapons. 
This period was marked by self-restraint by the supplier 
countries. The Arabs got more modern weapons than were 
given to us, but even the arms given to the Arabs were given 
with restraint'. 
'The situation. - chanced completely at the end of 
September 1955, with the conclusion of the Czechoslovak- 
48. ; O 
Egyptian Ax ms Deal... ' 
1 
(b) Arms control measures related to the military 
strategic doctrine, of Israel. The military situation 
dictated to Israel a strateGy based predominantly on counter- 
force tactics. This on its own part brought about 
decisions to concentrate, for example, on aircraft systems 
devoted predominantly to counter-force tactics, and also 
dictated the objective of "disarming" enemy armies 
(first 
and foremost the Egyptian army) rather than bomb enemy 
populations. This was the strategy to be applied during 
the Six Day War itself. 
The stratey* of com pellence(`) which was evident in 
some of the retaliation raids taken during the fifties 
should be seen within a context of 'no war' time. 11jthin 
the context of war, it could be construed rather as a 
linited strategy not necessarily aimed at compellence but 
rather at "disarming'' the enemy. This strategy may have 
partly changed after the Six Day '. tar when under the impact 
of a limited actual agar along the new co. --, se fire lines and 
guerilla attacks, Israeli forces were reported to have 
bombed centres of population. This may have served two 
purposes: (1) to deter future attacks; (2) to act as 
'coercive violence' in order to convince the Arab regimes 
that they should eventually comply wit: some or all of the 
Israeli demands. 
(3) 
(1) Speech made in i-. ay 1962, see Si i: 1on Peres, T-'_ashlav Ilaba 
(IIebrew) 'The Next Phase' , Tel Aviv, 
1965. 
(2) For a definition and elaboration of the concept of 
conpellehce see Thotias Schelling, 'Arms and Influence', 
Yale University Press, 1966. 
(3) on the aspect of 'compellence' in the Israeli 'deep pene- 
tration' bombing of -_ýSypt in 1970, see Yair Zvro n, 'T: ie 
Soviet union i_a Lxgyp t' , The Nei: I: iddle : last, London, June 1970, reprinted in Survival, ? s_stitvre or Strategic 
Studies, AuL; ust 1970. 
I 
TI 
It seems however that in the particular psyc, zolo- 
vical situation in which the Arab ? Torld finds itself at 
present, the second function twill not be fulfilled. On the 
contrary, actions li:. e those act as a cohesive force among 
sections of the populations in countries bordering Israel 
and breed violence and a desperate conmitnent to continue 
attacking Israel. The first purpose would be fulfilled 
were it not for the fact that Israel's neighbour powers are 
not in a position to control the Palestinian organizations 
responsible for a great part of the infiltration. It seems 
that even here a counter-force strategy is more fruitful. 
(c) In the field of limited reprisals to provocations - 
here of course there were definite changes from the fifties 
to the sixties. Suffice it to mention here that during 
1965 and up to the Samu reprisal of November 1966, Israel 
adopted a strategy of limited reprisal as against the Fatah 
infiltrations. Only this period, therefore, could be con- 
sidered as one in which a conscious strategy of limited 
reactions which could also be construed as an arms control 
measure was adopted. The strateM adopted during the fif- 
ties, as well as the Sarnu action, contributed to a process 
of escalation and thus could be construed as anti-arms 
control measures. 
In order to uuider3 Land the erhole issue of arms 
control measures in the Middle East, one raust refer to the 
basic differences in policies and strategies during the 
fifties and the sixties in Israel. Here a distinction 
should be drawn between three levels: 
.ý .ý 
12 
(a) The main objectives of foreiGn policy. ThrouGhout the 
existence of Israel up to June 1967, the main aims were: 
to secure the territorial status quo; to secure a balance 
of power in order to maintain the status quo; to pursue a 
peace settlement with the Arab Norld on the basis of the 
status quo. 
However within this general framework there were 
variations. 
During the period 1953-1956, the "status quo" policy 
tended to be flexible in the sense that there was willing- 
ness to force Arab acceptance of the status quo by means of 
a certain military strategy. Under the Eshkol government, 
there was an attempt at flexibility in a different direction, 
i. e. a political tactic based on "openness" towards the 
super-powers and also a very limited "openness" towards 
the Arab World. Thus under the two regimes there were 
attempts at flexibility, but these were of completely 
different natures. The flexibility of the second type was 
more akin to arms control measures. 
(b) The basic strategy. Here there were two types of 
strategy: during the period 1953-1956 the emphasis was on 
compellence coupled with deterrence, which gradually became 
"compellence" coupled with "coercion"t with the readiness 
to accept escalation to war rather than leave the state of 
affairs as they were. After the "Sinai War" of 1956 there 
was an abrupt change of policy. The need for reprisal 
subsided considerably; the exercise with conpellence and 
coercion stopped, and to the extent that there wore actions 
3 
along the borders they were limited to the border with 
Syria, where a particular state of affairs persisted. This 
particular state of affairs was a result of several elements: 
(a) the general conflict between Israel and the Arab world; 
(b) the fact that Syria was the most extreme Arab nationalist 
state with a special tradition of animosity towards Israel; 
(c) the unsettled issues between Israel and Syria as states 
under the armistice agreements regime; (d) the Israeli- 
Jordan Water Project. Elements (b) and (c) were specific 
to the Israeli-Syrian conflict. Element (d) was part of 
the general Arab-Israeli conflict, but caused specific 
Israeli-Syrian tensions and clashes*(') 
(c) The Military doctrine which was based both on a counter- 
force strategy and on an aggressive posture Going down to 
the lowest units. The General idea of this was that once 
an attack occurs the only reaction should be counter-attack. 
Furthermore, under certain conditions there is a necessity 
to undertake pre-emptive strilýe$r 
This basic military doctrine has been described in 
innunerable articles and several books, and recently several 
books published in Israel have elaborated at length upon 
the oriGins of this hind of tactics. Although the same 
tactics could be traced to the end of the thirties with the 
activities of the 'Special 1 ijaht Companies' , Hanodedet, and 
(1) A detailed factual account of the Israeli-Syrian 
problems is supplied by IT. Bar-Yaacov The Israeli- 
Syrian Armistice! 
, The r: agnes Press, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1967. 
N 
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mainly the Palmach, in which many future commanders of the 
Israeli forces participated, and although they were much 
more used during The Zar of Independence' of 1945, they 
received special significance during the fifties. Hero 
two famous units of the Israeli Army, 'Unit 1011 and the 
Paratroops, formulated or reemphasised this doctrine of 
quick aggressive response. This doctrine has been 
adopted by the Army and applied with Great success in the 
1967 war. 
ýý ý 
The correlation or interaction between all these 
levels of foreign policy and strategy is one of the most 
important factors in the Arab-Israeli conflict, *and has led 
to many misunderstandings. On the one hand, it is obvious 
that to a certain extent each affected the others, but at 
the same time it is also clear that observers tended to 
overlook the basic analytical differences between these 
levels. Thus zany krabs and forei. n observers confused 
the strateGic, tactical and political levels. For example, 
the notion of preemptive attack or preventive war, and the 
emphasis on aggressive posture on the tactical military 
level, led some observers to argue that this proved the 
'imperialistic' intentions of Israel. This assumption was 
mistaken, as it overlooked the distinction between the level 
(1ý See among others, Uri Milstein Unit 101 and the Pare- 
troona , 
(: Iebrew ), T e1-,, viv, 19 68 ; Shabtai 
Tevet Hasufin : ýatzariach 
, 
(Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1967 
Dr. tlicheel Dar-Lo: 2ar 1ýoldot Hatzanchanim , 
(Hebret, 
,) Tel-Aviv, 1968 ; Winston and Randolph Churchill 
The Si.. Days Nar , London, 1967 ; Some of the basic assumptions On which both the strategic and 
military doctrines are based were enumerated in Yigal 
Allon's Hasach she! Chol . 
(Ilebrew}, Tel-Aviv, 1960. 
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L15 of foreign policy objectives and the other two levels.. 
However, it is true that the strategic and tactical level 
did influence the development of the conflict in two sig- 
nificant ways: First, by creating, in the minds of many 
Arabs a set of images about the 'imperialistic' nature of 
Israel and thus aggravating the conflict; Second, by 
affectinG directly the volume of violence along the borders. 
These two effects have direct relevance to the problor of 
1 
nuclear weapons. 
" In sore of their basic assumptions about arms control 
and disarmament, Israeli decision makers are very similar to 
other decision makers who face sinilar security and political 
problems. Thus the uillin;, mess to secure a military super- 
iority, and to treat the enemy's declarations with the utmost 
suspicion and almost disregard them, are common to many 
decision mal. ers in situations of states' conflicts. : That 
perhaps contributed to the "style&' of Israel's policy on 
disarmament and arms control were some elements that were 
peculiar to the Israeli-Arab conflict and to the nature of 
the Israeli people, as a pioneer society; a mistrust of 
military Guarantees by big powers; a lack of a long 
tradition of diplomacy and war, and a lack of an intellectual 
approach to problems of foreign policy and defence. The 
last is not a reflection on the formal educational prepar- 
ation of the decision makers who in some cases are intel- 
lectually highly capable, but on a lack of a General intel- 
lectual approach to these problems. 
(1) See below in pýapft4 a. 
Israeli official positions on arms control and disarm-anent 
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The following; are positions taken in Israel: 
(1) A call for complete disarmament in all sorts of weapons. 
In their repeated calls for this, Israeli decision makers 
sometimes resembled some of the earliest Soviet approaches 
to the same problem. 
(2) The insistence that the real danger in the Middle East 
was created by the deliveries of conventional arms to the 
Arab countries. These weapons were sophisticated and very 
developed and were being introduced into the Middle East in 
ever-increasing quantities. 
C3) As regards nuclear weapons in general, the acceptance 
of the idea of the need for general disarmament. There was 
an 
also/Olvareneds. of the growing need to end: _ nuclear tests. 
Thus on 25.6.1962, Mrs. Golda DSeir , the Israeli Foreign 
Minister at the time said: 'Israel regards the growth of 
nuclear armaments x-rith great anxiety. Israel's policy is: 
to support in all possible ways the elimination of the 
terrible dangers which humanity faces as a result of the 
continuation of this terrible process. This is why Israel 
favours every measure which may limit and reduce nuclear 
weapons. The renewal of the tests was a terrible blow to 
the world. It is not only that the-tests are a clear sign 
of the acceleration of the nuclear arms race with all its 
possible dark consequences, it is also that they (the tests) 
constitute"a grave risk to the mental and physical health 
of our Generation... '(" 
ý1) See Knesset, Fifth Knesset, First session, vol. 36, 
p. 27.3-2-, - 32, Free translatioi-. 
14 rf 
And in the same vein, The Knesset, following a 
recommendation by its Foreign and Defence Committee, de- 
cided that: I... It joins the unanimous resolutions of 
the : Fiftieth Interparliamentary meeting convened in Sep- 
tember in Brussels about the danger to human life and world 
peace caused by nuclear tests and calls upon all states, 
parliaments and governments to make every effort to arrive 
at an agreement on non-continuation of nuclear tests under 
efficient international control'. 
( 
The emphasis on 
'effective control' may be interpreted as an acceptance of 
the Western position on the issue i. e. the need for some 
kind of "on the spot" control agreed by the two sides as 
part of an agreement about banning the tests. The Russians 
were against any such control. The logical consequence of 
this position was that Israel signed the Test-Ban Treaty on 
the 7th of August 1963. 
(4) General Declaratory Position on Nuclear Proliferation 
On several occasions Israel declared that it is 
opposed to nuclear proliferation. Thins in a reply to the 
Soviet proposal of 20.5.1963 which drew attention to the 
danger of nuclear arms in the Mediterranean area, Israel 
said: "The Government of Israel desires most solemnly to 
emphasize that every e: cpression of appreciation as to the 
nuclear 
danger of/arming and of nuclear warfare, every initiative 
to labour for their prevention, evokes in it the most positive 
response. Again and again, and consistently, the Government 
(1ý See finesset, Fifth ICnesset, First Session, vol. 15, 
P. 876 - 
Id8 
of Israel has given warning of the danger of nuclear 
armament, and at every opportunity has underlined its 
support of all measures designed, in practice as in 
theory, to avert the awesome peril.... On every inter- 
national forum it has declared its readiness to support 
all measures likely to arrest the spread of the danger of 
nuclear weapons in every part of the world, and at all 
times, and naturally, it has included the Mediterranean 
region". 
(1) 
(5) Middle East: Complete Disarmament vs. Nuclear Disarmament 
The official Israeli position was "that the issue is 
really not a partial disarmament from one kind of weapons 
but a general and complete disarmament of"the Israeli and 
Arab forces, and to that end Israel is always ready to co- 
operate and to negotiate directly with the Arabs about it". 
(2) 
This official position was based on various assumptions 
and carried various conclusions: 
(a) The general notion, which (on the part of the Israeli 
decision makers) was partly hypocritical and partly sincere, 
that General and Complete Disarmament is possible and that 
one should work towards it. Although it is difficult to 
believe that nature and experienced politicians like 2-Ir. Ben 
Gurion and others would discuss this notion with any sincerity, 
(1) See The Israel Digest, Volume VI, No. 13. 
(z) ibid. 
19 it seems however that somewhere the notion of "and the 
wolf will lie down with the lamb.. " has always had some 
impact on Israeli decision makers. This impact is 
probably the result of several elements: 
The tremendous central position that the Bible has 
played in the formulation of the new cultural milieu of 
Israel; 
The repeated and almost exasperating emphasis on 
the mission of the Prophets and their vision of the "End 
of Days", and on the idea that Israel should act according 
to this vision; 
The basic notion of Zionism, which was concerned 
with the building of a new society, and would brine about 
not only a national but also a social reform. 
0 
It was not so much the direct impact of these ideas 
that created the above-mentioned attitudes to disarmament, 
but rather the fact that they supplied the symbols by which 
the leadership could formally communicate the body of ideas 
that forms part of the more "idealistic" notion of the role 
of Israel in the international system and in the international 
cultural fran, etror'_c. In other words, biblical visions of 
the remote future of humanity, plus socialist utopian 
ideas of the sane future, were the only intellectual 
instrunents with which she older Israeli leadership could 
define its utopian ideoloGical targets. This was much 
more manifest in Ben-Gurion's approach than in Bshl: ol's 
attitudes, precisely because Ben-Gurion was more interested 
in being the intellectual and ideological mentor of 
Israel. That these same notions were very remote from 
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the rank and file of the people on the one hand and from 
the actual policies of Israel on the other hand, has con- 
tributed perhaps to cynicism, but at the same time has also 
had some influence on the formulation of some foreign 
1 
policy targets. 
It is obvious, however, that the biblical impact 
included at the same time a completely different set of 
ideas and notions related to the conquering of the "Promised 
Land" and notions of war and military heroism. Thus it 
would be misleading to conclude that biblical influence was 
purely in the direction of creating, at least on the overt 
plane, attitudes reminiscent of the Prophet's mission. 
Perhaps the main lesson that Israelis learnt from the 
Bible was rather the second one. But a-certain element of 
the Prophets' ideas were still there, and had some influence 
mainly among some of the older generation of decision makers. 
s 
(b) The assumption that if complete disarmament in the Middle 
East was ever to be secured, it would cone after a solution 
of the basic problems outstanding between Israel and the 
Arabs. By suggesting General and Complete Disarmament the 
Israeli leadership pointed in fact to the need first to 
solve these political problems. 
(c) General and Complete Disarmament could be arrived at only 
as a result of direct negotiations with the Arab countries. 
This notion of direct negotiations was and still is of 
(1} " These particular targets belong, perhaps, to what 
itolsti calls "universal long range goals". See his 
International Politics , p. 132. 
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As a preliminary note one can say that perhaps even 
those decision makers who felt that conventional weapons 
gave Israel as much superiority over the Arabs as could 
practically be hoped for, felt that the economic price was 
too large and hoped that something could eventually be done 
to stop the conventional arms race. An added element was 
that the U. A. R., Syria and Iraq received arms very cheaply 
and could hope to receive more, whereas Israel had to pay 
much more for arms bought abroad. 
(f) Most important of all, by arguing that Israel was inter- 
es7ted in complete and general disarmament, the Government 
could avoid, or hope to avoid, discussion about the problem 
of nuclear weapons as a separate issue. It seemed reasonable 
on the part of the Government to do'this if indeed it assumed 
that by having a great superiority over the Arab countries 
(and this in fact meant Egypt) as far as nuclear capabilities 
were concerned, it could use this superiority as a bargaining 
counter within a general discussion about the future of the 
arms race. This of course was not acceptable to those 
sections of public opinion Which were convinced that the 
Israeli nuclear option was not an advantage in the first 
place. It is important, however, to note that by continu- 
ously concentrating on the notion of General and Complete 
Disarmament, be it as a tactic or otherwise, it is probable 
that the Israeli decision makers really became convinced 
that this was the only form disarmament or arras control could 
take. 
These positions on arms control and disarmament were 
voiced mainly during the various debates in the Knesset on 
the arms race, and mainly in relation to the proposal advanced 
13 
by some opposition members for "The Middle Last as a Nuclear 
Free Zone". The following is an account of the development 
of the official position on the problem of nuclear weapons in 
the Middle East and the possibility of some agreement on 
excluding them from that part of the world. Some positions 
persisted throughout the whole period under discussion, 
whereas others changed after the change of premiers from 
Eshkol to Ben Gurion. 
One of the arguments advanced officially was that if 
the other side (neaning the Arabs) were not ready to discuss 
General and Complete Disarmament, there was no hope that 
they would discuss partial measures lilce nuclear agreements. 
(1 
Another argument was that in any case Israel was only 
involved in the development of atomic energy for peaceful 
uses, and therefore one could not understand the insistence 
on the problem of 'nuclear disarmament' or rather 'keeping 
nuclear weapons outside the Middle East'. The basic dec- 
laratory position of the Government has indeed always been 
that Israel is building a nuclear capability exclusively 
for peaceful uses. 
(2) 
1) Y. IIarrary, Knesset Fifth Knesset, First session, 
vol. 36, p. z435,25.6.1962; 'Ben Gurion, Knesset, 
Fifth Knesset, First Session, vol. 42, p. 3059, 
6.8.1962. 
(2) This position was first formulated by Mr. Ben Gurion 
in the Knesset 21.12.1960 after the news in the 
international press about the Dinona reactor. 
third and most important theme was that the real 
danger to peace in tie Middle Last lay in conventional 
arms being poured into the area. Furthermore, a demand 
to limit or ban one type of arms (meaning atomic weapons), 
would only divert attention from the real danger. 
(i) 
A fourth notion in the official position was that 
General and Complete Disarmament in the Middle East could 
be secured even before a General and Complete Disarmament 
could be achieved in the world at large. This was 
suggested for example by Mr. Ben Gurion in reply to the 
letter from Mr. Nehru during the Indio-Chinese war of 
1962. 
(2) 
A fifth element was the need for control' of the pro- 
posed General and Complete Disarmament. This demand was 
almost always attached to the proposal. Usually the 
demand was for mutual reciprocal control over General and 
Complete Disarmament, i. e. control by Israel and the Arabs 
themselves, but sometimes there was the suggestion that 
the control could be under U. N. supervision. Thus for 
154 
example on 5.6.1963, Mr. Ben Gurion in an answer to a question by 
(1 For examples, see Z. Man, Fifth Knesset, Fifth 
Session, Vol. 36, p. 2463,26.6,1962; Ben Gurion, I"---i. esset, 
Fifth Knesset, Second Session, vol. 27, pp. 1821-1824. 
As one example, p. 1823, ! Ir. Ben Gurion said: f... Iie 
who discusses only and exclusively a certain type of 
disarmament, a special disarmament, does not see 
reality as it really is and avoids seeing the danger 
facing us: Trom conventional weapons - missiles, bombers, 
submarines, tanks and guns. All these are conventional 
weapons... '. 
(2) See Mrs. Golda Neir, at the time the Foreign Minister 
when she referred to this letter in Knesset, Fifth 
Knesset, Second Session, vol. 3, pp. 93-94,12.11.1962. 
IS5 
lir. Mi!: unis said: 'Undoubtedly the honourable member knows 
the Government position which was confirmed by the Knesset 
that we demand complete disarmament in Israel and the 
neighbouring Arab countries under mutual control, even be- 
fore general disarmament is achieved. We shall agree' to 
United Nations supervision as well in these countries 
(meaning Israel and the Arab countries - Y. E. 
) before inter- 
national disarmament. '(') 
However, the whole idea of General and Complete Dis- 
armament was considered as quite unrealistic by many Israeli 
decision makers themselves. They considered it unrealistic 
both for the two super powers and so far as the Arab Israeli 
area was concerned (although as far as the two super powers 
were concerned they modified their position after the Test 
Ban Treaty). Thus on 13,11.1962 Mrs. Neir pointed out 
that the Arabs were not ready for any proposal for disarr.. a- 
ment of any kind. 
(2) 
An even clearer position was forrzu- 
lated by Mr. Aran when he said on the same day in answer to 
a MTapam leader who called for nuclear disarmament in the 
Middle East: 1.. '. The leader of Mapam argued in the 
political debate in favour of a resolution or declaration 
about nuclear disarmament of our region, before it arrived 
in our region'. He can say this with assurance as far-as, 
Israel is concerned. But he does not : snow what is happening 
(1 See I: nesset, Fifth Knesset, Second Session, vol. 30, 
P. 1985,5.6.1963. 
(2) See Knesset, Fifth Knesset, Second Session, vol. 3, 
p. 138. 
in the field in Egypt. So what is the point that four 
government must stand at the head of those who struggle 
against this weapon in our region'? He speaks about 
agreed control by the two sides - is there any substance 
to such a slogan? For the last eleven years there have 
been negotiations between the two biggest powers in the 
world, powers which have peaceful relations and which de- 
clare their wish for coe: cistence; all this time there 
have been negotiations about nuclear disarmament and they 
have broken down because of the problem of mutual (or 
reciprocal - Y. B. ) control. This only shows how this 
slogan is empty of any substance as far as our region is 
concerned, a region in which one side calls for exclusive 
existence and not coexistence, and hopes and wJ shes to 
it) 
destroy us. There is no use in preaching this, but it may 
cause harm. It will divert the attention of world public 
opinion to the problems of 'nuclear free zone in the Middle 
East' and from the real and close danger of an annihilating, 
war against Israel, a star which will be conducted by con- 
ventional weapons ... 10 
) 
What It-Ir. Aran was criticising 
here was the idea of nuclear disarmament under mutual (or 
reciprocal) control. However, by arguing that there was 
not even the slightest chance that mutual control could be 
successfully applied to such a partial measure, it seems 
rather obvious that he could not attach any credence to the 
possibility of successful control over the much more compre- 
Z. Aran, Fifth Knesset, Second Session, vol. 3, 
p. 132. 
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hensive measure of General and Complete Disarmament. The 
comparison with the Soviet position of the fifties and 
beginning of the sixties about General and Complete Dis- 
armament in the world becomes even more striking. 
The call for General and Complete Disarmament was 
aimed only at the Arab-Israeli area and not at other 
countries in the Middle East, presumably for the reason 
that Turkey and Iran were not involved in the conflict and 
also because they belonged to military alliances and thus 
a call for their joining a General and Complete Disarmament 
would have involved Israel in problems related to the 
bipolar relationship. 
The ýshkol Government 
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The beginning of the 1960's brought about a great 
change in the public atmosphere of Israel. This, was the 
result of several factors. There was Crowing irritation 
at the continued leadership of Mr. Ben-Gurion. Equally, 
there was a feeling that security problems should play a 
smaller part in the life of the country; this took parti- 
: cular form in the suspicions that some of the younger 
lieutenants of Mr. Ben-Gurion teere trying to use the 
enormous 'defence establishment to the advantage of their 
Equally 
political ambitions. :. 1 there were also suspicions among 
the old Iý: apai leadership that a new political elite con- 
centrated around : r. Ben-Gurion would try to take over the 
political leadership of the country after his retirement. 
This general chance of heart in the country brought 
about new alignments among political groups and parties, 
and eventually, when linked with the famous "Lavon affair" 
brought about an untenable situation for i-Ir. yen-Gurion 
personally. Public opinion swung against him, the party 
machine and political 
Lite felt that his leadership was 
more of a burden than an asset, and the other political 
parties increased their demands and showed growing appre- 
hensions at his continuing leadership. 
All this eventually forced his retirement and led 
to the establishment of a new government under the premier- 
ship of Mr. Eshkol. Following this change, there emerged 
eventually some significant changes in the foreign and 
defence policy of Israel. 
The major changes were the followin ;Irn 
(a) A switch of emphasis from the "special relationship" 
with France to the reestablishment of the "special relation- 
ship" with the U. S. A. There was a Crowing feeling that 
the U. S. was the only power which could be counted upon, 
and there were also hopes for the establishment of a 
permanent military relationship with either the U. S. or 
with Nato. This tendency, however, should be seen against 
the background of the Israeli image of international develop- 
ments and the structure of the relationships between the two 
super-powers. Ben-Gurion had hoped to bring about a 
military pact between Israel and a big Nestern power (first 
with Britain and later with the U. S. A. ) because he assumed 
a pure bipolar world where the bipolar conflict would 
continue, and he wanted Israel to be completely identified 
with the Syest. The Eshkol approach was rather different. 
He wanted a special military lint: with the Uest, because 
he again assumed a pure bipolar world, but one in which the 
two super-powers were becoming more reconciled, and in which 
participation in a military pact would ensure both the 
security of Israel and the status quo of the Middle East. 
All this could be done without provoking the Soviet Union. 
In other words, while Ben-Gurion wasjin his actions at least, 
ready to endanger the status quo by pointing out the dangers 
of Soviet penetration in the Middle East, Eshkol started to 
act as if the relations between the two super-powers in 
general and in the Middle East in particular were such as to 
permit, with Soviet help, the stabilisation of the status quo 
.. r,,,,, - ý, ý 
in the Middle East. Thus, he appeared to be ready to 
accept the possibility of an arrangenent between the two 
super powers which would insure the status quo. Israeli 
participation in a military alliance with the vest would 
" enhance the status quo 
in the Middle East, and provided 
that the Soviet Union was interested in the status quo, 
such a military alliance with the West would not affect 
Israel-Soviet relations. The Soviet Union would parti- 
cipate in the iaintenance of the status quo. 
(b) Precisely because Bshkol differed in his perception 
of the bipolar relationship, he assumed, and possibly 
rightly so, that the strengthening of relations with the 
U. S. A. might even improve Israel's relations with the 
Soviet Union. He assumed a growing detente between the 
two super powers, and this belief was fortified by the 
Test Ban Treaty in the same year that Eslikol came into power. 
This analysis does not necessarily mean that either 
Ben-Gurion or Eshkol had an articulated view of the struc- 
ture of the international system. The approaches of both 
Ben-Gurion and Dshkol were normally influenced by day to day 
necessities and calculations, 
(" 
which dominated their 
(1) In an article in "Dam - the paper of Plapai and hence 
mouthpiece of the Government, H. Danzig argued that 
there were new challenges and possibilities facing the 
Eshkol Government. These changes were the result not of 
a change in the new Government's attitudes - the new 
Government continued in the policy of "peace"and security', 
of the old government under Ben-Gurion - but they were 
caused by changes in the international situation. And he 
called upon the government to pursue these new possi- 
bilities. These were mainly concerned with the gradual 
rapprochement of the two super-powers on the one hand and the break up of some of the old blocs. 
By such formulation, FIr. Danzig, like many other semi- 
official commentators, tried to prove that there was no real chance between the two Governments, but at the same time pointed out precisely to the potential for change 
(see Dam r" 9-8-1963). 
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actions possibly even more than in other states. They 
were influenced by the changes in the relations between 
the super powers, and the differences between their two 
policies were also the result of differences in temperament 
and general personal outlook. But granting all these 
qualifications, some basic differences in the principles 
of their foreign policy wore still there. 
(') 
(c) A more relaxed attitude towards the Israeli-Arab 
conflict. - More was no question of revolutionary changes 
in basic Israeli attitudes and policies, but more emphasis 
was to be put on finding ways to decrease existing tensions 
by avoiding a 'forward strategy'. This policy however was 
not carried out, through a combination of several factors. Those 
were the combination of the opening of the Jordan '. rater Project, 
(1 The differences between Den-Gurion and Bs1il of in 
their perceptions of the bipolar relationship could 
be put to an extent within that part of the 
theoretical framework suggested by Michael Brecher 
in 'Research on Foreign Policy Bei: aviour t, Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, March 1969, which deals with 
elite ir! a es of various aspects of reality. Brecher 
has used this framework in 'Ben-Gurion and Sharett: 
Contrasting Israeli Images of the ALrabs', The 
Middle ^as t, No. 16, March 1969. On the lint: 
between elite images and foreign policy decisions 
see also I-Cenneth Boulding, 'National Images and 
International Systems', Journal of Conflict Resolution, 
Juno 1959. 
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the beginning of Fatah activities (in January 1965) and 
Israeli reactions to it, and the growing competition within 
the Arab World. 
(d) Basically, however, hr. Eshlcol, like his predecessors, 
and indeed any possible Israeli Premier, continued to put 
great emphasis on building the independent military cap- 
ability of Israel. The army was considered as the only 
guarantor of the existence of the country. Zihat is inter- 
esting is that because he arrived in the field of defence 
after Ben-Gurion (who was identified in the public image 
with the army) and because almost from the very first 
monent he was under heavy attack from Ben-Gurion, Eshkol 
had to prove that the security needs of the country would 
not be neglected. This produced the interesting phenomenon 
of a fundamental increase in the defence budget during 
Eshkol's regime. This was also partly due to the ability 
of the neu Chief of Staff, General Rabin, who knew how to 
secure the means for the army's needs. 
(') 
(o) Although the defence budget had increased considerably, 
and thus incidentally contributed on its part to the growing 
arms race in the region, much more emphasis was put on 
economic and social questions. This, coupled with the 
feeling that a war was not imminent (the assumption - at 
least of Mr. Eshcol - was that if a war were to occur it 
(1} See on this last point Amos Perelmuter 'Amy and 
State in Israel. ', Lon: -on, 1969; p 106 
would not occur before 1970 and this was also the basis 
on which military planning was conductedt`}), enabled the 
government to pursue economic policies, directed - at the 
expense of public consumption - toward achieving economic 
independence. The whole public debate became much more 
concerned with economic and social problems and this 
helped to influence, and was in turn influenced by, govern- 
ment policy. 
As concerning nuclear programmes, there gradually 
appeared a change in attitudes and also in policies. As 
far as the policies teere concerned, a certain change had 
already taken place under Ben Gurion, in the sense that 
programmes for nuclear development were postponed in order 
to divert money to conventional arias. This decision was 
taken by Nr. Ben-Gurion after a serious debate about the 
future strategic doctrine of Israel. In this debate Allon 
demanded investment of resources in armour and the Air Force, 
whereas Peres and Dayan demanded that the emphasis should 
be placed on 'scientific development ... and deterrence 
force' and suggested that Israel should: '... equip Zahal, 
for Tomorrow'. Ben-Gurion decided to adopt the Allen 
approach as for as application of resources was concerned 
but opposed the preemptive strategy suggested by Allon. 
(2) 
(1) See Shlomo :? akdimon, ' Likrat She' at Ha'effes' , (Hebrew), Hamdor, Tel-Aviv, 1968, p. 208. i: akdinon 
quotes a speech by shkol made during the 1967 crisis. 
(2) See Moshe A. Gilboa, 'Shesh Shan im Shisha Yamin' 
(Hebrew ; 'Six Days Sin Years' Am Oved, Second 
Edition, March 1969 pp. 29-30. In an article in 
' atariv' on 12.7,1963 Dayan argued that Egypt is 
developing nuclear weapons and thus the only way 
for Israel to meet such a threat was to have similar 
weapons. (See 'Southern African Jewish Timest, 
19.7.1963) 
However, apart from budgetary considerations, there were 
several other important political and strategic problems 
involved in the issue of future nuclear developments. 
As far as these were concerned, there was a change after 
the advent of the Eshkol government. This can be seen 
under two headings: first the application in full of the 
Allon approach. This approach was defined in Wasach shel 
Cholt and in his article in 'Molad,, 
(1) 
in which he pointed 
out that from the Israeli point of view, nuclear weapons in 
the hands of both sides - Israel and the U. A. R. - was a 
worse situation than if no nuclear weapons at all were in 
the hands of either side. 
(2) 
As for the feasibility of 
nuclear weapons in the hands of the Arabs, one school of 
thought in Israel had always argued that whatever weapons 
Israel succeeded in acquiring, the other side would also 
acquire them. 
" (This belief underlined much of, at least, 
(1) The article was published after the Six Day t+ar but 
was in fact originally delivered as a speech at the 
beginning of 1966. See P: olad, July-August 1967- 
(2) This attitude has been clearly defined in a discussion 
on 17.3.196ti., 'where IIr. Galili who like ; -. r. Allon be- 
lcnGs to Achdut I: a'avodah, said: '... I have pointed to 
the danger of missiles as a real and close danger, but 
one should not misunderstand my opinion about the 
danger of nuclear weapons. If it is in the hands of 
Israel to choose whether nuclear weapons will be placed 
in the hands of both Israel and 2G pt or will not be 
in the hands of either, Israel must prefer that it will 
not be in the hands of either, for if it is in the hands 
of one it will be in the hands of the other as Well... 
(I'"ncsset, I`iftli isnosset, Third Session, vol. 24, p. 1t40). 
(Sec also below in the passage on '. attitudes in the 
;; shkol Government towards General and Pomplote Disarria- 
rient in the 1.1iddle Bast'). 
(3) On this, see inter-alit, "Symposium on Foreign Policy", 
Ot, Vol. 1, No. 69 Se. )teriber 1966 and also in what 
Galili said in the Knesset. 
.ý5 the declaratory positions of a large part of public 
opinion in Israel. It is not however clear whether it 
was the opinion of men like Peres, who emphasised many 
times the possibility of usinG Israel's technological and 
scientific superiority vis-? -vis the Arabs in order to 
achieve qualitative superiority in the field of armaments). 
The attitude of men like Allon did not however mean that 
they were against a nuclear option. The question was 
what lind of an option. 
The second heading under which this question must be 
considered is the growing willingness to bring about closer 
relations with the U. S. This, as has been stated above, 
was one of the basic modifications in Israel's foreign 
and defence policy after Es! ihol came to power. This change 
had several applications, not least the effort on the part 
of Israel to achieve a formal military guarantee from the 
U. S. In that respect Eshl: ol tried to pursue the same 
objective as Ben-Gurion, but in a different international 
milieu. 1. Ihereas during the fifties such a military agree- 
ment would have entailed, perhaps, a worsening of the ei- 
indifferent 
ready sometimes bad, sometimes /-...:, attitude of the 
Russians towards Israel, it may, during the Sixties, have 
had a different effect, precisely because of the growing 
atmosphere of detente from 1962 onwards, and also, perhaps, 
because such a military guarantee would have secured a 
stable bipolar system in the Israeli-Arab region. However, 
such a formal military guarantee was not forthcoming, and 
thus the possibility of securin; a balanced bipolar system 
in the Middle East was not put to the test. 
Igo 
Both these factors contributed to a change in the 
policy of the Eshkol government on the Question of nuclear 
weapons. As far as the 'American angle' was concerned, 
part of the change was perhaps due to the feeling that the 
American Administration was ready to supply arms in order 
to keep the balance in arms between Israel and her neigh- 
bours. At least Mr. Eban saw this as a very important 
policy change on the part of the U. S. A. 
" 
This change 
of heart on the part of the American administration which 
was due to a change in the Israeli position and also per- 
haps to a change of perceptions about the Pliddle East, 
brought about some relaxation in the American position 
on the 'delicate Matter', as the atomic development in 
Israel was termed in the context of the negotiations between 
Israel and the U. S. A. 
Attitudes durinL, the I shlkol ; overrmlent towards General and 
Complete Disarmament in t 'he I. iddle rast 
Differences between the Eshl: ol regime and the Ben- 
Gurion regime in the field of foreign and defence policy 
started to emerge only Gradually. Thus in the field of 
disarmament, the official position at the beginning of the 
Eshkol Government remained that Israel should not concern 
itself with the issue of nuclear disarmament in the Middle 
East, as the real issue was the conventional arras race, in 
which the Arabs (mainly but not exclusively the U. A. R. 
) had 
(1) See 'Ot', Vol. 1, Noy 6, September 1966. 
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taken the lead with the generous help of the Soviet Union. 
In any case, Israel was ready to negotiate General and 
Complete Disarmament under mutual control and with United 
Nations control. 
') 
However, Eshkol had perhaps 
slightly modified the official position, first by 
mentioning the possibility of international control 
(2) 
1 
and secondly by pointing out later on that nuclear weapons 
were one of the categories of arms that would be included 
in any General and Complete Disarmament for the Arab 
countries and Israel. 
(3) 
He quoted a speech by Mrs. Meir, 
the Israeli Foreign Minister, in the United Rations General 
Assembly, where she suggested that the two sides would start 
negotiations in order to achieve General and Complete Dis- 
armament under mutual supervision which would include all 
the categories of weapons. 
A more realistic approach in Eshhol's attitudes 
about disarmament and arms control appeared subsequently, 
when he called upon the big powers (the United States, The 
Soviet Union, France and Britain) to accept some basic 
political principles about the Middle East, one of which 
would be to halt the arms race while keeping a stable 
security balance to deter aggression. ror this purpose 
(1) See Dshkol and Argov, Knesset, Fifth Knesset, Second 
Session, Vol. 33, pp. 2203-2201+, 26.6.1963, and again 
on 7.8.1963 when Eshkol called for a General and Com- 
plete Disarmament in Israel and the Arab countries and 
used the phrase, "under mutual control and international 
control". 
(2) Ben-Gurion had mentioned United Nations control, (see 
p. lir) but usually the demand during his Premiership 
was for reciprocal control. 
(3) See his speech on 17.2.1964. 
1U8 
there was no need for control. It could be sinply achieved 
t1) 
by the big powers if they did not supply destructive arms* 
An even more realistic note, admittedly from Galili, 
was struck when he said in the Knesset on 13.10.196+, that 
Israel must demand, among other things... "... a general 
agreement on gradual disarmament, agreed and under mutual 
control to avoid the spread of nuclear weapons into the 
area". (By emphasising the need for "mutual control", 
Galili might have meant in fact that no such plan was 
realistic, because the Arabs were surely not expected to 
agree to that. However, he struck a middle ground between 
other spokesmen of the government who insisted on General 
and Complete Disarmament and the opposition who called for 
Israeli initiative against the spread of nuclear weapons 
into the "area". ) 
From now on different and sometimes contradictory 
voices were heard. Thus Israel's Ambassador to the U. S., 
N; r. yban, in a press conference in New York, was quoted as 
saying, "... that an agreement to keep the 'region' free from 
nuclear weapons is of course welcomed", 
(2) 
11hile, on that 
very same day, Mrs. Meir, the Foreign Minister, formulated 
again Israel's policy in this field by saying "... our de- 
clared policy is to pursue a complete and comprehensive 
disarmament under mutual control, between us and our Arab 
neighbours". On 30.3.1965 Mrs. Meir again called for 
(1) Knesset, 20.7.1964. 
ý2) See Earzilai, 29.3.1965, in the Knesset. 
16 9 disarmament in conventional weapons and added that the 
demand for nuclear disarmament was ridiculous because it 
referred to a weapon which was not as yet in the Middle 
East, while the real danger was constituted by conventional 
weapons flowing into Egypt. 
(1 
On 25.5.1965, Mr. Eshkol criticized the paragraph 
in' the Mapam Party's programme which called for "atomic 
disarmament as a first step towards general disarmament". 
Eshkol argued that as no country in the region had atomic 
weapons, the real meaning of the programme was to rid 
"ourselves" of a weapon that was not there at all, and to 
let the other side pursue his armaments which were really 
dangerous. 
(2) 
Mr. Bban in an answer to a question in the Knesset, 
said: "Israel has always backed general disarmament in- 
clusive of nuclear weapons, in the world and in the region. 
It joined the Test Ban Treaty..... Only two weeks ago the 
Israeli representative in the political committee of the 
U, 11. declared Israels endorsement : of the resolution 
calling for an international committee to be convened to 
discuss disarmament.... " There is no point therefore in 
blaming Israel for apathy or lack of a principled approach 
to problems of disarmament in the world. "(3 
But apart from the general call for General and 
Complete Disarmament in the Arab-Israeli region there were 
(1) Knesset, Fifth Knesset, Fourth Session, Vol. 25. 
(2) Fresset, Fifth Knesset, Fourth Session, Vol. 28. 
(3) Fifth Knesset, Session I, Vol. 6, p. 106. 
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also official doubts as to the possibility of the Arabs 
agreeing to sit together with Israel to discuss ndclear 
disarmament. Thus() Mrs. 2Ieir argued that it was not 
at all clear that following an Israeli declaration of a 
readiness to discuss nuclear disarmament, Nasser would be 
Swilling to discuss it with Israel, 
But the general tone of the Eshkol Covernnent 
changed. On 1965, Esh1col had suggested a new 
formula for Israel's nuclear policy, namely that "Israel 
will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into 
the Middle East". By this changed formula more certainty 
about Israel's intentions in this field had been intro- 
duced. This new formula found its formulation in the 
Knesset itself. It had perhaps its impact on the 
following statement made by Eshlcol in the IZnesset, on 
12.1.1966, namely that "? 1e shall try within the limits of 
our capabilities to wort: for international agreements and 
regional agreements for the advancement of limitations of 
arms and for disarmament, inclusive of atomic weapons, 
under mutual control". 
The basic assumption remained that arras limitations 
agreements between Israel and the Arab countries were 
possible only when basic political attitudes had chaneed. 
(2) 
(1) Knesset VI, Session 1, Vol. 6, p. 232. (This was 
said within a very serious discussion of the new 
stage in the arms race in the Middle Bast in which 
some major arras deals were signed between some 
ZJestern powers and some Arab countries. ) 
(2) See Lban, Knesset, Sixth Knesset, First Session, 
Vol. 18, p. 1120. 
,ý r»ý . 
ý., 
E ý. 
Another assumption which remained unchanged was that 
Israel -would not initiate negotiations about nuclear 
disarmament. 
(') 
On 18,5.1966 the new formula was stated and 
elaborated upon in the Knesset. Thus on that date Eshkol 
said '... I am sorry that the President of Egypt is trying 
to deceive the people and to divert attention from the 
dangers constituted by the offensive weapons which exist 
in the region to nuclear weapons which are not in our 
region and which we do not want to be here. I have said 
before and I repeat here that Israel does not have nuclear 
weapons and that Israel will not be the first to introduce 
them into the region. He ... who really wishes to take 
away from the people living in the Middle East the fear 
of the arms race ... should wort: for general disarmament 
in the Middle East, or at least limitations of armaments 
of all kinds, while striking a reasonable balance ... in- 
clusive of ban on the introduction of nuclear weapons into 
our region... ' 
+... We have noted with satisfaction that the idea-. 
of regional conventional disarmament or regional disarmament 
has recently been suggested in he Eighteen Nation Committee 
on Disarmament, this as a first step towards general dis- 
armament... ' 
(2) 
(1ý See David Hacohen, Sixth Knesset, First Session, 
Vol. 18, p. 1126. 
(2) See Knesset, 18: 5.1966. 
.! rý L) 
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It is clear from this important passage that 
Israel had clarified its position ('Israel will not be 
the first to introduce nuclear weapons etc. '), and had 
also indicated that the problem of nuclear weapons could 
be negotiated within the framework of general negotiations 
on disarmament or arms control in the region. An import- 
ant and basic implication of this change in posture, was 
that the option could be used more freely to gain political 
objectives, without at the same time involving the general 
problem of nuclear proliferation. Thus a distinction was 
drawn between the political uses of the option and problems 
of proliferation. 
That also emerged from the same speech by Eshlcol 
in the Knesset (although not from the passage quoted above) 
was (a) that the big powers must tale the initiative in 
working towards limitations on the conventiolal arms race 
0 in the Middle East; 
(b) that a real and comprehensive agreement could be se- 
cured only when the bi,; powers agreed to Guarantee the 
territorial status quo and peace in the area. 
These two points show two possible uses of the 
nuclear option Israel had acquired i. e. securing big 
posers' guarantees for the territorial status quo and 
limitations on conventional weapons as a 
. 
quid pro auo for 
not 'going nuclear'. However in order not to raise 
anxieties. islil: of categorically declared that Israel would 
not be the first to introduce those weapons into the area. 
Even the Communist leader Milcunis conceded on 
23.5.1966, that there had been a change in the Israeli 
official position on nuclear affairs (he referred to the 
declaration that Israel would not be the first to intro- 
duce nuclear weapons into the Middle East), and that 
within the framework of a regional agreement on disarma- 
ment or limitations of arms there would be included an 
article banning the introduction of nuclear weapons. But 
in tlikunis' opinion this was not enough. Ni'. Hacohen on 
the government side reiterated the official position that 
Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons 
into the Middle rast. At the sa:. le time he criticised 
Nasser for his threats of a preventive war if Israel in- 
tended to introduce such weapons into the Middle East. 
" 
4 
In answers to questions in the Knesset on 13.2.1967 
Eshkol discussed Israel's position toward nuclear weapons. 
He was asked whether Israel would be ready to agree to U. N. 
supervision of nuclear reactors in Israel and the Arab 
countries. Here Dshkol again stated that Israel demanded 
General and Complete Disarmament in the Middle Last inclus- 
ive of nuclear weapons, under mutual control. At least 
there was a need for limitations of arras of all sorts while 
keeping a reasonable balance. If there was a question of 
stages, then the first stage was to solve the problem of 
conventional arms and only after that of other arms, which, 
in any case, were not yet present in the Middle East. There 
is here perhaps a retreat to the previous, tougher position, 
but this is not clear. 
(1) Itnesset, 23.5.1966. 
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The, development of the nuclear option in Israel 
triggered a limited debate in the country. The debate 
evolved around the question of what is the best "nuclear" 
policy to be pursued. 
A distinction should be drawn between the public 
debate on the one hand and the debate along the decision 
makers on'the other hand about the proper policy to be 
adopted towards nuclear problems. The second debate was 
not usually conducted in the open and thus it is hard to 
cover it comprehensively. In addition'to the usual diffi- 
culties in such a case, which are common to all states, 
including democratic societies like that of Israel, there 
were three additional obstacles to an open and intensive 
debate. 
First, there was the consideration that by dis- 
cussing nuclear issues openly, there ras a danger either 
of starting a nuclear arms race in the ? fiddle East' or in- 
vitinG American pressure on Israel. This last point 
accounted for the attempts to prevent the whole Dimona 
project from becoming known internationally(1). There was 
possibly also a fear in Israel that disclosures about Dirnona 
would precipitate Russian nuclear aid to. Egypt. 
(1) For attempts to suppress public debate on the nuclear 
issues, see for example report in Jewish Observor. s 6.7.1962. 
ý,. 
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The fear that the Soviet Union might Give large 
scale nuclear aid to Egypt if the nature of the Dimona 
project were revealed, was found to be mistaken. 
Israeli 
fears and anxieties about possible outside aid to Egypt 
in the nuclear field switched to the possibility of Indian 
or Chinese technological and scientific aid. It was ex- 
pected that this might be coming in the form of knowhow 
and perhaps also technical aid. 
Second, Israel adopted for a long time the notion 
that her efforts were, directed solely at producing atonic 
energy for peaceful uses and that there was no intention 
of creating a nuclear option. " Thus any open debate on 
issues of stratecic doctrines related to nuclear affairs 
was considered to be out of place.. This lies also the 
reason for attempts to suppress public debate on the subject. 
Third, the whole question of problems of defence 
in Israel was thought best kept out of open debate. This 
approach started to change at the beginn-InG of the sixties, 
but was still applied toi a much larger extent than in co.: - 
parable societies. One of the consequences of this 
approach was that the debate on foreign policy as well 
suffered considerably. The area of interaction between 
strategy and foreign policy is considerable everywhere, but 
much more so in Israel. The avoidance of an open and 
active discussion of strateGic problems in Israel made the 
debate on foreign policy Hore difficult. Not only strategic 
problems but also the different military activities along 
the border and even arms acquisition problems affected foreign 
policy, rather than vice versa. 
7G 
It seems probable that Israel at the time (late 
1950's) underestimated the strength of the American anti- 
proliferation mood, a mood which became much stronger 
towards the beginning of the 1960's and later. 
Another element should be added here in order to 
understand the attitudes in Israel towards secrecy in this 
context, an element which is a product of the whole nature 
of the Israeli society. After the growth of underground 
military organizations in the Jewish national community in 
Israel, a heavy premium was placed on two things. First, 
the role of secrecy in everything even remotely related to 
security, Second, the notion that once somothing is 
started Qr on its way, it is very difficult for an outside 
power to stop it. Israel has a tradition of strongly 
resisting outside interference and pressures. 
This notion perhaps contributed to the assumption 
that if indeed Israel was able to reach a certain stage in 
the Dinona project, this by itself would be a worthwhile 
achievement, even if at that stage outside pressures were 
to start. 
All these considerations were valid and important. 
However, once the nature of the project became known inter- 
nationally, the secrecy under which the project Evas built 
only increased suspicions and anxieties in the international 
community, perhaps more than would have been the case if 
the project had been openly built from the beginnirig. 
These suspicions and anxieties were increased at the boainnine 
1?? 
at least, by the attempts at the suppression of debate in 
Israel itself. 
Obviously because of the official Israeli attitude 'I 
the whole atmosphere was not conducive to an open debate 
on the nuclear issue. It appears also that even among 
the decision makers the debate was not as informed as it 
should, and possibly could, have been, a fact which is 
related to the process of decision making in Israel. Be- 
cause of its smh l]-size, but even more because of lack of 
attention to such matters, there have not been institution- 
alised agencies for planning, and advice on many problems 
in which foreign policy and strategy interact. Thus the 
decision-makers did not enjoy the advantage of being 
supplied - on a continuous basis - by informed advice on 
these issues. 
Notwithstanding all these obstacles, some debate did 
take place both anon decision-makers and also in the public 
at large. The debate among the decision-makers suffered 
from the lack of open intellectual communication t'aith insti- 
tutions of research and with 'informed public opinion', 
whereas the public debate suffered from lacle. of information. 
Apart from all this, side issues became involved in this 
debate, some of them 'concerned with domestic politics; and 
this again was scarcely conducive to a comprehensive and 
high level debate. 
The basic debate among the decision-makers, although 
chiefly carried out behind closed doors, did percolate outside 
e-8 
graduallyl" and especially towards the middle of the sixties. 
It came to the open in debates in the Knesset and in some 
other public debates although even then it remained rather 
limited. 
(1) 
Three general schools of thought could be discerned 
in both debates: (a) those who favoured a full nuclear 
weapons programme; (b) those who wanted to see Israel 
developing a nuclear option, and only an option, and were 
opposed to nuclear weapons; 
the creation of an option. 
(c) those who wore opposed to 
This category would presumably 
have been against any nuclear programme in the first place. 
Ono of the difficulties in distinguishing the various 
schools of thought is that sometimes adherents of the first 
view would appear to favour a nuclear option, and not a 
full scale programme. There were several reasons for this: 
First that if they were decision-makers they could not 
appear to favour a full scale programme while the government 
position was opposed to it, and second that some members of 
this school of thought possibly hoped that by advocating an 
option, there were good grounds for believing that eventually 
the option would be invoked. Thus, practically, it made no 
difference whether one advocated an option or a full scale 
programme. Third, in the jargon developed specially for 
the purpose of discussion of the nuclear issues in Israel, 
the term 'nuclear option' was sometimes used in'fact to 
describe a full scale weapons' procranne. Only later on 
(1) For fuller details see Chapter 3. 
1r' 
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when the debaters became slightly more sophisticated and used 
to the international terms used in these discussions was a 
distinction made between 'nuclear options' in the above- 
mentioned sense and nuclear options. But even later on some 
confurion persisted. 
Adherents of the third school of thought also tended 
sometimes to describe a full scale weapons' programme as a 
'nuclear option', this time because of reasons (2) and (3) 
suggested above. Thus for partly semantic reasons the 
debate suffered in substance. Another problem was the 
confusion or at least overspilling of the debate about arms 
control and disarmament into the debate on the basic issues 
of nuclear weapons. Obviously these are related problems, 
but at least an analytical distinction should have been 
drawn between them. Thus the notion of 'The Middle Bast 
as a nuclear free zone'') had been advanced partly as a 
genuine proposal and partly as a way of arguing against 
possible military uses of nuclear programmes in Israel. 
Instead of arguing against such possible programmes directly, 
the opposition used the idea of Iý i? JF2. 
Soon after the first disclosures of the Dimona pro- 
ject in the foreign press, a muted and limited public debate 
began on the nature of the project and also on the nature of 
nuclear weapons and their relevance to the Niddle East. 
Would be referred to in the text as AMDLTFZ. For purpose 
of convenience, this would also cover the proposal of 
'The Israel-drab Region as a ,. uclear Free Zone'. The 
difference between these two concepts will be clarified 
below. 
IOU 
The public debate developed Gradually and painfully, 
one of the main platforms for debate being the I: nosset, whereas 
newspapers and journals only joined the discussion later. 
The discussion in the Knesset gradually became more detailed 
and free, and indeed many of the main positions on the 
question were voiced with some degree of elaboration in the 
Knesset. However the debate lacked, and still lacks, the 
sophistication which was a characteristic in other potential 
nuclear powers, let alone places like the United States or 
Britain. 
One of the reasons for the low level of the debate 
in general was the Cap between the academic community and 
the defence establishment as far as strategic thinking and 
foreign policy issues were concerned. (In the field of 
the natural sciences the situation was very different. ) 
This gap did not necessarily mean a difference in basic 
attitudes, but a lack of understanding of the real need-for 
high level intellectual discourse on those issues between the 
two sides. 
The different political parties' positions 
A valid distinction of cateaorios could be made both 
between some parties and inside the various parties as far 
as the nuclear issues were concerned. Because of the in, 
portance of Mapai in the political scene in Israel, as the 
main party and the one expected to remain in power in the 
future, this particular party refrained from openly debating 
those issues. . 
An open debate would have meant disclosure of 
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official policy or interference with what was considered 
the domain of the group of decision-: rakers involved in such 
issues. This does not mean that there were no differences 
of opinion on these issues within 1'iapai, but to the extent 
that those existed they were confined to the debate inside 
the government and the other forums of decision-makin{;. 
This situation seemed very different from the one existing 
in India, where a very extensive and open debate inside the 
Congress Party went on from almost immediately after the 
first Chinese nuclear test. The position of Aiapai as a 
party on the nuclear issue could therefore be described as 
identical with the government 
! 
position. Such differences 
as might have existed never reached the level of an open 
public debate. This lack of debate was more regrettable 
precisely because it was in the Mapai party that any possible 
decisions on foreign and defence policy were really being 
taken. This of course is true to the extent that such de- 
cisions were taken at all within the framework of any political 
party. As a general rule one could argue that under Ben- 
Gurion's regime, decisions on foreign policy and defence 
policy were taken almost always by a very small group which 
was headed by Ben-Gurion himself and was composed of his 
close advisers. The role of the government as a whole in 
these tatters was rather limited. However, even within this 
structure of decision-making something had changed in the 
early sixties. A general debate on nuclear policy took 
place in 1963(1). in this debate the role of Allon who was 
a riernber of the Governnent and a member of Achdut Ha' avodah 
was quite si nificant in that he ar;, acd that the building of a 
(1) See pp. IG3-i,. 
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conventional capability was more important than the building 
of In nuclear option'. Thus it seems that the position of 
Achdut lIa'avodah as a political party within the context of 
the debate on the nuclear issue q;, was important or rather 
began to be important after about 1962, in the sense that 
some personalities from this party influenced the actual 
decisions about these matters. 
Achdut IIa 'avodah 
The main approach of this party to the problem of 
nuclear weapons and the atomic issue in Israel had been 
voiced by Allen and to a lesser degree by Galili. As far 
i 
as Allore is concerned his opinions were formulated in the 
second edition of his book 'Masach steel Choll and before 
that in a long article published In an Israeli monthly 
t? Solad'. In both places. Allon developed his notion of a 
'pre-emptive strike' against the Arab armies, predominantly 
the Egyptian army, in six hypothetical situations: 
(a) a concentration of offensive troops constituting a 
danger for Israel; (b) when it became clear that*tho enemy 
was preparing a surprise attack on Israels airforce bases; 
(c) if there was a limited air strike at Israelis nuclear 
reactors and research institutions; (d) if guerilla war- 
fare against Israel reached dimensions where defensive 
measures and reprisal attacks could not overcome then; 
(e) if Jordan joined a military pact with another Arab 
country and allowed foreign Arab troops to concentrate in 
her area, and especially west of the Jordan river; (f) if 
Egypt closed the straits of Tiran. Each one of those steps 
should constitute a casus-belli for Israel, which would have 
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to be followed by a pre-emptive strike. (Allen defined 
'pre-emptive strike' in a way similar to that used in 
international literature, that is: 'an (Israeli) operational 
military initiative against enemy military concentrations 
and the taking of enemy objectives which have a vital 
security importance, when the enemy has formed itself into 
an offensive posture and before he has actually started his 
offensivet(')* However the list of casus belli given 
by Allon corresponds only partly to this kind of definition 
of pre-onotive stride, 
It seeps logical that adherence to such a doctrine 
of pre-emptive strike which in fact broadens the causes for 
war beyond the immediate possibility of attack by an enemy, 
implies a high flexibility on the part of Israel, and 
readiness to use conventional troops liberally. Indeed 
Allore, s tic': inG to this position, opposed the notion of 'a 
balance of deterrence' in which nuclear weapons constituted 
the instrument of stability. In the above publications and 
elsewhere Allon insisted that in order to maintain the 
flexibility of Israel's strategy it was preferable not to 
+n nuclear'. He realised the differences between the 
situation that obtained between the two super powers on the 
one hand and the situation between Israel and the Arab 
states on the other hand. The main difference, in his mind, 
was that the regiraes in the Arab countries were 'militant, 
unstable and unreasonable and that there is a dancer that 
they would not be able to resist the temptation of a first 
strikeI. 
(a) 
Thus if both sides possessed nuclear bombs, 
(1) See Nolad Ju1y-Aucust 1967, p. 142. 
(2) ibid. 
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there would be no 'balance of terrors. Israel, maintained 
Allon, could not live under the permanent danger of nuclear 
annihilation. Another reason for his position was that it 
was precisely by conventional troops that Israel could main- 
tain its military superiority over the Arab armies. In 
another part of his article, he maintained that at least two 
generations, if that, would pass before the factor of time 
began to operate against Israel. Although he advanced this 
argument within a different context, it-is obvious that his 
conclusion was that there was no need to fear a possible 
Arab superiority in conventional weapons for a very long 
time indeed. 
At the same time it is evident that Allon favoured a 
nuplear option. The question of what level this option 
should reach was not clarified in his publications or open 
pronouncements. However on a certain occasion when he 
addressed a meeting in London, he said that Israel would 
not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into 
the Middle Last but it would not be the second either. This 
position implies a nuclear option at a high level. 
The main point in Allonts position remained that 
of I have to choose between nuclear weapons in the hands 
of both sides, for the sake of a balance of deterrence, and 
elinin. atinG this possibility, namely that both sides will 
not have it, I would prefer a balance of power maintained by 
conventional weapons and not by nuclear ones'. 
ýýý 
(1) See 2-. o1aºd, ' op. cit., P. 1113. 
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This approach was reflected in the position of Achdut 
Hatavodah towards the problems of arms limitations. Thus 
on 13.11.1962, in a debate in the Ianesset, 2-ir. Israel Galili, 
another important leader of Achdut IIatavodah, who later 
became Minister of Information and eventually a closer ad- 
viser of the present (1970) Prime Minister of Israel, i-Irs. 
Golda feir, said that lie favoured an agreement which would 
ban the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Arab-Israel 
area, and that this agreement should be under mutual control. 
He added that this would be a stage on the way to secure an 
agreement on general disarmament in the Arab-Israel area. 
Concern about the possibility of the introduction of nuclear 
weapons into the area prompted Mr. Galili even earlier to 
say in the Knesset on 26.6.1962 that Israel should caoporato 
- with any political 
power in order to participate 14 an effort 
of which the objective was that the "arms race in the Middle 
East will not deteriorate into a nuclear race''. And again, 
on the 17th March 1964, Galili stated in the messet that 
it was preferable that neither Israel nor Egypt should have 
nuclear weapons. If one of them acquired such weapons, 
added Galili, the other would have them as well. 
(1 
This position of the leaders of Achdut Ha'avodah 
became even more important after the gradual rapprochenent 
between this party and the main political party - AIapai, a 
development which led eventually to the establishment in 
February 1965 of the "Alliance" in which the two parties 
participated. 
t1 Knesset, Firth I'. nesset, Third Session, vol. 22, 
P. Ö. 
186 
The position of the Achdut Ha'avodah on nuclear 
questions was partly related to their conviction that 
nuclear developments were somehow connected with the 
'European Orientation' which had developed during the 
Ben-Gurion regime and which was advanced with great per- 
sistence by Peres. This orientation mear_t, first, links 
with France, and more menacing - as far as Achdut Iiatavodah 
was concerned - with liest Germany as well. Tlhat made this 
even more suspicrious in their eyes were the rumours about 
West Germany's ambitions in the nuclear field and their 
influence on nuclear developments in Israel. Thus I-Iosho 
Carmel, another of Achdut iIa'avodah leaders, said on 
22.10.1963: t... the debate on 'European orientation' or 
'American orientation' renews barren debates of times past 
about 'guarantees' and 'a defence treatyi and switches the 
focus of our security problems from self reliance .... to 
dependence on foreiGn help. The economic, technological 
and military Growth and strengthening of 73gypt necessitates 
an accelerated growth of Zahal, the raising of its quality 
and the increase in its capability. All this in order that 
Zahal will maintain in the future as well as before decisive 
superiority over any possible joint Axab military power 
that could be created in the Arab . rorld... ' He added 
that this did not mean that Israel should cease to try to 
secure friends in the world, friends that were needed both 
for future international campaigns and as sources of weaponst 
supplies. 'However', he stated 'there is a Great distance 
between this approach and the one which casts its fate on 
the Growth and strengthening of Germany, or on the growth 
and strenCtheninG of the European Continent under the 
I 
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leadership of Germany - even if somebody calls this 
approach 'an orientation on ourselves'(') - 
this distance. 
can be like the distance between existence and annihilation. 
' 
'Israelis security cannot depend on Germany, a 
Germany which aspires also to have nuclear weapons, a 
Germany which itself is a focus for international tension... '(`'] 
The Position of fafi 
After the establishment of ßafi in June 1965 under 
the leadership of Ben-Gurion and with the participation of 
Dayan and Peres, the public debate on problems of defenco 
and foreign policy was increasingly channelled into the 
differences between the "Alliance" on the one hand and ^afi, 
on the other hand. This was because some of the main 
former decision-makers (who now were in Rafi) were anxious 
to attach the ruling Alliance, and decided to do this partly 
in the above-mentioned fields. Some Rafi members were 
among the main advocates of a nuclear effort in Israel. 
It seems likely that some of them favoured a full-fledged 
nuclear weapons' programme, while others favoured a nuclear 
option on a high level. The ground was therefore fertile 
for a full scale debate on these matters. 
However even Rafi members never stated openly that 
Israel should 'co nuclear'. Instead there evolved a new 
doctrine that probably became accepted by some Alliance 
(1) This is the literal rendering of the Hebrew phrase 
which means a self reliance po licy. 
(2) See Knesset, Fifth Jfriosset, Third Session, Vol: 1, 
p. 28. 
members as well. This doctrine is what one might term 
as a 'psychological nuclear option deterrent', and 
probably consisted of several elements: (a) the -threat 
that Israel may go nuclear would suffice to deter the 
Arabs from attacking Israel; (b) the creation of a 
nuclear option would prove to the Arabs the scientific 
and technological superiority of Israel, and thus would 
deter them from ever contemplating an attack on Israel. 
The Arab countries would realise that because of Israel's 
scientific capabilities, she was unbeatable. In short, 
the nuclear option would serve as a symbolic reminder of 
Israel's will for survival and its capability to sustain 
this will. To the extent that the Arabs would be humili- 
ated and frustrated by this Israeli superiority, this would 
act as a deterrent by itself. Thus the option would be 
used also for "deterrence by, frustration". (c) An option 
at a high level would prove to the Arabs their inability 
to compete with Israel in the field of atomic development. 
The Arabs would realise that they were unable to compete 
with Israel in this field and this on its own part would 
contribute to the General deterrence posture of Israel. 
This kind of use of the nuclear option is similar to the 
use of the option as a deterrent against an attempt by the 
Arabs to go nuclear themselves. This in fact is the 
meaning of Allon's position when he said that 'Israel will 
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not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle 
East but it will also not be the secondt(l). (d) As the 
(1) See above p. 11-1. 
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Arabs would never know what really was going on in the 
field of atomic development in Israel, they might even 
suspect that Israel was producing nuclear weapons. This 
very fear, even when the bomb did not exist, would deter 
there from actually launching a war against Israel. The 
element of uncertainty would suffice to produce the same 
effect as that of proven atomic capability. 
These elements were not formulated in so many words, 
but one can deduce them from pronouncements by some Raft 
members and for that matter by members of other par ties who 
adhered to the same position, or by-political commentators 
close in their political opinions to some of the leading 
personalities of Raff. 
One of the real issues was therefore -whether to 
increase the element of uncertainty involved in Israel's 
nuclear activities ör rather to dimish it. In an important 
symposium published in 'Ot', the main disagreement between 
Eshkol on the one hand and Peres on the other hand was 
precisely the notion of uncertainty related to the atomic 
developments in Israel as far as Arab perceptions of these 
activities were concerned. Peres argued that by declaring 
that 'Israel will not be the first to introduce nuclear 
weapons into-the Middle East', Israel really diminished 
the effects of the 'nuclear option as a deterrent'. His 
position was formulated in the following way: t... in a\ 
place- where there are no peace agreements, each state 
should be allowed to cover itself with the shield she needs 
in order to diminish her vulnerability. This does not 
mean that I favour nuclear weapons, but I should like to 
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make it unambiguously clear that my position is that Israel 
should not free the . gabs from the suspicion they. have. 
We do not have to make it easier for then - as far as their 
intentions are concerned - to attack us. To put it 
simply, as lone as their aggressive policy is shrouded by 
clouds, we should not take away the clouds from our de- 
terrence policy'ýýý, 
pposition to Nuclear Armaments and Nuclear Options 
The opposition in the political parties came from 
various quarters: two left wing parties, t"_apam (r". iphleaet 
Hapoalim Hameuchedet - the United Workers Party) and Maki 
(t"Ziphlaga IComunistit Israelit - the Israeli Communist 
Party); various political personalities in various parties, 
mainly the Independent Liberals and the Liberals (before 
the latter formed an alliance with the Herut Party) the 
main religious party, and an independent group of intel- 
lectuals which formed itself into a committee and was very 
active in starting a public debate on the issue. 
The opposition of these groups to nuclear develop- 
ments in Israel was motivated by various factors, from 
which one can distinguish four main themes. First, a 
moral apprehension at the possibility that Israel would 
become involved in nuclear development for military purposes. 
Second, a fear that nuclear weapons in the Middle East might 
bring about a situation which would cause great harm to 
(1) See Ot, September 1966, po 36. 
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Israel in strategic terms. Third, that the buildinU of 
an option in Israel would harm the political relations 
between Israel and the big powers. Fourth, that reliance 
on such methods would both exacerbate the Arab-Israel 
conflict and would serve as another sign that Israel did 
not realise that the resolution of the conflict lay not in 
this or another strategic-military doctrine but in the 
realm of politics. The coimunist party (ilalci) was' also 
acting under the influence of the Soviet position. All 
these positions and motivations contributed tb the creation 
of a long list of arguments against both Israel 'going 
nuclear'and also (but in fact to a lesser extent) against 
the building of a nuclear option. 
(1) 
In due course of time, the notion of MENFZ had been 
suggested and advanced persistently by many members of the 
above mentioned groups. This notion was designed partly 
in order to counter the following argument: What would 
happen to Israel if Egypt started producing nuclear weapons 
or received theta from the outside. (idobody thought 
seriously that any other Arab state could even start to 
consider the production of a bomb. The only remote possi- 
bility would have been that outside powers could have given 
nuclear weapons to the Arab countries but even then the 
first on the list would almost certainly be Egypt. ) The 
proponents of this "scenario" argued that if igypt went 
"nuclear" then Israel must also It Goo nuclear" but this in 
(1 } These are" listed in" -I schematic form below in 
Appendix 2, 
L-- 
fact meant that Israel should first build an option, 
otherwise she might find herself one day completely 
Furthermore, "naked", and confronted by a nuclear Egypt. 
as no one can guarantee that an outside power would not 
one day sell or give in secrecy such a weapon to Egypt, 
Israel. must be ready for such an extreme contingency as 
well. The only preparation to counter such a surprise 
acquisition by Egypt of a nuclear bomb, was the existence 
of such a weapon in the hands of Israel. Thus the idea 
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of 1,112171Z Was sur; aested as a solution to this scenario. But 
the proposal for TUE ? P2 was intended also to pre-ehpt the 
creation of a situation in which both Israel and Egypt 
went nuclear. The notion-here was that such a situation 
would be inherently unstable and dissimilar to the 
"balance of terror" betzreen the two super powers. 
Another reason for proposing MENFZ Lias that the 
notion of nuclear free zones in different parts of the 
tworld became more and more a recognized strategy in the 
field of nuclear arras control. 
With Mali there had been the added motivation of 
the various Soviet proposals for turning the Middle east 
into a nuclear free zone. These proposals were at the 
beginning concerned only with the building of American missile 
bases in Turkey and later on with the Polaris submarines 
attached to the sixth fleet in the Mediterranean. Only 
later does it appear that the problems of a nuclear race 
among the local powers became the concern of the Russians 
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as well. it was in January 195 that the 
Soviet 
Union proposed that the Middle East should become. a 
nuclear free zone. The cause for this proposal was the 
planning and preparation for the establishment of nuclear 
missile bases in Turkey and possibly in the countries of 
other members of the Baghdad Pact 
(and later Cento). Maki 
proposed in the'I'Cnesset that the Soviet proposal should be 
debated. P: rs. Vilenska for 2: ahi detailed the Soviet 
Proposal and called upon the Knesset to adopt it. It is 
obvious that that Mrs. Vilenska had in mind were the 
American roves to instal missiles in some Zliddle Eastern 
states. She also implied that there were circles' in 
Israel who would be ready to agree to the stationing of 
proposal vas de- such rsissilos in IBracl. 
(1) 
This Mahl 
feated. 
Another Soviet proposal called for the creation of 
a nuclear free aor_a : rhich would cover the whole of the 
Mediterranean basin. This proposal was dated 20.5.1969. 
(2) 
The position of t . 'apam 
Traditionally Napam favoured a neutralist policy for 
Israel between Last and West, a neutralism which at the 
beginning, of-the fifties had been coloured by a strong pro-- 
Soviet tendency. This pro-Soviet orientation Gave way later 
{1ý See I,. ncsset, 19.2.1958. 
(2) For text of the Israeli answer (dated 30.5.1963) to 
. Io this proposal, see The Israel. Dir""est, Vol. VI, . 13. 
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on to a 'purer neutralist approach, a chance which took 
place after the realisation among many Mapam members of 
the basically hostile attitude of the Soviet Union towards 
Israel. A split occurred in the party and a small group 
of extreme left-wingers under the leadership of Dr. Moshe 
Sneh left and formed their own party which eventually 
joined Maki. However, towards the beginning of the 
sixties and especially when the new Kennedy Administration 
moved towards a thaw in the Cold Uar, a new approach 
emerged. Mapam began to endorse a policy based on the 
assumption of a growing understanding between the two super 
powers. Neutralism gave way to a new policy based on a 
different configuration of the international system. In 
other words Diapart hoped for a crowing, detente between the 
super powers, a detente which would enable these powers 
to pursue joint and constructive policies as far as the 
Piddle East and the Arab-Israel conflict teere concerned. 
The idea was that the two super powers would either extend 
joint guarantees to Israel or to all the countries in the 
middle Last, or alternatively would guarantee the neutralis- 
ation of the Middle East. The notion of detente included 
such concepts as nuclear disarmament and the creation of 
nuclear free zones in various parts of the world. In this 
context it is interesting to note that Mapam leaders argued 
that the orientation on the "Paris-33onn axis" which they 
opposed, would endanger Israel's relations not only with 
Russia but also With the United States. 
(1 
(i) See for example, ßarzilai, .: no ; et, I . 3.1963. 
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Within the context of the Arab-Israel conflict 
itself Piapan always favoured a moderate policy and 
endorsed a policy lending to some kind of a political 
settlement which would eventually resolve the conflict. 
At the same time it was aware of the security needs of 
Israel. One indication - among several - of this ataare- 
ness was that many members of Mapari served in very high 
positions in the Army during the 1911.8 war and some camtinued 
to do that later on. 
The opposition to nuclear developments in Israel, 
so far as i-. apamn was concerned, stemmed from all the causes 
indicated above (short of the effect of the Soviet policy 
to which only Maki adhered) and was also connected with 
their criticism of what became known as 'orientation on 
the "Paris-Bonn axis"I or the 'French orientation'. Thus 
general arguments against nuclear weapons were combined with 
criticism of a certain foreign policy. 
(") 
2Iapam leaders 
felt that the nuclear strategy pursued by Israel had inner 
and crucial connections with decisions about the direction 
taken by Israel's foreign policy. In this they were at 
the same time both right and wrong. They were right in 
the sense that some of the protagonists of the "miclear 
option" were themselves identifying foreign policy choices 
with strategic choices, moreover they (these protagonists) 
argued in fact that foreign policy choices should be dic- 
tated by the needs of arras acquisitions. Mapam leaders 
(1} See for exanpie, Barzilai, . riesset, 
4.3.1963" 
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were right on this issue in a different way as weil, 
nanely that the protagonists of a nuclear option were, 
or felt they were, close to France in the sense that the 
latter became one of the anti-status-quo powers in the 
international system in several respects and they assumed 
on this basis that France was not opposed to nuclear pro- 
liferation. However, Mapam and for that matter other 
groups using the same argumentation, were wrong in two 
senses: (a) Germany itself, apart from one faction of 
public opinion, felt strongly against nuclear proliferation 
in general including the case of Germany; and contrary 
to what Soviet propaganda hac to say, was not (and is not) 
an anti-status-quo power in the general sense. (b) Although 
the position on nuclear proliferation is one of the import- 
ant criteria for deciding whether"a state is anti-status-quo 
or not, it is not the only one. 
Because of the process of fragmentation in the 
international system the definition of what is a status quo 
power became very ambivalent. Powers act on several levels 
and differently in different areas, and this definition 
may change according to the level and area in which they act. 
France may be considered an anti-status-quo power on one 
level of her international activity and quite the opposite 
on a different level. Obviously this misperception of the 
opposition in Israel was shared by those who favoured an 
orientation towards France or a "French-German axis". Both 
sides had misperceptions about the new developments in Europe 
in* the sense that they saw them in a one dinensional way. 
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The tEuropeanst in Israel hoped for the development of a 
new united Europe (something which might have happened 
and is still a possibility), which would act independently 
of the super powers and in which Israel could become part. 
This Europe would change the status quo in many ways, among 
which the problem of nuclear proliferation was one. They 
had however, overlooked the possibility that the new Europe 
could decide to pursue a negative policy towards Israel 
and could also adopt an anti proliferation posture once 
its position as a new big power became a fact in the inter- 
national system. 
Mapan's position evolved around several principles: 
(a) a critical view of the notion that there was a possi- 
bility of establishing a stable balance of deterrence based 
on nuclear weapons between Israel and the Arab countries. 
(" 
(b) Opposition to the foreign policy objectives or orient- 
ations entailed or connected with a strategy of nuclear 
deterrence. (c) The need for a political settlement for 
the Arab-Israel conflict, which would be hampered by the 
development of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. (d) The 
suspicion that the defence establishment in Israel would be 
used for attainment of political objectives by one political 
group inside Israel and that the position of this political 
, group would 
be strengthened by the nuclear activities. 
Thus domestic political issues were discussed within the 
The term 'balance of deterrence' had never been used 
by any party to the debate. The tern: usually used 
was 'balance of terror'. 
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framework of the debate. 
(') 
Napara, with several other elements opposing the 
atomic position of the government, demanded an Israeli 
political initiative to create the TUMI"IFZ. Mapam emphasised 
that this meant not the whole of the Middle Bast but only 
the 'Israel-Arab' region. In other words, Turkey and Iran 
were not included. In this 1, Iapa:: i took a very different 
position from i"Ialci which insisted that the whole of the 
Middle at should be included in the area to be free from 
nuclear weapons, 
(2) 
Evidently, by insistence on the Arab- 
Israeli region as the relevant geographical framework, 
riapam wished to extricate the issue from the nuclear 
relations between the super powers, and not to put Israel 
in the awkward position in which she would have to take 
sides-on the question of American nuclear missiles in Turkey, 
or the nuclear weapons of the Sixth Fleet when this fleet 
visited the eastern Nediterranean. 
0) 
The second point 
on which i"Iapain insisted was to leave open the question of 
'who would inspect and verify'. Contrary to the, official 
(1) This particular point came to a head in the debate 
about the "Company for nuclear development". See, 
inter alia, h1-11amishmar, April 1963. 
(2) On these differences, see, inter ilia, the debate in 
the Knesset, 17.3.196+. 
(3) See the debate in the I'nesset, 20.7.1961 when ? iapan 
called for the establishment of the " Arab-Israeli 
region" a nuclear free zone, whereas Mahl called for 
turning the Whole of the Middle ast into a nuclear 
free zone; see also Knesset, Knesset 5, session 
vol. 27, P. 1825. 
The American nuclear missiles were withdrawn from 
Turkey already in 1963, a fact known to both I'Iapan 
and i'iaki; but this did not change the basic difference 
between their respective positions. 
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Israeli position which for a long time demanded mutual 
inspection as the only possible approach to control within 
any arms control agreement, Mapam suggested that powers 
which would be acceptable to the two sides, could servo 
as the control. . tlternatively or even in the first place, 
the United Nations could serve the same purpose. 
(') 
However, it accepted also the possibility of mutual 
control as an alternative, whereas 2: ahi on the other hand 
always suggested international control (or inspection) as 
the only approach to the problems of control within tie 
framework of P'SJ!, TFZ. 
(2) 
Still a different version 
suGgested by 1-Iapam called for U. N. supervision that ' I-. ould 
be agreed upon by the two sides'. 
ý3ý 
Obviously the most important difference on the 
question of 'who would supervise' e:: isted between Ilapam 
on the one hand and the official position on the other hand. 
Once Mapam suggested that the inspection need not neces-' 
sarily be mutual, her position immediately became very 
different indeed from that of the government. Hapar.: is 
position stemmed from the assumption that it would be 
improbable that the Arabs, and in this context the most 
important power was Egypt, would ever agree to mutual 
inspection. Thus, apart from all the other stumbling 
(1) See for exanple, Al-Uariishnar, 19.10.1962; 
Al-Hamishmar, 16.11.1962. 
(2) See for example Barzilai and Sneh in I'-nesset, 
I: nesset 5, 
sesaion 2, vol. 27, p. 1825. 
(3) See Knesset, 13,11.1962, Fifth Inesset, Session 2, 
Vol. 3, PP- 139-140. 
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blocks on the way to an agreement on Idenuclearisiatlon' 
of the Arab-Israel region, a condition demanding "mutual 
inspection" would have made such a diplomatic initiative 
a complete non-starter. 
The position of Miki 
As has been noted on p f. 19o-? the position of Maki 
was based on the same principles as those suCCested by the 
other groups opposed to the government on the nuclear 
issue. However in the case of Maki the Soviet position 
played an important role. 
( ) 
Thus in contrast to 2: apam Maki stuck to the notion 
of 'the Middle east as a nuclear free zones in which 
clearly Turkey, Iran and the Eastern Mediterranean were 
included. 
(2) 
The other basic difference between them 
and t"Iapam was concerned with the image they 
atomic issue as part of the general foreign 
policy of Israel. 11hereas 1,1a-par argued in 
first a neutralist foreign policy and later 
policy based on close relations between Isr: 
super powers within a framework of detente, 
had of the 
and defence 
favour of 
a foreign 
ael and both 
and considered 
the nuclear Policy of the Government to be connected with 
of 
a policy/anti-status-quo and anti-both super powers, 21aki 
(1) See p. 141 and the debate in the Knesset, 17.3.1964. 
(2) See above p. ! 43 ; Knesset, 17.3.1964; Knesset 
20.7.1964.1 
I 
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insisted - in the usual form of Soviet propaganda stance - 
that both the 'French orientation and the 'American' 
orientation of the Israeli Governt--ent were to be blamed in 
connection with the nuclear policy of the government. Pialci 
did differentiate between these two orientations, but 
criticised both of them and did not admit that on the issue 
of nuclear proliferation there was a great difference between 
the position of America and the Soviet Union on the one hand 
,, 
it may be and France on the other hand. 
(') 
In passimrn 
noted that the difference between the super powers and 
France in the last analysis was not so enormous, as France 
Gradually adopted an anti proliferation position, though 
did so only tacitly. 
2iaki tended on the whole to be much more vociferous 
and sharp in its criticism of the government's nuclear 
policy and argued that Israel aas aiming at creating a 
power for the actual inducement of the Arab world to accept 
Israel's political objectives. 
The Liberal Party 
As in the case of Mapai and later on the "Alliance", 
it appears that there was no unanimity of approach among 
the Liberal party on nuclear policy. The party included 
people of. different positions on foreiGn and defence 
policies and in fact these differences were played out along 
For the criticis, a of bo th orientations see for 
example Mii: unis, Inesset, 4.3-19631 Fifth Knesset, 
Session 2, Vol. 17, p. 1343. 
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the full spectrum of opinions on foreign policy. The 
party was composed of two former parties: the former 
"Progressive Party", which could be classified as a 
moderate party on all issues of foreign policy; and the 
former "General Zionists" who were more of a centre-to- 
right liberal party of the European tradition. In 196 
the united party was dissolved and most of the former 
"Progressives" created a new party, The Independent 
Liberals; whereas the majority of the former Liberal 
Party created an a1igv. ient with the right trine IIerut Party. 
For some time there had been contacts between the 
Liberal party and Dr. Nahum Goldmann, the former chairman 
of the Uorld Zionist T'ýovernent and at the time of writing 
still the President of the Jewisa World Congress. Dr. 
Goldmann is . noun for his independent and indeed noncon- 
formist position on problems of Israel's foreign policy. 
Partly due to his influence and partly due to the interest 
in foreign and defence policy shoim by some other members 
of the Party, a debate on Israel's nuclear policy-had been 
initiated in the Party's councils. 
In the various debates in the Party, two schools 
of thought emerged: the first including, among others, 
people like S. Abramov H. P., P. Rosen H. P. (and also the 
president of the party), and M. I: ol (later a minister in 
the Israeli Government) favoured the idea of an Israeli 
initiative to bring about MLNFZ . Other leaders, anion- them 
Y. Harrari ;.. P. , A. Rinalt I. P. and Y. merlin M. P. , opposed 
this idea. 
(') 
(1) See Halaretz, 2905,1962. 
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It is interesting that the Liberal party was the 
first party to bring the problem of Israel's nuclear 
policy to a formal debate in its central political organs. 
It seems that in the formal debate that ensued, the party 
endorsed the Government position. However, on one point 
there was unanimity of opinion between both schools of 
thought, namely, on the need for better and more efficient 
control over nuclear affairs in the country. This control 
was to be aimed at increasinG the supervision of the Knesset 
over these activities, and also allowing members of the 
opposition, or of coalition parties not directly involved 
in the running of the defence affairs, to become party to 
the decision-making process in defence and foreign policy. 
By emphasising this last point, the Liberal party shared 
in the general feeling in the country during the last period 
of the Ben-Gurion regime that the defence and foreign 
policy of the country should be subject to public scrutiny 
and should cease to be In holy cowl. The wording of the 
Liberal Party resolution on this issue was the following: 
'The Liberal Party favours the continuation of the efforts 
for the development and advancement of the nuclear research 
for peaceful uses in Israel, in all its aspects. At the 
sane time the Liberal party demands the establishment of a 
small body with the participation of the opposition, which 
will follow - having full information - the developments, 
and will have full control over developments in the field 
of nuclear research both theoretical and applied, carried by 
each of the government agencies'. 
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'It is advisable that this body should be a sub- 
committee of the Knesset committee on foreign and defence 
policy. This body must be party to political decisions 
related to nuclear research and nuclear developments. The 
Liberal party also demands the reestablishment of the Atomic 
Energy Commission which will be composed of scientists and 
e: cperts t 
A resolution calling for a halt to the building of 
( 
the reactor in Diriona as defeated`) . 
The Liberal party came back to the nuclear policy 
issue in 1963 within the general debate on foreign policy* 
and defence policy which took, ' place at the Party's confer- 
ence. The two schools of thought mentioned above had not 
changed their positions. Rimalt who emerged as the main 
speaker for the second school, criticised the demand for 
an Israeli initiative for an aGreenient on 2,. 'ß: i x`Z. He 
suggested that Israel should pursue two parallel courses 
"1 
of-action: first, to increase its military capability 'ii 
every way'; second, to try and secure guarantees. frort the 
big powers* 
The other school of thought represented by Rose., 
I_ol and Zeev :: atz agreed that Israel must increase its 
military capability but added that there must be an Israeli 
effort to secure that nuclear weapons would not be intro- 
duced into the +rc; ion' (namely the Mob-Israeli area). 
(1) See Habol; er, 8.8.1962. 
(2) ibid. 
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This ar, ns control measure could be verified by inter- 
national control and supervision. On this last point 
of the nature of the control there had been one variant: 
Posen adhered to the notion of 'mutual inspection' 
whereas the others suggested international control. The 
debate ended with a defeat for the second approach('). 
The official resolution of the party called for the 
strengthening of the deterrence posture of the Israeli 
army and for the establishment of a high powered defence 
committee nominated by the Knesset. The objective of 
this committee would be to strengthen civilian control 
over the defence establishment. 
(2 
The 'Public Committee for the Iluc? ear Disarmament of the 
lRe! ion 
Israeli nuclear activity and the complete lack- of 
any serious public debate on the i: ieaninL and implications 
of this activity on the one hand and the dangers entailed 
in the possibility of the introduction of atomic weapons 
into the Middle rast, prompted several people to initiate 
a public debate on these issues. Their objective as no 
doubt to propose an alternative to the government's policy 
in this field. The people concerned in this activity 
came mainly from the academic world and included among 
others, Professors Urbach, Sambutski, Natan, Leibovitz, 
(1) See H& "are Wiz, 17.5.1963 and 20,5,1962; IIaboker 
19.5.19 63. 
(2ý See ýýztbol: er 21 . 5.1963; Ha 1 <<retz 21 . 5.1963. 
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Stein and Bar-Ilillel. Very active among them was also 
PFr. yliezer Livnoh a former leader in the T: apai party, 
who lost favour with his party because of several inde- 
pendent positions he had taken on economic and social 
issues. The late Professor Martin Duber lent his name 
to some of the pronouncements of the Committee. 
The new committee organized several public meet- 
ings, published pamphlets and its members riot various 
political' leaders from all parties as a lobbying Group. 
(1 
Members of the group wrote articles in the press (notably 
among them IIr. Livneh) and initiated meetings with the 
central-organs of the partied. Along other activieis 
they sent a memorandum. to the secretariat of Mapai stress- 
ing the dangers inherent in a nuclear arms race in the 
Middle East. 
(2) 
The public activities of the group 
began with a statement published in Iia'aretz in April 1962 
which ran as follows: 
'We consider the development of nuclear weapons in 
this part of the world as constituting a danger tb Israel 
and to the peace of the 1'Iiddle rast'. 
tfe call upon the Israeli public to act while there 
is still time against this terrible eventuality by joining 
in the following three demands: 
1 See for example rla' ariv 5.7.1962; Al-IIarishmar 
1.7.1962. 
(2) See Ha t aretz 6.7-1962; Al-Ilar.. ±s: 1r.. ar 6.7.1962 etc. 
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(1) that the 2". 'iddle East countries should refrain 
from military nuclear production, if possible by mutual 
agreement; 
1 (2) that the United Nations be requested to super- 
vise the region in order to prevent military nuclear pro- 
duction; 
(3 that the countries of the Middle East avoid 
obtaining nuclear arras from any other countries t. 
Apart from this proposal members of the Committee 
demanded that Israel should stop building the reactor in 
1 
Dimona. 
The various arguments suggested by the Comnittee 
members resemble sirailar arguments used by members of 
2.1apan, Maki (here there were the obvious differences con- 
cerning the adherence of Maki to some Soviet policies in 
this subject), and the Liberals. '. -That distinguished 
this group from the other political groups, was its cozn- 
centration on this subject, and the fact that it included 
people of all political colours. The fact that it 
included some of the outstanding academic personalities 
in the country also enhanced its prestige. 
The Committee succeeded in startinC a public debate 
on the issue and contributed in a limited way to an increased 
interest in the problem. However, for the reasons 
su,; Gosted above(2) the public response to its activity was 
(1) See Davar, 12.10.1962. The paper cquotes Mr. Livnoh 
in a press conference. ' 
(2) Pp. 
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rather limited. Israeli public opinion I: ept its conformist 
attitude about foreign and defence policy and was rather 
reluctant even to become engaGed in such a debate. It was 
the activities of the parties like t"Iapam, and mainly Achdut 
Ha'avodah which brought about some change in the Israeli 
r 
policy on the problems of the atomic policy. 
Although the Committee criticised many aspects of 
the government ; policy on the atomic issue, it usually re- 
frained from a debate on the basic foreign policy orient- 
ation of the government. Thus the cozmple:: of issues 
connecting the 'French Orientation' i, iith the atomic policy 
of Israel did not become one; of the points to which the 
Committee directed its attention although members probably 
did this but not in their capacity as Committee members). 
Thus the Committee avoided becoming labelled with any 
particular political trend or orientation. However, 
committee members laid emphasis on what they perceived. to 
be the super powers policy on nuclear proliferation. Like 
Mapam members and other critiques of the government 
position they maintained that both super powers had a 
common interest in halting proliferation and would eventu- 
ally take active steps to frustrate proliferation. This 
argument was very central in the Committee's position in 
general, and' strengthened their belief that an agreement 
on non-proliferation into the Middle East could be-secured 
with-the help of the super powers. 
As has been indicated above, the Committee had some 
success in raising the issue of nuclear policy, but failed 
in securing wide public support for their point of vice. 
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1Jhether they had contributed, with the other opposition 
parties involved in this debate to a change in the Lshkol 
goverm.: ent's position on arms control is riot' clear. Talcin, 
into consideration the strong reaction of government 
officials to the Cor_unittee's declarations and positions, 
it seems unlikely. 
The Religious Parties 
Traditionally, the religious parties in Israel were 
never primarily concerned with foreign. and defence policies. 
The main party - the National, Religious Party - had always 
been ready to accept whatever defence policy had been 
, Cested 
by the current leadership of Hapai. The IIati. onal sug 
Religious Party demanded as a quid -pro quo for this 
acquiescence some concessions in the field of the relations 
between state and church. Traditionally the Ulapai leader- 
ship under Ben Gurion felt that the partnership with this 
religious party was the most convenient one and thus con- 
cessions were given to the latter party in what interested 
her most. 
. 
However, even within this framework of an 
unholy alliance, it was quite well crown that the leader of 
the religious party Moshe Haim Shapira, was a moderate in 
foreign policy. It is not known however to what extent he 
voiced his own opinion in various matters pertaining to 
these issues. 
Whereas Shapira usually adhered to the I"Sapa: L policy 
(whatever it may be under the leadership of the different 
roups), 'mere were differences of opinion among other 
leaders of the party on i'orei z ar-d defence policy. Thus 
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for example W. Raphael on the one hand could be considered 
as having ttou, h' positions in those fields, whereas r"Ir. 
Moshe Una M. P. on the other hand has always voiced different 
and more moderate policies. Indeed it was on the atomic 
policy of the Government that Una voiced some doubts which 
though formulated in very cautious terms still remind one 
of the rlapari position on these issues. 
The ? ieru t Par tv 
The iierut Party is known for its e: ctrene objectives 
in forei(, n policy. Deine a continuation of the Irrun Tzvai 
Leuii, one of the three military organisations in the 
1Yi: huv' 
(j ), 
I-lerut continued to adhere to the objective of 
'reuniting' the whole of Bretz Israel (Palestine on both 
sides of the Jordan), within the state of Israel. Its 
leaders emphasised time and again the need to concentrate 
on defence and preparations for the eventual 'next round' 
with the Arab world. They have always been quick to point 
to the dangers constituted by various ixab moves and to 
maintain that Israel is lagging behind the Arab world in 
terms of the arras race. After the emergence of the doc- 
trines of deterrence and especially after the news about 
the activities of German scientists in E3ypt, Herut spokesman 
began to insist increasingly on the need to develop new and 
forceful weapons in order to deter the Arab world fron 
attacking Israel. Tlithin this framework, P"_r. Menachexn 
(7 'Yishuv' is the Hebrew terra for the Jewish Community 
in Palestine. 
I 
2 11 
Degin, the leader of the Party, was in fact the only 
political leader in Israel who called openly for the 
creation of an independent nuclear deterrent for Israel. 
(1" 
Begin argued that in view of the declared policy of the 
Arabs about the destruction of Israel, and in view of the 
Egyptian preparation and experiments with chemical weapons 
carried by missiles, Israel would be justified in building 
her nuclear deterrent. Begin also argued that the Arab- 
Israeli conflict was unique because it was the only conflict 
in which one side as aiming at the complete annihilation 
of the other. This objective, according to him, did not 
exist in other conflicts such as the Indian-Pakistani one. 
Thus, he continued, the argument that Israel should not be- 
come engaged in the nuclear venture because it might induce 
other countries like India and Pakistan to 'go nuclear' was 
not relevant. 
This general approach also affected the party line 
on some related issues. To begin with, party spokesmen 
and the party newspaper (Herut) criticised severely any 
concession by the government to Anerican pressures in the 
nuclear field. There were demands that the government 
should not allow the visits of Americans to the Dimona 
reactor; there teere hintu that the American proposal for 
the building of the desalination project was linked with 
American control over Dimona and therefore should be seen 
in this context. The intention of this particular article 
(1) See his article in The Jewish Herald, Johannesburg, 
29.3.1966. 
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was obviously to suggest that Israel should abandon the 
desalination project and thus avoid American control. 
(') 
Second, the party spokesmen in the Knesset kept criticising 
the idea of an Israeli initiative for the "denuclearisation" 
of the t: iddle East or of the Arab-Isa, aeli region. Third, 
the notion of a deterrent power (though without saying it 
should necessarily be a nuclear one) %ept appearing in 
flerut leaders' speeches. 
One of the dilemmas that a. revisionist party like 
'IIerut' must face within the context of a debate on nuclear 
policy, is the relationship between nuclear weapons and 
foreign policy objectives. Nuclear weapons are the status 
, uo weapons. Thus a party which demands the expansion of 
Israel to cover larger parts of Bretz Israel, must take 
into consideration that the existence of nuclear weapons 
in the region would be the greatest possible obstacle to 
such an expansion. This dilemma was somewhat modified by 
two qualifications: first, lIerut leaders talked more about 
a nuclear deterrent force rather than in terms of a -weapon 
system which should or could be used within the context of 
a future war of expansion. Second, -Herut ceased at a 
certain point to demand an actual direct Israeli initiative 
for starting a future tsar for the e: pansion of Israel. 
However the dilemma was still there and it appears that no 
intellectual effort'had been devoted to its resolution. 
(1) See ! rcrut, 13.2.1964. 
(2) See for example, Haim Landau, I, nesset, I': _essot 6, 
Session 1", vol. 6, p. 280. 
213 
Indeed its very existence was not recoizized. This 
only reflects on the general ignorance among several 
sections of the Israeli political elite and public opinion 
in general, about the nature of nuclear weapons and the 
various contexts within which they should be considered. 
Another interesting reference to this could be 
found in a speech by N. 'r. Login in which he argued that 
unconventional weapons in the hands of Egypt were very 
dangerous- because no one could count on President Nasser 
to behave rationally. Begin continued by pointing to 
the difference in that respect between super-power relations 
on the one hand and those existing in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict on the other hand. In the latter case, he added, 
the Arab side could not act rationally and there was there- 
un 
fore a high probability of his using, /conventional 
1 
weapons. 
The logical conclusion from this kind of ar,; u::. ent 
could of course have been that there was no hope of creating; 
a stable balance of deterrence in the Middle East and there- 
fore nuclear weapons could not be used as a rational weapon 
of deterrence, and hence there should be an effort to reach 
an arrangement by ýwhich nuclear weapons would not be intro- 
duced into the Middle Dast. However this conclusion was 
not suggested by Begin. In fact he could not have su; gosted 
it because apart from everything else this line of argument 
(ý} See Knesset, Fifth I'. nesret, Session 2, Vol. 33, 
p. 2163,2LE. 6.1963. 
S 
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would have contradicted another which had been advanced 
by Herut leaders (and other political personalities as 
well), namely that there ras no possibility of reaching 
any kind of agreement with the Arabs on arms control, and 
at the sar:: e time there was no possibility of trusting big 
powers' agreements on this question. 
As far as guarantees were concerned, ? Terut leaders 
sometimes both argued in favour of concluding a military 
alliance with France and later on with America, and main- 
tained that these guarantees were not credible. (They 
have drawn on other occasions a rather surprising and 
confused distinction between military alliances and 
guarantees, maintaining that the latter should not be 
sought after whereas the first are worthwhile azzid 
advantageous for Israel. )(1) 
(1 See for example Begin in Knesset, Fifth Knesset, 
Session 3, Vol. 1, p*10,21.10.1963. 
Chanter V 
THE ARAD POSITION IN TIIE NUCLEAR FIELD(1) 
Arms races are usually the product of reciprocal 
anxieties of opponents about their actual or imagined 
intentions and capabilities. Sometimes, a certain regime 
in one state may start expanding its army for purely 
domestic reasons - prestige is one example. This on its 
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part may start an arms race or contribute to the escalation 
of an arms race. 
(2) 
(1) This chapter is limited in two senses: (a) It concen- 
trates mainly on the Egyptian position in the nuclear 
field and the reaction of Egypt to nuclear developments 
in Israel; (b) it concentrates mainly on the following 
subjects: (1) various strategies that Egypt has developed 
as a reaction to Israeli moves in. this field; (2) the 
extent to which Israeli developments have affected the 
basic Egyptian policy towards Israel; (3) the extent to 
which there was an interaction between Israeli nuclear 
developments and the war of 1967. 
All these subjects are related to the question of the 
uses of nuclear options, namely, to what extent did the 
Israeli'-- option affect Egyptian behaviour, and conversely 
to what extent there has been a game of mutual deterrence 
between Israel and Egypt on this subject. 
The chapter is based only on part of the available 
sources. The sources used are: (a) a selected collection 
of articles from Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria up to the end 
of 1965; (b) all of Radio Cairo broadcasts on the nuclear 
issue since the end of 1965, which were monitored by the 
BI3C monitoring service. These broadcasts always include 
the important weekly article written by IIeikal in al- 
Äharam, which were usually considered to be semi-official 
representation of the Egyptian policy. 
(2) On motivations for the arms race in the Middle East, see 
inter alia Lewis Bloomfield and Amelia C. Leiss, 'Arms 
Transfer and Arms Control', in J. C. Hurewitz (ed. ), 
Soviet American Competition in the Middle East, Praeger, 
New York, 1969. On the way in which embargoes and 
uncertainty about supplies of arms affect the arms race, 
see Y. Evron, 'French Arms Policy in the Middle East', 
The World Today, February 1970. 
-- i6 Most of the states in the Middle East participate 
in an arms race which started about fifteen years ago. 
In terms of quantities of arms, Egypt stands at the top of 
the scale in the Middle East, but several other powers in 
this region have also equipped themselves with highly 
sophisticated and abundant weapons. It has been Egypt 
which has been most concerned with whatever capabilities 
Israel has acquired or may acquire, and it was the Egyptian 
capability which created in the minds of Israeli decision- 
makers most of the anxieties which led to the ever increasing 
defence budget in Israel. The role of images, perceptions 
and misperceptions in this context is extremely important. 
As both Israel and Egypt are part of a multi-polar power 
system in the sub-system of the Middle East, the possibility 
of misperceptions is considerably increased. Egypt may 
have started an arms race because of inter-Arab competition, 
but this has led to increasing Israeli suspicions and as a 
result to the application of a certain policy aimed at 
increasing weapon levels in Israel. This on its part has 
led to another escalation of the arms race on the-part of 
the Egyptians, and so on. ' For example, the famous Egyptian- 
Czechoslovak (which was in fact an Egyptian-Russian) Arms 
Deal of 1955 was motivated by the creation of the Baghdad 
Pact. 
0 ) However, this arms deal was interpreted 
ý1) On the background to the 1955 Arms Deal, see Uri 
Ra'anan, Russia Arms the Third World, M. I. T. Press, 
1969. Ra'anan argues persuasively that the real 
cause of the Arms Deal was the creation of the 
Baghdad Pact and the resulting convergence of Egyptian 
and Russian interests, and not the Israeli raid on 
Gaza on the night of 28.1.1955-1.3.1955. The Gaza 
raid was extremely important in another context, namely 
that of the Israeli-Egyptian conflict. 
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by the Israelis as being aimed almost exclusively against 
themselves. Indeed, this arms deal became another im- 
portant step on the road which led eventually to the Sinai 
Campaign of 1956 and to the intensification of the Israeli- 
Egyptian conflict. 
The Egyptian weapons' acquisition drive seems to 
have been motivated by four separate considerations. To 
begin with, there has been the Arab-Israel conflict which 
at various periods played roles of varying importance; 
second, there has been the inter-Arab competition for 
power. This competition even deteriorated at a certain 
I 
point into a full scale war,, namely the war in the Yemen 
in which Egyptian troops played a central role. Third, 
there has been the ambition of a military regime to prove 
its vitality by the acquisition of prestige weapons. 
(1) 
Fourth, there has been the idea that a process of rapid 
modernisation could be encouraged by the building of a 
modern army equipped with modern arms. This last point 
also entailed the decision to concentrate on the domestic 
production of weapons' systems. Another possible motive 
is the pressure of the army proper (which became the main 
and even sole constituency of the regime) on the new 
(1) On the tendency of military 'Praetorian' regimes to 
acquire 'big' weapons for prestige objectives, see 
David C. Rapoport Praetorianism: Government without 
Consensus. Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, University 
of California (Berkeley) 1960'. 
On the special behaviour of the Arab military regimes 
within this context of "prestige through acquisition of 
weapons" see Windsor Philip 'Who Pays for the Arms Race? ', 
The New Middle East, No. 1, October 1968. 
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military regime to acquire more and newer weapons. 
The emphasis on a rapid development of the armed 
forces coupled with the modernisation of weapons charac- 
terised Egypt as early as the Muhamad Ali regime of the 
19th Century. In Muhamad Ali's behaviour one can already 
detect some of the main characteristics of the Nasserite 
regime, and there is indeed an interesting continuity in 
the main features of both regimes. In both cases, the 
building up of an army and ambitious armaments' production 
programmes, apart from being a (opus for tremendous energies 
and attention, became an element (and perhaps the most 
important one) in a process of assumed modernisation. 
Moreover, both regimes were intent on both a process of 
modernisation and on an ambitious foreign policy. 
To a certain extent King Faroult - at a certain 
stage of his career - was also inclined to some of these 
aims, namely the accomplishment of ambitious targets in 
the field of foreign policy. 
(') 
Some of the more ambitious programmes in the 
domestic production of weapons, programmes which had no 
relevance at all to the real capabilities of the country, 
were started in Egypt during King Faroukts regime. Indeed 
it was under him that an ambitious plan to build military 
aircraft was put into operation. 
(2) 
(1) See on this Sylvia Haim (ed. ), Arab Nationalism, 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 1962, 
especially pp. I+8-51. 
(2) See John It. Hoaglond and John B. Teeple, Weapons 
Transfer and Regional Stability: The Middle Eastern 
Case', Orbis, Fall 1965. 
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However, it was only under the new revolutionary 
regime that Egypt plunged into more risky and ambitious 
military programmes. In doing this, the new regime com- 
pletely overlooked the scientific and technological cap- 
abilities of the country. By trying to develop immediately 
highly sophisticated technologies the regime actually 
undermined the gradual sociological and ideological change 
which was necessary to bring about a valid and successful 
process of modernisation. 
What the varied weapons' production programme did 
was, first, to increase the anxieties and suspicions of 
Israel and possibly some of the Arab countries; and second, 
to change the self-perception of the Egyptian regime as to 
Egypt's capabilities. 
(') 
The Egyptian Weapons' Effort 
Up to 1955, the Egyptian army was armed mainly with 
, British weapons of various categories. 
This was the 
(1) This is not to judge who actually started the arms race 
between Israel and Egypt. It simply notes the reactions 
in Israel to a particular aspect of the process of arma- 
ments in Egypt, namely the concentration on independent 
production of some weapons' systems. On the other hand, 
as will be shown below the nuclear development in Israel 
contributed to great anxieties in Egypt and probably 
brought about, or at least enhanced, the Egyptian effort 
in the field of missiles (although even here there is no 
clear and definite indication that this was the case). 
It might also have affected the Egyptian effort in some 
conventional weapons. 
As to the general question of "who started the arms 
race" there is probably no definite answer, because both 
sides acted from the very beginning under a state of 
mutual suspicion, and also, as has been indicated above, 
in the' Egyptian case, there were several motives for 
developing an arms race. Nadav Safran, for one, argues 
that up to 1955, Israel led in the arms race. After the 
1956 war it was Egypt that took the lead in the race. 
See From War to War: The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 
1948-1967, Pegasus, New York, 1969, p. p 157 - 1589 
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inevitable consequence of the special place Britain had 
held in Egypt at the time and was also due to the fact 
that British officers and technicians trained the Egyptian 
army. The Arms Deal of 1955 changed all that and started 
a long process at the end of which the Egyptian army was 
completely armed by Soviet weapons. 
'An examination of the Egyptian build up of military 
forces since 1955 particularly with regard to aircraft and 
missile systems, reveals two main phases of development which 
are probably characteristic of the effort by any developing 
nation to establish strategic capabilities. The first 
stage is the direct importing of weapons systems from a 
foreign power, together with the necessary training and 
logistical support. The second stage is. the development 
of weapons systems under domestic control but using the 
technology provided by personnel, processes and material 
imported from abroad. In neither stage, as a general 
rule, can a developing nation proceed independently of 
foreign help.. *'(') 
The massive arms deliveries turned the Egyptian army 
into an extremely well equipped force. On 4th June, 1967 
the Egyptian armed forces had at their disposal about 500 
combat aircraft including Mig 21, 19,17 and 15, IL 28 and 
TU 16, and about 1,200 tanks and SPG1s. 
(2) 
(i) ifecional Stability and Weapons Transfer: The Middle 
Eastern Case', op-. cit., pp. 715-716. 
(2) The Military Balance, 1967, The Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London. 
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t 
However, for several reasons Egypt plunged into 
the second stage of arms acquisitions, i, e. domestic produc- 
tion of planes and missiles. 
On 25 July 1962, President Nasser officially 
opened the Helwan Air-Storks near Cairo, which had been in 
pilot operation for several years. The new establishment 
concentrated on producing the IIA-200 'Saeta' jet aircraft, 
and more important, the IIA-300 super sonic fighter bomber. 
Initially the HA-300 was designed byMesserschmidt in the 
Hispano factory in Seville, Spain. The Spanish government 
decided in the late 1950's to terminate the project, and 
it was transferred en bloc to Iielwan in Egypt. A team of 
German and Spanish workers continued working in Helwan. 
(1) 
It was reported that Mossersehmidt was offered the 
directorship of the Egyptian aircraft industry but refused 
to take it, and the Austrian aeronautical engineer Ferdinand 
Brander became the head of the project. 
(2) 
it is estimated 
that during the first half of the sixties a complement of 
300-350 German aircraft engineers were employed at Helwan 
and India and Egypt agreed to co-operate in the development 
and production of the HA-300 and the Indian super sonic 
fighter HF-24.3) 
(1ý See HIoaglond and Teeple, op. cit.; Flight International, 
26.3.1964; Aviation Week, March 16,1964. 
(2) See HHoaglond and Teeple, op. cit. 
(3) See Flight Internationa;., 26.3.1964. 
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Work on missile -design '" .' started in Egypt as 
early as 195"19 ( though this early date °i: s- suggested, only by one 
source), and German scientists were already more than 
involved these programmes. But it was only in 
1959-1960 that the missile production programme started. 
on a really large scale. The work was conducted under 
the supervision of the German rocket desigier Eugen 
Saenger, in collaboration with several other German 
specialists. 
(1) 
Three types of missiles have been developed. The 
'Al-Zafir' of 200 nautical miles range; 'Al-Kahir' of 325 
nautical miles range;. and a much larger one, 'A1--Ared' 
with a range of 510 nautical miles. The total number of 
missiles produced is not known. The main drawback in the 
missiles which were developed was their lack of a reliable 
guidance system. It seems that up to the Six Day War, at 
least, the Egyptians, or rather the German scientists, were 
unable to overcome difficulties in the development of a 
reliable guidance system for the missiles. It would 
appear from this description of the Egyptian missile 
effort that Egypt did not start research and development 
in this field as a response to Israeli activities in 
missile development. However, a different interpretation 
is suggested by several observers, namely that the missile 
development in Egypt started as a reaction to similar de- 
velopments in Israel. On the 5th July, 1961 and during the 
(1 See Hoagiond - and Teeple, op. cit.;, other sources suggest 
later dates for the begiajag of missile developmemt ssd see 
below. 
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election campaign to the Sixth Knesset, Israel launched 
an experimental rocket called Shavit 2. The launching 
of this rocket prompted - according to these observers - 
the Egyptian drive in the same field. 
(') 
The question 
which side started the 'missile race' is therefore still 
an open one. It has been reported that the Egyptians 
asked the U. S. A. for rockets similar to the Shavit 2, just 
a short period before the abovement+oned launching took 
place. According to these reports, Egypt may have learnt 
about the imminent launching and wanted to secure a propa- 
ganda victory by launching. them first, or at least not re- 
ceiving a propaganda defeat by not launching them immediately 
after the Shavit launching. 
(2) 
Eventually, the American 
government decided to supply the rockets. 
(3) 
These press reports indicato either that Egypt had 
not, at the time, any missile research and development 
project underway, or that even if it had, it was still in 
its initial stages; hence the Egyptian attempt to secure 
some help from the U. S. A. in this field. It might also 
be that although some work on missiles had already started 
at the end of the fifties or at the beginning of the six- 
ties, the real 'leap forward' occurred after the launching 
of the Shavit 2, either as a result of its or as part of 
the plan decided upon before the said launching* 
(4) 
(1) See mainly Safran, op. cit, pp. 155 -156. 
(2) For the first point, see The New York Times, 6.7.1961; 
and for both points see The Times, 7-7-1961. 
(3) See The Times, 8.7.1961. 
(4) See below, p. Z13 about the connection between missile 
development and nuclear activities. 
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In the early and middle 1960s there were persistent 
reports about Biological and Chemical research and develop- 
ment in Egypt, and information about these projects is also 
rather confused; but it seems that Egypt tried to pursue 
the possibilities of various Biological, Chemical and 
tRadiologicall weapons to be installed as warheads in 
missiles. Of particular interest were stories about the 
development of possible 'cobalt bombs'. These were des- 
cribed extensively during the trial of Otto Yuklik in 
Switzerland. 
(1) 
However, the attempt to describe these 
weapons as 'atomic warheads' was completely erroneous. 
There were also reports of extensive purchases of 
Strontium 90 and cobalt by Egypt, presumably for a use 
in these warheads. 
In the world of the arms trade everything is 
possible, and indeed at a later date the Swiss paper 
"Weltwoche" reported that in fact Egypt was acting simply 
as a commercial agent for Communist China which needed 
Strontium 90'and cobalt badly and could not buy them' 
directly in the open markets in the West. In any case 
the real purpose and scope of work conducted in Egypt in 
the field of radiological weapons remains unclear. 
The Nuclear Effort in Egypt 
From a very early stage the Nasser regime recog- 
nised the importance of science for both the general 
(1) See for example r2pcrts in Ma' ari , ý_ Yediot Ahronot 
2(5 
development of the country and for the purpose of 
developing an independent capability for the production of 
arms. A Ministry of Science 
(the only one in the Middle 
East) was established with Dr. Saleh Hadit, as Minister. 
The Ministry supplies the administrative framework for 
scientific work being conducted in Egypt. The research 
work itself is being conducted in 'The National Centre 
for Research' whose director is Dr. Riad Turki, an insti- 
tution established in 1950. 
The first atomic reactor was built with Soviet aid, 
but part of the equipment was'purchased in West Germany. 
(') 
The reactor is a UTUR-C Research Reactor, light water, 10% 
enriched uranium, 2 WIth, and became critical in 1961. 
It is insufficient for the production of niäterial for nuclear 
(weapons. 
It is situated in Inchass, the Eastern Delta. 
2ý 
Egypt tried without much success to expand and de- 
velop further her capabilities in this field,, and here, one 
of the more important developments was the growing co- 
operation between Egypt and India. The Indian Atomic 
Energy Commission decided to extend full co-operation to 
its Egyptian counterpart. 
(3) 
(1) On the capability of the reactor, see for example 
Na'ariv, 22.8,1962; this reactor is mentioned in 
most of the published material discussing the atomic 
effort in Egypt. 
(2) See William R. Van Cleave, 'The Impact of Technology 
on. the Middle East', International Research and Tech- 
nologr, Nuclear Journal, Vol. I, No. 2, February 1996-, p. 17- 
(-3) See The Jewish Observer. 1962. 
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But Egypt also tried to find ways to secure 
nuclear knowhow and technology from Western powers as, woll, 
tho tgh without great success. There have been different 
reports on these attempts. One instance was presumably 
the attempt to secure such help in 1963 from France when 
the attempt was made to buy a reactor for electricity 
production. 
(') 
A high-ranking Egyptian scientific mission 
visited several American and European states with the in- 
tention of buying such a reactor, but failed. One of the 
reasons suggested was that the donor states demanded control 
over the plutonium produced in the reactor. The proposed 
reactor was of the natural uranium type moderated by heavy 
water, and having a capacity of 200 Ahle. ='-. '. 
A continuation of this effort, or possibly a new 
one was the proposed nuclear power and desalination plant 
-which was planned to be built in Borg-al-Arab in the early 
seventies by Western Companies but the Egyptian Government 
was not able to raise the money. 
(2. ) 
There have been unconfirmed reports of an Egyptian- 
Soviet agreement about the building of such a reactor(3), 
but its clauses are not knoten and its very existence is not 
very clear. 
(4) 
(1) See Uri Dan in Ma'ariv, 30-9-1963- 
(2) See Van Cleave pp. cit., p. 24. 
(3) See I. arierchav, 13.3.1964" 
(4) Thus Van Cleave op. cit. doed not even mention it 
in his detailed description of the nuclear capabilities 
of EGypt. 
0 
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A possible E-yptian-Chinese co-operation in the 
field of nuclear training has also been mentioned, presur- 
ably because of the lack of willingness on the part of 
the Soviet Union to extend nuclear aid without control. 
(1) 
The three main difficulties which Egypt faced and 
still faces as far as nuclear programmes are concerned 
(both for peaceful and military uses), are: (a) the 
lack of an adequate industrial and technological infra- 
structure; related to it is (b) the lack of an adequate 
scientific and technological knowledge which is predomi- 
nantly the result of a lack of a high level and large 
scientific manpower; and (c) the tremendous financial 
costs involved. 
The lack of a sufficient riunber of scientists and 
high level technicians is partly due to the whole state 
of higher education and scientific research in Egypt and 
9 
(1) See Andrew Wilson (OFNS), published in the 
Jerusalem Post, 4.6.1965; see also United 
States Atomic Energy Commission Division of 
International Affairs, Summary of Atomic 
Itnergy Programs Abroad, August 1965; Van 
Cleave op. cit. The last two sources 
suggest that Egyptian technicians were boing 
trained in China in the nuclear-field. 
indeed in the whole Arab World. 
(1) 
As for the financial costs involved, it appears 
that even before the 1967 War, the needs for the con- 
ventional army and for economic development were such 
that there were hardly any margins left. Indeed, insofar 
as investment in military layout was concerned, Egypt 
started to lose the race with Israel sometime in the 
sixties* 
(2) 
This limitation gras certainly exacerbated 
by the extravagant and useless investment in the missile 
programme. 
Arab Reactions to the Nuclear Developments in Israel 
The disclosures by the international press about 
nuclear developments in Israel found coverage in the Arab 
press and received the attention of the Arab governments. 
(1) A. B. Zahlan, 'Science in the Arab Middle East', 
Minerva, January 1970, describes the poor state 
bf affairs in the field of scientific research in 
Egypt, although he points out that Egypt is much 
superior in this field, as in all the other fields 
of higher education, to the rest of the Arab world 
(Lebanon comes next with some potential). 
According to Zahlan only 20 scientists in the 
whole of Egypt and in the American University of 
Beirut, have successfully established research 
programmes. He goes on and says that in En 
Shams (the nuclear centre of Egypt) in which there 
is the largest concentration of scientific manpower 
in the Middle East-(excluding Israel), there are 
altogether 12 Ph. D. level physicists, and the total 
number of scientists (including N. Sc. and above) in 
all fields (mostly applied ones) is 200. 
(2) See Safran, op. ccit. Chapters 1F & 5. 
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The initial Arab reaction was mixed. On the one hand 
there was a suspicion that in fact Israel is aiming at 
the building of a nuclear military capability. Israel's 
declarations about peaceful uses of nuclear energy(') 
were disbelieved generally. On the other hand there was 
a suggestion that in fact Israel is spreading the news on 
purpose, namely that Israel was making propaganda points 
in order to frighten the Arabs. 
(2) 
Commenting on the 
news, President Nasser even raised the possibility that 
the 'Imperialist Powers' were preparing the ground for 
arming Israel with atomic weapons while pretending that 
Israel had produced them by herself. 
(3) 
The Arab anxiety about the news was evident in a 
statement by the Lebanese Premier on 20th December 1960. 
The Premier concluded that as long as Israel existed no 
Arab could live in Peace. 
(4) 
And the Jordanian Prime 
Minister said on 27th December 1960 that he was certain 
that Arab countries would pay serious attention to the 
matter. 
(5) 
(1) See for example The Times, 6.7.1961 which discussed 
the Arab reactions to the implications of the launching 
of the Shavit 2 and indicated that the Arabs were 
certain that this rocket was to be used for military 
purposes. It then pointed out that this reaction was 
similar to the Arab reaction to the news about the 
atomic development in Israel. 
(2) President Nasser in a speech in Port-Said on 23.12.1960 
hinted that it was Israel which was spreading the news 
about her nuclear efforts, doing this in order to 
frighten Egypt. See Middle East Record, Vol. 1, p. 287- 
(3) Middle East Record, Vol. 1, p. 288. 
(4) Ibid, p. 288, quoting Radio Beirut, 20.12.1960. 
(5) Ibid, p. 288, quoting Radio Beirut, 27.12.1960. 
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Through the beginning of 1961 the Arab press 
continued to give prominence to the issue. 
(1) 
The first inter-Arab discussion on this new do- 
velopment was at the meeting of the Arab Foreign Ministers 
held in Baghdad in February, 1961 at which plans to counter 
the possible danger to the Arab position were discussed. 
The topic was only one among several others involved in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict, the others being the Jordan Water 
Project and Israeli activities in Africa. 
(2) 
No clear 
indication was given of the position or policy adopted. 
It was just stated that the'meeting had approved the plan 
which must be followed in this respect. 
(3) 
It was also 
reported that the Arab representatives at the United Nations, 
were to urge the United Nations to entrust the International 
Atomic Agency with investigating the Israeli situation* 
(4) 
(1) These are some of the representative arguments: The 
whole issue was mere propaganda, aimed at frightening 
the Arabs and inducing them to make peace with Israel 
(al-Ahali, Baghdad, January 1961; al-Bayan, Baghdad, 
January 1961; al-*fustagbal, Baghdad, January 1961. See 
Middle East Record, Vol. 2, p. 223). Israel was 
incapable of manufacturing the bomb without the assist- 
ance of the Western powers (al-Gumhuriyah, 3.1.1961). 
The Arab states and especially UAR, Iraq and the Lebanon 
are also capable of manufacturing the bomb (al-11a at, 
30.12.1960, see Middle East Record, Vol. 2, p. 223). 
The Arab states should coordinate their efforts in order 
to prevent Israeli nuclear capability (al-Mgnar, 13.1.1961 
ad-Difa, 15.1.1961, see Middle East Record, Vol. 2, 
p. 223). Heikal commented on the news on 27.1.1961. He 
referred to 'rumours' that Egypt might abandon her 
policy of positive neutralism as a reaction to the 
Israeli nuclear effort and said that this was improbable. 
Positive neutralism was a fundamental to Egypt. The 
answer to Israel's nuclear development lay in the 
strengthening of the Arab position (al-Ahram, 27.1.1961). 
(2) See La bourse E_, ptienne, 5.2.1961. (3) See Diiddle East News Agency, 4.2.1961. 
(4) See Akhbar al-Yawm, 18.3.1961. 
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Since then the problem has remained on the Arab 
agenda. Thus the Secretariat of the Arab League called 
upon-member-states to study the following problems as a 
preparation to the meeting of the Arab military consulta- 
tive Committee: (a) Tho Palestinian problem; (b) the 
French aid to Israel in regard to the 'production of a 
nuclear bomb'. 
(') 
However, this move and the deliberation in that 
meeting of the Arab chiefs of staff do not seem to show 
that the nuclear developments in Israel had already become 
uppermost in the minds of Arab decision-makers. Thus 
both the reports in the London Times and more significantly 
in La bourse Egyptienne relegated this topic (Israel 
nuclear development) to the end of the reports of the 
meeting. Even there the formulation was: 'French aid 
to Israel including equipment for building a nuclear re- 
(2) 
actor'. However, if indeed the Egyptian missile 
effort started as a result of the news about Dimona, then 
the Egyptians at least did react to this new move by Israel. 
La bourse Egyptienne of 21.5.1961 quoted extensively from 
an article published in 'The Red Start which discussed 
Israel plans 'for nuclear arms'. 
(1) See La bourse Egyptienne, 18.4.1961. 
(2) See The Times, 24.4.1961; about the meeting see 
also La bourse Drptienne, 24.4.1961. 
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The Launching of Shavit, Arab reactions to it, and Egyptian 
self-images of the Egyptian missile Development 
Arab reactions to the launching of Shavit 2, an 
Israeli experimental missile, in July, 1961, somewhat 
resembled previous reactions to the news about the nuclear 
effort in Israel. On the one hand suspicion and anxiety, 
while on the other a suggestion that the new missile has 
no real significance. Egyptian accounts tended to emphasise 
more the second approach whereas the Lebanese and Jordanian 
comment expressed concern. Thus authoritative Egyptian 
sources were quoted as stating that they had not been 
surprised by the launching which had only a propaganda 
value. 
(') 
One Western observer comment was that there are 
indications that the Arabs might ask the Soviet Union 
for nuclear bombs if Israel began production. 
(2) 
(1) al-Hasa, 7.7.1961, see Middle East Record, Vol. 2, p. 224" s 
and Heikal wrote that Shavit 2 was in fact a French 
rocket about which Israel had spread lies and which 
scared no one. (al-Ahram, 12.7.1961, see Middle East 
Record, Vol. 2, p. 22 Bahjat al-Talhuni the Jordanian 
Prime Minister, on the other hand, stated that he saw 
in the rocket 'a new threat to the Arabs in the form 
of an alleged scientific achievement' and he appealed 
to the Arabs to protect themselves by solidarity. 
(Radio Amman, 6.7.1961, see Middle East Record, Vol. 2, 
p. 224). Similarly the Lebanese press deplored Arab 
disunity and lack of purpose in face of Israel's 
efforts and exhorted them to change their ways. (al- 
Ha at, an-Nahar, al-Kifah, Beirut al-Hasa, 6.7.1961, see 
Middle East Record, Vol. 2, p. 22 . 
(2) See The Times, 6.7,1961. 
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In Egypt, as in Israel, the question of nuclear 
weapons became interwoven - at least in the public debate - 
with development in the field of missiles. A great 
upsurge of self-congratulation accompanied the first 
launchings of the Egyptian missiles. Apart from pointing 
out the scientific achievement of the Egyptian producers, 
there were suggestions about the renewal of the heritage 
of Pharaonic Egypt and also that Egypt was entering the 
space era*(') 
But perhaps more relevant to the nuclear issue is 
the notion suggested by several sources that the decision 
to start developing the missiles was taken by President 
Nasser when he heard about the building of the nuclear re- 
actor in Israel. 
(2) 
The Arab press and declarations 
connected the missiles with the general scientific and 
military posture of Egypt in general and her position in 
the conflict with Israel in particular. 
(3) 
What is perhaps 
interesting to note in this context is the ttotalistict 
character attributed to missiles. For instance the 
Lebanese pro-Nasserste newspaper Kul Shai said while 
discussing the missiles that what wan important for the 
Arabs was that they would have a power 'which will be able 
to annihilate Israel when the time comes'. It may be that 
(1) See al-Alchbar, 22,7.1962 and Cairo Radio 21.7.1962. 
(2) See, Said Fariha, a Lebanese journalist who quoted 
Heikal on this, and Heikal in al_Ahram, 20.7.1962. 
(3) See al-Gumhuriyah, 29.7.1962, and 24.7.1962; the 
military correspondent of Akhbar al-Yaim 28.7.1962; 
Sawt al-Arab, 21.7.1962. 
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this kind of attribution created among both Israelis and 
Arabs, but specially among the latter, the association of 
the nuclear bomb with missiles in general. This associ- 
ation came of course on top of the general observation 
that the Super Powers and other nuclear powers tended to 
concentrate on missiles as the main-delivery system for 
nuclear weapons. Whereas in Israel one school of thought 
among those who advocated 'going nuclear' hoped that by its 
(the nuclear bomb's) totalistic character one could hope 
to secure a permanent settlement with the Arab world, those 
in the Arab world who wished to reach a total 'solution' to 
the Palestine problem also tended to attribute to the 
weapon system closest to the nuclear bomb, i. e, missiles, 
the same total characteristics. There is also another 
aspect which connects missiles and atomic bombs, namely, 
the scientific achievement concerned in the development of 
both these products. For example there is the unsophisti- 
cated argument that a power which can produce missiles can 
also produce nuclear bombs. Thus the weekly 'Al-Huadatl 
(Lebanon) wrote on 3.8.1962 that the Egyptian missiles 
had turned the balance of power in the Middle East against 
Israel, and it continued: 'Egypt will soon surprise the 
world when it will announce an achievement in the field of 
nuclear research for both scientific and military uses... ' 
The development'of missiles on the Egyptian side 
therefore created a whole series of misperceptions (partly 
shared by the Israelis) about the nature of missiles as 
independent weapons and not just as delivery systems, and 
also showed that this kind of weapon's development affected 
1% 
public attitudes towards other problems such as the 
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technological and scientific capabilities of Egypt. 
Arab Reactions during the years 1964-1965 
Arab concern with nuclear activities in Israel 
continued in the years 1964 and 1965. One Arab reaction 
gave the priority to the general strategic conventional 
posture and discounted Israelis potential nuclear threat. 
This position was possibly due to three factors: (a) the 
direct concern with the Jordan Water Project and the 
possibility of escalation into war in the near future, in 
which case the war should be conventional; (b) the Jordan 
project seemed, in the long term, to be a greater threat 
to the Arabs, in the sense that it would 'double Israel's 
capabilities' (according to various Arab sources )v than the 
atomic effort; (c) the nature and capabilities of either 
nuclear weapons or nuclear options were not realised 
(following the Arab assumption that indeed Israel was, in 
fact, aiming at building a nuclear bomb). 
(1) 
An example 
was the article by Ahmed al-Kaldi which was devoted to a 
detailed analysis of the military balance of power between 
Israel and the Arab countries in which the possibility of 
Israel nuclear bombs was not even mentioned, although 
the reason may have been that the author was discussing 
capabilities in 1964 and not future ones, 
(2) 
(1) See for example article by Colonel Hitan al-Kilani, 
in al-Usbu al-Arabi, Lebanon, 9.3.1964. 
(2) See al-Moharrer, Lebanon, 22.6.1964. 
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Even the second Arab summit played dorm the 
Israeli nuclear development. The meeting discussed three 
subjects: (a) the military situation -a report by the 
general commander Ali Amer; (b) the diversion of the 
Jordan waters; (c) the Palestinian identity (or exist- 
ence)*(') It seems that the main concern of the parti- 
cipants in this meeting (apart from antra-Arab conflicts 
and competition), was the diversion of the Jordan waters 
and the possibility of a clash as a result of it. The 
report on the military situation again did not contain any 
reference to nuclear developments in Israel* 
(2) 
A slightly different approach however, was indicated 
by Walid al-Khalidi, who, in discussing five aspects of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict agreed that Israel would be able to 
(3) 
produce an atomic bomb in 1968. 
The approach certainly changed towards the end of 
1965 when Heikal wrote a long article on the possibility 
that Israel might produce nuclear bombs and suggested an 
Egyptian strategy to counter this development. Following 
this article, Ahmed Khalifa wrote a long article in al- Huria 
Lebanon, 
(4) 
about the need for a preventive war against 
Israel, in order to destroy the nuclear reactor in Dimona, 
thus paralysing Israel's capability to produce nuclear weapons. 
(1) See al-Hayat, Lebanon, 10.9.1964. 
(2) See Akhbar al-Yawm, Egypt, 12.9.1964. 
(3) See al-Usbu al-Arabi 25.5.1964; a lecture given by 
al-Halidi in the 'Arab Cultural Club' in Beirut 
and published subsequently in al-Usbu al-Arabi. 
() 20.10.1965. 
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Khali3'a writes that atomic weapons in the hands of Israel 
constitute two major dangers to the Arab world: (a) now 
Israeli aggression against the Arabs with the objective 
of territorial expansion under the umbrella of nuclear 
weapons; (b) the indefinite continuation of the Jewish 
"robbery in Palestine". Israeli nuclear capabilities 
would paralyse Arab capabilities to regain Palestine. 
Once Israel obtained nuclear weapons (which, addedJaialiTa, 
according to experts would take about 3.8 years) she would 
immediately try to use it for expansion, the probable tar- 
gets being the West Bank, the Gaza strip and the Jordan 
river sources. As Israel waa on the verge of equipping 
itself with nuclear weapons, the only Arab answer could be 
a preventive war. This new strategy, continued, Ithalifia, 
was based on the assumption that a war would break out 
within the following three to five years and also that time, 
contrary to the assumption of the revolutionary Arab regimes, 
was not working on the side of the Arabs. In such a future 
war the cornerstone of Arab power would be the Egyptian army. 
The role of the Palestinians in this future war would be to 
create a political unit; to help the other Arab armies 
militarily and mainly (in the military field) to pursue 
military activities of the Fedayeen kind. 
The need for a preventive war in order to forestall 
the possibility of an Israeli bomb, -aas developed with 
great clarity and persuasiveness in Saleh Shabal's lecture 
in 'The Arab Cultural Club' in Beirut, on 1.11.1965. This 
was the culmination of several references in the Egyptian and 
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Lebanese pro-Eüyptian press to the problem of 'Israel and 
the Bomb'. 
(') 
Shabal argued that Israel-had fulfilled 
all the six basic conditions which were the prerequisites 
for producing the nuclear bomb, and that the secrecy under 
which she was carrying out her nuclear activities, her 
readiness to produce-heavy water alone and manufacture 
natural uranium, for a price ten times dearer than that of 
the international markets, all this led to the conclusion 
that her atomic. activity meant preparation for war. 
At least some Arab commentators envisaged a certain 
link between the conventional- arms race in which Israel was 
engaged and the atom bomb. Thus Salah Shabal(2) argued 
that there were three possible reasons for the Israel- 
German arms deal and subsequent Israeli arms deals (such 
as the acquisition of 200 Patton tanks from the U. S. after 
the cancellation of the Israeli-German arms deal): (a) to 
create a deterrent against any possible Arab preventive war 
aimed at destroying the atomic installations in Dimona; 
(b) to enable Israel to attack first in order to forestall 
an Arab preventive war, namely a preventive war to prevent 
a war; (c) to permit Israel to occupy part of the Arab 
lands, the best time for which would immediately be prior 
to acquisition of the'bomb; Israel would occupy territories 
and announce immediately afterwards that it had the bomb. 
(1) See al-Anwar, Lebanon, 6.11.1965, and a1-1Tä , Lebanon, 13.11.1965. 
(2) See al-Anwar, 15.2.1966. 
- 239 
This it would succeed in 'freezing+ the situation. This 
would also happen if the Arabs succeeded in the meantime 
in producing atomic weapons, because then to balance of 
terror' would be created, which would freeze the new 
status quo. 
Schools of Thought and Positions taken by the Arabs in 
regard to a pcssible Israeli Nuclear Bomb 1 
The debate on the possibility that Israel might 
produce a nuclear bomb became - as explained above - more 
intensive towards the middle of the sixties. The debate 
was at one and the same time concerned with the problem 
of the general future of the Arab-Israeli conflict and 
also with the question of the best strategies. for the 
various Arab objectives within the context of the conflict. 
inevitably the various positions reflected differences 
between the different states and also between the emerging 
Fatah and other Palestinian groupings on the one hand and 
the established Arab regimes, and in particular Egypt, on 
the other. 
These various positions themselves passed through 
several stages. 
One possible categorisation of Arab attitudes was 
suggested by one of the main verbal protagonists, Saleh 
ShEbal. 2) According to Shabal, there were five basic 
Arab approaches to the problem: 
(1) The Egyptian position will be discussed in greater 
detail below. 
(2) See his lecture as pulýZished in ai-Anwar, 6.11.1965 
with additions in al-}yät, 13-11.1965. 
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(a) Those who maintained that nuclear weapons 
cannot in fact be used during wars proof of which was 
found in the fact that the nuclear pourers have not used 
this weapon since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The purpose of Israel in acquiring nuclear weapons was 
in fact not to use them, but only to frighten the Arabs. 
(b) Those who assumed that the numerical super- 
iority of the Arabs was such that it would balance an 
Israeli nuclear bomb. 
(c) Those who believed that if Israel acquired 
N 
nuclear bombs, the Arabs would get them as well, thus 
negating the effect of the Israeli bomb, so that war 
would still be conducted along conventional lines. 
(d) Those who maintained that the campaign to 
Iliberatet Palestine was basically of a 'Fedayeen' type, 
hence nuclear weapons were irrelevant. 
(e) Those who assumed that the effort to keep 
nuclear weapons excluded from the t: iddle East would succeed 
and the major powers would enforce their will on Middle 
East, so that neither Israel nor the Arabs would be able 
" to acquire these weapons, 
Other approaches and variations on the above- 
mentioned categories have boon suggested by various other 
Arab writers: 
If Israel acquires nuclear weapons she will try 
to use them in order to continue territorial expansion. 
If both sides acquire nuclear weapons there will be a 
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'balance of terror' and the Arabs will lose their ability 
to 'liberate' Palestine. In any case, Israel has got 
the potential to produce nuclear weapons. 
(') 
Nuclear weapons are neither a deterrent nor a 
weapon for causing fear. The future war with Israel will 
be conducted by conventional weapons because nuclear 
weapons cannot be used in direct military confrontation* 
(2) 
The Israeli nuclear potential carries with it ex- 
tremely grave dangers for the Arab world. At worst oily 
Israel will produce the bomb - and that will be within a 
period of three years(3) - and will not hesitate to use it 
if necessary in ä situation when her survival is threatened. 
Arab-Israeli relations are very different from the relations 
between the major powers where there exists an understanding 
that wars should remain limited and should be conducted 
outside the territory of both sides and without danger of 
real defeat to either. At the same time the argument that 
the conventional resources at the disposal of the Arabs can 
outbalance the bomb is not valid. Lastly, an Arab bomb 
will only help to stabilise the present situation via the 
mechanism of the balance of power. In time of war it might 
not stop Israel from trying to use the bomb. One cannot 
count on the major powers either to bring about "denuclearis- 
ation" of the Middle East or to give guarantees to the Arabs 
(1) Walid al-aled, al-Usbu; _-, al-Arabi, 
Lebanon, 25,5.1964. 
(2) The Hebrew commentator, Radio Cairo, 21.6.1964. 
(3) Written in 1965. 
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against an Israeli nuclear threat. Both these approaches 
will entail acceptance of the status quo, which is unaccept- 
able to the Arabs. Palestinian 'fedayeen' action is im- 
portant, but cannot by itself bring about the "solution" 
of the Palestine problem, therefore the only practical 
approach will be to start a preventive paar. 
(1 
In general, one can distinguish between several 
basic Arab approaches. The first one, which eventually 
became the approach of the Syrian Baathist government, 
maintained that the "Palestinian Problem" could be "solved" 
by guerilla action developing into a "national liberation 
war", and that nuclear bombs, could not be effective against 
such operations. The operational implications of this 
approach could be twofold: on the one hand an increase of 
fedayeen action, but at the same time postponement of a 
full scale war. 
(2) 
Furthermore it raised the possibility 
of a prolonged conflict without any need for quick action. 
Ostensibly the Fatah approach was similar to the Syrian one, 
namely that nuclear weapons were ineffective against 
guerilla action and that the right strategy for the 
'liberation' of Palestine was a protracted guerilla cam- 
paign against Israel. It appears however that the Syrians 
used the slogan of""national liberation war", and gave 
backing to the Fatah primarily as instruments in their com- 
petition with other Arab regimes. 
(1) Shabal, op. cit. 
(2) At the same time the Syrian pressed, on the declaratory 
level, for immediate war against Israel. 
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The Fatah approach" suffered from an acute 
dilemma. On the one hand, Fatah believed and hoped that 
guerilla action would lead to the 'liberation' of 
Palestine; but on the other hand, they hoped that their 
activity would lead to an open war between Israel and the 
conventional armies of the Arab world. In other words, 
at a certain level they considered their actions as simply 
the catalyst of a process by which only the combined con- 
ventional power-of the Arab world would be able to 'solve' 
the Palestine question in the way they wanted. If that 
indeed was their approach, they had to consider the problem 
of nuclear weapons as an instrument against conventional 
forces and not only guerilla forces. The same dilemma, 
but on a different level, kept haunting Fatah from the 1967 
war onwards, namely whether by fpiiret guerilla activity 
there is any possibility of defeating Israel or whether 
there is a need for direct conventional confrontation. 
(Even according to Maoist doctrine and General Giap's 
approach, the 'third stage' of guerilla war turns into a 
conventional war when the erstwhile guerilla forces become 
conventional and openly attack the weakened forces of the 
enemy which by that time will be confined to the 'cities'). 
The question of nuclear weapons will have to be raised at 
that third stage. The dilemma remains, and there appears 
to be no answer to it. ' 
(1) On Fatah, general strategy and their dilemmas 
see Y. ßarkabi, Fedayeen Action and Arab Strate{; r, 
Adelphi Paper No. 53, Institute for Strategic 
Studies, London, 1968. 
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The second approach argued that an Israeli bomb 
was a dangerous development for the Arab world and would 
change the balance of power in the I--Iiddle East. This 
approach had been advanced mainly by Egypt, for the 
obvious reason that this country would be the first to 
face an atomic threat from Israel. Thus, Iieikal(l) dis- 
cussed the various possibilities open to Egypt, which he 
defined as follow: (a) to wait until Israel obtained 
nuclear eapons,, and then to act as seemed best at the time; 
(b) to enter into a scientific race which might in the end 
lead to &'-nucleax balance but which would postpone the hope 
of the Arab nation to "solve" the Palestine problem for an 
unlimited period; (c) to trust in international political 
action despite the fact that the world always tends to 
accept any existing situation as preferable to alternatives, 
even if injustice is caused; (d) to act in a preventive way 
before the crucial moment. Elaborating on this last 
possibility, Heikal argued that preventive, action would be 
possible only after the fulfilment of certain preconditions, 
such as the strengthening of both Egypt and the other Arab 
countries. He insisted that action should come before 
Israel acquired superiority. He also argued that Egypt 
should develop the capability to absorb a first strike (he 
did not elaborate on whether this meant a nuclear or a 
conventional strike), and to answer in kind. 
This kind of argument obviously leaves the way open 
to every kind of policy or strategy. One of the options is 
(1) See a1-Ahram-, 15.10.1965. 
2115 
to build a competitive nuclear capability, and then 
either to launch a surprise attack or to adopt a 'balance 
of terror' policy. Another option is to launch a surprise 
preventive attack immediately and thus eliminate the 
possibility of Israel becoming a nuclear power. 
(') 
This basic approach, which stressed the dangers 
entailed by ar. Israeli atomic bomb - from the point of 
view of the Arabs - could of course have led to a different 
conclusion, namely that the Arabs should concur in some 
sort of negotiations on arms control in the Middle East or 
even negotiations leading to the settlement of the Arab- 
Israeli conflict, or perhaps still to a tacit acceptance 
of the status quo for an unlimited period. None of these 
policies was suggested by the main Arab states. But one 
Arab state at least argued (possibly within the context 
of internal Arab competition) that another Arab state had 
in fact adopted such a policy. Thus Syria argued that 
this kind of an acceptance of the status quo was what Egypt 
was really seeking. 
(2) 
Clearly the various Arab positions reflected 
several political and ideological factors at the same time. 
To begin with, the various positions and strategies 
suggested were used as arguments within the context of the 
internal Arab competition for political power and influence. 
Second, each position represented the power position of the 
(i) On the need for a preventive strike aimed at the 
Israeli nuclear installations see al-Garidn, 
Lebanon, 22.2.966. 
(2) See an editorial leader in al-Ba: 'ath, Syria, 
28.11,1965. 
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state advocating it relative to the power position of Israel. 
Third, they indicated the differences in the intensity of 
hostility towards Israel. Fourth and last, the positions 
were also affected by the ideological context within which 
each regime (or guerilla movement) acted. 
The Egyptian position 
Egypt was and still is the most important military 
power in the Arab world and the one most likely to be 
affected by an Israeli nuclear weapons programme. So 
far as the military aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
are concernedp the two main opponents are Israel and Egypt. 
The particular Israeli-Egyptian conflict started in 1948 
with the Egyptian invasion of Palestine and it has con- 
tinued to develop since then. This is not the place to 
elaborate upon the various stages of this particular 
conflict, and both sides give different starting points 
for the beginning of the escalation of the conflict between 
them. It is clear, however, that from 1955 onwards 
(because of the cumulative effects of mutual anxieties 
about the objectives of both sides; the Gaza raid of 
28.2.1955; the. Fed ayeen activities and the arms race), the. 
two sides came to consider their strategic and military 
relations as the overriding consideration in their general 
military strategy. 
(1) 
This attitude was strengthened by 
(1ý Israel has to take into her military considerations 
the threat posed by the other Arab countries whereas 
Egypt since 1956 has to take into consideration other 
problems such as inter-Arab competition and a possible threat to the big powers (objectively more imaginary 
than real, but real enough in the eyes of the Egyptian 
leadership). However, even while taking into account these other problems, it appears that for both Israel and Egypt, their mutual military relations were still the prime concern. 
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the Sinai campaign of 1956. The commitment of President 
Nasser to a war against Israel became more important in 
the overall foreign policy of Egypt and interacted 
increasingly with the notion of an 'integral Arab unity' 
under Egyptian hegemony. 
(1) 
Mutual suspicions and anxieties between Israel and 
Egypt led on both sides to the development of an arms race 
and the unfolding of mutually opposed strategies. Thus 
every new step by one side in research and development which 
could lead to a new breakthrough in the balance of military 
power caused considerable anxiety to the other side. it 
is not surprising therefore that the Arab state most 
affected by the news about Israeli nuclear activity was 
Egypt. 
Whether Egypt under President Nasser was really 
planning a military campaign against Israel as a short 
range foreign policy objective or only as a long-range 
objective -a question of great importance - is'not clear#(2) 
What does seem to be clear however is that at a certain 
stage President Nasser adopted a very cautious stand in the 
(1) On this last point see for example Safran 'From TaTar 
to lfar', op. cit., chapter 2; _ I. William Zartmen 
'T: ilitary Elements in Regional Stability', in J. C. 
Iiurewitz (ed, ), Soviet-American Rivalry in the 1"Iiddle 
East, -op. cit. 
(2) "A definite answer to this question requires a 
separate and extensive study. It is my personal 
contention that he planned it as a long range 
objective, and that he possibly was ready at certain 
stages to come to some sort of political accommodation 
with Israel provided some political pre-requisites were 
met. 
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Arab-Israeli conflict. This presumably was the result 
of his realisation that the balance of military power 
did not favour him. At various stages ho argued that war 
against Israel could and should be launched only when 
three conditions were fulfilled. These were that a 
meaningful Arab unity should have been achieved; that 
Israel should be isolated from International Society; and 
that the military balance between Israel and the Arabs 
should have changed. 
(1) 
It may be that the first and 
third of these conditions were posed precisely because the 
unlikelihood of their achievement would save Egypt from 
the necessity of taking any action; or that the first 
condition, at least, represented an independent Egyptian 
objective, mentioned in this context in order to justify 
Egyptian claims to hegemony in the Arab world. Probably 
the answer is affirmative, yet at the same time the option 
for an attack on Israel was kept open. In any case, the 
possible introduction of a major new weapon system which 
cbuld tip the balance of military power in Israel's favour 
for a long time, posed several serious dilemmas for Egypt. 
To begin with, to the extent that a war against 
Israel was a short range objective, a change in the military 
balance would have postponed any successful war against 
Israel for an unlimited period. Second, it would put 
Egypt in the impossible situation by which the last condition 
(1) See Iieikal in altem , 25 September, 1964. 
249 
of President Nasser would be proved completely unrealistic 
and thus, within the context of internal Arab politics, 
Egypt would have either to renounce this condition or else 
admit that it was ready to renounce the objective of a 
future war against Israel. Third, one of the Arab misper- 
ceptions was the 'expansionist' character of Israel. The 
fear that Israel might launch a surprise attack against 
Egypt or against another Arab country - in which case Egypt 
would find itself compelled to intervene - persisted in 
Egypt and in the other Arab states. This last possibility, 
and also the fear of a war rising out of some process of 
escalation, certainly demanded some reaction to tho nuclear 
development in Israel. 
(') 
Another problem posed by the 
Israeli nuclear development was the prestige issue. Two 
of the main declared objectives of the Egyptian military 
regime were the war against Israel and the building of a 
strong and capable military machine superior to the Israeli 
one. For such a regime to admit inferiority in the de- 
velopment of any weapons' system, could have meant the loss 
of considerable prestige both domestically and in the other 
Arab countries. This last point indeed was a contributory 
factor to the great enthusiasm with which the xiissile*sl 
development in Egypt was welcomed. 
(2) 
These dilemmas and the änxieties raised by the news 
of Israeli nuclear developments forced the 2Gyptian leader- 
(1) On the Israeli 'expansionist' policy within the context 
of discussion on nuclear weapons, see for example ; _eikal 
in al-Aharai, 20,8,1965, broadcasted by Cairo Radio, BBC 
monitoring service A'ß/1943,23.8.1965. 
(2) On this point see above in pp. jy3 
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ship to pursue several alternative policies: (a) An 
attempt to build an independent nuclear production cap- 
ability; (b) An attempt to build up a missile capability 
which could perhaps act as balancer. 
( The complicated 
Egyptian reactions and attitudes about missile development 
have been indicated above)('). (c) The continuation of the 
conventional arms race, in order to build up a conventional 
superiority. The notion that conventional superiority may 
still. -häve great importance even after the introduction of 
nuclear weapons, had been suggested by IIeikal, 
(2) 
when he 
discussed the possibilities of surprise attacks just before 
or even after the introduction of nuclear weapons. Although 
ostensibly this discussion was concentrated partly around 
the concept of a preventive or pre-emptive war, the emphasis 
on the role of conventional weapons and primarily missiles 
and fast aircraft was clear. 
(3) (d) To try to secure some 
kind of nuclear aid from the Soviet Union, and failing that 
from other countries. (e) To try and secure guarantees 
from the Soviet Union against a possible threat by a presumed 
Israeli bomb. (f) To try to doter Israel from actually 
"going nuclear". This presumably could be secured in one 
of three ways. It could be achieved by a threat that Egypt 
would launch a surprise preventive attack against Israel if 
(1) See pp. 2.3-S ; On the notion that Nasser decided on 
the missile project after learning about the develop- 
ment in Diinona see, "233. 
(2) al--Ahram., 20.8.1965. 
(3) And see below in the discussion of the notion of 
preventive war, and the military doctrine of the 
Egyptian army. 
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the latter reached the threshold of nuclear capability. 
An alternative was diplomatic activity aimed at securing 
super-powers' pressure on Israel to desist from actually 
passing this threshold. Or there remained the possibility 
of a threat that Egypt herself would produce nuclear bombs 
if Israel 'went nuclear'. (g) general diplomatic acti- 
vity aimed at the creation of 'a nuclear free zone in the 
Middle East' but under Egyptian conditions and for as long 
as it suited the interests of Egypt. 
Egypt's activity in the field of missile and nuclear 
development has been indicated above. The conventional 
option was of course partly a continuation of the arms race 
in conventional weapons which had been going on between 
Israel and Egypt for some time. In the particular debate 
on nuclear weapons, this option was usually mentioned in 
connection with the notion of a preventive strike against 
Israel. 
The Problem of preventive war 
The notion of a preventive strike was raised several 
times by Egyptian commentators. 
(1) 
it was mentioned (al- 
though in a not very explicit way) by Heikal in his article 
in al-Aharam of the 20 August 1965. Later on, and after the 
Casablanca summit meeting of the Arab leaders (September, 
(1) See pp. 234-S and also see President Nasserts speech 
in Port-Said on 23 December 1960 when he said that if 
the U. A. R. became certain that Israel was making an 
atom bomb, it would mean the beginning of war, because 
the U. A. R. could not permit Israel to manufacture an 
atom bomb. She would have to attack the base of 
aggression. See 2"fiddle last Record, Vol. I, p. 287. 
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1965), the notion of a preventive war was continuously 
adverted to. It Was mentioned as an option to counter 
the possible Israeli bomb, by Heiltal in al-Aharam, on the 
15 October 1965. President Nasser seized on the problem 
when he declared, on the 18 February, 1966 in a press 
conference with Iraqi newspaper editors: 'If Israel pro- 
duces the atom bomb, then I believe that the only answer 
to such an action would be preventive war. 
(') (Arabic: 
harb trigaiyah. ) The Arab states will have to take 
immediate action and liquidate-everything that would enable 
Israel to produce the atom bomb. 
(2) 
The same threat was 
repeated by President Nasser in his speech in Cairo on 22 
February, 1966.3) 
At what stage would this preventive war be launched? 
Would it be launched just before Israel acquired its nuclear 
weapon capability or immediately after that stage had been 
reached? There are different answers to this question. 
Thus, for instance, al-Ahram; in an article quoted in Radio 
Cairo on 19 March 1966 wrote, in general terms, that if 
Israel developed nuclear weapons the only answer by Egypt 
could be a preventive war, 
(4) 
From this wording one may 
draw the conclusion that the war would be launched after 
the development of a nuclear bomb. However, a political 
(1) Broadcasted by Baghdad Radio on 20.2.1966, see BBC 
monitoring service 22.2,1966. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) See BBC monitoring service, ME/2096,24.2.1966. 
(L) See BBC monitorinC service, 21B/21110. 
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commentator on Radio Cairo pointed out on 9.9.1966 that 
an Egyptian answer to an Israeli nuclear programme would 
be a preventive war against Israel launched by Egypt and 
the other Arab countries 'before Israel is capable of 
producing nuclear weapons'. 
(') 
The same position was 
again stressed by Radio Cairo on 9 December 1966. 
(2) 
The issue of preventive war is extremely compli- 
cated. If a nuclear programme of research and development 
is under way, under conditions of great secrecy, who could 
tell the exact stage at which a certain development took 
place? One of the possibilities of course would be to 
decide that the critical stage had been reached once a 
nuclear test had been carried through. Usually a first 
test is conducted with a. device and not with the actiial 
bomb, and is a stage prior to the assembly of a bomb. At 
the same time, it might be argued that perhaps a prototype 
of a bomb had been assembled before the test, with the 
assumption that if the test - carried through merely with 
a device - were successful, the bomb would be ready for 
immediate use. One could also envisage a situation where 
bombs would be assembled in secrecy without any test. 
The possible uses of such bombs is a different 
question (which will be discussed later), but the dilemma 
of the opponent remains tantalising. It may assume that 
nuclear bombs if they are not tested, and if their existence 
(1) See ßßC monitoring service t1E/2262,12,9.1966. 
(2) See BBC nionitorin service i'r/2340, ' 12.12.1966. 
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remains unknown, are not really relevant to the problem 
of the balance of military power. On the other hand one 
may calculate that such bombs (if they existed) had in 
fact changed critically the balance of military power and 
would therefore justify a preventive strike or preventive 
war. But would not such a decision come too late (from 
the point of view of the opponent - in this case Egypt)? 
There are many uncertainties here which can contribute 
only to growing anxieties and hence to a motivation to try 
and strike first. 
But this problem of 'when to strike' is also connected 
with the other problem of ? what scope of wart. UJill the 
preventive strike be aimed at the centres of nuclear pro- 
duction or rather will it be a full scale war? Both on 
this issue and on the former one the evidence in the pub- 
lished Egyptian material is sketchy, and there are indi- 
cations for both positions. 
(') 
The lack of detailed and 
deep analysis of these issues appears to be not the result 
of considerations of secrecy imposed on the debate, but 
rather the consequence of a lack of sophistication at the 
level of strategic thinking. This is not surprising in 
view of the serious intellectual questions involved in such 
discussions, questions which could be dealt with only within 
a framework of a sophisticated intellectual milieu, which is 
(1) Thus for example on 9 December 1966, Radio Cairo said 
that Egypt would have to launch a preventive war 
before Israel produced atomic bombs; see DDC 
monitoring service 82/234+, 12.12,1966. 
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lacking in Egypt. It also requires a tradition of thought 
on strategic problems which again does not exist in Egypt. 
But even if the situation were different and such a milieu 
and tradition did exist in Egypt, the question of pro- 
emptive or preventive war aimed at forestalling the creation 
of a nuclear capability, is an extremely complicated issue. 
This is so because of the large number of imponderables 
about the actual state of affairs in the producing state, 
and also because a decision to go to war depends not only 
on the nuclear problem but also and perhaps more so, on 
other considerations which do not have direct relevance to 
the problem of nuclear weapons. 
A different question is whether the Egyptian army 
had developed or rather intended to develop, a capability 
to launch a surprise attack with either limited aims (like 
the destruction of centres of nuclear production) or 
general aims. If one considers the arms build-up in 
Egypt during the period 1956-1967 the answer is probably 
in the affirmative. Like the Israeli army, the Egyptian 
army developed the capabilities for 'blitz' strategies 
based on concentrations of armour and air power(1), which 
could be applied in a surprise attack, beginning with a 
surprise air strike. However, such a capability let alone 
the mere mention of the concept of pre-emptive war, did not 
necessarily moan that the strategy of pre-emptive war became 
a main strategy for the EGyptian army. Apart from the 
(1) On this interesting point see Safran, op. cit., 
p. 250-251. 
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debate within the context of a possible Israel atomic 
bomb, the notion of pre-emptive strike had not been 
suggested extensively by Egyptian writers. Furthermore 
the notion of a pro-emptive strike must be considered 
within the political context, and the three main con- 
ditions which Nasser enumerated as the prerequisites 
before a successful war against Israel could be launched, 
namely Arab unity, favourable international situation and 
the Arab build up, suggested a different strategy from 
that of a pre-emptive war. (Needless to say, the dis- 
tinction between preventive war and pre-emptive war should 
not be forgotten in this context. , 
In a sense every scar 
motivated by the fear that the other side is about to 
produce nuclear weapons or had already produced them 
should be defined as a preventive war, as it is not des- 
tined to pre-empt an imminent military strike by the 
nticle'ar weapons produced. It could be defined, if at all, 
as 'pre-emptive' only in the limited popular sense that 
it simply has the objective of pre-empting a certain step 
taken by the opponent.. ) A concept of pre-emptive war 
as a main strategy must put a premium on purely military 
considerations. It must postulate that notwithstanding 
the political situation, if a certain military development 
takes place, there is a need for an immediate military 
action to be taken. Obviously, that was not the basic 
military-political concept of the Egyptian regime. 
It may be that under the pressure of anxieties 
about a possible Israeli nuclear weapon production the 
Egyptian regime started to consider such possibilities as 
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well. But perhaps a more probable explanation of the 
threats about a preventive war, is that they were intended 
mainly as a deterrent. At the same time in order to 
increase the credibility of this deterrent threat there 
was a need for Egypt to develop some applied strategic 
military doctrine to take account of the possibility of 
an Israeli bomb, by a preventive action. 
yptian Policy and Strategy: Was there a Change? 
A further problem is whether under the impact of 
the possibility of an eventual Israeli bomb, Egypt had 
decided to change her basic commitment to an eventual war 
against Israel (either as a long range foreign policy 
objective or as a short range objective).. There is no 
positive indication of this. To-the extent that there 
were indications of caution on the part of the Egyptian 
regime vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, it appears 
these resulted from the non-fulfilment of the three con- 
ditions cited above. In turn, the failure was presumably 
based mainly on the deterrent power of the Israeli con- 
ventional forces, a deterrent power which had acquired 
considerable credibility through the experience of the 
Sinai campaign of 1956 when the power of the Israeli army 
had been proved. The notion that Egypt must change her 
basic strategy against Israel because otherwise Israel 
might go nuclear, has not been suggested by the Egyptians. 
This question is of course crucial because one of the 
possible justifications for the development of a nuclear 
option by Israel (as distinct from an actual weapons, pro- 
gramme) was that it might deter Egypt from continuing to 
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endorse the aim of the eventual destruction of Israel. 
At the same time it appears that the Israeli 
nuclear programme must have brought about a basic 
reassessment of the Arab, and mainly Egyptian stratogy. 
(1) 
But apart from pointing to the logical need, on the part 
of the Egyptians for such an assessment, it is not clear 
what changes were taken as a result of it. Heikal, for 
instance re-emphasized again on 15 October 1965 that 'The 
most prominent forces of pressure on the Arab situation 
are now Israel's nuclear potential and the need to be 
cautious and prepare for it'. 
(2) 
But apart from raising the concept of preventive 
war (mainly as a deterrent) and re-emphasizing the need 
for strengthening the armed forces and mainly the aircraft, 
there was no indication of either changing the basic aims 
of Egypt vis-? -vis Israel or of changing the basic strategy 
or political prerequisites for a war against Israel. It 
was an indication of great concern. At the same time, 
the fact that Egypt emphasized, both on this occasion as 
on others, that she herself was the main Arab opponent to 
Israel and thus also the main target of Israel, though 
indeed genuine (because it was logical), served also to 
strengthen her hand in the inter-Arab competition. 
During 1966 inter-Arab competition became even 
more acute than before, as did the fears about the alleged 
(1 See Heiltal ts article in Ahram., 15 October 1965, 
quoted by BBC monitoring service, 2IE/1968. 
(2) ibid. 
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American plans to encircle Egypt and the 'Arab Revolution'. 
Within this context, the problem of nuclear weapons in 
Israel was mentioned only sporadically. Another issue 
concerning Israeli arms received much Greater publicity. 
the case of 
That was/the American arms sent to Israel after or instead 
of the famous German Arms Deal with Israel which was can- 
celled because of Arab pressures. In passing one could 
argue that even this Anerican project came under fire 
partly as another issue of the inter-Arab competition. 
Thus King Faisal was criticised severely for maintaining 
close relations with the United States, while the latter 
was supplying arms to Israei. 
(1) 
This concern about American arms deliveries to 
Israel could of course be interpreted within the context 
of suspicions about American intentions towards the Arab 
'revolutionary' regimes in General. Be that as it may, 
the fact remains that Egyptian attention was occupied by 
many issues at the time and loss emphasis was put on the 
nuclear issue (at least on the level of declaratory policy). 
It may of course be that this lack of apparent concern was 
also due to some belief among the Egyptian leadership that 
there was no immediate danger of an Israeli bomb. 
(2) 
(1) See for instance Heikal's article titled 'Five 
Questions to KinC Faisal' on the eve of the 
latter's departure for a visit to the United States, 
al-Ahram.., broadcasted by Radio Cairo, 27.5.1966. 
(2) On this see below, in the discussion of the Egyptian 
diplomatic moves concerning Israel's atomic develop- 
ments and the possibility of American assurances on 
this issue. 
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On 15th of May, 1967, the crisis that culminated 
with the Six Day War began to unfold. From now onwards, 
Cairo Radio devoted an ever growing place to the crisis 
and its causes. However, the problem of nuclear weapons 
was not mentioned. In Chapter 1 the causes for the crisis 
and war of 1967 were set out, as they have been suggested 
by the various observers, among which the issue of Israel's 
nuclear developments and the need for preventive war in 
order to destroy the centres for nuclear production are 
not mentioned. It is interesting that the Egyptian 
sources do not mention them either. Ostensibly, one 
might have expected Egyptian propaganda at least to mention 
the issue of Israeli nuclear developments as one of the 
causes for the Egyptian initial move, even if the real 
causes of the crisis were different, as indeed they were. 
By mentioning this issue they could certainly have hoped 
to get much more sympathy from the international public 
opinion than they actually got. Indeed, taking into 
consideration the deep anxiety in the West and particularly 
in the United States about nuclear proliferation, this 
kind of Egyptian argument could certainly have secured 
for Egypt at least some understanding in these quarters. 
The fact that the Egyptians made no mention of the nuclear 
issue as one of the justifications for their initial moves 
in the crisis, though it could have served their propaganda 
purposes, confirms beyond doubt that they themselves had not 
considered this issue as one of the rationales- for their 
moves in the crisis. 
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a 
One could of course advance two alternative 
reasons why the Egyptian leadership had not mentioned 
the issue of atomic developments in Israel as a reason 
for the Egyptian move in May, 1967, even if in fact this 
had been a serious reason for their rove. First, that 
by raising this issue there would have been a nountinG. 
suspicion that Egypt was aiming from the very beginning 
at starting a preventive war. This suspicion would have 
caused added damage to the international image of Egypt 
and might have possibly brought about a stronger American 
commitment to Israel. These were precisely the things 
which President Nasser had always tried to avoid. Second, 
that Eqpt would have refrained from mentioning the nuclear 
issue in order not to cause anxiety to the Egyptian army 
and people and to other Arab states on the eve of a 
possible war. 
Neither of these arguments seems to be valid. 
" To begin with, the conbination of the causes sugcested 
by Egypt itself and all the observers give a comprehensive 
and adequate picture of the causes for the crisis and 
the escalation which eventually took place, and there is 
no apparent reason why another one should be added. 
Second, by mentioning nuclear developments in Israel, 
Egypt could have argued that her moves wore not intended 
to start a war, but rather as a bargaining counter to force 
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Israel to cease working on her nuclear projects. 
(1) 
By 
arguing in this way, Egypt could have secured a sympa- 
thetic international public opinion and also could have 
avoided creating anxiety amongst its own population. The 
burden of the evidence suggests therefore that the Israeli 
nuclear option was not among the causes that led to the 
1.967 crisis. 
The Threat that Egypt would 'Go Nuclear' 
Apart from the threat of preventive war as a do- 
terrent against 'Israel going nuclear', the Egyptian 
regime used another deterrent, namely the threat that 
Egypt itself may tgo nucleart in case of an Israeli bomb. 
This position which has been repeated on several occasions, 
was connected with the general Egyptian declared policy 
on the nuclear issue. This general position was on the 
whole parallel to the Israeli one in the sense that both 
countries maintained that they were not interested in 
introducing nuclear weapons into the Middle Nast. The 
obvious difference being that Israel was much more advanced 
in the nuclear field. (in the Israeli case that was as 
has been pointed above, the position adopted by the Lshkol 
ý1) That such an idea could have been accepted as valid 
by many observers in the West, is evident from the 
concern in these countries about nuclear proliferation 
in general and the suspicions voiced about the Israeli 
project in Diriona in particular. So much so that 
crises games were played before the crisis of 1967 ever 
started, on the basis of a scenario drawn along the 
lines of an Lgyptian move against an Israel which had 
armed herself with nuclear weapons or was just about to 
do so. See for example Eichael H. Banks, A. J. P.. Groom 
and A. N. Oppenheim, 'Gaming and Simulation in Inter- 
national Nationals', Political Studies, February 1968. 
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government at a certain juncture. The Ben Gurion govern- 
ment kept declaring that Israel was building a nuclear 
capacity for peaceful uses, but by avoiding discussing any 
actual policy on arms control measures concerning nuclear 
policy it in fact created menacing images in the minds of 
the Arabs, 
The Egyptians maintained that they would go nuclear 
only if Israel did it first. Thus on 24 July 1965, Prosi- 
dent Nasser in a long speech on the occasion of the U. 1. ß. 
revolution anniversary disclosed that the Americans demanded 
from him towards the end of 1963 as a consideration for 
the wheat aid, the following demands: (a) a pledge not to 
produce nuclear weapons; (b) to keep the Egyptian army at 
the same level; (c) not to produce rockets; Nasser related 
his answer; tAs far as we are concerned, we have no intention 
of producing nuclear weapons and are not working on the 
production of nuclear weapons. Yet all the talk you say 
is entirely rejected. '(') 
Another reference to the need to build an Egyptian 
nuclear deterrent is included in rIeikal's famous article 
of 15 October, 1965 in which he maintained that Egypt must 
build her nuclear capability. 
(2) 
The question is whether 
(1) See 13BC monitoring service, PIE/1918,21+. 7.1965 
(2) See also BBC monitoring service r'E/2o76,1.2.1966. 
Radio Cairo here quotes an article published in 
Ai_t-1'as5 (Lebanon) reportinb that the U. A. R. Deputy 
Premier Dr. : iatiri, said to a Japanese paper that 
the U. A. R. was in principle opposed to nuclear weapons, 
but if Israel arned herself with them the U. A. R. would 
do the same. 
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this had been suggested as just a threat to deter Israel 
from 'going nuclear' or as a policy. However, it seems 
that some Israeli decision-makers considered very 
seriously the possibility of E'ypt 'going nuclear' if 
Israel did. To that extent therefore, the threat had 
some credibility. This threat in turn also created 
anxieties on the Israeli side, as various observers argued 
that if Egypt had the capability to too nuclear' she would 
not hesitate to do so regardless of what Israel night or 
might not do. 
(') 
Either because of her inferiority in the field of 
nuclear developments or because of a fear that the intro- 
duction of nuclear weapons on the part of both Israel and 
Egypt might create a balance which would secure the st atus 
quo, there had been on the whole more emphasis in Egypt 
on the notion of preventive war rather than the production 
of nuclear weapons, as the reply to an Israeli bomb, 
The Possibility of a Soviet Guarantee to Egypt 
If Israel developed nuclear bombs and Egypt did 
not produce them, what then? One line of response could 
be to ask for Soviet aid for the production of these weapons, 
or even for the direct transfer of nuclear weapons. This 
however, was (and still is) completely contradictory to 
the Soviet position on nuclear proliferation. The Soviet 
(1) See above pp. ýqý.. y 
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Union was against such transfer even when her allies in 
Eastern Europe were interested in it. There has been 
only one example of transfer of lmowhow and technical aid 
in the nuclear field from Russia, namely in the case of 
China in the period 1957-1960, and the Russians have 
regretted it ever since. 
(l) 
It seems however that the Egyptians at least en- 
quired about this possibility(2) and received a negative 
answer. The alternative 
Soviet guarantee against 
according to the same New 
Soviet promise about such 
in December, 1965. This 
Grechko while on visit as 
was to ask for some sort of a 
a nuclear Israel. Indeed, 
York Times report, a certain 
a guarantee had been extended 
promise was given by Marshal 
head of a high powered military 
mission to Cairo. The promise was to give a nuclear 
Guarantee to Egypt if Israel produced atomic bombs. 
(3) 
There was no official Egyptian confirmation of ` 
these reports. The Egyptians on their part denied it. 
They insisted that no guarantee was sought or received. 
ý1) See on this last point, inter alia, Walter C. Clements, 
The Arms Race and Sino-Soviet Relations, Hoover 
Institution Publications, 1968. 
(2) See New York Times, 4.2,1966. 
(3). See on this also Radio Rabat, as quoted by BBC 
monitoring service ME/2081,7.2.1966. 
(4) See for example, the leader in al-Gumhuriyah, 6.2.1966, 
and also al-Ahram as quoted by Radio Cairo which 
emphasized that Egypt refused to ask for guarantees 
and therefore if Israel developed atomic weapons the 
only answer would be preventive war. (BBC monitoring 
service 1' /2170,20.4.1966. ) 
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Ostensibly such a denial could stein from the wish to 
appear independent and to keep for propaganda purposes 
the position of a non-aligned power (which reminds one 
of the Indian position and dilemma on the same problem). 
However, there are doubts about the existence of a formal 
Soviet promise of this kind and what is more important, 
its effectiveness. To begin with such a promise could 
act as a real deterrent against Israel (in the sense that 
it would deter Israel from tgoing nucleart), only if it 
were made public and communicated forcefully to Israel. 
It would not be enough to promise it to Egypt within the 
closed walls of the conference room. It must be delivered 
to Israel, which was not done (at least not publicly), and 
it is doubtful whether a private Soviet note to Israel 
could fully serve this deterrent purpose. To cite just 
one example, by sending the note in private the Russians 
would have left the way open for Israel to deny that a 
warning had ever been sent to them. Second, it seems 
doubtful whether Grechko was in a position to give this 
promise, independently of a decision taken by the highest 
political leadership in the Soviet Union. Third, if 
indeed such a formal and definite promise was given one 
might have expected some American reciprocal moves or 
initiatives. Finally, and this comes back to the Egyptian 
reaction, by confirming the existence of a Soviet promise 
the Egyptians need not necessarily have jeopardized their 
position as a neutralist power. After all, this promise, 
if it were given, was not the guarantee itself but only a 
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promise to give a guarantee in the future if certain con- 
ditions were fulfilled. (In the Indian case the dilemma 
was whether to ask for the guarantee itself and this was 
after China already had its nuclear weapons. ) In this 
context it is interesting to note that Cairo radio felt no 
scruples in indicating American assurances to Egypt on 
this issue of the Israeli nuclear progranio(1). This 
suggests that it was not just a propaganda stance on the 
part of the Egyptians to deny the c;: istence- of a guarantee 
(or for that matter a promise of a future guarantee). It 
seems therefore that if a promise was given, it was not 
yet a formal definite one, but rather a loose one, and 
that both the Russiansand the Egyptians had not formulated 
a joint final formal policy or strategy on the problem. 
Such a promise if it had been given could have only a 
limited deterrence value. 
Another point related to this issue should be made. 
There were indications, or at least speculation, that one 
of the objectives of Israel in her nuclear activities was 
to create a situation whereby both super powers have to 
extend military guarantees to both sides of the conflict. 
(2) 
If the Russians indicated their willingness to extend some 
kind of guarantee to Egypt under some conditions, Israel 
could approach the United States and demand some promises 
for guarantees if some other conditions were created. Thus 
(1) See below p. Z(, R. 
(2) See for example Sources of Conflict in the Middle 
East, Adelphi Paper No. 26, Institute for Strategic 
Studios, London, 1966. 
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if a Russian promise to Egypt of the kind alleged to have 
been given by Grechho, had indeed been extended, the first 
stage of the Israeli objective had been accomplished. If 
the Egyptians and the Russians realised that this indeed 
was the Israeli objective and were anxious not to enable 
this Israeli strategy to materialise, then they should have 
been even more reluctant to become involved in such a 
promise and certainly had to try not to allow it to become 
public. As has been pointed above, the fact that it was 
not made public partly jeopardised its credibility as a 
deterrent. In any case it appears that the Russians were 
not thinking at the time in terms of guarantees to Egypt. 
From the Soviet point of view there could have been 
both advantages and disadvantages in extending such a 
guarantee or the promise of such a guarantee. The advant- 
ages were quite obvious, namely to increase Soviet influence 
in Egypt and to deter Israel from 'going nucleari,. something 
which might jeopardise the general policy against nuclear 
proliferation and also would introduce dangers of various 
kinds into the Middle East. On the other hand such a 
promise if it were to be honoured might involve the Soviet 
Union in situations over which she had no control. To tale 
merely the most obvious scenario in which Israel and Egypt 
became engaged in conventional war and Israel was threatening 
Egypt with the use of nuclear weapons unless Egypt did, or 
desisted from doing, something. Under such conditions the 
Soviet Union might be dragged into-the war and this certainly 
might prompt American intervention or at least the danger of 
threat of such an intervention. At the same time, 
asymmetrical proliferation in a sub-system can prompt 
guarantees by the super-power which has commitments and 
interests in this sub-system. The behaviour of the Soviet 
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Union in the Middle East from the beginning of 1970 onwards 
shows its readiness to become involved militarily, and 
might reflect upon a situation in which asymmetrical pro- 
liferation took place. 
During 1966 and up to the Six Day War, Egyptian con- 
cern about Israelis nuclear developments and intentions seemed 
to have been slightly mitigated at least on the declaratory' 
level. This was the result of growing pressures in other 
fields: the increasing inter-Arab competition, the unending 
war in the Yemen, the fears about American intentions vis-a-vis 
Egypt and the various plans for an 'Islamic alliance' directed 
against Egypt and the other 'radical' Arab states. But perhaps 
other reasons were on the one hand American assurance about 
Israeli intentions in the nuclear field, and on the other hand 
the Israeli insistence that 'Israel will not be the first to 
introduce atomic weapons into the Middle East'. 
The most interesting piece of evidence about such an 
American assurance was given indirectly by Radio Cairo on 
9.9.1966. The Radio commentator criticised American- 
Israeli co-operation in the nuclear field. He argued that 
there must be suspicions about this co-operation and added: 
'The U. S. which has itself guaranteed that Israel will 
not resort to atomic weapons, built with its reactor... '. 
in other words, there had been some official American 
assurance to Egypt about nuclear developments in Israel. 
To what extent the Egyptians attached credibility to this 
assurance is another matter, and one which could not be 
Z-; % _. ý 
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assessed with much accuracy. This is particularly difficult 
because of the propaganda effects of any Egyptian declaration 
on the inter-Arab competition. Indeed in the same broadcast 
Radio Cairo stressed once again that the answer to an Israeli 
bomb would be a preventive war. Still, the existence of 
American assurances had been confirmed. Taking into account 
the American concern about nuclear proliferation in general, 
a concern which was well-known to the U. A. R. as she was 
represented in the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, 
and the repeated American visits to Dimona, such assurances 
must have had some impact, if only a marginal one. 
L 
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Chapter VI 
SOME STRATEGIC AND POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING 
THE FEASIBILITY OF THE CREATION OF A STABLE BALANCE OF 
DETERRENCE BET'. "IEEN ISRAEL AND EGYPT IN THE CASE OF TIIE 
INTRODUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS 
A stable balance of nuclear deterrence depends both 
upon political, and on military-technological-strategic 
factors. The discussion here will concentrate mainly upon 
the second set of factors and on the feasibility of their 
development within the framework of a conflict between small 
neighbouring states involved in a fierce conflict. But 
there will also be some reference to the political impli- 
cations of the introduction of nuclear weapons. 
It is clear that both sets of factors interact, and 
that the more important ones are the political, because it 
is politics which is at one and the same time the ultimate 
goal of strategic postures and military actions, and politics 
which decides the initial conflict between two sides. 
However, to the extent that a conflict situation already 
-exists, strategic behaviour within the given situation is 
one of the factors determining the degree of the stability 
of the relations between the conflicting parties. At the 
same time intermediate political steps also have great 
effect on strategic behaviour. Indeed, this complex of 
interactions should have been in a nutshell the essence and 
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objective of arms control theories. 
(1) 
In the case of the super powers, certain strategic 
conditions necessary to a stable nuclear balance have 
been suggested: second strike capability; capability for 
flexible or graduate response; an adequate command and 
control system; a flow of communication about the capabili- 
ties and intentions of both sides. 
The question is, are these same conditions applicable 
to a local nuclear situation and could they be developed in 
the Middle East? Could a stable balance of nuclear de- 
terrence develop between local rivals if all of these 
strategic conditions do not in fact exist? Furthermore, 
it would appear that a nuclear superiority (admittedly on 
the side of the Americans) has not interfered with the 
stability of the central balance of deterrence. 
(2) 
Would 
such be the case in a local nuclear conflict situation? 
These questions evolve around the strategic conditions 
mentioned above. The main 'strategic' discussion below will 
be concerned with the problem of 'second strike capability' 
(1) As it happened, much of the literature about arms 
control avoids this interaction between the political 
mode and the strategic one. Instead it concentrates 
completely on the military sphere. See for example 
David V. Edwards, Arms Control in International Politics, 
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969. Negotiations on arms 
control, were usually conducted exclusively within the 
realm of things military. At the same time, their 
success or failure depended to a large extent on the 
political-strategic climate of the time. 
(2) It is a question whether the stability in this case de- 
rived from inherent strategic behaviour or from the 
political prudence of the militarily superior super power. 
Or upon the balancing factor of the Soviet threat - both 
conventional and IRB:. r's - to West Europe, or the nuclear 
counter-deterrent against the U. S. A. itself. 
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and the possibility (if such exists) of developing adequate 
response to nuclear threats or uses, or adequate nuclear 
response to conventional threats or uses of forces. The 
question of adequate command and control system will not be 
dealt with as the evidence available is not adequate. The 
question of communications will be discussed briefly. 
The discussion of the strategic factors affecting 
the stability of any nuclear relationship in the Middle East, 
is drawing on the only known similar situation which exists 
currently, namely, the central balance of nuclear deterrence 
between the super powers. A discussion in these terms can 
be at best a discussion in analogies. In the first place 
the nuclear relationship between the super powers is still 
a short episode in history; then again the nature of this 
relationship is very different from the nature of the 
relations in the Middle East. Thus while engaging in this 
sort of analogy, one must bear in mind that there are severe 
limitations on such a form of argument. 
Part of the discussion is aimed primarily at demons- 
trating that indeed there are basic differences between the 
two types of political relationships (the one existing between 
the super powers, the other that which exists, or might be 
emerging, in the Israeli-Arab region). This argument 
immediately indicates the limited nature of the analogy. 
However, even while pointing to the limitations of the analogy 
and to the obvious differences between the two types of re- 
lationships, the discussion itself is still carried out with 
the aid of an inventory of analytical concepts, which are 
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themselves the product of one kind of relationship, namely 
that between the super powers. This is an obvious obstacle 
but one which cannot be overcome. 
Whereas in the nuclear relationship between the 
super powers the emphasis was usually more, on the problem 
of the credibility of deterrence, the discussion which 
follows concentrated on the problem of stability (or lack 
of it), and the avoidance of escalation. This approach 
is partly a result of the analogy with the super power 
relationship and partly the result of the assessment of 
the 'ferocity' of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the nature 
of the communications (or rather lack of them) between the 
local powers in the Middle East, and finally, the nature 
of the systemic pressures exerted on the local powers in 
the Middle East. These last pressures are the result of 
the interaction of several levels of conflict and compe- 
tition in the Middle East, primarily the interaction between 
the Arab-Israeli conflict and inter-Arab competition and 
conflicts. 
One of the results of the systemic pressures(') is 
that the threshold for escalation into a nuclear war appears 
(1) See below in pp. 3o8-11 for an elaborate discussion 
of this subject. 
- 
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to be lower in the Middle East, than is the case in the 
nuclear relatipnship between the super powers. The 
propensity to escalate will be higher in the Middle East, 
and escalation might result from a crisis which on the 
face of it, concerns smaller stakes (in relative terms) 
than is the case with a crisis between the super powers. 
Thus whereas the element of 'irrationality' within the 
framework of the 'rationality of irrationality'(') behaviour 
of the super powers, which on its own part is one of the 
elements of the credibility of the deterrent posture of 
the two super powers, is being-fortunately continuously 
circumvented by the decision-makers in America and Russia, 
in future nuclear Middle East, this element would increase. 
At the same time it'could be assumed that the very existence 
of nuclear weapons in the Middle East will impose limitations 
on the decision-makers. These limitations might partly 
counterveil the systemic pressures, but these latter would 
still keep the threshold for nuclear war in the Middle East 
at a lower level than is the case in the super powers' 
relationship. 
The Questions of Second Strike Capability and Motivations for 
First Strike 
The need for a second strike capability as a 
stabilising factor in the super powers' nuclear relations 
was recognised more than a decade ago and found its first 
public comprehensive elaboration in 1ohlstetter's article 
'The Delicate Balance of Terrort. 
(2) 
Indeed much effort 
(1) For an excellent discussion of the concept of the 
"rationality of irrationality" and a critique of 
the concept and its applications, see Steven Maxs: *ell, 
Rationality in Deterrence, Adelphi Paper, No. 50, 
Institute for Strategic Studies, London. 
(2) Foreign Affairs, January 195q. 
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has been devoted by all the nuclear powers to developing 
second-strike delivery ststers, with the United States 
leading the way and the Soviet Union following. Its 
relevance to the Middle East has been recognized by some- 
participants in the public debate on nuclear weapons in 
Israel. 
The first question is whether it is technically 
possible to develop a second strike capability in Israel 
and Egypt. The simple answer is certainly in the aiTir- 
mative. There is no reason to believe that it is 
impossible to build hardened silos in various parts of 
either Israel or Egypt. Nor would the expense on such a 
project, if it is concerned with a small number of missiles, 
be prohibitive in comparison to other items in the defence 
budgets of both Israel and the U. A. R. Furthermore, at 
least for the foreseeable future, conventional aircraft 
could be used by loth sides as the main second-strike 
delivery system. With the development of Vertical Take Off 
planes the difficulty in achieving the complete destruction 
of all the other side's aircraft on the ground has increased. 
Because of the ability of her pilots and ground crews, Israel 
is most probably in a superior position in this respect. 
But, there is no technical reason why both sides could not 
acquire some sort of a very primitive second-strike cap- 
ability with conventional delivery systems, or at least 
create uncertainty in the mind of the other side as to their 
capability to acquire it. 
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At the same time such a conventional capability 
would be primitive and insecure, and it seems likely that 
because of the scarcity of nuclear bombs, both sides would 
try to develop missile systems for the purpose of delivering 
nuclear warheads. 
(1 
On an elementary level of analysis it could be 
argued that the number of bombs needed by both sides to 
create a credible deterrent could be quite small. Israel 
is very small and a very large percentage of the population, 
as well as the centres of economic and cultural life, are 
concentrated in a small part of the country. The situation 
as concerns Egypt is somewhat different, but not qualitatively. 
The greatest part of the population of Egypt is concentrated 
in a narrow strip of land along the Nile and the Delta. The 
Aswan Dam could therefore be a very obvious target. Its 
destruction could lead to terrible consequences for Egypt. 
Moreover, Egypt's urban population is concentrated in a few 
towns, like Cairo and Alexandria. These few towns would 
also be obvious objectives for a "counter-value" nuclear 
strike, and their limited number makes the number of bombs 
needed relatively small. The urban population in Egypt 
seems to be the real source of military and economic power 
in the country; the Felaheen population still lives on a 
very low level of economic and educational development and 
could not be considered for a very long time as an alternative 
(1) For the Israeli possible development in this field see 
above p/. t: Z, 4 For the Egyptian programme see above 
PP- 22.2-2214. 
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to the urban population. The process of recovery and 
of building up a new professional class might take gener- 
ations. What is also important to note in this context 
is that the present regime and presumably any future 
regime considers the urban population as its power base, 
and thus would consider the destruction of this population 
practically tantamount to a destruction of Egypt itself. 
Thus in order to destroy Egypt as a modern state, or rather 
as a state aspiring to become such, it would be sufficient 
to destroy the few urban centres of population. 
If missile systems were developed as the main 
nuclear delivery system, then hardened silos would become 
the main means of creating a second strike capability. If 
such hardened silos were achieved, the motivation for a 
first strike would depend primarily on the accuracy of the 
guidance systems coupled with the payload of the missiles. 
If the accuracy is low, a decision to strike first against 
a nuclear silo of the other side would be tantamount to 
unilateral nuclear disarmament, as several bombs would be 
required for the destruction of one hardened silo. Thus, 
if both sides have an equal number of missiles with about 
the same payload a first strike by A in which, for example 
half of his missiles is used, would cause the destruction 
of only, let say, a quarter of the number of silos of B. 
The result being that B enjoys, after the attack a marked 
nuclear superiority over A. This would enable B to threaten 
or blackmail A. Guidance systems do tend to become more and 
more accurate to the point that eventually a first counter- 
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force strike, might become a plausible option. 
(')' 
In 
such a case the superiority of offence over defence reaches 
a point in which motivations for surprise first strike are 
overwhelming. The result would then be that the anxieties 
of both sides might lead to the danger of pre-emptive war or 
at least to an ever escalating arms race. To the extent 
that guidance systems remain inaccurate, the motivation for 
a first strike (counter-force or oven counter-force combined 
with counter-city) decreases, but the motivation for an arms 
race is strengthened, so that a certain balance between 
defence and offence of the two sides as far as the nuclear 
delivery systems may be maintained. 
Furthermore, even when guidance systems are not 
absolutely accurate, there might be cases in which first 
counter-force strikes might prove to be to the benefit of 
the attacker. This might also be the result to some extent 
of misperceptions about the actual relative capabilities of 
the two sides or about the vulnerability of these forces. 
It might also be argued that the attacker could hope to 
create havoc with the command and control system of the 
attacked and thus avoid the danger of retaliation or blackmail 
This tendency will be strengthened if some form of 
terminal target-seeking guidance would be developed 
and installed into warheads. The main offensive 
systems of both super-powers are still guided by an 
inertial guidance system. For details see intor-alia 
Ian Smart, Advanced Strategic Missiles: A Short Guide, 
Adelphi Paper NO-6--6-39 Institute for Strategic Studies, 
London, 1969. 
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later on. This is even more the case in an atmosphere 
where strategic communication is lacking, such as that 
which might prevail in a nuclear fiddle East. (The only 
qualification on this observation is the possibility that 
the super powers would be invited to act as 'go betweens 
within the franework of strategic communication. In that 
case they could apply their various sophisticated intelligence 
systems for this purpose. One of the problems in that case 
would be their political credibility, namely whether the 
local nuclear powers would trust the information supplied by 
the super powers. ) Thus again one of the possibilities 
is that notwithstanding the fact that a small number of 
nuclear weapons is sufficient to create a credible deterrent, 
there might be a strong motivation to become involved in a 
very serious arms race(1}. This arms race (which could be 
avoided only by an agreement to limit the number of missiles) 
would be more harmful than the arnis race between the super 
powers, because of the smaller margins of Israel and Egypt 
economies. Here Israel is again in a relatively superior 
position vis-ä-vis Egypt, because of her much higher GNP per 
capita (around $1460 per head in 1968 as compared with 1186 
in Egypt). But with Israel's other military commitments the 
burden on the economy of Israel would also be tremendous. 
Whereas the number of bombs needed for the crippling 
of both countries is limited, there is one difference between 
(1) For other reasons for such a motivation see above 
pp - A-It-4 and below pp. 28q-9o. 
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them which is caused by the smaller size of Israel. 
Whereas Egypt enjoys comparatively large areas in which 
to install her future nuclear weapons, the same does not 
apply to Israel (in its pro Six Day liar borders and 
possibly even after that but with the exception of the 
Sinai). Because of this relative smallness, silos 
could be installed not very far from cities or at least 
some centres of population. 
This would mean a possibility that nuclear bombs 
directed at a hardened silo somewhere in the Negev might 
'spill over' to hit one of the concentrations of people 
in Israel. 
Such a danger would involve by necessity the 
blurring of the distinction between counter-force and 
counter-city strikes. To the extent that this distinction 
is important as a stabilising element in a balance of 
nuclear deterrence, 
(') 
to blur it would destabilise the 
nuclear relations between Israel and Egypt. The concept of 
1second strike capability' while springing from other con- 
siderations in the fifties, became related later on to this 
distinction between counter-force and counter-city strategies. 
(1) Since reliance on "assured destruction capability", 
this distinction as an element of stabilising balances 
of nuclear deterrence no longer has the aura of a 
universal rule. It would apply however in a ? Middle 
East context. Indeed, it would perhaps apply at a 
certain stage in the development of balances of deterrence 
between any pairs of new nuclear opponents. 
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Both "second strike capability" and this distinction 
together combined to stabilise the balance of nuclear 
deterrence. This at least was the American doctrine, 
whereas the Soviet Union continued in building up weapons 
for counter-city strategy. The question of course is 
whether a counter-force strategy on its own does not 
destabilise the nuclear balance because of the images it 
creates. It is true, as Philip 1-tindsor has pointed out, 
that the inoluctible implication of the change in the 
American strategic doctrine was the building of a cap- 
ability for a first strike, and what is even more important 
that a strong suspicion was created in the minds of the 
Russians that indeed the Americans had adopted a first 
strike doctrine'). This development and the 1reverse 
missile gape brought about the new arms race, but had not 
basically destabilised the central balance of deterrence, 
probably because the Americans developed a credible graduate 
response doctrine and second, because the political climate 
started to change from the antagonism of the fifties to the 
partial thaw of expected detente in the second half of the 
sixties. 
(1) See also on this Russian suspicion, Arnold L. Horelick 
and Myron Rush, Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign 
Policy, University of Chicago Press, 19669 esp. 
pp. 83-103 and Oran Young, The Politics of Force, 
Princeton University Press, 1964, p. 88. 
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In conflict situations between two powers, there is 
a mutual suspicion that the other side contemplates a first 
strike. There are two interacting problems here: first, 
how to reduce fears of first strike; second, if because of 
political and psychological reasons, this fear cannot be 
reduced substantially, what is the best strategic doctrine 
within which a fear of first strike would be less conducive 
to instability? It could be arGued that in some of these 
conflict situations a counter-force strategy or at least 
the ability to develop such a strategy and distinguish it 
from a counter-city strategy, is more conducive to nuclear 
stability. This is so because of the damage limitation 
effect of a counter-force strategy. 
In the Israeli-Egyptian situation, there are two 
reasons why there is in any case a strong mutual image of 
an inclination towards a first strike posture within the 
context of any nuclear strategy: first, the deep rooted 
inclination to use surprise first strike strategies, an 
inclination which might spill over into the atomic field, 
and which would be difficult to erode even with the intro- 
duction of a second strike capability; second, the ferocity 
of the conflict between the sides, which (and specially if 
the present situation continues) would lead to a completely 
new historical phenomenon, namely the emergence of two 
nuclear powers which are continuously engaged in some sort 
of limited war, a war which escalates continually or at 
least contains a potential for a dangerous escalation 
! #) 
(1 On both these points t see below pp. Zqq-ios , ä, 4-8. 
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There are also two reasons why precisely a counter- 
city strategy in the Israeli-Egyptian case would be more 
conducive to the creation of fears of first stril: o (contrary 
to the situation in the central balance of deterrence): 
first, the belief in the Israeli public that the main ob- 
jective of the Arab world is to bring about a complete 
physical annihilation of the Israeli population, something 
which could 'best' or most efficiently - if at all - be 
accomplished by. a surprise total counter city attack. It 
is not important in this context whether this image is a 
valid reflection of reality or not. It is sufficient that 
the image exists and is indeed very prevalent in Israeli 
society; second, the possibility of a catalytic war 
initiated by a third Arab country and aimed at the mutual 
destruction of both Israel and Egypt. This possibility 
could be envisaged as a result of the interaction between 
the inter-Arab competition and the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
An Arab state could try to provoke Israel and Egypt into 
a uar while itself remaining outside the ring. The provo- 
cation could be brought about in different ways: Syrian 
behaviour on the eve of the 1967 crisis in the Middle East 
serves as an example. 
The strategy which appears to be most conducive 
to nuclear stability is the one based on a second strike 
deterrence, which combines elements of counter force and 
counter city capabilities, which on their part enable 
parties to develop flexible response strategies. As will 
be shown below, in the Israeli Egyptian situation, it will 
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be very difficult to develop any spuret counter force 
strategy, and hence there will be no possibility of 
developing any strategy based on a combination of counter 
force and counter city strategies. 
Thus, because of the strong suspicion on the part 
of both sides that a first strike is contemplated anyway; 
and because in the Israeli-Egyptian case, a 'pure' counter- 
force strategy is impossible to develop, and hence no 
flexible nuclear strategy of any kind, and lastly because 
a counter-city strategy in this context is conducive to the 
creation of fears of first strike, the introduction of 
nuclear weapons into the Israeli-Egyptian region will be 
more destabilising than was the case with the relationship 
between the super powers. 
The line of argument below will be twofold: on tho 
one hand to show how difficult it would be to develop a 
credible and defensible counter-force strategy, while on 
the other to look at the role of mutual images which will 
emerge as a result of the introduction of counter-city 
strategies, briefly listed above. After that will come a 
discussion of the systemic pressures on the possible future 
nuclear relations between Israel and Egypt. 
f 
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The impossibility of developing a spure' counter-force strategy 
As has been pointed above, the small size of Israel 
would mean that an Egyptian first strike might "spill over" 
into the Israeli centres of population. This possibility 
will on the one hand increase the motivation on the side of 
Israel to strike first, while on the other hand the Egyptian 
perception of this Israeli motivation would again increase 
the Egyptian motivation to strike first. 
There is of course another level of consideration 
at which such an unintentional nuclear 'spill over' from 
counter-force strategy to counter-city strategy may change 
the deterrence posture of Israel and this involves the 
question of whether Israel would be ready to retaliate 
massively to an Egyptian first strike. For example, if 
Egypt realised that a counter-force first strike could very 
well hit an Israeli centre of population because of the 
geographical limitations of a small country, she would also 
need to consider the certainty of an Israeli reprisal against 
Egyptian cities. This would cause further hesitations on 
the part of Egypt. On balance, however, it appears that 
a clearer distinction between the two types of strategies, 
and at least for reasons indicated above and below, the 
ability to develop strategies and delivery capabilities 
which involve distinguishing between them, is important for 
the stabilisation of a nuclear balance of deterrence. 
The problem would be compounded if it were believed 
that nuclear warheads were being carried by conventional air- 
craft as well as by missiles, or only by the former. As some 
287 
of the air bases are situated near centres of population, 
any counter-force first strike would almost certainly 
'spill over' into these centres of population. Thus every 
nuclear first strike against Israel would by definition be 
also a counter-value one. 
Given the poor quality of the Egyptian air defence 
(as was shown during its performance in the Six Day War and 
again during the War of Attrition'), it seems reasonable 
to assume that the Egyptian High Command would assume that 
conventional aircraft could serve as an important delivery 
system for Israeli nuclear bombs and would therefore have 
to accept that a first counter-force strike by Egypt aimed 
at crippling the Israeli nuclear delivery vehicles must 
inevitably hit centres of population. Thus the High Command 
must recognize from the first that it cannot develop a real 
counter-force strategy. At the same time the Israelis must 
assess this kind of reasoning on the part of the Egyptians, 
and thus formulate an image of the readiness of Egypt to 
employ a counter-value strategy. 
Another consideration which is raised here is the 
general perception in Israel of the Arab objectives as regards 
Israel. There is a widespread view in Israel that the ulti- 
mate intention of the Arabs is to exterminate physically all 
the Israelis or at least the great majority of them, 
(1 
(1) On this IStreichert image of the whole conflict see 
for example, Michael Brecher, 'Ben-Gurion and Sharett's 
Conflicting Images of the Arabs', The New Middle East s 
No, 18, March 1970. 
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Such an image of Arab intentions would only strengthen the 
Israelis' belief that the obvious inclination of the 
Egyptian High Command was to concentrate on both a counter- 
value strategy[ and first strike, again because of the 
reasons listed above. This perception would inevitably 
lead Israel also to develop a counter-city strategy as the 
only reasonable deterrent against a parallel Egyptian doctrine. 
In any case, in a situation in which the two sides 
have a limited ntunber of warheads there is a high Probability, 
at least in the first stage of nuclear armament, that both 
would develop a counter-value doctrine rather than a counter- 
force doctrine (which would entail the production of many 
more warheads). The paradox in the situation is that the 
possibility of a credible second strike capability could in- 
crease precisely because the two sides would have adopted 
counter-city strategies, and also because of the limited 
number of warheads and the understanding that counter-force 
strategies would not secure necessarily any superiority. 
(1) 
What would increase however is the motivation for a surprise 
counter value strike with the hope that after the destruction 
caused to the other side there would not be any nuclear res- 
ponse, or again because of the Great fear that the other side 
would strike first in any case. In other words, whereas a 
second strike capability was and still is an extremely im- 
portant element in strengthening the stability of the balance 
of nuclear deterrence between the super powers, and while it 
(1) 
" See above pp. ?, 'td-9. 
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is conceivable that Israel and Egypt could develop a 
limited, rather primitive and increasingly - in terms of 
the local GNP's - expensive second strike capabilities, it 
is also true that the relevance of these capabilities as a 
factor enhancing the stability of a nuclear balance of de- 
terrence in the Middle East would diminish. Even if the 
two sides developed this limited capability (which needless 
to say is still a basic requirement but not a sufficient one), 
they would not be able to develop the corollary 'pure' 
counter-force strategy which is required (even as an alter- 
native strategy) in order to keep options open and to de- 
crease anxieties and suspicions. 
It emerges therefore that both sides would have to 
employ first strike counter-value strategies, a requirement 
which would change only if they developed sophisticated 
delivery systems with many warheads. The development of 
such systems would involve them in an extremely expensive 
arms race, which they can ill afford and especially while 
the limited war between them continues (both sides are al- 
ready spending now more than 20; '0 of their respective GNP's 
on defence). But in fact the logic of deterrence might 
force them to allocate the same proportion of resources, 
once they went nuclear. Another requirement for the change 
in these strategies is some tacit or formal agreement about 
precisely such a change. But even if these two requirements, 
namely a more elaborate nuclear weapons delivery system and 
agreements about strategies, were not, still the knowledge that 
only a limited number of bombs would be sufficient to cripple 
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completely the societies of the two opponents, and the 
anxieties about the intentions of one's opponent will put 
a premium on and create motivations for first strike counter 
value strategies. 
As counter-force or mixed or flexible strategies 
act as 'damage limitation' factors, and as this factor is 
important in enhancing the credibility of the deterrent and 
thus enhancing the stability of the nuclear relationship, 
the impossibility to devise such a complex strategy, will 
again affect the stability of relations between the two 
local opponents. (Other 'damage limitation' measures like 
ABM systems and elaborate nuclear shelter programmes are so 
expensive, and ABM needs such tremendous technological cap- 
ability, that they are not likely at all to exist in the 
Middle East even in the most remote future. ) 
The dangers of this situation are obvious. Although 
technically ä primitive second strike capability could be 
developed, the anxieties on the part of both sides and the 
Thar that one side would launch a counter city strike in the 
hope of destroying the centres of population of the other 
side before it was too late, and at the same time hope that the 
opposing centres of command would be destroyed, and thus the 
danger of retaliation limited, this danger would become 
considerable. It could be partly overcome only if hardened 
silos were developed and most of the nuclear warheads were put 
in them. These silos should then be sited as far away as 
possible from centres of population. In the case of Israel 
291 
this could be done, and even then only in a limited way, 
if the silos were constructed in Sinai, and if these 
arrangements were communicated to the other side in a 
credible way. Even then, those steps should not contra- 
dict the opponent's basic strategies and political 
interests. 
The Problem of Rationality 
In-short, a high degree of communication between 
the two sides and a high degree of rationality on the part 
of both sides is necessary. 
(l), 
It could be safely argued that the element of 
irrationality involved in decisions and assumptions in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict is rather high. There are many 
mutual misperceptions between the opponents. It is however 
also true that because - several of 
the Arab countries are 
involved at the same time in various kinds of conflicts with 
(1) The term 'rationality' is used here in the sense 
suggested by Sidney Verba in 'Assumptions of Rationality 
and Non-Rationality in Models of the International 
System', in Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba (ed. ), The 
International System: Theoretical Essa s, Princeton 
University Press, 1961. Verba's definition could be 
expressed in a short way in his following words: 
'... Non rational models assume that when an individual 
is faced with a choice situation in relation to an in- 
ternational event ... he responds in terms of what we 
shall call non-logical pressures or influences. These 
are pressures or influences unconnected with the event 
in question ... A non logical influence is any influence 
acting upon the decision maker of which he is unaware and 
which he would not consider a legitimate influence upon 
his decision if he were aware of it. ' Rational models 
of individual decision making are those in which the 
individual responding to an international event bases 
his response upon a cool and clearheaded means-ends 
calculation. 
292 
one another and must in consequence take decisions at 
varying levels which are not always consistent, their 
behaviour appears to be more irrational than in fact it 
is. For this reason (inherent' irrationality should 
not be overstressed. Bearing this qualification in mind, 
the conflict is not dissimilar to other conflicts in the 
way it has developed. Still, both for reasons of 
'inherent' irrationality and 'apparent' irrationality, an 
arms control agreement of the type suggested above would 
be more difficult to achieve than in some other conflicts. 
It should be noted in passing that the difficulties rise 
more from tapparent' irrationality, i. e. pressures arising 
from inter-systemic disputes, than from - as is usually 
believed - 'inherent' irrationality. The latter in fact - 
as involving misperceptions - could be changed in due course 
of time (albeit perhaps over a longer time than in other 
conflicts). 
Israeli Missile Silos in Sinai 
But the idea of situating missile silos in Sinai, 
for example, as an arms control measure, is by itself an 
example of how arms control measures may contradict the 
political and indeed strategic interests of one party, in 
this case Egypt. It i' certain that Egypt would not be 
interested in any nuclear arms control agreements which 
perpetuated Israel's control of Sinai. 
But even discounting this important political reserv- 
ation, there is "other dilemma involved in such an Israeli 
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Move0 Nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel would pre- 
sumably have three alternative objectives: to deter the 
Egyptians from starting a war in which they might have a 
conventional superiority; to deter Egypt from launching a 
nuclear war; to deter the Egyptian forces from completely 
destroying Israel if indeed a conventional war had begun 
and Egyptian forces were advancing towards the centres of 
Israeli population. The credibility of the Israeli de- 
terrent would increase, if precisely in the'case of all 
these three alternatives there were doctrines for credible 
response. Now, by positioning the missiles in the 
southernmost part of the country which is closest to Egypt 
and hence most likely to fall into the hands of an even 
limited successful Egyptian thrust, Israel would be faced 
with an agonising dilemma. Not tö use her nuclear weapons 
would mean either that they fell into the hands of the 
Egyptians or that they were simply destroyed with the conse- 
quent loss of the nuclear deterrent. On the other hand, 
their transferrence to positions closer to the main centres 
of population in the north would incur the blurring of the 
distinction between counter-force and counter-city strategies. 
Again, an Israeli use of nuclear weapons when the Egyptian 
forces had secured just a limited success and when there 
was- still hope that by conventional means Israel would be 
able to defeat the enemy or at least contain him, would be 
a form of irresponsibility which would invite an Egyptian 
nuclear counter strike. 
Moreover, the very installation of the missile silos 
in Sinai, might lead the Egyptians to consider from the 
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beginning all the above mentioned possibilities. In that 
case Israeli deterrence' capability even against a limited 
Egyptian attack might be strengthened, but on the other 
hand, it might lead Egypt precisely to launch a first 
nuclear strike. This latter calculation would be the 
result of the interaction of political and strategic factors: 
if the regaining of Sinai remains a vital national interest 
for Egypt, the Egyptians might be pushed into an attempt to 
regain it, come what may. In such circumstances the 
motivation to attack would be overwhelming and the problem 
of credible response, short of complete mutual annihilation, 
of greant importance. An Egyptian understanding of the 
grave dilemmas facing Israel under such conditions as 
those enumerated here, might lead them to assume that Israel 
would launch a nuclear first strike in the first stage of 
an Egyptian conventional attack. The Egyptian conclusion 
might be a need to attack first with nuclear weapons against 
the Israeli silos. (This depends on the assumption that 
guidance systems became accurate enough to ensure that the 
attacker would not in fact disarm himself by attacking. ) 
The problem then would be how to limit a possible exchange 
to counter-force strikes. Theoretically this is possible, 
but in practice it would involve again a high degree of 
tacit understandings between the two sides as to the way in 
which such wars would be fought, an understanding which is 
still very far from everybody's expectations. 
Thus, on a certain level and within the framework of 
nuclear strategic thinking, the installation of missile 
silos in Sinai could be conducive to an increase in 
stability, because it enables the two sides to develop an 
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option for counter-force strategy. At the same time 
because of the political problems involved, precisely such 
an installation, which assumed tho continuation of Israeli 
control of Sinai, might lead to strong motivations and 
hence anxieties, for an Egyptian attack. But once these 
political considerations interact with the strategic ones, 
there is again a danger for fears of first strike and there 
are grave difficulties in evolving arms control measures to 
limit whatever nuclear exchanges which might take place, 
to counter-force strikes. 
The difficulties for example that Israel for one, 
would encounter when trying to apply a nuclear response 
to a limited successful Egyptian military probe, apply 
with further complications also to a situation where 
missile silos are installed only within the confines of 
Israel proper (within the borders of pro 1967). The 
difficulty there would be how to react with nuclear weapons 
to a limited Egyptian conventional success: Whether to 
launch a limited nuclear strike or not. And again, if 
the silos were installed in the southern part of Israel, 
which is the furthest from centres of population but at 
the same time closest to the Egyptian border, what about 
the possibility that they would be overrun by a limited 
Egyptian attack? Such an attack would not presumably 
endanger the very existence of Israel, but for Israel not to 
respond by a resort to a nuclear strike might mean the loss 
of the silos themselves or at least an important part of them. 
From the point of view of nuclear stability and if 
only strategic considerations are applied, the 'Sinai 
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scenario' has some obvious advantages as compared with 
the 'Israel proper scenario', because it enables develop- 
ment of more flexible nuclear options. But it has the 
major disadvantage that politically, it would increase the 
motivation on the part of the Egyptians to try and start 
some military action. 
Thus the limited size of Israel and the fact of 
shared borders create an obstacle to the development of 
a stable balance of nuclear deterrence quite apart from 
the question whether the small size invites an annihilat- 
ing counter-city strike. To surunarise, the notion that 
because Israel is smaller than Egypt a nuclear exchange 
would by necessity affect her more than it would Egypt 
is not valid. As was noted above Egypt would suffer 
from a nuclear exchange to a very high degree, indeed to 
such a degree that would be unacceptable to its regime. 
This at least would be the situation as long as either a 
military regime or a regime intent on quick economic de- 
velopment remains in power. Both such regimes would 
perceive the destruction of the urban population of Egypt 
as the greatest possible disaster. But where the small 
size of Israel compared with that of Egypt does come into 
account, again as has been noted above, is that it makes 
it much more difficult for the development of a stable 
balance of nuclear deterrence. 
There is another implication of the small size of 
Israel and E, *ypt within the context of a discussion of 
second strike capability. This is related to the distinction 
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between the concepts of deterrence and defence. 
(') 
Whereas 
in the relationship between the two super powers, the 
creation of a second strike capability means both that 
deterrence has been strengthened and that there is still 
some meaning to the notion of defence as well, in the 
relations between small states like Israel and Egypt, the 
situation is completely different. In the first case, 
a first strike against the nuclear forces of the other 
side would still leave the country mostly intact. This 
could even be partly achieved by a combined first strike 
against military and civilian objectives. In the relations 
between Israel and Egypt, a first strike against the nuclear 
forces of the other side would automatically mean the over- 
whelming destruction of the society under attack. The 
existence of the second strike capability would have 
meaning only within the context of deterrence and not 
within the context of defence. Thus two main differences 
emerge here between the meaning of a second strike cap- 
ability in the Israeli-Egyptian context on the one hand and 
its meaning in the context of the super powers. First, in 
the case of the super powers, a second strike capability 
would have a meaning both as a 'deterrent' and as a, 'defence' 
(1) For a valid theoretical discussion of the 
distinction between the two concepts and also 
of the relevance of different nuclear weapon 
systems and different strategic doctrines to 
these concepts, see Glen Snyder, Deterrence and 
Defence: Toward a Theory of National Security, 
Princeton University Press, 1961, 
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measure, in the sense that a first strike would leave 
part of the attacked country unaffected, and thus the 
damage limitation factor would be quite high. Second, 
the ability to develop flexible response strategies would 
again be high. In the case of small powers, both 
these possibilities are closed and the only available 
strategy would be a massive retaliation one. 
Another disadvantage and a very important one, 
would be the inability of powers like Egypt and Israel to 
develop doctrines 
matter, graduated 
, war. This again 
deterrence postur 
a limited failure 
the Israeli point 
of limited conventional war or, for that 
nuclear war or limited tactical nuclear 
would diminish the credibility of the 
e of the nuclear-weapons in the case of 
in the conventional battlefield. From 
of view the situation would pose certain 
dilemmas. To begin with, the e: istence, of nuclear weapons 
would diminish the capability of the superior Israeli con- 
ventional forces to retaliate in force in case of strong 
provocation from Egypt or from an Arab ally of Egypt. It 
would mean in fact the end of the period in which the 
Israeli conventional forces were an important instrument 
of politics and diplomacy. This would be so because of 
the dangers of escalation into a nuclear war. 
It would mean that a limited action by Egyptian forces 
that might be successful could not be encountered by a 
strong reaction on the part of Israel. Furthermore, if 
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no settlement was reached between the two sides, and the 
Sinai Peninsula remained for the time being under Israeli 
occupation, but without being firmly and legally annexed 
to Israel, pending future understanding, there would be 
two obvious consequences. On the one hand Egypt would 
consider this territory as her own and would thus feel 
compelled to try to take it back with the force of arms 
if need be. On the other hand the commitment of Israel 
to keep this territory at all costs as part of her terri- 
torial integrity, would be less credible or would at least 
appear to be less credible. Under such conditions the 
common agreement to the 'rules of the game' would be lacking. 
The likelihood of misunderstanding leading to 'misescalation' 
and to conventional war would increase. 
Another dangerous situation arises from the de- 
velopment of strategies of surprise air strikes, as was 
evident in and after the Six Day War. The Israeli victory 
in the war was preceded by a successful surprise air strike. 
This victory created a series of both valid and mistaken, 
images on the Egyptian side. ! 1any Egyptian officers 
came to believe by analogy that a successful surprise 
air strike is already equivalent to a total victory in 
a future war. This was a misperception, as the Israeli 
victory could have been secured even without the 
successful air strike. However, this misperception is 
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common among Egyptian military leaders, and could prove 
dangerous once applied to a nuclear situation. In that 
case the question would not be the possible success or 
failure of such a surprise strike but to what extent 
nuclear stability could survive. As strategic doctrines 
tend to lag behind the introduction of technological 
innovations in the field of armaments, and all the more 
so in the case of a still undeveloped country like Egypt, 
there would be the danger that for some time after the 
introduction of nuclear weapons, the army leadership would 
continue to retain the misperception about the advantages 
of a surprise attack. The fear that certainly these 
leaders would have, namely that Israel on her own part 
would apply the same strategy to nuclear weapons, would 
only strengthen this Egyptian tendency. 
This spill-over of strategic doctrines from the 
conventional field to the nuclear one is of great importance. 
It is interesting to note that the United States and the 
Soviet Union became (one after the other) nuclear powers 
after a long experience in a certain kind of conventional 
war, namely the Second World t: ar, which showed that in 
such a war what counts in the end is not a surprise quick 
strike but the accumulation of manpower and economic and 
technological resources. They saw in fact that their 
opponents exercised the 'Pearl Harbour' and Blitzkrieg 
doctrines to no avail, and their approach to the problem 
of nuclear weapons in the first stages of the atomic period 
was influenced to some extent by these experiences. This 
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was certainly more evident in the Russian case than in the 
American one. In the latter case, the-notion of the 
supremacy of the strategic bombardment was more widespread. 
However, even this notion was different from the 'Pearl 
Harbour' variants, and in any case within the nuclear con- 
text this notion was used mainly to strenCthen the trend 
to base American strategy on the concept of deterrence rather 
than as a doctrine for actual use. (There had been how- 
over a school of thought in the United States which thought 
seriously about the possibility of a'nuclear Pearl Harbour'. 
But the main body of strategic thinking was concerned more 
with the deterrence effects). 
The 'Pearl Harbour' and other surprise attacks and 
Blitzkrieg doctrines were formulated as conventional(') 
counter-force strategies. Their application to nuclear 
relations between Israel and Egypt, would create a moti- 
vation to 'knock out' the nuclear delivery systems of one's 
opponent. In the presumed absence of a capability to 
develop a "pure" nuclear counter-force posture, one variant 
of a nuclear 'Pearl Harbour' doctrine might mean a first 
strike counter-city doctrine. In any case a premium on 
a surprise first strike would create great instability in 
the relations between the two countries. 
To sum it up, the images of the Egyptian military 
leadership developed after the Six Day War and partly as a 
(1) 'cpnventional' in this context moans a war fought 
With conventional weapons. 
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result of this war, of both Israeli intentions and 
possible futurb strategic doctrines and also the misper- 
ception of hose they (namely the Egyptians) could best 
defeat Israel, namely by a surprise air strike, would 
a priori destabilise any system of relations between the 
two countries in which nuclear -weapons were acquired by 
both sides. 
The Political Prerequisite 
This leads to the main question involved in the 
stability of any balance of nuclear deterrence, namely 
to what extent there is a need for an a priori political 
stability before the introduction of atomic weapons into 
the system, in order that a measure of stability would 
be created. It is undeniable that the balance of nuclear 
deterrence between the super powers was a major contri- 
bution to the elimination of a third world war. Still 
there are three questions here: First, to what extent 
were the relations prior to the introduction of nuclear 
weapons more stable than is the case in the Israeli-Arab 
conflict; Second, to what extent did the introduction of 
nuclear weapons add or detract from this stability; third, 
to what extent changes in the balance of deterrence caused 
by various factors (strategic, political, technological 
and psychological), affected the political stability between 
the two super powers. As has been suggested above, once 
the balance of deterrence had been stabilised - and this 
stabilisation is a continuous process and demands continuous 
attention and effort - it increases the stability of the 
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bipolar system. Moreover, the balance of nuclear de- 
terrence has become more and more identified with the 
complex political relations between the two super powers, 
and to an extent with the general relations between east 
and west. By becominG so identified it was both affected 
in a favourable way by the changes in the political climate 
in the international system and also contributed signifi- 
cantly to these changes. 
At the same time, if the balance of deterrence be- 
came more stable not only because of developments in the 
technology of weapons (like the creation of a second strike 
capability), in the strategic doctrines and in the recip- 
rocal images and perceptions both sides have of both the 
nature and the uses of nuclear weapons and of the intentions 
of their opponents, but also because of the changes in the 
political climate in the world; if again, these political 
developments had much to do not only with nuclear weapons 
but also with the Soviet-Chinese relations, with domestic 
problems and inter-alliance problems, then the nature of 
the growing stability of the balance of deterrence becomes 
clearer. Again, if the forties and fifties were dangerous 
and unstable, it was not only because of lack of under- 
standing about the nature of nuclear weapons but also be- 
cause of basic political reasons and because of the novelty 
of the whole nuclear situation, a novelty which needed 
studying before new ways of coping with the new dangers 
were worked out. 
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It appears at the present time that oven the 
limited political stability which was maintained in 
Europe in the forties and fifties, was and is lacking 
in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This absence is related 
to, or is the function of, two characteristics of the 
conflict: the ferocity of the conflict and the number 
of effective actors. This is . not 
the place to elaborate 
upon the structure of the Middle East sub-system and the 
structure of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Suffice it to 
say that first, there are several conflicts which are 
coincidental and interacting in the Middle East and only 
one of them is the Israeli-Arab one, and, second that 
there are several levels to the Arab-Israeli conflict it- 
self. There are at least four conflicts Going on at the 
same time between Israel and the Arab countries, namely 
the Israeli-Egyptian, the Israeli-Palestinian and the 
Israeli-Syrian; another conflict is that between Israel 
and Jordan, but this last one is becoming more and more 
subsumed by the Israeli-Palestinian one. Apart from 
these active conflicts, some of the other Arab countries 
are involved in different ways and in varying degrees of 
intensity in the general conflict. As far as the first 
point is concerned, what is important to remember is that 
the inter Arab conflict, namely the competition for power 
positions and hegemony in the Arab world, has been since 
1948 interwoven with the Arab-Israeli conflict in many ways 
and on different levels. 
-. 305 
Thus we have a picture of extreme complexity as far 
as the system is concerned, and this complexity works 
against a "rational" process of decision-Making within 
the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict or at least makes 
such a process extremely difficult. 
What is also important to note is that all three 
or four Arab-Israeli conflicts have at least two sets of 
causes. First of all, there are state interests and 
'tangible' geopolitical or 'power political' causes. 
These causes are in the last analysis the most important 
ones. But beyond them and in some cases side by side 
with them, there is a whole series of mistaken images and 
misperceptions which the two sides have of each other. 
These misperceptions, which are certainly more evident on 
the side of the Arabs(1), combine with the basic interest's 
questions to create an extremely intense conflict. But 
the actual development of the conflict and the recurrent 
escalation into violence, are mainly due not to these basic 
causes, but to other intermediate factors, like the lack on 
the part of both sides of a tradition of war and peace; 
some mistaken strategies pursued by both sides, and the 
perceptions both sides have of their opponent's inter- 
mediate policies. and strategies. 
(7) For an extensive study see Yehoshafat Harkabi 
tErndat Ha'aravim Besichsuch Israel-Arav' 
(Hebrew), Tel-Aviv, 1963. 
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One of the criteria by which to distinGuish between 
different conflicts, as far as the role of violence is 
concerned, and also the limitation on this violence, is 
that of levels of ferocity or levels of hostility. 
Measuring such levels is a very difficult task. It could 
perhaps be done by counting several different variables: 
first, the incidence. - of the outbursts of violence - the 
number of wars and clashes short of war; second, the 
number of actual casualties in the various wars and other 
outbursts of violence in comparison to the size of popul- 
ations involved; third, the attitudes on both sides and 
the way in which they see the other side; and also the 
way they envisage the resolution of the conflict. Taken 
together these criteria can be used to indicate tho ferocity 
of any conflict. 
It appears correct to assume that the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, assumed, after the Six Day War, the nature of 
conflict with high ferocity. To say this is simply to 
repeat in different words what has been suggested before, 
namely that the political situation in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict is today much worse than was the international 
political situation during the first phases of the Cold War. 
Of the three criteria suggested above for the 
tferocityt of conflicts, the first and third apply to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Even before the Six Day War, there 
were two other wars between Israel and the Arabs (1948 and 
1956) and there was a succession of limited violent military 
actions alone the borders. Second, the political elites 
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of both sides (and in the Arab case there have boon of 
course several states involved with differinG attitudes 
and positions), had and still have diametrically opposed 
conceptions about the rights and wrongs involved in the 
conflict and the ways in which to resolve it. The number 
of casualties was not as high as in 
national violent clashes. But the 
flict being a prolonged one creates 
rate of casualties to be expected. 
counts, the Arab-Israeli conflict co 
being at present a 'ferocious' one. 
some other inter- 
prospect of tho con- 
an image of a high 
Thus, at least on two 
)uld be considered as 
Another element which complicates the conflict and 
adds to its ferocity is that on a certain level, it is a 
civil war, in the sense that the Palestinians feel that 
the whole of Israel belongs, to them and that until their 
objective is secured, every military measure is allowed. 
Other Arab countries adhere to the same objective or at 
least pay lip service to it. 
One of the arguments advanced in Israel against the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into the PIiddle East was 
that the way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict should 
be political, and that the introduction of nuclear weapons 
into the area would only create anxieties and accelerate 
the arms race. The contrary ardent was that nuclear 
weapons would stabilise the situation. Both these argu- 
inents should be put into the context of the model about 
levels of ferocity of the conflict. Whereas the first 
ar ument appears to be valid, it should be qualified by the 
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amendment that at a certain stage and after the level of 
the 'ferocity' of the conflict has been lowered, a stable 
balance of nuclear deterrence could further stabilise the 
political relations, provided the other difficulties 
(to 
be found in the "strategic" field) on the way to a stable 
balance of deterrence had been overcome. But at the 
level of hostility in which both sides find themselves at 
present, it seems almost certain that the political 
requirements for 'nuclear stability' do not exist. 
The other structural element which makes the 
creation of a stable balance of deterrence in the Arab- 
Israeli region more difficult, is the number of effective 
actors. Apart from the main actors, namely Israel, 
Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Palestinians, there are also 
other Arab countries like Iraq and Saudi Arabia which have 
some role to play in the conflict and can, albeit to a 
limited extent only, influence its development. Any of 
the major Arab states might be interested in some circums- 
tances, in bringing about a conventional war, which might 
escalate into a nuclear war, between Israel and Egypt or 
between Israel and another Arab country. This observation 
need not necessarily be taken as a definite prediction, but 
rather as a strong possibility. The following scenarios 
are based on such a possibility, and thus will illustrate 
a sot of dangers which might result from nuclear prolifer- 
ation in the Middle East. The following scenarios will 
deal only with Israel and Egypt, as it is inconceivable 
that any other Arab country will acquire nuclear capability 
in the foreseeable future. Indeed, it is improbable that 
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Egypt herself will become such a power unless an existing 
nuclear power were prepared to supply her with either the 
bombs themselves, or alternatively with extensive techno- 
logical knowhow and financial aid. However, this 
external aid is conceivable in some circumstances, and 
hence the discussion is not altogether improbable. 
Provided that the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
antra-Arab competition or conflicts were to retain their 
basic characteristics (and at least as far as the second 
is concerned this seems most probable), the motivation 
for a third Arab state to provoke a clash between Israel 
and Egypt, provided she would not herself be hurt remains 
quite high. It is not necessarily that this third Arab 
country will aim from the start at bringing about a nuclear 
zwar, but she might be ready to provoke any kind of war, 
probably a conventional one, which might lead, even without 
this being contemplated from the first to a nuclear war. 
This action on the part of an Arab state could be motivated 
either by ignorance of the nature of nuclear weapons and 
nuclear diplomacy, thus not realising the dangers involved 
in such tactics, or precisely because of the understanding 
of the nature of nuclear weapons and the intention of 
creating havoc. 
This assumption about motivations on the part of 
third Arab countries, is extrapolated from past experience. 
Some of the obvious examples for such behaviour are: 
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(a) the attempts by Fatah prior to the 1967 war to provoke 
precisely such a war between Israel and the conventional 
armies of both Egypt and the other Arab countries; 
(b) the 
recurrent attempts by Syria to do precisely the same thing 
and this time not necessarily with a view to 'solve' the 
Palestinian problem, but in order to secure a better 
position in the Arab world within the context of the 'Arab 
Cold t'lar'(1); (c) the position endorsed by Saudi Arabia 
since the Six Day "War, which amounted in fact to an attempt 
to keep the Egyptian-Israeli conflict at a very high level 
while not interfering in it physically. Thus Saudi Arabia 
is ready to pump a certain amount of money into Egypt but 
only on the condition that the latter would be ready only 
to endorse a military solution and reject a 'political 
solution' to the conflict. 
( 2) The Saudi interests are 
obvious: as long as Egypt was engaged in her conflict with 
Israel she would not be able to recover economically, her 
dependence on Saudi Arabia would increase and hor ability 
to increase its influence in the Arab world would further 
diminish. Indeed, one of the results of the Six Day ? Tar 
was the termination of Egyptian involvement in the Yemen 
and the diminution of her influence in Southern Yemen as well. 
(1) The term is taken from the excellent study by Malcolm 
. err The trab Cold Tti'ar, 1958-1967: A Study of Ideology; 
in Politics, 2nd ed., London, 1967, which describes 
extensively the process of negotiations between Egypt, 
Syria and Iraq during the beginnings of the sixties. 
(2) The number of press reports on this position is extensive. 
See for example press reports before the convention of 
the Arab summit in Rabat in December 1969. 
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An attempt to provoke a war (a conventional or oven 
a nuclear one) would'be the result of a complex process. 
It could come like the manoeuvres preceding the 1967 war 
when a certain element in the Arab world had assumed that 
provoking Israel would force Egypt to intervene after a 
certain process of provocation and retaliation; and then 
Egypt would succeed in forcing her conditions upon Israel 
as a result of a supposed Egyptian conventional superiority. 
In a nuclear situation some Arabs might hope that this 
could happen or that Israel` might be forced to give in 
before hostilities started, because of fear of a nuclear 
exchange. Or again it could come about if a nuclear Egypt 
signed a military pact with another Arab country and 
found herself in the awkward position - so well known to 
the super powers - of either having to climb dorm from 
her commitment in case of a war between Israel and her 
ally, or to become (that is, rgypt) involved in a risky 
situation in which escalation might bring about a nuclear 
war between the two nuclear powers in the region. 
The introduction of nuclear weapons into the Arab- 
Israeli region could certainly create Crave problems to 
Egypt in the intra-Arab field, precisely because of the 
logic, and the paradoxes, involved in the nature of nuclear 
weapons. The dilemma facing Israel's Arab neighbours, 
would be whether to seek Egyptian protection against a 
possible Israeli nuclear blackmail or rather to refrain 
from it precisely because of the dangers inherent in such 
a situation. The history of the last twenty-three-odd 
years, shows that under such conditions and when states 
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feel a great threat to their security, they usually tend 
to seek guarantees from their stronger allies. The 
dilemma for the Arab countries bordering on Israel would 
be not whether an alliance and Guarantee would bring about 
instability in the balance of deterrence between Israel 
and Egypt but rather, which power they should fear more, 
namely a nuclear Israel which might (at least according 
to the prevalent Arab images) threaten then, or Egypt, 
which has plans to control eventually the whole Arab world 
(or again this at least is the image of her objectives, an 
image which most Arab decision-makers appear in fact to 
have). 
It is impossible to predict which course of action 
these Arab countries would take; . suffice 
it to say that 
if indeed Israel's Arab neighbours as a result of their 
fear of a nuclear Israel, joined Egypt in a meaningful 
military alliance, one of the politico-strategic objectives 
of Israel - namely to keep the Arab world as divided as 
possible - would be frustrated. At the same time if 
indeed such a military alliance came to pass in such a way 
that Egypt's control over its allies is not too strong, the 
dangers of misescalation or of a Machiavellian deliberate 
calculation on the part of the allies or one of them, are 
quite obvious. Syria guaranteed by Egypt, might start 
provocation along her borders with Israel in tho hope that 
Israel might self-deter herself from retaliating because 
of fear that Egypt would invoke her treaty with Syria, thus 
creating a danger of nuclear war. In such a case, Syria 
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could appear as the defender of the Arab world, and as 
the only country prepared to tackle Israel and indeed to 
get away with it. Again Syria might provoke Israel with 
the deliberate intention and hope that Israel would indeed 
retaliate, thus putting Egypt into a 'no win' situation; 
if Egypt intervened, she and Israel might face escalation 
into nuclear war, and if she (Egypt) did not intervene 
her position in the Arab world would suffer considerably. 
It is necessary within this context to consider the 
notion advanced by several scholars of the irrationality 
and irresponsibility of small powers in regards to the 
question of nuclear weapons. The argument is that small 
powers would tend to act irrationally once they have 
nuclear weapons. An analysis of the former example, shows 
that the real problem is not necessarily that because of 
inherent psychological reasons these powers will use in 
an irrational way the nuclear weapons which they control 
but rather that because of the dilemmas they face as the 
big' allies of other small powers they might be forced 
to act in a way which is irrational and which they would 
have avoided were it not for their political relationship 
to their allies. The problem is really a structural one 
and not a psychological one. To provoke a nuclear war 
between two other powers, a war in which the provoking 
party is not involved, is certainly immoral and might in 
all probability lack prudence. It is not necessarily an 
irrational step to take. As for as irrationality is con- 
cerned, the question is really how Israel and Boypt them- 
selves would behave once they became nuclear powers. One 
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could argue, albeit without any proof, that these powers 
would behave with less rationality than the super powers. 
At the same time one could argue that once they had nuclear 
weapons in their arsenal, this fact of life would impress 
itself upon their conduct. As either argument could be 
pursued without the possibility of assessing its validity, 
it would appear more useful to assess the structural con- 
ditions prevailing in the area and in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and to contemplate how - even if both sides 
behaved in a manner not less rational than the two super 
powers behaved during the nuclear period - the outcome 
might still be more catastrophic than iri the super-power 
relationship. 
As far-as the problem of irresponsibility - as distinct 
from irrationality - is concerned, one could add that the 
two super powers themselves behaved sometimes in a somewhat 
irresponsible manner or at least were ready to do so. At 
a certain level the doctrine of massive retaliation if 
handled, not by the shrewd and sophisticated Dulles but by 
somebody less capable than he, bordered on nuclear irres- 
ponsibility. The Truman Administration contemplation of 
the use of nuclear weapons in Korea is another instance of 
such possible irresponsibility or at least recklessness. 
It was less irresponsible than the Eisenhower Administration 
in the former example, because there was only a limited 
danger of Soviet retaliation against liest Europe, and no 
danger of Soviet retaliation against the United States 
itself. On the other hand the number of bombs available 
in America was so small that it could be argued that their 
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effectiveness in any case would have been rather limited. 
They could be effective only insofar as their actual use 
or the threat of their use had a great psychological impact. 
A third possible example was the behaviour of both Russia 
and America during different stages of the Cuban crisis in 
1962. 
Thus apart from the strategic problems involved in 
the creation of a stable balance of nuclear deterrence 
between Israel and Egypt, given a model of Israel and 
Egypt acting in isolation from the rest of the Middle East 
sub-system, structural pressures exist in the area which 
would make it difficult for Arab leaders, and thereby for 
Israeli leaders, to behave in a manner which would increase 
nuclear stability. Indeed, it would be difficult for 
the super powezr leaders to behave rationally or responsibly 
if they were to be put in the same conditions. The real 
problem in the Middle East context therefore is not the 
presumed 'inherent' difference between more responsible 
and less responsible loaders, but between different struc- 
tural situations, and also between the levels of the 
ferocity of the conflict. 
This ar ; ument about the systemic pressures could 
be elaborated in the following way: there are special 
characteristics of the relations in the Arab world, which 
it is reasonable to assume, will lead to a certain struc- 
ture of relations inside a possible future Arab military 
alliance under the hegemony of Egypt. First, the level 
of military and political integration would be relatively 
low. To achieve a high degree of such integration pre- 
supposes a level of social sophistication which is completely 
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lacking in the Arab world. Second, attempts to compote 
against the 'bloc leaclert namely Egypt would continue and 
the level of military and political control exercised by 
Egypt would be very low. Third, there would be no ideo- 
logical coherence inside the alliance. In the Arab world, 
states keep changing their ideological orientations, but 
the real differences run along ! Real politik' lines, which 
are then ascribed to ideological differences. One example 
is the differences between 'Batath socialism' and 'Nasserite 
socialism', differences which have been advanced to explain 
the very real political conflict between Egypt and Syria. 
But this conflict sprang from political competition which 
had nothing to do with ideological differences. On the 
other hand, ideological differences became less important 
when the real political interests*demanded. somo sort of 
co-operation. Thus, after the Six Day , -lar, Egypt and 
Jordan became close to each other because of their common 
interests. Indeed, if the Arab countries do have stronger 
though shifting relations with either of the super powers, 
it is as much to secure guarantees from their super power 
ally against local enemies as against the other super power.. 
Fourth, in the Arab world the declared ideological objective 
is ultimately a political unity. However, most if not all 
the Arab leaderships, while adhering to this objoctive, 
opposed it in practice when it meant that another Arab 
state would take control of the united Arab super-state. 
Indeed even the Egyptian leadership was sometimes doubtful 
about such a prospect, because of the obvious tensions which 
would be caused by it. An Egyptian nuclear guarantee to 
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other Arab countries, combined with the declared policy 
of Arab unity, and the actual. fear and oppositon of the 
Arab allies to this idea of unity under Egyptian hegemony, 
would create enormous tensions within the alliance. It 
would strengthen motivations on the part of the Arab 
allies to do away altogether both with the Israeli threat 
and the Egyptian patronage, a motivation which could lead 
to the fomenting of a war provoked by one of the allies. 
Geographical proximity is yet another dostabilising 
systemic factor. It could be speculated that, had the 
super powers had common borders, their ability to manage 
their crises without resort to full scale conventional war 
which might have deteriorated into nuclear war, would have 
been limited. The existence of a European frontier 
removed from their own frontiers and perhaps more importantly, 
the existence of 'grey areas' in Asia and Africa, enabled 
the super powers to avoid direct military confrontation 
and to develop (mainly on the American side but to a limited 
extent on the Soviet side as well), doctrines of limited 
conventional wars. These doctrines supplied the two 
sides with - at least - the intellectual instruments to 
deal with the extingencies of nuclear diplomacy without 
an unavoidable escalation into nuclear war. 
In the Israeli-Egyptian case there has not developed 
any real common understanding as to the way in which war 
will be conducted. There were some instances of limited 
tacit understandings in this field, but the general rule was 
rather the contrary, namely the lack of a comprehensive 
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understanding on these issues. The main linitina factor 
on the Israeli side related to the political objectives, 
and also the notion that Israel should not cross the Suez 
Canal (a position held both in 1956 and in 1967-1970). 
However, Israelis 'deep penetrations strategic bombing of 
Egypt during the first months of 1970 showed that Israel 
also had not realised the full significance of the concept 
of "limited war". 
0 
In the past, actual limited action along the borders 
between Israel and Egypt led to full scale war". What 
is as important within this context of 'limited wart or the 
lack of it, is that the two sides have not yet succeeded in 
formulating their basic national interests in such a way 
as to accept a tacit recognition from the other side that 
these interests would not be encroached upon. Thus the 
main problem for the two sides under conditions of nuclear 
proliferation would be to reformulate national interests 
and to improve communication. This might happen in due 
course, but until the process has reached some degree of 
maturity (and the process must be a continuous one), the 
dangers of misunderstanding about the limits to which one 
could Go, would be there. 
That the two sides have common borders, that they 
are at present in a period of actual war and that most 
(1) Thus in 1955-1956 infiltration and retaliation led 
to war; in 1967 infiltration and retaliation were 
conducted between Israel and Syria and Jordan and 
not Egypt. But Israeli retaliation against these 
countries was considered by the Arabs as a symbolic 
action against Egypt. 
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channels of communication between them are closed, certainly 
is not conducive to the working out of the necessary 
preconditions for a stable balance of nuclear deterrence. 
Under such conditions it seems likely that instead of 
stabilising the situation, nuclear weapons would only 
create enormous dangers. The conclusion again is that 
the introduction of nuclear weapons will further destabilise 
Israeli-Lgyptian relations, unless there is prior to it a 
period of relative calm in the relations between the two 
countries. 
The Super Powers Role and the Question of Guarantees 
Another extremely important factor is the probability 
of guarantees, or intervention by the super powers in case 
of the introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East. 
It is extremely difficult to predict anything with any 
measure of accuracy here as the development depends on so 
many imponderables. One can only describe 
some 
possible 
trends and the alternative scenarios which may develop. 
It is important however, to note from the start that the 
situation may have changed in a significant way since the 
beginning of the Soviet direct military involvement in 
Egypt during the first months of 1970. This direct in- 
volvement signifies a Crowing commitment which may withstand 
great pressures (on the Soviet Union at least), to withdraw 
from the Middle East sub-system in case of proliferation, 
a possibility which will be dealt with below as one of the 
scenarios. 
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The iriponderablos affectinG the future behaviour 
of the super powers in this context, are to be found in 
different contexts: the future of the bipolar system in 
general, namely the future of the particular level of 
direct relations between the super powers in the global 
international system; the interests of the super powers 
in the Middle East itself and the extent to which there 
is any syrnietry between their objectives in this area; 
the attitudes of both super powers to problems of nuclear 
proliferation and the extent to which general proliferation 
will, take place. 
The following is a scheme of different possible 
structures of relationship between the super powers in 
case of proliferation in the Middle East. Those will 
include in the first place a general account of the 
possibilities of the development of the bipolar system: 
Different types of bipolarity 
(a) Bipolarity which will taýýe the form of a full and 
comprehensive joint policy of the super powere in different 
sub-systems of the global international system, and hence 
the Middle East as well. This could come both before nuclear 
proliferation took place in general or in the Middle East 
in particular. The super powers will assume some sort of 
condominium over parts of the world inclusive of the Middle 
East, or alternatively credible joint guarantees against the 
use of force in general or against nuclear threats or the 
use of them in particular. 
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(b) Revitalisation of competitive bipolarity strictly in 
the Middle Basta This could come as a result of a tacit 
decision by the super powers to divide this region into 
very clear spheres of influence within which the super 
powers enjoyed great control, each within its own sphere 
of influence. This could come about either as part of a 
general revitalisation of bipolarity leading to tight 
bipolarity in which the whole Global international system 
or the greatest part of it were divided between the two 
super powers. In such circumstances, the division of the 
Middle East would mean a Greater dependence of developments 
inside this reGion on developments in the general bipolar 
system. The role of the local actors would become more 
limited. 
Both those possibilities, condominium in the P"; iddlo 
East and its division into spheres of influence, could 
theoretically come as independent developments and not 
necessarily as part of the general revitalisation of bi- 
polarity in the global international system. However, at 
least the variant of 'condominium' appears to be dependent 
to a large extent on the change of relations between the 
super powers towards policies undertaken nuch more in common 
in the global international system. The variant of joint 
guarantees is less dependent on such a general global 
development. 
The possible variants therefore are: Bipolarity in 
the sense of 'condominium' in the whole Global international 
system inclusive of the Middle East; Bipolarity in the 
'condominium' sense in only parts of the world but inclusive 
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of the Middle East; Bipolarity in most of the global 
international systen but exclusive of the Middle East in 
which a different kind of relationship will govern the 
super powers relationship in this region. The same 
variants could be applied to the second type of bipolarity 
(competitive bipolarity): division of the whole of the 
global international system into two big military alliances, 
and hence a division of the Middle East into two parts 
belonging to the two alliances (in which case the Arab- 
Israeli conflict would become much less important, and 
dependence on super powers would become the overwhelming 
consideration of the local actors); competitive bipolarity 
in only parts of the international system but inclusive of 
the Middle East; competitive bipolarity in most parts of 
the world but exclusive of the Middle East. It could be 
added that under conditions of 'competitive bipolarity' 
there might be a tendency to include most - if not all - 
the sub-systems in the bipolar system. As the extreme 
form of competitive bipolarity(which could be described as 
'tight bipolarityt(1)) has never really existed, this 
observation about its all-encompassing totality is based 
on the assumption that in this particular system of relation- 
ship between the super powers, the military component would 
become much more applicable than in the present day systems. 
Nuclear weapons, or at least the threat of them, could be 
(1 This concept has been suggested by Morton Kaplan 
in Syste^ and Process in International Politics, 
New York, 1957 
323 
used more freely in order to intimidate third powers to 
join either alliance, or conversely, the threat of nuclear 
blackmail by one super power would force third powers to 
join the other super power's alliance. 
(c) On the other side of the spectrum of relationships 
between the super powers is the general possibility of a 
complete fragiientation of the international system. This 
could have several different manifestations. One possible 
example is the complete withdrawal of the super powers from 
alliances and commitments in the international system. Iso- 
lationism would become the rule in both super powers and 
the big military alliances would disintegrate. One result 
could be the emergence of some big powers which would try 
to take over the role of super powers or, alternatively, 
the role of those powers which stand at the top of a new 
hierarchy of the international system. This possibility 
signifies some sort of an effort to recreate the role of a 
super power and/or new world powers. This possibility, 
isolationism on the part of the 'old' super powers, and the 
emergence of new ones appears to be very improbable in the 
foreseeable future. Another variant of the possible com- 
plete fragmentation of the international system, is iso- 
lationism on the part of the super powers coupled with 
fragmentation of the international system along the lines 
of regional sub-systems, with no big powers trying to attain 
the role of super power or world power. Big powers even 
while creating substantial nuclear second strike capabilities, 
would limit themselves to their immediate sub-systems. The 
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big alliances would fragment, but no other new powers or 
world alliances would ezneree instead. 
A complete fragmentation of the international 
system would not mean necessarily that the Middle East 
sub-system would become completely independent. If it 
did become completely independent from outside great-power 
intervention (and in this scenario these big powers would 
not include the super powers in any case), then. the internal 
military component of the local powers would become much 
more important and relevant to political power and influence. 
Thus a nuclear Israel and a nuclear Egypt could play the 
role of local tsuper powerst. There might be however, 
another possibility, namely that the Middle East sub-system 
would become either a part of another sub-system, for example 
a Mediterranean sub-system, or a new sub-system composed of 
both Middle East and the Balkans (which was the case until 
the First World War), and in that case the erstwhile Middle 
Eastern powers proper would be less important militarily 
and politically. Another possible development in the 
Middle East in circumstances of extreme fragmentation of 
the international system, will be that the super powers 
would retreat from the Middle East, but some medium powers 
(or in a different nomenclature: big powers) would become 
involved as outside powers in the region. These new out- 
side powers, if acting in a fragmented international system, 
would be more free to use their military power as they would 
be freer of the restraints imposed by the central balance 
of deterrence existing today. 
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(d) In between these three general possibilities there 
are several more which are generally marked by some 
measure of bipolarity on one level, while at the same time 
a readiness on the part of the super powers to accept a 
fragmented international system on various other levels. 
One scenario is that of the super powers reaching a gradual 
revival of bipolarity (in the sense of joint policies) in 
the field of arms control along with a limited measure of 
detente in Europe plus withdrawal from other parts of the 
world, or most of the other parts. This is a mixture of 
fragmentation- of the international system; common policy 
on problems of arms control as far as they relate to the 
super powers own strategic weapons; and continuation of 
the division of Europe into the big military alliances but 
with a measure of detente. 
Another scenario within this general possibility is 
the development of multipolarity in some sub-systems (in 
such a case America; Russia and China would be the poles 
of power) whereas both super powers would withdraw frort 
other sub-systems, and would maintain either competitive 
or cooperative bipolarity in their direct relationship 
(on 
the level of strategic arms for example). In all these 
scenarios there is no clear indication of how the super 
powers would conduct their relationship inside the Niddle 
East. They could agree jointly to withdraw from it or 
alternatively to include it in their sphere of limited corn- 
petition within the General framework of detente and com- 
petition. What could however, be generally assured, is 
that in case of a limited fragmentation of the unternational 
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system, the interest of the super powers in the Middle 
East would always be secondary to their commitment to 
Europe, and in the case of America it would be secondary 
also to its interests in Latin America and possibly in 
parts of the Pacific Ocean and East Asia. 
In very general'terms, it could be argued that 
some types of super-power relationship in the Middle East, 
would make nuclear proliferation in this region very 
unlikely. Thus for instance, a 'condominium' policy 
implies the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict (or 
at least its freezing), and also a general agreement about 
arms control in the Arab-Israeli region. It appears 
reasonable to assume in these circumstances both that the 
motivation on the part of the local actors to 'go nuclear' 
would diminish and also that the super-powers would inter- 
vene jointly against any move in this direction. Again, 
in circumstances of revitalised 'cold war' bipolarity, in 
which the Middle East is completely divided between the 
super powers into two military alliances, each under the 
strict control of one super power, there is a high prob- 
ability that nuclear proliferation would not take place. 
In this case it would fail to occur not because of the 
fading away of the Israeli-Arab conflict, but because the 
super powers would have much greater control over their 
local allies or clients, and would impose their anti- 
proliferation policy on these clients. Nuclear prolifer- 
ation in a Middle East which is divided along 'tight bipol- 
arity' lines is destabilising for the 'central balance of 
deterrence'. 
6 
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It would appear therefore that nuclear prolifer- 
ation in the Middle East could take place - as far as the 
super powers are concerned - only under conditions of a 
looser relationship between the super powers in the Middle 
East which would mean also the relative or absolute lack 
of control over the local powers. 
It could be argued therefore that once nuclear pro- 
liferation took place in the Israeli-Egyptian region, in 
the sense that the two local powers 'went nuclear', the 
super powers will have either to impose one of the two 
types of bipolarity or to withdraw from the region, or 
still else to withdraw in a limited way, namely to restrict 
their involvement to certain spheres of political activity, 
ý1) 
The super powers have different sets of interests 
in the Middle East: economic investments; traditional 
commitments to allies, ambitions for influence in the 
littoral states of the Mediterranean, or the negative 
interest of not allowing the other super power to expand 
its influence in the same area, etc. Their attitude 
towards the Arab-Israeli region is therefore decided on 
the basis of more than the logic or 'rules of behaviour' 
of nuclear strategy and diplomacy. Thus their decisions 
of whether to remain involved in the Middle East once 
nuclear proliferation took place there would not be ex- 
clusively determined by their assessment of effect of pro- 
liferation on their mutual strategic relations. The ex- 
istence of different sets of considerations complicate any 
on the different effects on the super powers of 
syri etrical or asymmetrical proliferation, see 
Chapter 1, pp. 6S-Gil" This Chapter discusses only the effects of 'symnetricalt proliferation. 
t 
prediction about their likely behaviour. However, even 
bearing in mind all these qualifications, it appears safe 
to assume that if indeed proliferation took place in the 
Middle East (namely that Israel and ºpt 'went nuclear' 
then to a large e:: tent the super powers would decide upon 
their future involvement in the area in the light of the 
possible effects that proliferation would have on their 
mutual relations. 
What could these possible effects be? It would 
appear that the new nuclear powers could not in any way 
threaten directly one of the super powers. Neither Israel 
nor Egypt would even remotely have the capacity to attack 
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the super powers with their nuclear weapons. This, coupled 
with the various detection and intelligence systems avail- 
able at present to the super powers, would make the possO 
bility of a catalytic war provoked by one of the local. 
powers remote. (Indeed the whole notion of catalytic war 
as a I_pOiQibility ' in case of proliferation could be 
discounted,. because of developments in detection and in- 
telligence systems). Tlithout the capability of developing 
even a 'minimal deterrent' force against one of the super 
powers, or the ability to provoke a catalytic war, the 
nuclear weapons in the hands of Israel and Egypt could not 
affect directly the stability of the central bqlance of 
deterrence. They could however destabilise the local 
balance in the 2": iddle East itself. They could for instance 
be used in order to achieve a 'quick solution' to the 
conflict before the super powers could intervene to stop a 
329 
local escalation. Such an attempt, or even the threat 
of such a move, while the super powers were still involved 
in the area, right necessitate an intervention by the 
super powers, that same intervention which they have been 
trying incessantly to avoid. Indeed the local powers 
have tried already in the past to involve the super powers 
in their local conflict, each local power trying to involve 
its friendly super power on its side, and they did so 
while armed with conventional weapons. (Isere there was a 
difference between Israel and Egypt. egypt being the 
losing power in her military confrontation with Israel, was 
the first to try and involve the Soviet Union on her side. 
Israel appealed for United States aid only in order to deter 
the Soviet Union from becoming directly involved. However, 
it would appear that had Israel been in the role of the 
losing side, it would have appealed on her part to the 
United States to help her. Uhether such a help would be 
forthcoming, as indeed eventually Soviet help became partly 
available for Egypt is open to conjecture. ) Thus the 
introduction of nuclear weapons would not change this 
propensity of the local powers to try to involve the super 
powers in their local conflict whenever they were put at a 
disadvantage. As has been pointed above, the local powers 
cannot start a process of catalytic war in the original 
sense of the word, namely by direct nuclear attack of the 
super powers in order to start a world conflagaration. 
Thus the danger for the stability of the super-power re- 
lationship lies not in a qualitative change of the relations 
between local actors and super powers as a result of the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into the Piddle East, but 
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in the introduction of a further destabilising element on 
the local level where at the same time super powers' 
Guarantees are involved. After all, even if one super 
power extends guarantees to a local nuclear power and the 
latter is attacked by its local nuclear opponent, this 
does not necessarily mean that the guarantor must use 
nuclear weapons to defend its ally and the same applies to 
the use of nuclear threats. The super-power could use 
conventional weapons or the threat of them. The danger is 
not that nuclear proliferation coupled with super powers 
guarantees to local powers might necessarily and in contra- 
distinction to a similar situation but without nuclear 
proliferation, bring about the use of nuclear weapons by 
the super powers. The danger is rather in the added 
element of instability on the local level on the one hand 
and in the need for the super powers to devise plans to 
deter the possibility of a surprise nuclear strike by one 
local power aGainst the other. This is very difficult to 
achieve unless the super powers actually control the 
nuclear weapons of their allies or clients. 
It could therefore be assumed that the super powers 
will not be inclined to extend Guarantees once nuclear 
proliferation took place in both Israel and Egypt. But 
there iniGht be other situations; for example if only one 
local power 'went nuclear', or if some sort of super power 
involvement had taken place already, after which the local 
power 'went nuclear'. Hero the super power finds itself 
already deeply involved While its ally 'goes nuclear' or 
conversely the other adverse local power 'goes nuclear' or 
yet still while both of them 'Co nuclear', 
33 
.E 
The super powers can devise policies in order to 
avoid those effects of proliferation in the fiddle East, 
which might destabilise their own strategic relationship. 
They could impose one of the two types of bipolarity. 
Failing that, they could also reach a tacit understanding 
according to which they keep their presence in the Arab- 
Israeli region, but would retreat from it once the local 
powers wore becoming involved in a military conflict which 
appeared to escalate into nuclear threats or the actual 
use of nuclear weapons. Such a crisis management mechanism 
has its own inherent ambiguities. It would probably 
enable the super powers to extricate themselves from a 
dangerous situation. It would not however erase the 
anxieties and suspicions of the local powers. 
Another alternative outcome of nuclear prolifer- 
ation into the Israeli-Egyptian region, might be a decision 
on the part of the super powers to minimise their commit- 
ments and interests in this particular region, while main- 
taining their positions in the rest of the Middle East. 
The success of such a policy depends partly on the 
readiness of the other Arab countries belonging to the 
core area of the Middle East, to disengage themselves from 
direct participation in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Such 
a disengagement is a remote hypothetical possibility, which 
might come about as a result of the combination of nuclear 
proliferation, coupled with the tremendous tensions inside 
the Arab world. However, the other possibility which was 
mentioned above, namely that the Arab countries neighbouring 
Israel will join a military alliance with Egypt as a result 
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of proliferation, would make a super-power inclination 
to disengage just from Israel and Egypt and retain 
interests in other Middle Eastern countries, more difficult. 
This would be possible only if the whole of the 'core area' 
of the riddle East were left alone. This, incidentally, 
would still leave all the oil-producing countries in the 
Middle East, outside the area from which the super powers 
had disengaged. 
A Short Comment on the Present Situation 
It would have seemed inconceivable until the middle 
of 1970 that the super powers would either allow them- 
selves to become more embroiled in a situation which might 
bring about an international confrontation or to allow one 
of them to pursue a policy which would at the same time 
enable it to reap the advantages of being involved and 
the ability to get away once the conflict became'more 
dangerous. In other words they both sought symmetry in 
their positions and their relationship with each other and 
with the local powers. 
This symmetry might have been affected by the 
Growing direct physical involvement of the Soviet Union in 
Egypt, beginning in February 1970. It is still too early 
at the time of writing to assess the consequences of this 
involvement within the context under discussion. It 
certainly showed a growing Soviot commitment. to Egypt and 
to a certain political regime in Egypt. It also raised 
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the question of the symmetry of commitments between the 
two super powers in the Middle East. This second 
question is open to different answers. On the one hand, 
as long as the Soviet involvement assumed only a defensive 
posture and as long as there was no direct military need 
for the United States to come to the aid of Israel, the 
possibility of symmetry still existed. On the other hand, 
the recent tendency towards a more limited global role in 
the United States coupled with the problem of American 
intentions in case of further Russian involvement in inter- 
mediate situations short of general offensive against 
Israel, created at least the image of a possible asymmetry. 
However, there is not yet a clear answer to these questions, 
and most probably the decision-maker's of either super power 
are unclear in their own minds about the form of their 
country's relationship in the Middle East. 
One point appears however to be clear. It seems 
now quite inconceivable for the Egyptian- leadership to 
decide on building a nuclear capability against the wishes 
of the Soviet Union. Although Egypt is still a free 
agent in many respects, it would seem improbable that the 
Russians would allow Egypt to build a nuclear capability 
against their will. But in an indirect way, the recent 
Russian involvement affects Israel in the same manner. 
Once Russian military units are stationed in Egypt, Israel 
has much more limited military options, Israel decided 
not to continue her 'deep penetration' bombing inside : typt: 
and pari passu this would apply also to any strategy (and 
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the weapons needed for it), which is aimed at the des- 
truction of the centres of Egyptian population or of any 
other major target inside Egypt. Any strategic bombing 
of the heart of Egypt - with conventional or nuclear 
bombs - would mean at present an attack on Russian units, 
and the possible Russian retaliation. Thus, the Growing 
Russian involvement in Egypt -would mean an added obstacle 
on the usefulness of an Israeli nuclear bomb. Moreover, 
the image of the Russians as guarantors of the UA. TR, might 
imply a Soviet guarantee against an Israeli nuclear threat - 
apart from the limitation on its actual use. Thus, one 
of the possible effects of the Soviet growing presence in 
Egypt is the creation of an added measure against pro- 
liferation in both Israel and Egypt. 
Conclusions 
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Any discussion of the effects of nuclear proliferation 
on the structure of the international system, could benefit 
by drawing distinctions between the global international system, 
the bipolar system, and the various regional sub-systems. The 
effects might be different for each of these. 
The proliferation of nuclear options which came through 
the proliferation of nuclear technology, has already had multi- 
dimensional effects on the bipolar system on the one hand and 
on local conflicts within sub-systems on the other. In the 
first case it has both stabilising and destabilising effects. 
In the second case it has not as yet destabilised relations 
in any profound manner, but created a potential for future 
instability. 
Nuclear proliferation itself will probably again have 
different effects on these two levels of the international 
system. The super powers have succeeded in developing mecha- 
nisms which could enable them to disengage themselves from 
sub-systems into which nuclear weapons have proliferated. In 
case of symmetrical proliferation in sub-systems, this would 
be more likely to be the case, and as a result the destabilis- 
ing effects on the bipolar system would be much more limited. 
In assymetrical proliferation, on the other hand, there are 
dangers of destabilisation of the bipolar system. 
Apart from the effects on local conflicts inside sub- 
systems, nuclear proliferation might also change in different 
ways the structure of a sub-system, as it will affect relations 
even among local actors in the sub-system which are not 
h6 
'Going nuclear' and which are not parties to a local conflict. 
In the Middle East sub-system itself, symmetrical pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons would probably have some 
destabilising effects on the Arab-Israeli region because of 
three sets of factors: (a) strategic considerations. (These 
are drawn as an analogy to the nuclear relations between the 
super powers, and hence the conclusion depends on the validity 
of such an analogy. ) These considerations are involved in 
problems like the creation of a second strike capability; 
motivations for a nuclear arms race and the creation of mutual 
images of one's opponents' motivations for first strike. 
(b) the ferocity of the Arab Israeli conflict as it stands at 
present; (c) the systemic pressures resulting from the 
political configuration of the Middle East sub-system. In 
any case one of the main factors deciding whether proliferation 
did occur in the Middle East; and whether it was symmetrical 
or not, is the structure of super-power relationship in the 
future. 
i 
Nuclear options have been used in the past, are 
presently being used, and will probably be used in the future 
in order to secure diplomatic and strategic advantages. They 
will be used vis-ä-vis different categories of powers and in 
different ways. In the Israeli case these uses were conducted 
both vis-a-vis the super powers, especially the United States; 
and vis-a-vis the Arab countries, primarily Egypt, The main 
uses, to the extent that information is available, appear to be 
concerned with attempts to increase security either by supplies 
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of more conventional weapons from America or by, tacitly, 
using it as another factor in search for military guarantees. 
There are indirect indications that some Israeli decision 
makers hoped to use the option vis-a-vis the Arab countries 
in order either to achieve a change in the basic pattern of 
the conflict, or to add another deterrent to a possible Arab 
attack. Both these uses - - if they were sought - appear to 
have failed. Another use was to deter Egypt from trying to 
tgo nuclear' herself. Egypt herself was not capable of 
doing it in any case, but it is probable that this particular 
use of the Israeli option could be potentially fruitful. 
Although there have been some indirect indications that 
some Israeli decision makers considered that the option, or 
a future actual weapon., could be used for compellence pur- 
poses as well, it still appears that the building of the 
option should be considered primarily within the framework of 
the deterrence posture that Israel adopted from after the 
Sinai campaign of 1956 on grds and specially since the be- 
ginning of the Eshkol government. 
It appears that it was the Eshkol government which 
changed the policy of Israel on questions of arms control 
as related to the nuclear option, by making this position 
less ambiguous and at the same time being more ready to use 
the option for bargaining purposes. 
The country most affected by the Israeli nuclear do- 
velopments was Egypt, in the sense that it had always been 
the main military power among the Arabs, and the one that had 
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most to fear from an Israeli nuclear bomb. This fear how- 
ever, was not sufficient to induce Egypt to abandon her role 
in inter-Arab conflicts and to concentrate on either of two 
policies: either to come to some peace agreement with Israel 
or at least to abandon the anti-Israel policy (which she had 
adopted at least as a long range foreign policy objective); 
or else to retreat from the Yemen and mend, as far as possible, 
her relations with the other Arab states so as to be ready to 
start a preventive war against Israel. 
The development of the Israeli option appears to have 
contributed to the Egyptian motivations to accelerate the 
conventional arms race. This is the probable conclusion from 
their effort in developing missiles, if indeed they did so - 
as according to some sources they did - after they learnt 
about the Israeli nuclear developments, and second fron their 
notion of the need for preparing for a possible conventional 
preventive war in order to forstall Israel from 'going 
nuclear'. 
Although there was not any basic change in the 
Egyptian strategy or in the three basic prerequisites 
(according to Egypt) for a successful campaign against Israel, 
there emerged the concept of 'preventive war'. It seems 
that it was created more with the aim of deterring Israel 
from 'going nuclear' than as an actual strategy, but, needless 
to say, once a concept has been suggested, it is usually 
followed by some military build up or a new military doctrine. 
The war of 1967 was the result of many complex reasons 
of which the Israeli nuclear development was hardly one. 
1r 
i 
.i I°. 
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The war was not a preventive war within the context of the reactions 
of states to opponents producing nuclear options. Thus the-theoretical 
point about preventive wars as a result of the proliferation of nuclear 
technolor was not proven, though it was not refuted either. It was 
not refuted first because future situations could bring, about different 
reactions. Second, because it may be that Egypt felt more secure about 
the Israeli nuclear development, as a result of American and Russian 
assurances and of the Israeli new policy, 
(1) 
and hence felt no i zediate 
need for preventive war on this particular issue. It may still, so the 
ardent might go, revert to this course of action if she knew for sure 
that Israel was about to develop the bomb. 
//The 
effects of nuclear 
proliferation, and the proliferation of nuclear options, should be 
ajudged within the context of each sub-system. In the case of the 
Middle East, the proliferation of nuclear technolor added another 
dimension to the relationship of Israel and Eft on the one hand, and 
between the local and the super powers on the other. While the 
development of the options by the local powers was used both to bring 
pressure to bear on each other and on the super powers, changes in the 
super power relationship in the sub-system is an important factor in 
defining the limits of these uses of the options. 
(1 This new policy was formulated in the declaration that "Israel 
will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the " 
Middle East". 
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When at the end of 1960 the sensational news 
appeared in the international press that a nuclear reactor 
was being built in Dimona(l) in Israel, the general inter- 
national reaction was one of scepticism, abhorrance and 
anxiety at the possibility of an atomic race in the Middle 
East; though it was coupled with admiration for the 
scientific and technological capability of Israel. Since 
then, the whole issue of 'Israel and the bomb' has occupied 
the minds of decision-makers in the world, becoming part 
of the general problem of nuclear proliferation, which in 
its turn has become a major area of concern in the inter- 
national system* 
(2) 
The problems arising from Israel's 
nuclear option are obviously complex and they serve as a 
nexus to a host of others. These may be approached under 
(1) See inter alia, Daily Express, 16.12.1960; New York 
Times? 19.12.1960; The Times, 10.12.1960. 
(2) The literature on nuclear proliferation keeps 
proliferating. Some of the obvious and by now 
well known works are: Alastair Buchan (ed. ), 
A World of Nuclear Powers?, The American Assembly, 
Prentice Hall, 1966; Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, 
The Spread of Nuclear S"1e ons, Chatto & Windus, 
London, 1962; R. N. Rosecrance (ed. ), The Dispersion 
of Nuclear Weapons, Columbia University Press, 1 
Raymond Aron, Le Grand Debut, Calman Levy, Paris, 
1963; Pierre N. Gallois, The Balance of Terror: 
Strategy for the Nuclear Age, Boston, 1961. For the 
effects of proliferating on the alliance system see 
for example, Albert Wohlstetter, 'Nuclear Sharing: 
Nato and the N+1 Country', Foreign Affairs, April 1961; 
for a comprehensive bibliography on nuclear prolifer- 
ation see Bertel Heurlin, 'Nuclear Proliferation', 
Cooperation and Conflict, No. 3-4,1967. 
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various aspects and discussed in several contexts. To 
begin with, there is the gene'ral problen of nuclear pro- 
liferation, its effects on the international system and 
the role of Israel within this general context. 
(1) 
Second, 
there is the development of Israeli strategic doctrines 
1 The literature on the effects of n"aclear proliferation 
on the international system is also growing. Most of 
the works mentioned in note 2 deal with this problem 
as well. See especially Buchan's introduction in A 
World of Nuclear Powers? ; Stanley Hoffman, 'Nuclear 
Proliferation and World Politics' in Buchan op. cit.; 
Rosecrance's introduction and 'International Stability 
and I lucleär Diffusion' in Rosecrance op. cit. ; Aron 
op. cit.; see also R. N. Rosecrance, Problems of 
Nuclear Proliferation., Security Studies Paper No. 7, 
University of California, 1966; Erasmus, 'Policentrism 
and Proliferation', Survey, January 1966; Karl Deutch 
and David Singer, 'Multipolar Power Systems and Inter- 
national Stability', "World Politics, April 1967; a 
short theoretical discussion is included in Morton 
Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics 
John Wiley & Sons, 1957, w ere he elaborates on the 
model of the 'Unit Veto System'; Pierre Hassner, in 
the 'Nation State in the Nuclear Age', Survey, April 
1968, which is devoted mainly to the present pre- 
. proliferation 
phase, touches upon this subject as well; 
Hedley Bull The Control of the Arms Race , New York & 
London, 1961,2nd edition, 1965, chapter 9; Ciro 
Elliott Zoppo, 'Nuclear Technology, Multipolarity, ' 
and International Stability', World Politics,. July 
1966; Frank Aiken, 'Can We Limit the Nuclear Club? ', 
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September 1961. 
On the 'small state and proliferation' see David Vital, 
The Inequality of States , Oxford University Press, 
19 7, chapter 9; Robert Rothstein, Alliances and 
Small States , Columbia University Press, 196b. Some 
of these works mention the Israeli case. A somewhat 
more detailed work on the Israeli contemporary position 
on problems of non proliferation and the Non Prolifer- 
ation Treaty is included in George H. Quester, 'Israel 
and the Non Proliferation Treaty', Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists, June 1969; on the Israeli nuclear 
option see Leonard Beaton, 'Why Israel does not need 
the Bomb', The New Middle East, No, 7, April 1969. 
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and the role of the nuclear option within them. 
(') 
Third, 
there is the context of Israel's relations with the super 
powers, mainly with the United States; and fourth, there is 
the impact of the creation of the Israeli nuclear option on 
the development of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The whole 
discussion can also be approached within the context of the 
strategic and diplomatic uses of the nuclear options 
generally and in the Middle East in particular. Finally, 
. 
this discussion can throw light on the kind and pattern of 
images and perceptions that Israeli decision-makers and the 
Israeli public opinion have of both the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and also of the structure of the Middle East sub-system and 
of the international system at large. This list is not 
exhaustive but it indicates the central position that the 
'atomic' issue holds (or should hold) in the foreign and 
defence policy of Israel. 
This does not mean that it attracted great 
attention from informed public opinion in Israel-decision 
makers included. Nor does it signify that even its com- 
(plexity 
has been fully appreciated within Israel. 
2) However, 
(i) The only books discussing these problems with depth 
are Yigal Allon, Masach Shel Choi (Hebrew), second 
edition, 1968; Israel Ber Bitchon Israel-Etmol, 
Hayom, Machar , 
(Hebrew), 1966. 
(2) The fact that Israel's nuclear policy has not been 
discussed fully and in depth in the public debate, 
was partly due to pressure applied by some official 
quarters who tried at a certain stage to suppress 
this debate. '.. hat is perhaps as serious is that it 
appears that no official agency had been asked to 
study in depth and detail and on a continuous basis, 
all the implications of alternative nuclear policies 
for Israel. 
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the purpose of this paper is not to discuss all the 
important issues involved in the problem of Israel as a 
potential nuclear power, or to describe at length the 
public debate, but to concentrate rather on two main 
features. First, what place did the whole idea of nuclear 
weapons and a nuclear option occupy in Israel's strategic 
'doctrines and postures? This will be discussed here 
through a schematic categorization of Israel's basic 
strategic postures during the fifties and the sixties. 
Second, what were the diplomatic and strategic uses of 
Israelis nuclear option'? This must include a discussion 
of the role of ambiguity and the resultant uncertainty 
in Israel's 'atomic diplomacy' vis ä-vis the Arab world. 
The Concept of 'Strategy' as used in this paper 
The term 'strategy' has many definitions and is 
open to various interpretations. 
(') 
However, in this 
paper the terni is used more or less within the context 
of Thomas Schelling's combined definitions or approaches. 
Schelling suggests a definition for strategy(2) which 
(1) For an extensive study of definitions of strategy 
and the 'classical' strategists' approach to the 
sub-discipline of strategy, see Michael Howard, 
'The Classical Strategists', in Problems of Modern 
Strategy', Part 1, Adelphi Paper No. 54, Institute 
for Strategic Studies, London, 1969. A somewhat 
independent definition is suggested by General Baufre, 
Strategy of Action , Faber & Faber, London, 1969. 
(2) The Strategy of Conflict ' Galaxy Books, 1963. 
. 158 
includes the following elements, that: a) it only covers 
situations of conflict; b) it applies to the 'rational 
behaviour' of the parties to the conflict; c) it is 
behaviour which is directed towards winning the conflict; 
d) 'it is not concerned with the efficient application of 
force but with the exploitation of potential force' and 
tit is the employment of threats and threats and 
promises .... s0) However, in his later book "Arms and 
Influence" Schelling builds models of the efficient 
application of force in order to secure some diplomatic 
gains. This results in the develop-lent of the concepts 
of coercion and compellence. Compellence is the pressure 
brought to bear on an opponent in order to force him to 
take a course of action. Deterrence, on the other hand, 
is aimed at dissuading one's opponent from doing something. 
Because of this difference, deterrence need not involve 
initiating any action. The deterrer only defines the- 
risk to the other side if action is taken. ' ... Compelling 
in contrast, usually involves initiating an action (or an 
irrevocable commitment to action) that can cease or become 
harmless only if the opponent responds. '(2) 
There are two main differences between deterrence 
and compellence apart fron those suggested above: a) 
compellence by its very nature tends to be more involved with 
(1) Schelling, op. cit., p. 15. 
(2) Arms and Influence , Yale University Press, 1966, 
p. 72. 
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violent actions, deterrence less so. Ideally, deterrence 
is merely an announcement (or tacit signal) of what would 
happen to the opponent were he to take a certain line of 
action. This is a common case in nuclear strategy. 
However, occasionally acts of violence also include 
elements of deterrence, especially when the other party is 
warned of future punishment that he is likely to incur if 
he continues in his behaviour. However, this qualifi- 
cation is not the rule. In the case of compellence, on 
the other hand, violent action is more probable. (Schelling 
suggests that compellence and deterrence expressed by 
violent action and especially during times of war should 
be defined as 'offence' and 'defence' respectively. See 
below). b) compellence by its very nature must be more 
definite than deterrence. It usually involves such 
questions as 1wheret, twhat' and 'how much' should the 
opponent do. As Schelling suggests: to 'Do Nothing' is 
simple, 'do something' ambiguous. '(1) Therefore compell- 
ence has to be defined clearly. 
While deterrence and coinpellence are both concerned 
with the threat of force, 'defence' and 'offence' are con- 
cerned with the actual use of force. However, for the 
purpose of this paper the terms of compellence and deterr- 
ence alone will be used, and they will cover both the 
threats to use force and the actual use of force which has 
as its objective deterrence or compellence. In the case 
(1) P. 72. 
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of compellence an act of violence would signal as an 
inducement to the other side the threat to use more force. 
Finally, there is the notion of coercion by threat 
or act. This concept implies the readiness to use force 
or cause pain to the other side in order to'induce him to 
do something. But coercion is not concerned with the 
causing of pain and suffering as an object in itself but 
only as an instrument to secure diplomatic advantages. 
The development of Israel's strategic postures can 
be categorized within the framework of deterrence, com- 
pellence and coercion, As these concepts are analytical, 
they suffer from the obvious limitations of all models in 
the social sciences, and some which are peculiar to the 
sub-discipline of strategy. 
(') 
(1) Some of these limitations are spelt out in 
H. Green, Deadly Logic , and in Anatol Rappoport, 
Strategy and Conscience , Harper and Row, 1964+. 
Their critique tend to discount the whole sub 
discipline of strategy, but this objective they 
fail to accomplish. Strategic concepts are 
analytical ones and hence they can serve as useful 
instruments for the explanation of one analytical 
aspect of international political reality and 
conflict, but not of the totality of this reality. 
This is something which several policy oriented 
" strategists tend to ignore. But granting this 
important qualification the strategic concepts 
themselves are still useful as models of behaviour. 
Another pitfall of some policy oriented strategists, 
is that though they maintain that strategy is concerned 
with two actors' öames 
(to put it in the language of 
game theory), they in fact think only in terms of one 
actor game. In other words, they think only in terms 
of what their side might do within the context of 
threats of violence and actual violence as methods 
for accomplishing political objectives, and they 
ignore the probability that their opponent might 
apply the very same methods. (The reference to game 
theory in this discussion does not imply that in my 
view 'strategy' is identical with game theory or that 
strategic conflicts are necessarily "two actors tames"). 
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One of the obvious limitations on Schelling's 
concepts is his assumption of rationality in conflict. 
In the real world, irrational behaviour in international 
conflicts is quite widespread. However, for the purpose 
of this paper, the discussion will still be mainly con- 
ducted within the framework of the analytical concepts of 
strategy mentioned, but with three main modifications: 
First, most activities which fall within this 
definition of 'strategy' contain elements of all these 
analytical concepts and do not fall within exclusively 
any one of them. Second, the extent to which these 
activities succeed depend to a large extent on the images 
they have created in the minds of the other side. Further 
more, to some extent the reaction of the opponent determines 
whether a certain action or threat should be construed as 
deterrent, conpellent or coercive one. Consequently, the 
way in which we describe our action (whether by terms of 
deterrence, compellence, etc. ), neither explains the 
'objective' character (in these terms) of the action, nor 
does it explain the way in which the other side conceives 
these actions. Thus the question is not whether deterrence 
or compellence has failed, but also whether a certain 
action could have been considered initially as a 'deterrent' 
or a tcompellent'. Thus the problem is one of communication 
and also of the difference of cultural contexts existing 
between the opponents. Third, this can be discussed only 
on the understanding that these strategic concepts interact 
with the foreign policy goals of both conflicting parties. 
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Thus the strategic definition is not determined only by 
the cultural context and images which both sides have, but 
also by the respective foreign policy goals. What also 
has to be considered is whether or not these goals complement 
the strategies employed. 
It thus seems that, using these strategic concepts 
as analytical instruments, a study of Israel's foreign and 
defence policy could. produce valuable results, especially 
if communication with the other side and reciprocal per- 
ceptions are also considered. This is particularly 
important in the case of Israel because of the widespread 
usage of the concept of deterrence. 
Short outline of the Strategic Postures and Doctrines of Israel 
After the War cf. Independence and since the creation 
of the 'armistice regime' in 1949, Israeli foreign policy 
formulated the principle of the acceptance of the terri- 
torial status quo within the new armistice borders. This 
principle made of Israel a status-quo power. The principle 
both stabilised the domestic debate in Israel on foreign 
policy and also improved her foreign relations with most 
parts of the world. This principle needed a complementary 
strategic posture aimed at strengthening the status quo and 
at the same time the country+s defence in case of war (the 
famous 'second round' promised by the Arab Governments during 
the first half of the fifties). 
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The general doctrine which developed at the time 
was therefore based on the creation of a strong army which 
would be able to withstand another attack by the Arab armies. 
This meant that the concept of deterrence had not been fully 
developed and the emphasis was on preparation for war, not 
on either deterring a war or the employment of the army for 
the accomplishment of diplomatic objectives. It has been 
(1}. 
suggested that Israel during this period led the arms race 
But even if this was the case (and the question of who 
started the arms race in the Middle East at different stages 
is difficult to answer, this was not an attempt at coercive 
diplomacy or in order to create a deterrent; it was mainly 
due to her need to build a reserve army and to standardise 
its equipment. In the early fifties, Israel concentrated 
rather on absorbing the great number of immigrants, the 
building of the economy, the development of the civil service 
and transforming herself from a volunteer society to a 'civil' 
society. The Arab problem appeared less urgent. Hopes for 
an eventual peace dwindled after the negotiations in Lausanne 
and Paris proved abortive: a failure - incidentally - for 
which Israel was partly to blame. 
(2) 
However, by the middle of 1953 the situation in 
Israel began to change. The reasons-for this were partly 
domestic, and partly due to the developments in the Arab 
world. On the domestic front there was a change of prime 
(1) See on this point, Nadav Safran, Fron liar to filar: 
The Arab Israeli Confrontation 7 8-1967, New York, 
19099 Pp. 
(2) See Roni Gabbai, A Political tudy of the Arab-Jewish 
Conflict, Geneva and Paris, 1959, chapters 4£6. 
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minister and a change in the leadership of the army and the 
defence establishment. In the Arab world, one major de- 
velopment occurred, namely the revolution of the 'Free 
Officers'. This was greeted in Israel with a mixture of 
rising hopes and anxieties. At the same time infiltration 
into Israel increased and thus the border situation-became 
more acute. These developments were followed by a 
worsening in the international situation as far as Israel 
was concerned. America was increasingly committed to the 
policy of alliances within the general framework of the 
strategy of containment. 
(1) 
A strategy of containment in 
the Middle East meant in reality an attempt to create 
military alliances with the leading Arab countries. 
These developments caused great concern in Israel, 
which was possibly exaggerated. In any case the Israeli 
reaction to this combination of factors was the resort to a 
new strategy, namely the strategy of retaliption. This 
strategy had its precedents in the pro-state period, but 
when employed by the state created a completely new situation 
(1) On the general position of Israel at the time and 
the growing anxieties in Israel in regard to the 
American intentions, see Ernest Stock, Israel on 
the Road to Sinai , Cornell University Press, 1967, 
On the American policy of containment as applied to 
the Middle East, during the first half of the fifties, 
see mainly John C. Campbell, Defence of the Middle 
East , revised edition, Prager, 1960, Part 1. On 
American Israeli relations during this period see also 
Nadav Safran, The United States and Israel , Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962. 
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in the Arab-Israeli conflict. What is important from the 
point of view of this paper is not the critical question, 
namely to what extent were the Israeli anxieties justified, 
but rather the categorization of the new strategy according 
to the analytical concepts suggested above. The Israeli 
justification for retaliatory raids, was that they were 
aimed at forcing the Arab governments to stop the infil- 
tration. At a later stage Israel's explanations became 
more coloured by the concept of deterrence. The Israeli 
raids, according to these explanations, were purely deterrent 
actions. However, other observers saw these raids 
differently. According to General Burns 
(2) 
, for instance, 
the raids were really aimed at forcing the Arab side not 
just to stop the infiltration but also to accept a certain 
political settlement. In other words, the raids were 
designed to attain two alternative objectives. First to 
deter indirectly the Arab infiltration. Indirectly because 
as in the case of both Jordan throughout the period of 
1953-1956, and Egypt until the middle of 1955, the infil- 
tration was not organised by the governments. It was hoped 
that the Israeli raids would compel the Arab governments to 
stop the unorganised infiltration. Thus by a compellent act 
a deterrent effect would be secured. When the raids were 
directed at Egypt after the latter had begun to sponsor the 
(1) See for example General Moshe Dayan, Yoman Ma'arechot 
Sinai , 
(Hebrew), Am H: asefer, Tel-Aviv, 19 5. 
(2) Lieutenant General E. L. M. Burns, Between Arab and 
Israeli , London, 1962. 
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Fedayeen campaign, they would serve directly as a deterrent. 
Second, the raids were aimed at compelling the Arab govern- 
ments to accept certain political objectives. The most 
important of these was the attainment of a full and complete 
peace with Israel. Secondary aims were more limited, for 
example the opening of the Straits of Tiran or to enforce 
the opening of the Suez Canal for Israeli shipping. 
As there has not been any detailed study of the 
Israeli retaliation policy between 1953-1956(1), most of the 
views in this paper are therefore based on an interpretation 
of existing sources. But with these qualifications one can 
still argue that from the information available, it appears 
that the Israeli strategy of retaliation contained ueveral 
strategic elements. It would be valid to argue that 
several of the raids were aimed at accomplishing a deterrent 
effect, others at attaining a compellent effect, while still 
others were executed in order to cause pain to the other side 
for 'pure retaliation. -. Furthermore, some raids were 
executed with the aim of achieving, if not all three, at 
(1ý For some partial studies or accounts see Burns, op. cit., 
Stock op. cite, Moshe Brilliant, 'Israel's Policy of 
Reprisals', Harper's, March 1965, pp. 68-72; Dan 
Horowitz, 'The Permanent and the Transitory in Foreign 
Policy' (Hebrew), Min Hayesod, Tel-Aviv, 1962, pp. 94+-128; 
Kennet Love, Suez, The Twice Fought : dar , McGraw Hill, 1969, which deals inter alia with Israel's retaliation 
policy; Yair Evron, 'I"Iediniut Hutz Hanikba'at al Yedei 
Hatsava' (Hebrew), Ha'aretz, December 1965. 
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least two of these objectives simultaneously. There were 
also times when the raids were carried out without any 
definite objective in mind but just because of local tactical 
military considerations, or in order to achieve some 
political objectives in the international scene. It must be 
stated that these notions of deterrence, compellence and 
coercion or their popular translations were not even con- 
ceived of at the time. Even at present, the concept of 
deterrence is unfortunately sometimes applied to situations 
and actions which have in fact little in common with it. 
This does not mean necessarily that such strategies are 
bad, but merely that ex post facto official explanations 
in terms of these concepts are not necessarily accurate. 
It also means that the refinements of these concepts which 
have been developed in the strategic literature, were 
scarcely applied in practice. 
It is also important to note that Israel's retali- 
ation policy, far fron deterring the Egyptians from their 
activities, had in fact the reverse effect. It provides 
in fact a good example of how a policy of deterrence, 
coupled with compellence and carried out by coercive means, 
can lead to a process of escalation. In this process of 
escalation, compellence and coercion become the sole 
strategies and deterrence finds no place. 
After the 1956 war, in which Israel succeeded in 
accomplishing three main objectives, namely a free passage 
through the Straits of Tiran, the termination of activities 
of the Fedayeen and the improved credibility of the Israeli 
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forces as a deterrent, there ensued a period of limited 
calm in the Arab-Israeli region. This calm did not, 
however, alleviate the basic fears of the Israeli decision- 
makers that eventually there might be a recurrence of war. 
The main fear was of Egypt for she was not only the most 
important Arab power, with the greatest army and potential, 
but also a power whose declared intention was to reverse the 
outcone of the 1956 war. Egypt also became increasingly 
committed to Arab unity under its hegemony, and this again 
was coniidered extremely dangerous for Israel. Apart from 
these anxieties, the most important direct consideration 
for both sides was the accelerating arms race. Whereas 
between 1950 and 1955 the Israelis led the arms race, roles 
were thereafter reversed, and Egypt took the lead in this 
race*(') 
It appears that both sides entertained mutual 
anxieties about each other's intentions, and the arms race 
supplied yet another reason for the growing fears and 
apprehensions. It was thus reasonable for both sides to 
try to create adequate strategic doctrines to deal with 
possible threats from the other side. One of the main 
fears of certain Israeli leaders (though by no means all of 
then), was that the Arab world, led by Egypt, would unite 
for another round against Israel. Although an Arab victory 
would have been unlikely because of the obvious differences 
and animosities within the Arab world, the possibility did 
(1) See Nadav Safran, 'Fron War to Warf, op. cit., pp. ar1"r 
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influence the position taken by some decision-makers. Mr. 
Ben-Gurion himself, after the signing of the 1963 pact 
between Egypt, Syria and Iraq immediately wrote to the 
leaders of the Western world asking them for guarantees 
in the face of the growing menace arising from new Arab 
unity. This initiative failed for two reasons: first, 
the Western powers dismissed fears of Arab unity as 
groundless; second, they were not ready to abandon their 
well-established. approach of witholding formal military 
guarantees from Israel. 
') 
Growing fears about the possibility of another Arab 
attack demanded that the Israeli army should be prepared 
for such an eventuality. It also raised the question of 
how to bring about a situation where future wars could be 
avoided altogether. The problem became increasingly one 
of how to deter the Arabs in General and Egypt in particular. 
Thus gradually a new doctrine of deterrence emerged. This 
time the thinking about deterrence appears to have been 
more fundamental than in the previous strategic postures. 
The new doctrine was on two levels, first the conventional, 
and the second on a level aiming at the eventual creation 
of a nuclear option. At present there is no available 
evidence 
(2) 
as to the initial intentions of the Israeli 
(1) On this episode see Michael Bar Zohar, The Armed 
Prophet , Arthur Barker Ltd., 1967, pp, 292_29 , 
(2) There have been several suggestions that Israel is 
planning to 'go nuclear' eventually but no Israeli 
decision maker has ever suggested that this is the 
case. For suggestions in the Knesset from which the 
implication was that Israel was planning to produce 
nuclear weapons see for example Toufic Toubi on 6.8.1962. 
Suggestions to this effect by non Israeli sources abound 
but were usually denied by the Israeli government. Some 
Israeli political commentators close to some of the decision makers have argued several times, in various 
articles in favour of Israel tgoing nuclear'. See for example, Avraham Schweitzer, in Halaretz 
, 14.8.1962. 
370 
decision-makers when the Dimona project was planned and 
launched. 
It appears that at the time, important differences 
existed between decision-makers about Israeli nuclear 
policy. An important debate on the problem took place in 
1962, in which Alon maintained that Israel should concen- 
trate on building up her conventional forces, and that the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East would 
harm the interests of Israel. 
') 
This debate concluded with the acceptance of Allon's 
policy. Ben-Gurion, who chaired the meeting, endorsed 
Allon's approach about the need to concentrate on the con- 
ventional forces. 
On the conventional level, however, it appears 
that a real change of emphasis took place at some early 
point in the sixties. This perhaps was due mainly to the 
appointment of General Rabin to the position of Chief of 
Staff towards the end of 1963. The growing emphasis on 
deterrence could be witnessed by the way in which this 
concept was mentioned more and more in the Knesset debates. 
(1) See Moshe Gilboa, Shesh Shanim Shisha Yamin , (Hebrew), Am Oved, Tel-Aviv, second edition, 1969, 
pp. 29-30. Allon's position on the question of the 
best nuclear policy for Israel is included in 
'Masach shel Chol' op. cit. and in 'Hagana Peila- 
Aruva Lebitchonenu', (Hebrew), Molad, July August, 
1967. 
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The general idea being that, by creating a strong and 
well equipped army, the Arab countries would realise that 
there was no real hope of ever achieving their declared 
objective of the destruction of Israel. The basic 
dilemma here was that the deterred party might be subject 
to misperceptions about its ability to succeed in such 
a war. In other words, the deterring party must be able 
to communicate to the opponent the latter's inability to 
launch a successful war. This can presumably be 
accomplished by several means. First, the deterring 
party can quite openly communicate to the other side the 
massive supplies (or whatever they may be) of weapons in 
his arsenals. Second, proving by action, as it were, 
the basic inability of the opponent to succeed in its 
planned actions. This can be achieved for example by 
successful small scale clashes or skirmishes along the 
borders, or by starting limited escalation whenever there 
is some military interference from the other side: all 
this just to increase the credibility of the conventional 
deterrence posture. The dilemma involved in the last two 
approaches is that such measures could be interpreted by 
the deterred party not just as measures aimed at 
increasing the deterrence posture, but rather as coercive 
measures aimed at compelling it, or even worse, as an 
exercise in 'brute force'. Furthermore, Egyptian decision- 
makers felt, to some extent, that Egypt on her part was 
engaged in a deterrence e°ercise against Israel. This 
partly stemmed from Egyptian misperceptions about Israel's 
foreign policy objectives. References to the 'expansionists 
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intentions of Israel can be readily found in Egyptian 
and Arab literature. Thus every action taken by Israel 
could have been interpreted by the Egyptians and the other 
Arab countries as an expansionist move which must be pre- 
vented, and deterrent actions must be taken in order to 
deter such future Israeli moves. 
In the event of both sides becoming involved in 
'active deterrence'(') (as General Tzur has termed the 
new postures, the Israeli army assumed that escalation 
would be the only alternative. 
The problem therefore of how to increase the 
credibility of deterrence without starting a process of 
escalation, is one of the most crucial in a situation of 
conventional deterrence within a context of possible 
limited military. action. It becomes much more proble- 
matical in a situation like the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Here there are several actors, and the Arabs themselves 
are caught by a situation of intense competition, where 
(1 See interview with the then Chief of Staff, General Tsvi 
Tzur, in Bamachane , the Jewish New Year issue, 
September 1962. General Tzur suggested in this inter- 
view that the Israeli Army should move from deterrence 
to 'active deterrence'. The meaning of this concept 
had not been clarified by General Tzur, but the impli- 
cation was that the army must be ready to be activated 
in a matter of minutes. This would mean in the first 
place a deterrence posture, and also a posture of 
permanent readiness to disarm the enemy in case 
deterrence failed. 
a 
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one of the symbols of the competition is the separate 
ways by which the Arab states propose to solve the 
'Palestine problem'. 
The other level of the new strategy of deterrence 
emerging in Israel during the early sixties 'Jas the nuclear 
one. If indeed the objective of some Israeli decision- 
makers was to create the actual weapons, then the rationale 
for this was as follows: The Arab world may at some time 
unite under the leadership of the Nasser variety intent 
on the destruction of Israel. Such a united Arab world 
(or at least part of it) night be in a position to muster 
enough troops to overcome the'hitherto conventional 
superiority of Israel. Furthermore, and perhaps alterna- 
tively, if a process of modernisation in the Arab world 
proved to be successful, even one Arab power like Egypt 
might be in a position to launch a successful conventional 
war against Israel. Moreover, the question is not just 
whether the attack would prove to be a success, but of what 
is the Arab perception of their chances. Unity in the 
Arab world or modernisation in the Arab world, might lead 
the Arabs to the assumption that they would succeed in 
their attack, and this even if the assumption proved to be 
false once put to test. 
Thus the only alternative to annihilation or to war 
in general, would be the creation of a decisive deterrent 
force which would convince the other side that they could 
never accomplish their aims. 
"4 
However, if nuclear deterrence failed then the 
new weapon could frustrate the conventional attack of 
the opponent. This could be achieved by threatening 
to use the-weapon, once the possibility of a conventional 
defeat for the Israeli side arose. This objective could 
be attained by either the use of tactical nuclear 
weapons(1) or by threatening to use the strategic weapon 
against the other side's centres of population. 
Alternatively, acquiring a superior weapon system, 
also meant the possibility of using it for compellent 
purposes, namely to force the other side to accept 
Israeli political demands. This would presumably include 
a demand for the acceptance of the territorial status-quo 
and the signing of a peace treaty with Israel, 
(2) 
(1 As tactical nuclear weapons are much more sophisticated 
and expansive than strategic ones, the first stage in 
the nuclear weaponry of all the nuclear powers have 
always been that of strategic weapons. 
{2) For a possible reference to such an alternative see 
interview with Mr. Shimon Peres in Davar 28.9.1962. 
Following are the relevant question and answer: 
'Question: When you have recently mentioned the need 
for a new approach, you have stressed the switches from 
the stage of defence to the stage of deterrence and 
from this to compellence. What is the new stage? 
Answer: I would have explained it in the following way: 
when the types of arms in the hands of the two sides 
were limited, obviously the doctrine of defence had its 
place. The two sides had a long time to defend them- 
selves, stop and in the last analysis, conduct a 
defensive war. When the new jet planes and tanks 
arrived, the main danger represented was of surprise 
attack and naturally the basic defence. was to deter 
the enemy from attacking. But when the non conventional 
weapons arrived and in this stage they are mainly the 
missiles, the very existence of the weapons - even before they are used, might create a compellent effect 
on the existent situation. Obviously when we say 'compellence', we have to remember the differences 
between the Arabs and ourselves as far as the objectives 
/continued... 
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All this assumed that the other side would not have 
similar weapons. The Israeli side would thus be left 
with a superior weapon system which could be used for 
either deterrence or compellence. 
There has always been some difference of opinion 
among Israeli decision makers about the ability of the 
Arabs (in fact Egypt) to obtain the same or even superior 
weapon systems as Israel. It seems that one school of 
thought argued that in the final analysis Egypt would be 
in a position to get whatever Israel had succeeded in 
acquiring. Another school of thought tended to argue 
that in fact Israel could use her scientific and techno- 
logical capability in such a way as to succeed in surpassing 
Egypt in at least some weapon systems. This argument was 
voiced, not necessarily in connection with the nuclear 
policy of the country, but also independently. What 
tended to create some confusion in this field, was that 
sometimes precisely those persons belonging to the second 
school of thought, argued in the public debate that whatever 
Israel was doing in this or other armament fields was due to 
Footnote (2) continued... 
of the compellence are concerned. The Arabs want to 
compel us to surrender and we want to compel them to 
make peace. The difference between types of arms 
changes to a certain extent the various conceptual 
approaches'. 
(Mr. Peres referred here to the effects of missiles, 
but said that his analysis of the phase of 'compell- 
ence' covers non conventional Weapons in general. 
Whether he referred to nuclear weapons in this inter- 
view, or not, is anybody's guess. what is important 
in this context of this paper, is simply to speculate 
on how possibly the alternative of 'compellence' as a 
use for nuclear threats could be envisaged. On this 
point see also Avraham Schweitzer, in 'Ha'aretzt, 
14.8.1962). 
4 
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the need to match Egypt's development in the same field. 
However this kind of presentation in the public debate 
should not obscure the real positions of the two schools 
of thought. In passing, it might be noted that such 
switches of opinion from the public debate level to the 
level of decision making are well known in other states, 
and are legitimate in the political process. 
After a time a new rationale was suggested by some 
political commentators as to the development of an inde- 
pendent nuclear. deterrent in Israel. The argument this 
time was that if both sides acquired atomic weapons, then 
a situation resembling the lbalance of terror' between 
the two super powers, would emerge. It was argued that 
there was a possibility to transform the present (pre 1967) 
unstable situation between Israel and the Arab countries 
into a new situation, whereby the Arab world would be 
convinced that there was no hope to defeat Israel and 
would accept the 'rules of the ganef' which governed the 
behaviour of the two super powers. Thus a fourth alter- 
native can be added to the rationales of an Israeli 
atomic weapons' programme. 
(1) 
(The question whether a 
stable balance of nuclear deterrence could develop in the 
(1) See for example Shmuel Segev and Avraham Schweitzer 
in 'Symposium on Nuclear Policy', Hotam; Rimalt, 
Zinurot , September 1962; Avraham Schweitzer, 
Ha'aretz 14.8.1962. 
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Israeli-Arab area is of course one of the crucial points 
for debate and one in which the role of irrationality is 
crucial. This however is again not part of this paper. 
) 
The mixture of deterrent and compellent elements as 
the objectives of an Israeli nuclear weapon, was both 
ambiguous and unclear. To the extent that ideas about 
such uses of the nuclear weapons circulated among some 
political observers and possibly some decision makers (as 
far as the latter were concerned this has not been con- 
firmed by any published authority), this demonstrates two 
misperceptions about the nature of nuclear weapons. On 
the one hand, was the notion that atomic weapons were just 
a new weapon, not qualitatively different from all the 
conventional systems. Nuclear weapons could be used as 
instruments of threat and diplomatic pressure precisely 
like any conventional system, the only difference being 
that they could effect better results because of their 
bigger payload. That this was the notion follows from 
the following analysis: If one were to use nuclear 
weapons as a threat for compellent purposes, one would 
have to be prepared to witness their use. If not, their 
credibility as instruments of compellence would be found 
lacking. If this were so, an even more serious conse- 
quence could ensue, namely that the credibility of the 
nuclear deterrent would be found lacking. The notion that 
these weapons could be used as a compollent also shows 
another and a contrary misperception, namely that nuclear 
weapons are so different from other weapons that they can 
achieve any diplomatic and military objective. 
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Henry Kissinger(') suggested that there are three 
stages of perception about the nature of nuclear weapons, 
which follow upon their possession. First, nuclear 
weapons are perceived simply as 'bigger guns'; second, 
they are looked upon as the ultimate weapons which can 
ensure completely the security of the nation, making all 
conventional forces obsolescent; third, a more balanced 
and rational approach is adopted, whereby a synthesis of 
nuclear and conventional forces is sought. It thus 
appears that unwittingly some Israelis followed Kissinger's 
model but with two major qualifications: (a) Kissinger 
referred to powers which had already gone nuclear; (b) 
Kissinger outlined three sequential stages of perceptions, 
whereas among these Israelis two of these stages occurred 
simultaneously. 
The same misperceptions can be traced in the 
general Israeli approach to problems concerning nuclear 
weapons. Their development would have meant on the one 
hand that Israel disregarded their special nature as far 
as the reactions of the super powers were concerned. It 
was precisely the special nature of nuclear weapons which 
induced the super powers after a time to take energetic 
measures to halt nuclear proliferation. On the other hand, 
the school of thought which possibly favoured the develop- 
ment of such weapons in Israel, based its approach on the 
perception of nuclear weapons as absolute deterrent, thus 
(1) See Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy , New York, 1957, pp. 388 ff. 
admitting in a sense the special character they have, a 
character that would render necessary their special 
treatment by the super powers. 
But the notion that nuclear weapons could be used 
as the 'absolute deterrent' is not valid in any case 
within the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict. 
This 
could be demonstrated by the following example: 
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Hypothetically, if Egypt had no nuclear weapons, but Israel 
had, and conventional hostilities developed, the real 
problem would be when to use the deterrent. What if, 
for instance, the initial Egyptian attack was partly 
successful in the sense that part of Israel was overrun 
or just part of the Israeli army 'disarmed' (in the 
Iaausevitzian sense). Would the use of the nuclear 
deterrent under such conditions be rational? Bearing this 
dilemma in mind, it could be argued that the possession of 
nuclear weapons by one side to the conflict, would not 
necessarily deter the use of conventional troops by the 
other side. Furthermore, any use of atomic weapons in 
the conflict would bring about an extremely strong inter- 
national censure. All this adds up to the paradoxical - 
yet well known - conclusion that the deterrence posture of 
a nuclear Israel facing a non nuclear Egypt, would be only 
slightly improved in cases of limited conventional attacks 
and possibly limited Egyptian successes. 
The above e:: ample is based on the assumption that 
deterrence has failed even though it .., as originally rein- 
forced by the existence of nuclear Weapons in the hands of 
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Israel. However, it could still be argued that a non 
nuclear Egypt would find it extremely dangerous to start 
an attack on a nuclear Israel. There is however the 
possibility of nisescalation. 
(') 
For example: If an 
initial Egyptian move were performed primarily as a 
deterrent against Israel, as for instance the first 
" Egyptian move in the 1967 crisis. This move might 
nevertheless create a new situation, in which hostilities 
were joined either because of an Israeli pre-emptive strike, 
or a limited Egyptian attack. Under such conditions, 
the question would really be whether a limited Egyptian 
conventional success would be sufficient reason for Israel 
to use atomic weapons. It can be argued that Israel 
would decide that only a danger to the very existence of 
the state would render rational the use of nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore its use in the circumstances of a limited 
Egyptian success might incur a reaction from the Soviet 
Union, a reaction which America would find it extremely 
difficult to oppose. This last point is obviously based 
on the present attitudes of the super powers towards nuclear 
proliferation. This scenario does not refute the value 
of nuclear weapons as a deterrent, but certainly shows 
their limitations when in the hands of Israel under con- 
ditions of limited wars. 
Stanley Hoffmann defines and describes Imisescalationt 
in the followinG tray: t ... embroilment that comes not 
from a wrong calculation, but from a process beyond 
calculation.. " . crises of misescalation indicate that 
in a world of acute competition there are times when 
calculations - rational or unreasonable - become impossible. ' See Hoffman, op. c t. p. 102. 
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These possible misperceptions about the nature of 
nuclear weapons were and sometimes still are, common to 
other nuclear or potential nuclear. powers. They stem from 
the paradoxical situations created by the peculiar nature 
of nuclear weapons and the blurring of the distinctions 
between deterrence and defence. 
(') 
To state that mis- 
' perceptions exist does not necessarily moan that nuclear 
deterrence would not work, or that nuclear weapons in the 
hands of Israel would be more dangerous for her own security 
or for the stability of the world, than the same weapons 
in the hands of the super powers. What it does mean 
hoi: ever, is that in her diplomatic relations with the 
super powers, Israel would have suffered considerably had 
she gone nuclear. Also, and perhaps even more importantly, 
in terms of the strategic objectives destined for nuclear 
weapons, Israel could have witnessed a completely different 
outcome than the one envisaged. 
The Uses of Nuclear Options 
A much more sophisticated approach is that dealing 
with the effects - both strategic and diplomatic - of a 
nuclear option. Here it is not yet clear what objectives 
were sought by Israel. One could however list some of 
those that cane about as a result from actual policies and 
(1) For an excellent analytical study of the distinctions 
between these two concerns, see Glenn H. Snyder, 
Deterrence and Defence : Towards a Theory of National 
Security , Princeton, 1961. 
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tactics. To begin with, one has to differentiate between 
the 'Arab' front and that of the super powers. Towards 
each of them, Israel could hav3 pursued different aims, 
using the existence of a nuclear option as a strategic and 
diplomatic leverage. What is therefore interesting to 
note, is the ability (either pursued or just put forward 
here) to use the nuclear option as both a deterrent and a 
compellent. 
As has been pointed out before, the concepts of 
deterrence and conpellence are strategic in nature and 
therefore presumably should have been limited to this field. 
It seems however, that these very concepts can serve as 
effective tools for the analysis of diplomatic behaviour 
as well. Differences could arise when the concept of 
coercion (which has its deterrence and compellent aspects) 
is introduced. Here the role of diplomacy ends and 
violence takes over. Thus, only within the realm of 
diplomatic threats, can the concepts of deterrence and 
compellonce be introduced. One could however stretch 
this by pointing out that at a certain level the invocation 
of diplomatic threats which do not escalate into violence, 
are similar to $coercion' in the field of strategy. It 
seems however, that this would not be the case with the 
threat to Igo nuclear'. The threat itself can be used as 
both a compellent and a deterrent. But once the threat 
has been invoked, there is no way to use the actual nuclear 
weapons as a deterrent against the kinds of actions which 
were hoped to be deterred by the threat of 'going nuclear'. 
The same is applicable in part to its use as a compellent. 
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The real, and most significant, issue raised by 
the development of an Israeli nuclear option, was not 
the abtual production of nuclear weapons, but rather the 
ways in which the option of producing these weapons were 
used. These uses are evidenced in either a clear or a 
tacit way and are partly based on intentional or unwitting 
ambiguity. 
The great concern of the super powers about the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation, is already a well estab- 
lished fact in international politics. This concern is 
shared by Britain as a nuclear power as well. Furthermore 
it could be argued that neither France(1) and China, 
specially the first, is keen on nuclear proliferation. 
As usual in international politics, this concern of the 
super powers was aroused belatedly, sometime at the be- 
ginning of the sixties. But it was some time after that, 
that a common policy to halt proliferation was reached. 
By 1968 the Non Proliferation Treaty had at last been 
accepted by the United Nations General Assembly. The 
super powers had meanwhile succeeded in developing new 
techniques and methods which would reduce the dangers to 
themselves of proliferation, and had also started the 
process of withdrawal from various parts of the world - 
independently of any nuclear proliferation. These two 
developments could have made the need for an anti- 
ý1) On the French position see inter alia, r". endel Wolf, 
'French Attitudes on Disarnamentl, Disarmament, 
June 1967, reprinted in Su r rival, December 1967 
0 
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proliferation policy less pressing. However, again 
because of the length of time between the creation of 
new images to correspond with the realities of the inter- 
national system, and the changes in the 'objectives 
reality and interests, it was probable that the super 
powers' joint policy against nuclear proliferation would 
remain high on their list of priorities for some time to 
come. 
Both before and after the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
was endorsed by the United Nations, America was extremely 
concerned about the Dinona project in Israel, but perhaps 
is at present overshadowed by other pressing issues 
involved in the continuous crisis in the Middle East. This 
concern had not subseded since the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Before the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been endorsed, the 
two super powers were already trying to bring pressure to 
bear upon their allies, clients, close powers and nonaligned 
alike, to accept some control or inspection over centres of 
nuclear production in these countries., This was done with 
a dual objective. First, to disallow proliferation before 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been ratified. Second, in 
order to halt proliferation by the independent measures of 
the super powers in case the Non-Proliferation Treaty would 
not become operational after all. However, after the Non- 
Proliferation Treaty had been accepted by the United Nations, 
the aim of the super powers became to p-ersuade the non- 
nuclear-weapon states to sign and ratify the Non-Prolifer- 
ation Treaty. The pressure had been successful and resulted 
in the question becoming really: what kinds of inducement 
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and bribe could the super powers offer to the near-nuclear- 
weapon states? 
In the case of Israel published evidence is 
negligible because of the nature of diplomatic and 
strategic negotiations. However it appears that the 
nuclear option had been used or at least could have been 
used for the attainment of the followirg alternative 
purposes: 
(a) Mithin the context of possible arms control negotiations 
on the }fiddle East. Here the idea was that Israel's 
superiority over the Arabs in'nuclear development, would 
enable her to demand limitations by the super powers on the 
supplies of conventional arms to the Arab countries'. It 
is reasonable to assume, that the aim was to apply controls 
to the supplies of Soviet conventional weapons to the Arab 
countries, specially those weapons in which the Arabs - with 
the help of Russia - achieved meaningful superiority over 
Israel. 
Israel has demanded on several 6ccasions(1) precisely 
(1) This demand has been formulated in the notion of 
'general and complete disarmament for the i"Iiddle Fast'. 
See for example, Den Gurion in the Knesset on 5.6.1963 (Fifth F. nesset, Second Session, vol. 30, p. 1985); Fsh1ol and 
Argov on 26.6.10.63 (Fifth I{nesset, Second Session, vol. 33, 
pp. 2203-2204); Eshkol on 7.8.1963 in the Knesset. On all 
these occasions the call was for disarmament under mutual 
control and inspection, namely Arab and Israeli, but the 
implication was that the big powers must first stop sending 
arms to the Area. The role of the big powers in this 
context had been spelt out more clearly by slu: ol on 
18.5.1966 in the Knesset when ho said I... Ho... who 
really wishes to take away from the people living in the 
Middle Bast the fear of the arms race... should work for 
General disarmament in the Middle : -ast, or at least limit- 
ations of armaments of all kinds, while striking a 
reasonable balance... 1 
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such a control over the supplies of conventional weapons 
to the 1"Siddle East. This demand, coupled with Israel's 
refusal to negotiate separately on the imposition of 
controls over nuclear production, led several observers 
to conclude that her superiority in the field of atomic 
research was being used as a bargaining counter. . For 
several years Israel maintained that she was not prepared 
to discuss the several proposals for controls on nuclear 
proliferation in the Tfiddle rast. Such a refusal osten- 
sibly made for a very tough bargaining position, but its 
very extremity created great concern which in its turn was 
not conducive to any bargaining process. At a later 
stage and under the Eshl: ol government, a new notion was 
introduced, namely that 'Israel would not be the first to 
introduce nuclear weapons into the fiddle Eastt. 
(') 
With 
such a change of position on problems of arms control and 
disarmament, Israel did not abandon its bargaining counter, 
just made it both more tacit and at the same time more 
conducive to a process of bargaining. The fact that 
Israelis initiative on controlling the conventional arms 
race did not succeed, was not due to the limitations of 
the atomic option as a compellent within the context of 
relations with the super powers, but because of other con- 
siderations which worked against this initiative. Taking 
into consideration the great military victory of 1967, which 
(1) This notion had been formulated by Eslihol himself in 
1965. He repeated and reemphasized it in the : Lr_esset 
on 18.5.1966 when he said: 11 have said before and I 
repeat here that Israel does not have nuclear weapons 
and that Israel will not be the first to introduce 
them into the region'. 
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was accomplished with conventional weapons, one could also 
argue the possibility that at least some Israeli decision 
makers were ready to do without arms control over 
conventional weapons in the Tiiddle Last. In any case it 
would appear that several Israeli decision makers were 
sceptical in the first place about any prospects of arms 
control over any type of weapons. This was partly due to 
the General Israeli approach to the notion: - of arms control 
and disarmament. 
However the nuclear option remains as an important 
bargaining counter in any future arms control negotiations. 
It would certainly cease to be so if Israel 'went nuclear'. 
The nature of nuclear weapons is such, that the very fact 
that they have once been produced means that a critical 
threshold has been passed. In that sense it resembles the 
actual use of these weapons. Once they have been used a 
certain taboo has been infringed0) upon and the situation 
has changed in a basic qualitative way. 
(b) The demand for guarantees or military alliances. 
The information on this point is again vague and to a 
certain extent contradictory. The problem of guarantees 
is a crucial one in the foreign and defence policy of Israel. 
To begin with, the question is to what extent there ever was 
a readiness on the part of Israel to 'delegate? the guarantee 
of her security to a foreign power. U hat is certain is that 
(1) On the notion of the 'nuclear taboo' see inter alia 
Stanley IIoffmarnhopl cit. , p" 99. The term had been 
coined by Raymond Aron. 
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both Prime Ministers Ben-Gurion and Eshkol sought some kind 
of military alliance with Western powers or with Nato. 
(1 
At the same time it is clear that a very strong tradition 
in Israel never accepted that Israel could depend, in any 
circumstances, on outside military guarantees. This 
contradiction can be partly explained in two ways: first 
that there was a search for alternatives and for the 
maximilisation of security; second, that some division of 
opinion always existed between the two approaches. (The 
war of 1967 and the crisis preceding it convinced the 
majority of public opinion in Israel that outside military 
guarantees were not credible in any cased) In the event 
that military -uarantees could not be secured, would a 
political guarantee or commitment do? If the two super 
powers had given a joint political commitment to Israel 
this might have amounted to something. A joint commitment 
however, did not appear to be on the cards. 
(2) 
America 
on the other hand had already several times indicated its 
strong political commitment to Israel. The real problem 
remained of how to turn this commitment into a tangible 
formal military one. This however, has not been forthcoming 
(1). See for example Bar-Zohar, op. cit. pp. 182-184; 
256-258; 292-294. 
(2) Since the 1967 war, there have been repeated indi- 
cations that the Soviet Union might consider the 
possibility of participating in a sy stem of joint 
political guarantees to the integrit y of the terri- 
torial status quo (the pre 1967 one) , of all the 
states in the ; diddle last, On the possible use of 
the Israeli nuclear option to secure such a guarantee, 
see Sources of Conflict in the Midd le East , Adelphi Paper No. 26, Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 
March 1966, pp. 43-44. 
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because of other factors which proved to be more important 
than the question of the nuclear option and nuclear pro- 
liferation. 
Indeed the pertinent question has been, on the one 
hand, the extent to which Israel was ready to use the option 
in order to secure strategic and diplomatic advantages and, 
on the other, how high on the super powers' list of priorities 
the problem of nuclear proliferation was; again, to what 
extent was America ready to extend precisely such military 
guarantees to near-nuclear-weapons states in general and 
Israel in particular. If, hypothetically, Israel was really 
just interested in 'going nuclear' and not in any alternative 
to it, then no 'give and take' game could have been developed 
as far as relations with America were concerned. Similarly, 
if America perceived the policy against nuclear proliferation 
as being very low on its list of priorities, no bargain, nor 
even a process of bargaining could have been initiated. 
What should be stressed is that nuclear proliferation as a 
problem, and the acquisition of a nuclear option as an asset, 
were extremely important in the relations between Israel and 
the United States, but at the same time were not independent 
of many other considerations. Under such conditions, the 
obvious outcome is a middle way in which no critical decision 
is taken on either side. 
It should also be added that it is doubtful whether 
Israel had in the past, or for that matter in the present as 
well, recognised to the full, the bargaining instru.: ient she 
has in the form of a nuclear option. 
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To be ready to use the option entails a decision 
not to'go nuclear' and at the same time ability to make 
a decision as to what quid-pro-quo is required in general 
or at any particular time. In the changing circumstances 
of the 1970's, after the war of 1967 and with the growing 
realisation of the possibility of American withdrawal from 
parts of the world, the ability to secure formal American 
military guarantees for Israel seems to be less probable. 
At the same time the interest of the super powers in the 
success of the lion-Proliferation Treaty have been main- 
tained and their fear of nuclear proliferation in the 
volatile PTiddle Last, must also have become more evident. 
An American military guarantee to Israel might mean inter- 
national confrontation, in case local deterrence between 
Egypt and Israel failed and Russia had extended similar 
military guarantees to Egypt. On the other hand, if 
America did not extend these guarantees, what else could 
Israel demand and accept from the United States as a quid- 
pro-quo for not 'going nuclear'? 
The answer is of course complicated. To begin with, 
Israel's decision to 'go or not to go nuclear) should not 
depend simply on the basis of its relations with the United 
States but in the first place on the basis of hard strategic 
considerations vis-a-vis the Arab world. Second, " diplo- 
matic relations with America have more than one dimension. 
At the present, it appears already that there are several 
differences of opinion between America and Israel on the 
question of how to solve the crisis that has engulfed the 
Israeli-Arab region since 1967. This is an example of 
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one central issue for bargaining. Furthermore America 
has several potential forms of pressure against Israel 
in other fields. The nuclear option could be used to 
counteract these American bargaining counters. 
(c) Another use and possibly the most feasible, 
lies in the field of supplies of conventional arms. Both 
super powers have found it more convenient to supply arms 
rather than to Give guarantees or commitments and thus 
run the risk of becoming directly involved on behalf of 
their client states or close friends in the Middle East. 
The Soviet Union found it the easiest way out of its 
Middle East debacle in 1967 when she was asked by her Arab 
allies either to participate in the war and save them from 
the Israeli army, or at least to secure the immediate 
return of the occupied territories. Instead of doing 
either, Russia concentrated on supplying vast amounts of 
conventional arms to her allies. Taking into consider- 
ation the gradual loss of credibility in Israel of any 
outside military guarantees, it appeared from the point 
of view of both sides, that the best way out for the 
United States, would be to agree to supply conventional 
arms to Israel of the amount and quality required. If 
Israel 'went nuclear' it is highly probable that America 
would become less ready to maintain the supply of weapons. 
The discussion of guarantees should be supplemented 
by one further consideration, namely the readiness of the 
super powers under the Resolution of 19.6.1968 of the 
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Security Council(l), to come to the aid of any state, party 
to the Non-Proliferation Treaty attacked or threatened by 
(1ý 'Resolution of Security Assurances Adopted by the 
United Nations Security Council, 19.6.1968, 
'The Security Council 
'Noting with appreciation the desire of a large 
number of states to subscribe to the Treaty on the 
Non Proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thereby 
to undertake not to receive the transfer fron any 
transferer whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices or of control over such 
weapons or 'explosive devices directly, or indirectly; 
not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not 
to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture 
of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. 
'Taking into consideration the concern of certain 
of these states that, in conjunction with their ad- 
herence to the Treaty on the non proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, appropriate measures be undertaken 
to safeguard their security, 
'Bearing in mind that any aggression accompanied 
by the use of nuclear weapons would endanger the 
peace and security of all states, 
11. Recognizes that aggression with nuclear weapons 
or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear- 
weapon state would create a situation in which the 
Security Council, and above all its nuclear-weapon 
state permanent members, would have to act immediately 
in accordance with their obligations under the United 
Nations Charter; 
12. Welcomes the intention expressed by certain 
status that they will provide or support immediate 
assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any 
non-nuclear-weapon state party to the treaty on the 
Non Proliferation of nuclear weapons that is a victim 
of an act or object of a threat of aggression in which 
nuclear weapons are used; 
13. Reaffirms in particular the inherent right, 
recognized under Article 51 of the Charter of indi- 
vidual and collective self-defence if an armed attack 
occurs against a member of the United Nations, until 
the Security Council has taken measures necessary to 
maintain international peace and security'. 
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nuclear weapons. It is evident that contrary to the 
situation of other near-nuclear-weapon states like. India, 
Japan or Germany, Israol is not at present interested in 
a guarantee by the super powers or the United States, 
against nuclear threats or attacks. After all Israel 
is much more advanced in nuclear technology than Egypt, 
and in any case Egypt does not possess nuclear weapons. 
The Security Council guarantee - for what it is worth - 
can not thereforö increase Israel's security in any way. 
The same observation also applies to other types of 
guarantees against nuclear weapons or nuclear threats, 
like the idea of a joint guarantee by the two super powers 
which some Indian decision makers had in mind. 
') 
However, the Security Council guarantee and other 
possible future guarantees against the use of nuclear 
weapons or*the threat of their use, could apply adversely 
- 
(1) One example has been the indications that Shastri 
sought at a certain stage precisely such a 
guarantee. This guarantee could have taken'the 
form-of a four power guarantee (of all the nuclear 
powers) or of a three powers guarantee (USA, 
Soviet Union and Britain) or even-of a super 
powers' guarantee. Shastri himself denied that 
he asked for nuclear guarantees but the press 
kept suggesting that. - (See inter alia Daily 
Express , 
8.1.1965; "The Hindu , 21.1.1965; 
The Hindu , 28.1.1965; The Guardian , 8,7,1965. 
Many other members of the Indian political elite 
thought about such a possibility, which was 
considered by them as the only alternative to an 
independent nuclear deterrent. 
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to Israel if she ever decided to tgo nuclear' in the 
future. Because of the general attitude of the nuclear 
powers about proliferation, it seems inconceivable that 
Egypt would be in a position to acquire nuclear weapons 
from one of the present nuclear powers, and it is not 
in a position to produce them by herself. Thus it appears 
that in the medium-range future, Israel will only face a 
non-nuclear Egypt. This could only change if the whole 
anti proliferation policy embodied in the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, were to fail, and the super powers decided to let 
the tendencies towards proliferation continue without con- 
trol. (It is still doubtful whether even in such a 
situation proliferation would take place on a large scale. ) 
If this happened, it is conceivable that one of the non 
status quo nuclear powers might supply Egypt with nuclear 
weapons or with the know how and technology to produce them. 
In the absence of such a development, Egypt would remain 
a non-nuclear power for a long time and a nuclear Israel 
would have to reckon with the possibility that the Security 
Council's guarantee, or for that matter, another guarantee 
might be sought against her. At first sight it would seem 
improbable that a guarantee of this nature would be invoked 
in case-of a successful Arab attack which led to an Israeli 
threat to use her nuclear weapons as a last resort. The 
real question however, is the definition of a 'last resort'; 
also a definition of which side started the war. Though the 
Security Council guarantee could be invoked only if the 
three nuclear powers - America, Russia and Britain - agreed 
to. impose it (each of them can use the veto right against a 
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resolution calling for its invocation), it still remains 
as a partial measure against nuclear threats. Thus, if 
Israel ever decided to 'go nuclear' it would be important 
from her point of view that first, the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty be ratified and thus diminish the danger that Egypt 
would follow suit; also, that certain rules of behaviour 
concerning the Security Council guarantee be worked out. 
The latter requirement would be less important if Israel 
did not go nuclear but just retained her option. However, 
the first requirement would still remain crucial and for 
the following reason: 
If Egypt acceded to t1 Non-Proliferation Treaty, the 
chances are against her attaining a high level of nuclear 
potential before the safeguards and controls under the Non 
Proliferation Treaty were activated towards her. Israel 
therefore could keep its lead in the field of nuclear 
technology. Superiority in the field of 'nuclear options' 
would enable Israel to use its option more flexibly for 
bargaining purposes. She would therefore find it a useful 
diplomatic instrument. This would be perhaps less the case 
if Arab anxiety got beyond reasonable limits. 
The success of theeNon-Proliferation Treaty depends 
partly on Israel's adherence. But doing so, would only 
mean that the system 
future progress, not 
phase of her nuclear 
Furthermore, under a: 
Israel, like all the 
withdraw from it, if 
of safeguards and controls halted 
cancelled her previous work. The 
option would thus at most remain static* 
rticle 10 of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
other parties to the treaty, could always 
'..... it decides that extraordinary 
ý.. rý 
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events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have 
jeopardized the supreme interests of its country'. Thus 
it is in Israel's interest that the Non Proliferation Treaty 
should operate, whether she wishes to 'go nuclear', or only 
to keep her option and use it for bargaining purposes. 
Could the option be used against the Arab states as 
well, in order to achieve some political and strategic ad- 
vantages? Indeed this possibility has been elaborated upon 
to some extent in Israel. 
') 
It appears that it has been 
suggested or believed that a degree of uncertainty towards 
the option would serve a certain political and strategic 
purpose. Here however, the main idea was not the use of 
the option itself as a bargaining counter, but the attempt 
to create intentional ambiguity about the stage of nuclear 
development which the country had reached. In other words, 
it was not a use of the option, but the actual weapon. 
Thus, without actually producing it, the deterrence effect 
of nuclear weapons would be achieved. 
Several more uses of the option must be considered. 
These can be summed up under the title of 'psychological 
nuclear deterrent'. This has the following elements: 
a) the threat that Israel might go nuclear would be 
sufficient to deter the Arabs from attacking Israel; b) the 
creation and existence of a nuclear option in Israel, would 
prove to the Arabs the scientific and technological superiority 
of Israel. Thus it would deter them from contemplating the 
(1) See 'Symposium on Foreign and Defence Policy', 
. 
at , No. 1, September 1966. Those participating in 
the symposium were Eshkol, Eban, Galiji, Barsilai, 
Peres. 
397 
possibility that they could ever compete with Israel in 
-science and technology. As scientific and technological 
superiority or parity are essential as a prerequisite for 
military victory, the Arabs would relinquish hopes of ever 
defeating Israel. The option serves as a symbol of 
Israels will for survival and an element of frustration 
for the Arabs. Indeed, this particular element could be 
described as 'deterrence by frustration'. c) In a more 
limited way, the existence of the option could convince the 
Arabs of the superiority of Israel in the nuclear field, 
and thus deter them from ever contemplating the creation 
of nuclear weapons. This implied threat appears to be the 
rationale underlining-Yigal Allon's remark that 'Israel 
would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into 
the Middle East but she would not be the second either' 
The element of ambiguity has undergone considerable 
change over the time. During Ben-Gurion's government, 
Israel's official policy first cloaked the Dimona project 
in secrecy, and later maintained that the project was simply 
intended for peaceful uses. Insistence on this explanation, 
and opposition to any idea of arms control in this field, 
only aggravated Arab suspicions and created a conviction 
that Israel was indeed planning to Abo nuclear' at the first 
possible moment, 
(") 
The introduction of the formula that 
(1) On 23.12.1960, immediately after the first reports on 
Dimona, : asser mentioned the co rater measures that the 
Unit will : lave to take against t. --e possibility that 
Israel will produce nuclear weapons. (Broadcasted by 
Radio Cairo on 23.12.1960); much of the later Arab 
commentary on the question simply tool: for Granted that 
Israel is aiming to 'GO nuclear', and concentrated on 
the best Arab strategies t6 encounter this possibility 
or to deter it. 
(VI f0i ýiwiýi, Gýýýtrrýirý lti"it. WýT 
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'Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons 
into the Middle East t, *rerioved a certain ambiguity and 
introduced a degree of certainty about Israel's terms for 
tacit bargaining. 
As far as the Arabs were concerned, the riain question 
was: to what extent were the uses of the Israeli option, 
as described above, effective? Furtheinore, to what extent 
was the role of ambiguity within this context constructive 
or counterproductive from the view point 'of the Israeli 
national interest. However, an extensive and thorough 
analysis of the Arab position and reaction to the atomic 
development in Israel, would require a separate and lengthy 
article. Suffice it to say that basically, the creation 
of an Israeli atomic option does not appear to have chanced 
the pattern and characteristics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
It did create great anxiety amongst some Arab decision- 
makers, mainly in Egypt: it contributed to the escalation 
in the arms race; 
(1) 
it initiated in Egypt the concept of 
( 
'preventive wart2) and also the threat that Egypt, itself 
(1) There have been suggestions that the Egyptian missile 
effort started after the disclosures about the Dimona 
project (see Said Fariha, a Lebanese journalist who 
quoted Haikal on this, and also Heikal in ai-Ä. hr= 
20.7.1962). There are however two other versions as to 
the question of when did this missile effort start. 
First, suggested by Safran, in From War to rar that 
Egypt started with this effort only later on and as a 
reaction to the launching of the Israeli Shavit 2 
experimental rocket (namely in 1961). Second, that they 
started earlier, namely in 1959-1960. (See John H. 
Hoagland, Jr., and John B. Teeple, 'Regional Stability 
and Weapons Transfer: The Middle Eastern Case t, Orbis , Fall 1965). 
(2) See inter ilia, I: eilcal, al-Ahram. 20.8.1965; President 
Nasser in a press conference on 18.2.1966, and again in 
a speech on 22.2.1966 (see for the first declaration BBC 
Monitoring Service 22.2.1966; for the second speech see BBC Monitoring Service M/2096,22.2,1966). 
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might `go nuclear' if Israel were to do the same. 
(1) 
Most 
important of all, the conflict continued to develop in its 
traditional way in the sense that when Arab-Israeli 
hostility became interwoven with intra-Arab competition at 
a critical point, and when violence became more intensive 
along the borders, a major political crisis exploded which 
eventually escalated into the war of 1967. 
Conclusions 
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Three basic problems are involved in this discussion: 
a) the extent to which the possessor of a nuclear option is 
ready to use that option in order to secure strategic and 
diplomatic advantages. It appears that in Israel this 
use was limited, partly due to the consideration that an 
option is something which should not be interfered with 
(and the kinds of uses which have been suggested here imply 
that at a certain logical point there would be some inter- 
ference), partly because, at least in the beginning, Israel 
was unconscious of being able to use the option for such 
purposes. However, at a later date there was more readiness 
to use it for diplomatic and strategic bargaining. 
(1) 'See inter alia Heikal, al-Ahram, 15.10.1965; 
The UAR Deputy Premier, Dr. IIatin told a 
Japanese journalist that if Israel went nuclear, 
the UAR would do the same. See BBC Monitoring 
Service IIB/2076,1.2,1966, quoting Radio Cairo 
on this (the original report teas . published 
in 
al-:: asä Lebanon). 
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b) the readiness or lack of readiness of the outside 
powers to be persuaded by the option, depends again on the 
priority they give to the problem of nuclear proliferation 
and on the other interests involved in their relations with 
Israel. To the extent that a policy of anti-proliferation 
becomes the overriding consideration, America would have 
been more prepared to put pressure on Israel not to 'go 
nucleart, yet would also be more prepared to give Israel 
growing advantages as a quid-pro-quo. As far as the Arab 
world is concerned, and Egypt in the first place, it is 
inconceivable that the existence of a nuclear option would 
change the basic pattern of conflict either way, or the 
basic strategies employed by the two sides. The existence 
of the nuclear option in the hands of Israel could however 
secure one important purpose only, namely that it would 
serve as a tacit deterrent against Egypt tgoing nuclear', 
if the latter were to acquire the ability to coppeto With 
Israel in this field. This statement must be qualified: 
first, if Egypt ever decided that nuclear weapons in the 
hands of both sides would be a preferable situation to the 
present one. Second, if that being so, Egyptian decision- 
makers believed that during the time between the production 
of an Israeli bomb in consequence of this Egyptian decision, 
and the production of an Egyptian bomb, Israel would be 
unable to use her nuclear weapons in any way. Third, if 
one of the nuclear powers decided to extend extensive aid 
to Egypt in this field. All these three considerations must 
be cumulative. 
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c) The pertinent question is whether to increase the 
ambiguity and resulting uncertainty, surrounding the Israeli 
nuclear option or to reduce it. Every threat involves some 
uncertainty, which on many occasions derive from intentional 
or unintentional ambiguity. However one should first dis- 
tinguish here between two types of ambiguity. On the one 
hand there is the ambiguity concerning the actual stage of 
nuclear development. On the other hand there is the 
element of ambiguity involved with any threat about 'what 
would happen in the future if deterrence or compellence 
failed'. The first type of ambiguity, in the context of 
intense international conflict between Israel and Egypt, 
can create many anxieties, suspicions and uncertainties 
that would not be conducive to any rational reaction to the 
inducement or deterrent created by the Israeli nuclear 
option. The second type of ambiguity is perhaps more 
conducive to a process of rational bargaining. However, 
even here as far as the relations with Egypt are concerned, 
what could be achieved is the deterrent effect against EGypt 
'going nuclear' itself, rather than any other objective 
either in the realm of deterrence or compellence. And in 
any case, with whatever degree of ambiguity, the main effect 
of the option within the context of Israeli-Egyptian relations 
would be to serve as such a deterrent. 
Still, it appears that diminishing ambiguity of both 
types about Israeli intentions would serve to somewhat calm 
those Arab anxieties which are not conducive to a rational 
process of bargaining. Some ambiguity of the second type must 
remain, insofar as Israeli reactions to possible Arab moves 
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are problematic, but this ambiguity should operate only*in 
the context of the deterrence posture and not that of the 
compellence posture. 
d) The experience of the Israeli retaliation policy 
of the 1950's on the one hand, and of nuclear diplomacy 
between the super powers on the other hand shows the very 
limited advantages that could be accrued from the use of 
the option as an instrument of compellence. Usually such 
a use in the Israeli-Egyptian context brought about escal- 
ation and not successful compellence. As has been pointed 
out above, the result in the American-Israeli context, of 
the use of the option as a compellent, may be different 
partly because what is involved is not strategic, but purely 
diplomatic relations. 
It appears therefore that the existence of the 
nuclear option in Israel can serve as another instrument in 
her diplomatic and strategic process of bargaining with the 
super powers and the Arab world. To invoke this option 
would'close, for Israel, these and future avenues of diplo- 
matic and strategic bargaining. 
This discussion does not consider whether or not 
Israel should have started at all with the Dirona project 
or whether she could have in fact secured some advantages by 
other means. It merely points out the present advantages 
and disadvantages for Israel of the option, and to some of 
the possible results of invoking it. 
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Appendix II 
"7Di ."CIO 
Or ARGUMENTS "VOICED 
lit 
ISflADL IN yý} 
PUBLIC DEBATE ON T} NUCLEAR ISSUE , 
Arguments against Nuclear Weapons 
1. The suspicion that Israel is developing nuclear weapons 
encourages an atomic arms race in the region, 
(') 
2. The world cannot remain indifferent to what Israel is doing 
in the nuclear field. 
(2) 
3. There is a need for a complete nuclear disarmament in 
the world. 
(3) 
The implication is that the same principle 
must apply to the Middle East as well. 
4. As long as the nuclear weapons are in the hands of the 
four big powers their exclusive responsibility for the fate 
of humanity restrains them. There is also hope that they 
will come to some agreement on disarmament. 
(4) 
5. If many states become nuclear the probability of nuclear 
wars will increase. This is mainly because there are many 
irresponsible leaders. 
(5) 
It is not clear whether the first part of the argument 
stems from the mathematical argument, i. e. that an increase in 
the number of nuclear powers will bring, by necessity, a high 
(1) Peled, Knesset, 5.7.1966. 
(2) Avneri, Knesset, 5.7,1966. 
(3) Sneh, Knesset, 31.10.1961. 
(4) Hazan, Kne____sset, 6.8.1962. 
i5) i-" 
(+) Some of the passages quoted below are expressed in somewhat tortuous English 
and sometim9s appear wilfully ignorant of the terms of the strategic debate. 
However, as Dr. Johnson remarked, a translator's business is to translate 
his author and rot to improve him. 
4 04 
probability of nuclear wars, notwithstanding whether the 
leaders are responsible or not, or whether it is based on the 
argument of lack of responsibility of the small powers. 
6. Armed conflict in every part of the world, even with 
conventional weapons, threatens to spread all over the world. 
This becomes a certainty in the case of a local nuclear war. 
(') 
7. The economic burden involved in nuclear weapons develop- 
went is enormous and hence economic development in general 
will be severely hampered. 
(2) 
8. Nuclear weapons cannot serve as a substitute for con- 
ventional arms. A good example is the U. S. where there has 
recently been a change in military doctrine and a new emphasis 
on conventional forces. 
(3) 
9. It is not conceivable that Israel will be able to develop 
nuclear weapons by herself, and thus the big powers will 
intervene before the completion of work and all the investment 
will be loste(4) 
10, "Atoms for peace" activities are very important, but it 
is difficult to distinguish between a peaceful reactor and a 
military one. 
(5) 
The implication of this being that it is preferable not 
to establish even a peaceful reactor. 
11. The development of missiles and atomic weapons will bring 
about a dangerous arms race* 
(6) 
(1) Hazan, Knesset, 6.8.1962. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) ibid. 
(4) ibid. 
(5) ibid. 
(6) ibid. 
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12. There is indeed a balance of terror between the two super 
powers but it will not exist as between Israel and the Arabs, 
and this is for two reasons: (a) The warning time period in 
the Arab Israeli case is much shorter than in the super powers' 
case; (b) The super powers have a second strike capability. 
(1) 
The notion of second strike capability recurs frequently 
in the writings of the opposition to nuclear programmes. Al- 
though it has not received any thorough treatment. 
(2) 
13" In a nuclear arms race in the region Israel will not have 
the upper hand. The proof is in the work going on in Egypt 
in the field of non-conventional weapons. 
(3) 
14. The Arab Israeli conflict is basically a political one 
and deterrence is not the way to solve this conflict, 
(4) 
1$. Israel-German co-operation in the field of atomic energy 
isolates Israel in the world and puts a stigma on Israel. 
(5) 
16. A small Israel with a great concentration of population 
along the narrow coast is more vulnerable to nuclear weapons 
than the Arab countries which are vast, with a dispersed 
population* 
(6) 
17. The big powers are united in their opposition to nuclear 
proliferation. 
(7) 
(1) Hazan, Knesset, 12.11.1962. 
(2) See for other examples: Livneh, Ha'aretz, 7.2.1963. 
(3) Nikunis, Knesset, 20.3.1963. 
(4+) Mikunis, Knesset, 25.6.1963. 
(5) Sneh, Knesset, 3.11.1964. 
(6) Barzilai, Knesset, 29.3.1965, 
(7) Barzilai, ibid. 
18. Only naive people can believe that nuclear weapons in 
a ©) 
the Middle East could create a "balance of terror". In the 
region it will only give birth to madness and a Gadarene race 
-towards-destruction. 
(' 
119. Because of the danger that a small nuclear power may 
facilitate a direct nuclear confrontation between the two 
super-powers, the latter will have to control this small 
nuclear power, and it will lose independence. 
(2) 
20. A small country developing nuclear weapons will be put 
on the map of nuclear retaliation of the super-powers. 
(3) 
21. If one side in the Arab-Israeli area has nuclear bombs, 
the other side will also have them sooner or later, and it 
is more probable sooner rather than later. Thus if Israel 
has the nuclear bomb it is beyond doubt that Egypt will also 
acquire one. The idea that Israel could secure an advantage 
over Egypt is therefore not valid* 
(4) 
The question is 
rather whether a situation whereby the two sides have nuclear 
bombs, i. e. a balance of terror will secure a situation of 
peace. 
22. It is not clear whether the balance of terror existing 
today between the two super-powers is really stable and 
final. 
(s) 
(1) Hazan, Knesset, 23.5.1966. 
(2) Avneri, Et gar, 31.5.1962. 
(3) ibid. 
(4) Avneri, Haolam Hazeh 29.8.1962, the same position also 
by Abramov, Tmurot, September 1962. 
(5) Avneri, HHaolam Hazah, 29.8.1962. 
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23. The leaders of the two super-powers are responsible. The 
same does not apply to the leaders in the Middle East. 
(') 
24. There is no hope for an Israeli nuclear ultimatum against 
Egypt, because in such a case either the U. S. or the U. S. S. R. 
will supply Egypt with nuclear bombs. 
(2) 
25. "Israel's security, like the security of Egypt and all 
the other Middle Eastern countries, will depend, in the long 
run, on unswerving efforts for an international agreement to 
free the region of all aggressive weapons in general, and of 
the new "unconventional" weapons in particular. "(3) 
26. The general outlook underlining part of the opposition 
to nuclear armaments in the Middle East is expounded in Victor 
Cigielman's article in New Outlook, where he - inter alia - 
quotes Lord Russell as follows: "The balance of power has 
never kept the peace in the past, and I don't see why it should 
in the future. The balance of power is a doctrine that has 
been advanced more or less since the contest between France and 
Spain in the time of Emperor Charles the Fifth.... The more 
dreadful the weapons are, the more you fear the enemy and the 
more you hate him. And therefore you are more ready to fight 
him. " Lord Russell does not think that "any rational person 
can expect victory. But only one per cent of mankind is 
rational. If you took a Gallup Poll of Americans and Russians 
on this question 'could we win a nuclear war? ' you would-find a 
(1) Avneri, *Haolam Hazeh, 29.8.1962. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) Victor Cigielman, New outlook, look, September 1962. 
great majority who would think they could. " Mr. Cigielman 
continues by saying: ''We may assume that a similar poll. 
carried out in Tel-Aviv or Cairo would obtain a similar res- 
ponse. "(') 
27. Nuclear arms in Israel invite super-power intervention 
and a danger for the loss of independence via American 
pressures. 
(2) 
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28. There is no point in postponing the decision about halting 
nuclear production. This is for two reasons: (a) If the 
nuclear establishment in the various Middle Eastern countries 
expands, the chances of imposing effective control will diminish; 
(b) the first stage in nuclear weapons' production is the most 
expensive one, and it would be worthwhile to try and get a 
"nuclear free zone" in the Middle East, and thus save the vast 
amounts of money that Israel has to spend now on this first 
stage. (All this within the framework of a discussion on a 
"nuclear free zone" under effective controls*)(: 
)) 
29. It is not probable that the Arab armies will try to launch 
a total offensive against Israel. It is more conceivable that 
they will concentrate on guerrilla attacks, Fedayeen-type 
activities. Against such attacks nuclear weapons do not seem 
to be a credible deterrent. 
(4) 
O. Nuclear war in the Middle East means complete destruction 
to Israel and only partial destruction to Egypt. Precisely 
(1) New Outlook, September 1962. 
(2) Avneri, Haolam Hazeh, November 1962. 
(3) ibid. 
(4) Yehuda Ben-Moshe, quoted in A1-Hamishman, 10.11.1962. 
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because of that there is no hope for mutual deterrence and 
there is a possibility that an Arab leader may decide one day 
that it is worthwhile to start a nuclear war because he thinks 
along the lines that it is better to give some sacrifice in 
order to destroy Israel completely. 
(') 
31. There will not be a state of mutual deterrence between 
Israel and the Arab countries because Israel will not 
conceive of attacking Arabs if they have only conventional arms. 
On the other hand the Arabs will not hesitate to attack with 
nuclear weapons if they have them. 
(2) 
32. If Indeed Israel has nuclear weapons first, the big powers 
will not allow Israel to enjoy this advantage for one moment. 
This could be done in one of two ways: (a) Egypt will be 
given the same quantity of nuclear weapons as Israel; (b) The 
big powers will take over the nuclear weapons that are in the 
hands of Israel, by direct action. 
(3) 
33. If indeed Israel has a relative advantage in terms of time 
over Egypt, as far as nuclear weapons production is concerned, 
it is advisable to use it as a bargaining leverage in the pro- 
cess of negotiations towards a'free from arms zone'in the Middle 
East. 
(4) 
34. Because the big powers will not allow only one side in the 
(1) Abramov, Tmurot, September 1962. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) Livneh, Ha'aretaz, 12.1001962. 
(4) i_. 
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Arab Israel conflict to have nuclear weapons, the power which 
"goes nuclear" first, is in fact acting for its enemy. This, 
because as has been stated in note 33, the big powers will re- 
dress the imbalance and the aggrieved power will get nuclear 
weapons without all the vast expenses. 
(') 
35" There is no basis to the argument that the call for a 
nuclear free zone in the "area" is hollow. Those opposing 
this demand claim that there is no hope for evolving a valid 
system of inspection. However the same people that raise this 
objection call at the same time for a General and Complete 
Disarmament, where inspection will be much more difficult. 
(2) 
36. "... Israel must take the initiative in calling upon the 
U. N. or more practically, upon the Soviet Union and America, 
to impose this nuclear disengagement... " (in the Arab countries 
and Israel - Y. Evron). 
(3) 
37. The Middle East is not a closed system. Thus there is 
no hope that one side in the Middle East would be able to 
utilise its technological and scientific superiority and pro- 
duce a final weapon without the other side importing it- 
(4) 
38. The scientific and technological effort invested were the 
result of objective needs, and thus the elaborate theory de- 
veloped around it should not continue. This has been mani- 
fested with the recent Test-Ban Treaty. 
(') 
(1) op. cit. 
(2) Moshe Erem, Davar, 1.1.1963. 
(3) New Outlook, May 1963. 
(4) Y. Eilam, Ha'aretz, 2.9.1963. 
(5) ibid. 
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39" Nuclear proliferation may bring about an annihilating war 
between Israel and Egypt in which the super-powers would stand 
-aside. 
C1 
The policy or strategy suggested by the opponents of 
"Israel going nuclear" had been formulated quite early in the 
public debate. This was the idea of nuclear disarmament of 
the Arab-Israeli region in one version or the Middle East in 
another version. The idea was that prior to the introduction 
of nuclear weapons into this particular area (under either 
definition), some sort of agreement would be reached by which 
this zone would be recognized as an atom free zone. There 
have been different ideas as to whams the safeguards or the 
system of control would be. 
1. The solution to the atomic problem is an Israeli political 
effort to bring about an atom free region, one possibility 
being a plan similar to the Rapacki Plan suggested for Europe. 
This would include Turkey and Iran as well, but Israel could 
not contribute much in this direction. Another possibility 
is a nuclear free zone comprising only the Arab-Israel area. 
(2) 
2. There is a danger that Egypt will decide to develop nuclear 
weapons in order to destroy Israel. It is therefore important 
that Israel mobilizes every political force in an effort to bring 
about a situation whereby the atomic arms race will not spread 
to the area. 
(3) 
(1. ) Livneh, 'commenting on a famous debate between General 
Gallois and Henri Kissinger which took place in Paris; 
Ha1aretz, 6.12.1963. 
(2) Hazan, Knesset, 6.8.1962. 
(3) Galili, Knesset, 26.6.1962. 
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3. A call for an atom free zone in the Middle East, 
(ixikuns, 
Knesset, 12.11.1962; Mikunis, Knesset, 5.6,1963 in this dis- 
cussion Mikunis pointed out that in any case the U. S. was 
pulling its nuclear forces out of Turkey1 
4. A cal. for atom free zone in the Arab Israel area. Israel 
should take the initiative in keeping this new area out of the 
atom arms race* 
(2) 
5. On several occasions opponents of the official policy 
argued that there were moves on the part of the Arabs indicating 
a willingness to create a nuclear free zone either in the 
Arai- 
Middle East or in the jd Israel area. Thus on 15.1.1963 Sneh 
argued in the Knesset that Israel should have a dialogue with 
such Arab voices. While Nikunis argued on 13.10.1964 that 
in the joint Soviet/Egyptian communique, published after the 
visit by the Soviet Prime Minister to Egypt, it was stated 
that they would act together for an international agreement 
to turn the Middle East into an atom free zone. 
(3) 
6. The demand for a nuclear disarmament in the region has 
the 
chance of being supported by Moscow, Washington and 
London. 
7. The various advantages of an Israeli initiative in this 
direction are enumerated by Hazah as follows: "... Abdul Nasser 
(1) Mikunis, Knesset, 22.12.1964; Sneh, Knesset, 30.3.1965. 
(2) Mapam, Knesset, 13.11.1962; Hazan, Knesset, 24.6.1963; 
Barzilai, Knesset, 7.8.1963; Hazan, Knesset, 24.6.1963; 
Mikunis, Knesset, 22.10,1963; Sneh, Knesset, 6.1.1964 
7.3,196k ; in a rather and 17.20 1962=9-'ri*ikunis, Kness t, 17.3,1964; - 
limited way Galili, Knesset, 15.7,1964; Mapam, Knesset, 
20.7.1964; Maki, Knesset, 20.7,1964; Barzilai, Knesset, 
12.10.1964. 
(3) See also Sneh, Knesset, 30.3,1o65. 
(4) Barzilai, Knesset, 29.3.65, 
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declared that he wishes to have a'nuclear free zone in our 
region. " When these words came following his declarations 
about his preparations for a destructive war against Israel, 
then his words lack any persuasive credibility. But we 
have to take the initiative into our hands and to put him to 
trial before the whole world. `e have to declare that we are 
ready to negotiate with him about means that can assure nuclear 
disarmament and inspection of it... We start here with a 
peace offensive that will put the onus of responsibility of 
the future on the big powers and Egypt,.. "(') 
8. The demand for a nuclear free zone should be directed at 
the big powers so that they will not allow the introduction 
of nuclear weapons into the area. 
(2) 
9. A proposal for partial disarmament and especially nuclear 
disarmament may be an opening for peace in the Arab/Israeli 
conflict and at least will serve as a political asset. 
(3) 
10. General and Complete Disarmament between Israel and the 
Arab countries is not feasible because it can come only after 
Global General and Complete Disarmament. Therefore this 
slogan of the government id not realistic. What is realistic 
is the'Middle East as a nuclear free zone* 
(1) Knesset, 23.5.1966. 
(2) Galili, Knesset, 13.10.1964. 
(3) Una, Knesset, 4.3.1963. 
(4) M. Sneh, Ka, 16.8.1963. 
X14 
Arguments in Favour of Nuclear Weapons Or a Nuclear Option 
(1) t: ith conventional weapons, -Egypt can hope to reach a 
----decisive superiority-over Israel. 
(') 
(2) In a nuclear arms race, Nasser will be afraid that 
Israel will have a decisive superiority over Egypt. 
(2) 
(3) Nuclear arms in the hands of Israel may force Nasser to 
come to terms with Israel. 
0 
ýý A nuclear balance, namely nuclear weapons in the hands 
of both Israel and the Arabs will be no worse than the 
present situation* 
(4) 
(5) A nuclear balance namely a situation in which both sides 
will be equipped with nuclear weapons, may bring about a 
situation of mutual deterrence and no military action. During 
this period there will be a hope that the two sides will 
understand that military action is not a necessity. Thus 
and with the fruition of other conditions, there is a hope 
for a formal understanding between the two sides. 
(5) 
(6ý The Israel doctrine of deterrence is based on the prin- 
ciple of qualitative superiority that balances the quantitative 
superiority of the Arab side. This superiority is composed 
of two elements: ' (a) The quality of the fighting man; (b) the 
(1) Schweitzer, Hataretz, 14,8.1962. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) ibid. 
ýý ibid. 
(5) ibid" 
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scientific-technological superiority of Israeli society. 
As far as the fighting men are concerned, this superiority 
still exists. With the second element however, the situation 
may be changed, and in any case Israeli superiority 
is not a situation which by necessity will continue. Egypt 
hopes that with some 'special' weapons she may have an ad- 
vantage over Israel and use it for a surprise attack. it 
is essential therefore for Israel to secure for itself every 
type of weapon which Egypt is either capable of acquiring 
or is on the verge of acquiring. Moreover Israel must do 
it before Egypt does. liar will be eliminated if Israel had 
a deterrent capability superior to the Egyptian ono. 
(l) 
(7) The danger of war would be eliminated once the two sides 
had the same kind of weapon. 
(2) 
(8) The trend in the world is towards more powers having 
nuclear weapons. Examples are Sweden, India, Canada and 
West Germany. 
(3) 
(9) If Egypt equipped itself with nuclear bombs, the balance 
between Egypt and Israel would change fundamentally, and 
these weapons would become the decisive weapons in the 
hands 
of Egypt. If Israel also equipped itself with these weapons, 
then a balance of terror would emerge, similar to the one 
that insured that no third world war took placeo(4) 
(1) Rimalt, Tinurot, September 1962. 
(2) ibid. 
(3) Poles, Ha'aretz, x, 909,1962. 
(4+) 
. 
Lb-id- 
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(10) If Israel equipped itself with nuclear bombs it would 
redress the imbalance in conventional weapons which is in 
(1) 
existence at the moment. 
(11) Israel is not interested in destroying Cairo or over- 
running it. This should be remembered within the context 
of a debate on nuclear policy. 
(2) 
(12) The alternative to nuclear weapons in the hands of 
Israel is that Israel will join Nato. Till now however, 
Nato had made no sign that it is ready to let Israel join itp 
The real alternative therefore is not neutralism but a 
strict pro-western orientation. 
(3) 
(13) The introduction of new weapons into Israel may enable 
her to achieve strategic deterrence and also enforcement ox* 
dictation of her objectives to the other side* 
(4) (Because 
of the probable intentional ambiguity of the argument it 
could not be construed necessarily as representing Mr. Peres' 
approach to nuclear policy) 
(14) A possible reference to nuclear weapons or to a nuclear 
option and the perception of these weapons is contained in 
the following comment by Peres: 'With us the difference bet- 
ween demonstration of weapons and the uses of weapons is the 
(1) ibid. 
(2) ibid.. 
(3 ) ibid. 
(4) This was suggested in a rather indirect way by Peres in 
Yediot Ahronot, 28.9.1962; and in the same cautiousness 
in Davar, 28.9.1962. 
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difference between deterrence and defence. Deterrence is 
this type of weapon which would impress the process of con- 
siderations of the other side. ' Defence is the type of 
weapon we need according to our own considerations. There 
is not always a contradiction between the two. To the ex- 
tent that there is one we should not neglect one in favour 
of the other. '(') 
(15) If time favours the Arab side in the conflict, there 
is no guarantee that the Arabs would not use it in order to 
acquire such conventional capability which would be sufficient 
to destroy Israel. 
(2) 
Arguments refuting the notion of 'The Middle East as a 
nuclear free zone' 
(16) All the proposals for regional nuclear disarmament 
(like the Rapacki plan) have the basic common assumption of 
willingness to have coexistence. This is-not the case in 
the relations between Israel and the Arab countries. 
(3) 
(17ý Plutonium could be produced in secrecy and hence there 
is no guarantee that the Arab side would not produce it under 
such conditions of secrecy. Moreover there is no system of 
inspection against deliveries from outside. 
(4) 
(1) Peres, Davar, 4.1.1963. 
(2) Rimalt, Haboker, 17,5.1963" 
(3) ibid. 
() i_" 
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(18) Inspection would mean that the inspectors may find 
conventional military socrots while conducting their ins- 
pection. 
(1) 
(19) It is wrong to assume that the present three nuclear 
powers (America, Russia, Britain) are the only responsible 
powers in the world. This argument about the responsibility 
which could be found only among the leaders of the nuclear 
powers is an insult to other countries like India, Canada, 
Sweden and China. As this argument is not well founded the 
(2) 
argument against proliferation is not valid. 
2) 
(20) Indeed the three nuclear powers of today (written in 
1963 - Y. Evron), had been involved in this century in big 
wars, or conversely became involved in wars too late and 
thus threatened the peace of the world. The examples are: 
Britain with the appeasement policy; America joining the 
Second World War too late, and the Soviet Union even going 
to the length of signing a non-aggression pact with Germany. 
All this proves that they are not more responsible than the 
others. 
(3) 
(21) In the Cuban missile crisis, Washington was not far 
from the point of deciding to use nuclear weapons* 
(4) 
(This kind of argument obviously contradicts other argu- 
ments in favour of the stability of a nuclear balance of 
deterrence. ) 
(1) oy_ cit. 
(2) Poles, Ha'aretz, 15.7.1963" 
(3) i. _" 
(4) ibid. 
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(22) The only alternative to nuclear proliferation and an 
alternative which should be demanded by the potential 
nuclear powers as a quid pro quo is a joint guarantee by all 
the three nuclear powers to the security and territorial 
integrity of each and every state in the world. This 
however is not forthcoming at all and is not realistic, 
11) 
(23) Israel has secured a limited room for manoeuvre within 
the context of the arms race in the Middle East which enables 
her to bring pressure to bear upon the big powers to halt 
the arms race in the Middle East. By declaring herself to 
be in favour of nuclear disarmament in the diddle East, Israel 
would only sabotage her own position. 
(2) 
(24) The question whether a small state can or cannot de- 
velop nuclear weapons or should or should not do it, is not 
more relevant because several small states like west Germany, 
India, Canada, Sweden and Jugoslavia would become nuclear 
powers within a period of three to five years. And if this 
is the case then Israel must take into account the possibility 
that some of them would aid Egypt to narrow the gap existing 
between her and Israel in this field. Egypt already has 
scientific agreements with India, Jugoslavia and Communist 
China. 
(3) 
(25) The Arabs may reach qualitative parity with Israel 
(the 
(1) Poles, Ha'aretz, 15.7.1963. 
(2) M. Zak, Ma'ariy, 9.8.1963. 
(3ý Segev, 'Symposium on Nuclear Weapons', Hotam, 
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advocate here means presumably parity in conventional weapons - 
Y. Evron). If this is the case then one must go back to the 
--question of the nuclear weapon. 
(') 
(26) Israel is facing recurrent arms races which become more 
intensive each time (presumably in conventional weapons - Y. 
Evron). But in the field of scientific development she has 
reached a superiority which enables her both to deter the Arabs 
and even to reach decision ('Hachra'aht in Hebrew). Such 
superiority should not be given up just because somebody argues 
that the other side does not want to destroy Israel. 
I... I think that this could have been one of the idsal. 
situations that Israel could have reached, namely that the 
Arab countries recognized Israelis deterrence capability and 
therefore are not ready to fight against her. On the con- 
trary, now the Arabs are talking about a war of defence 
against Israel and not about a war of annihilation. ... 
Unconsciously there had been created a deep recognition of 
Israel's capability not only to deter but also to reach a 
decisive position ('Hachratah' - Hebrew), and accordingly 
they 
have planned their policy in the last year. Suffice 
it to 
mention the fact that the Jordan water project had been acti- 
vated without any problem, that the Arab plans for diversion 
of the Jordan water have been frustrated without our being 
compelled to be involved in a large scale war. Suffice it that 
we have now comparative peace along the borders*** 1(2) 
(1) Schweitzer, 'Symposium on Nuclear Policy', H_, 
op. cit. 
(2) Segev, 'Symposium on Nuclear Policy', Hotam, op. cit. 
Aft 
(27) There is a possibility of creating a balance of terror 
between Israel and the crab countries. This is to although 
Israel is small and hence more vulnerable. In fact the conf-. 
lict is mainly with Egypt and Egypt means mainly the big 
cities and those could be destroyed exactly as Israel could 
be destroyed. Moreover the Arab Israeli conflict Is similar 
to the super powers, conflict because in both cases these are 
total conflicts. These are conflicts not on territories but 
on absolutes. In the super powers' case it is on the control 
of the whole world and in the Arab Israeli conflict it is 
about the existence of Israel. This similarity reflects also 
on the possible similarity in the creation of a balance of 
deterrence. 
(') 
(1) Segev, 'Symposium on Nuclear Policy', Hotam, 
op. cit. 
